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Introduction 
‘We realise the value of water only when the source has dried out’  
Fuller (in: Van der Zalm, 1989: 327)  
 
 
1.1 Calls for a different approach 
 
The city of Brussels, headquarters of the European Union, is incomplete: a river is 
missing. One could say the capital of Belgium is hiding a part of its history beneath 
the earth’s surface. Brussels was founded at the borders of the river Zenne and its 
tributaries in a marsh (the present lower part of the city). The oldest written document 
in which Brussels is mentioned dates from 1015 to 1020: it speaks about a river port 
(where goods were handled) connecting Brussels with Antwerp and the North Sea 
(Deligne, 2005). The river brought food (fish), shelter (city walls), drinking water and 
relaxation (walking paths and bathing sites) to the inhabitants. Between 1250 and 
1400, about 35 wells appeared in the city area. Water was used by households and 
industrial processes, polluting the resource unlimitedly. Ironically, pollution had been 
accelerated by the construction of a modern and systemic sewerage network since 
1848. The negative impact of these human activities became unbearable: rich people 
turned their back to the river side and moved away, the poor workers stayed behind. 
Since the only function of the river left was a “discharge channel”, the elite decided to 
overarch the river as part of a major city redevelopment scheme. Consequently, the 
river turned into a sewer. The works were carried out in the 1871-1877 period, in the 
mean time providing the rich an opportunity to clean up the slums along the river side 
(ibid.).  
Implicitly, this example of Brussels tells us how a healthy aquatic ecosystem may 
support sustainable socio-economic development whenever managed and used in a 
wise, no-detrimental way. There are numerous comparable examples of human inter-
ferences with the Earth’s river systems which have caused (and still cause) a dramatic 
decline of the state and functioning of the involved aquatic ecosystems (Jones, 2010; 
Solomon, 2010). Gradually, the combination of physical, chemical and biological 
changes pay off as significant limitations to socio-economic development such as. by 
floods and droughts, by water-related diseases and by decreasing harvestable fish 
stocks. Continued growth of the human population and unconditioned and uncoordi-
nated land use patterns still contribute to a further deterioration of the wet natural 
resources (Rogers and Leal, 2010; Jones, 2010). Text box 1.1 sums the critical chal-
lenges of the global water crisis (based on Jones, 2010). 
In terms of property rights, due to its fluid, dynamic and border-crossing nature, 
nobody entirely “owns” water resources; generally water resources are considered a 
common heritage of mankind (Savenije and Van der Zaag, 2000). However, many 
nation states take water resource management decisions unilaterally without taking  
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account of upstream and/or downstream consequences (ibid.). Although access to 
water is considered as a basic human right, due to particular political systems, socio-
economic circumstances, a lack of infrastructure and hydro-geographic features, 17 
percent of the world population has no access to safe drinking water (Jones, 2010). In 
conclusion, Cosgrove and Rijsberman (2000) refer to a global water crisis as one 
caused by bad institutions, bad incentives and uneven allocations of resources. In 
many international river basins, upstream-downstream asymmetries are part of the 
explanation of fresh water distribution conflicts (Savenije and Van de Zaag, 2000).  
 
Text box 1.1: Critical challenges of the global water crisis 
(based on Jones, 2010) 
o 3.6 millions of people die each year from water-borne disease, of which 2.2 
million are in the Least Economically Developed Countries where 90 per cent 
are children under the age of 5; 
o 40 per cent of the world population (2.6 billion people) has no access to basic 
sanitation rising to nearly 50 per cent in Asia and 70 per cent in Africa; 
o Over 1.1 billion people (17 per cent of the world population) have no access to 
safe drinking water, including 300 million people in sub-Saharan Africa; 
o Population growth and increasing demand is set to reduce global per capita 
water resources by more than a third in the coming 50 years; 
o A third of the world population presently lives in countries suffering moderate 
to severe water stress and this is likely to rise to two-thirds of a much larger 
population by 2025; 
o Agriculture is the largest water user in the world by consuming some 70 per 
cent of available resources, much of it in inefficient irrigation. Ten countries 
use more than 40 per cent of their water resources for irrigation; 
o Commercialisation, privatisation and globalisation of water management have 
been detrimental in a number of developing countries, with conflicts between 
profit motive and service provision and clashes between multinational compa-
nies, national governments and the people. Financial crises are now rapidly 
transmitted around the world affecting water and sanitation provision; 
o Climate change will cause a major redistribution of global water resources – in 
general, regions now short of water will get less and regions that currently have 
plenty of water will get more. 
 
Some authors mention the increased risk of wars around fresh water resources (e.g. 
De Villiers, 1999). Barraqué (2004: 5) points at the influence of the media. Whereas 
they ‘have popularised this idea initially developed by hydrologists and ecologists as a 
potential extension of water stress, social scientists have carefully reviewed both the 
situations of shared waters and the so called water wars and they have discovered that 
the proportion of international rivers with conflicts was minimal’. Most conflicts 
where water was involved were not water wars, but at best wars where water could be 
taken as a weapon (Wolf, 1998; Turton and Solomon, 2000). Barraqué (2004: 5) adds 
that most conflicts on water sharing or reallocation are domestic rather than interna-
tional: ‘big hydraulic schemes in particular are more frequently challenged both by 
economists and ecologists when they are domestic, only because they are more 
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numerous’. Notwithstanding that the number of water wars have been limited up to 
the time of writing, the diagnosis of a global water crisis upholds.  
In response to the global water crisis, scientists, water managers and politicians 
around the globe have initiated a search for the Holy Grail of sustainable develop-
ment, management and use of water resources. Parallel in the broader social and po-
litical context of the water policy domain, as of the late 1960s there were calls for 
more interactive, reflexive and deliberate planning and decision-making processes 
(Van Tatenhove and Leroy, 2003). For example, Integrated Water Resource Manage-
ment (henceforth IWRM) has been introduced and has become one of the dominant 
paradigms in the global water policy discourses, since the early 1990s (Molle, 2009). 
Derived from the perception that traditional supply-driven technology and infrastruc-
ture-based water management concepts only are frequently not adequate to solve wa-
ter resources problems, the IWRM approach is expected to deal with the complex 
nature of water resource systems and the understanding of water as both a common 
pool resource and an economic good (ICWE, 1992; Global Water Partnership, 2000). 
Text box 1.2 explains why water may be considered a common pool resource. In the 
European legislative context, as a resource, water is considered as a common property, 
rather than a market good (Barraqué, 2003). However as a public service, water is 
usually considered a commodity (ibid.). 
 
Molle (2009: 484) presents the social life of the IWRM paradigm, i.e. the evolution 
from the idea of a river basin as an operational (hydraulic engineering) concept for the 
development and management of water resources (‘full control of nature to optimise 
human use’) towards ‘a wider political arena where contrasting interests and world 
views confront one another and are, sometimes – as promised by the IWRM rhetoric 
– reconciled’. The Global Water Partnership (2000: 22) defines IWRM as ‘a process 
which promotes the coordinated development and management of water, land and 
related resources, in order to maximise the resultant economic and social welfare in an 
equitable manner without compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems’. IWRM 
requires an enabling environment in which the key stakeholders are actively involved 
and in which central-local policy coalitions and public-private partnerships implement 
policy strategies and allocation tools (Rogers and Hall, 2003). Building on the Helsinki 
Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and Interna-
tional Lakes (UN-ECE, 1992), river basins are considered the appropriate units for 
the sustainable use, development and management of interrelated water and land re-
sources. This consideration paves the floor for the Integrated River Basin Manage-
ment paradigm (henceforth IRBM; Savenije and Van der Zaag, 2000). Due to both the 
complex, holistic and ambiguous nature of the aims and concepts that it embraces, the 
IRBM paradigm invites a diversity of voices and interpretations. As will be explained 
in Section 1.2 this makes a harmonised translation into collective choices for all 
Europe’s river basins at least troublesome. 
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Text box 1.2: Fresh water as a common pool resource 
Common pool resources are characterised by a combination of a low degree of 
exclusiveness and a high level of exhaustiveness (Savas, 1977). Common pool 
goods are those, like fish in the ocean, whose usage cannot be directly charged to 
individuals but whose quantity is reduced after use (Howlett and Ramesh, 2003). 
What makes water a common pool resource? Studying the world’s fresh water 
resources a distinction is often made in blue and green water. Green water – the 
rainfall that is stored in the soil and then evaporates or is incorporated in plants and 
organisms – is the main source of water for natural ecosystems and for rainfed 
agriculture. Blue water – renewable surface water run-off and groundwater recharge 
– is the main source for human withdrawals and the traditional focus of water re-
source management (Cosgrove and Rijsberman, 2000).  Available blue water totals 
about 40,000 km3 a year (Shiklomanov, 1999). Of this, an estimated amount of 
3,800 km3 (roughly 10%) was withdrawn (diverted of pumped) for human uses in 
1995. Of the withdrawn water, about 2,100 km3 were consumed. The remainder 
was returned to streams and aquifers, usually with significant reductions in quality. 
If human populations are withdrawing only 10% of renewable water resources and 
consuming only 5%, there seems to be no overall problem of exhaustiveness. To 
illustrate the contrary Cosgrove and Rijsberman (2000: 6-7) summarise the facts:  
o A large fraction of global water resources is available where human demands 
are small such as in the Amazon basin, Canada and Alaska. 
o Rainfall and river run-offs occur in large amounts during very short periods, 
such as during the monsoon season in Asia and are not available for human 
use unless stored in aquifers, reservoirs or tanks. 
o The withdrawal and consumption figures do not show the much larger share 
of the water resources that is “used” downstream as already degraded in quality 
by upstream pollution, hence of lower value. 
o Water not used by humans generally does not flow unused to the sea. Instead 
it is used in myriad ways by aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems – forests, lakes, 
wetlands and coastal lagoons. 
This leads to the following conclusions (ibid.):  
1. Even though people use only a small fraction of renewable water re-
sources globally, this fraction is much higher – up to 80-90% - in 
many arid and semi-arid river basins where water is scarce. 
2. In many tropical river basins a large amount of water is available on 
average over the year, but its unequal temporal distribution means 
that it is not usable or that massive infrastructure is required to pro-
tect people from it and to store it for later use, with considerable so-
cial and environmental impacts.  
3. In many temperate zone river basins adequate water resources are 
relatively evenly distributed over the year, but they are used so inten-
sively that surface and groundwater resources become polluted and 
good-quality water becomes scarce. 
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1.2 Integrated River Basin Management: complexity and ambiguity  
 
Complexity 
Issues of IRBM are complex in nature. The complexity is expressed by substantive 
diversity and the involvement of multiple stakeholders in different policy sectors at 
and across interrelated political levels (Mitchell, 1990 and 2007; Driessen, 2007; Wat-
son, 2007). IRBM concerns resilient ecosystems, anticipation and mitigaton of floods, 
water scarcity, water quality deterioration and balancing of user functions. In many 
cases it may be not made clear explicitly which objectives receive priority over others. 
Furthermore, there are critical uncertainties and gaps in knowledge about cause-effect 
and means-ends relations (Driessen, 2007; Van Leussen, 2011). Water policy formula-
tion, implementation and evaluation processes are played simultaneously by mutually 
dependent actor networks at different political levels within and across river basins. 
Although IRBM presupposes river basins as the appropriate level to address water 
management issues, Molle (2009: 492) summarises the arguments for the mismatch 
between political and river basin boundaries: ‘Yet, political or administrative bounda-
ries seldom correspond to watershed lines and the socio-economic forces and 
processes as well as the webs of power that influence the management of water re-
sources also do not dovetail with natural limits’. Or as Swyngedouw (2004) argues, 
social and environmental dynamics result in particular level configurations, both in 
terms of ecology and regulatory regimes, each supported by their discursive represen-
tations and justifications. Molle (2009: 492) concludes that ‘power is by nature mobile, 
unstable and dynamic and cannot be circumscribed to, or durably match, established 
boundaries or levels’.  
As an ambition IRBM simultaneously seeks to address two highly complicated 
and complex problem sets: cross-sector planning and sustainable development (Jeffrey 
and Geary, 2006). The water policy domain, in realising its aims and management 
approaches is mutually dependent on other policy sectors like spatial planning, nature 
and agriculture (Van Rijswick, 2001; Driessen, 2007). Cross-sector planning is a chal-
lenging ambition since the speciality principle generally is a strong barrier. Each sector 
has its own legislation, division of tasks, responsibilities, cultures, instruments and 
implementation procedures (ibid.). Furthermore, Driessen (2007) argues that despite 
the subsidiarity principle, an effective top-down implementation of agreed policies 
from higher to lower governance levels often is an illusion. Given the extensive de-
bates in international water sector journals (e.g. Water Policy and Water International), 
experts, politicians, water managers and other stakeholders puzzle over a common 
definition of IRBM and the paradigm’s interpretation and implementation under dif-
ferent physical and institutional circumstances. Advocates like the Global Water Part-
nership (2000) acknowledge that IRBM has never been unambiguously defined, nor 
has the question of how it is to be implemented been fully addressed.  
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As a matter of conclusion, Jeffrey and Geary (2006: 4; original italics) argue that: 
 
[..] whilst the concept of IWRM has substantive intuitive influence, it remains a 
normative theory – a prescriptive framework derived largely from observation and 
focused on how things should be done. Despite its popularity (and one might say its 
reputation) IWRM remains: (i) a theory about, (ii) an argument for and (iii) at best a 
set of principles for, a certain approach to water resources management. Empirical 
evidence which unambiguously demonstrates the benefits of IWRM is either missing 
or very poorly reported. 
 
Ambiguity 
IRBM aims at collective-choice rules for sustainable development, management and 
use of water resources. To arrive at such rules there are (at least) two major challenges 
which invite ambiguity. Firstly, the holistic nature of sustainability attracts actors with 
diverging views, interests and interpretations which may change quite dramatically 
over time (Dryzek, 2005). The challenge is to arrive at common definitions, arrange-
ments and actions which are supported, guided and periodically revised by the key 
stakeholders. Secondly, free-riding behaviour which will hinder collective action pops 
up at the horizon.  
Given the range of pure ecocentric to anthropocentric life philosophies, stake-
holders will have diverging views on both means and ends of sustainable develop-
ment. Hence different stances and approaches will have to be acknowledged and 
bridged to arrive at common definitions and practices. Blewitt (2008: x) concludes: 
‘Maybe the best way to view sustainable development is as a collage or a kaleidoscope 
of shapes, colours and patterns that change constantly as we ourselves change.’ In 
“soft” (anthropocentric) views of sustainability, nature is a resource mastered by hu-
manity which should be handled with more care. Economic growth is essential for the 
pursuit of sustainability which can be realised by incremental changes over the next 
30-50 years by a mix of legal arrangements, market forces and technological develop-
ment (Pezzey, 1992; Bebbington, 2001; Klostermann, 2003). According to “hard” 
(ecocentric) views of sustainability, humans and nature are two separate things; har-
mony is sought. Economic growth must be abandoned or refined to reach a sustain-
able situation; a participatory process is required aiming at behavioural change. The 
present situation is along way from sustainability; it may take 150-200 years to bridge 
the gap (ibid.).  
Opinions differ on the options for translation of the sustainable development 
discourse into policies and management approaches. Since the concept is multidimen-
sional and encompasses social, ecological and economic goals and perspectives, some 
critics view it as vague, self-contradictory and incoherent, incapable of being put into 
practice (Blewitt, 2008). On the opposite side, others like the sociologist Ratner are 
more optimistic. Ratner (2004: 62) considers the sustainability concept meaningful ‘for 
the way it brings such differences into a common field of dispute, dialogue and poten-
tial 6greement as the basis of collective action’. A coalition of economists and ecolo-
gists has tried to bridge the gap between ‘conventional economics’ (“soft” sustainabil-
ity) and ‘conventional ecologics’ (“hard” sustainability; Costanza et al, 1997). Costanza 
(1991: 83; original italics) argues that one should stop ‘…thinking of ecological and 
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economic goals as being in conflict. To achieve sustainability we must develop an 
ecological economics that goes well beyond the conventional disciplines of ecology and 
economy to a truly integrative synthesis.’ Given that economic systems are dependent 
on their ecological life-support systems, ecological economics sees the human econ-
omy as part of a larger whole. Human preferences, understanding, technology and 
organisation co-evolve to reflect broad ecological opportunities and constraints. Hu-
mans are responsible for understanding their role in the larger system and managing it 
for sustainability. The primary macro-goal is sustainability of ecological oriented eco-
nomic systems (ibid.). Since technology’s ability to remove resource constraints is 
critically uncertain, Costanza (1991: 85) pleas for a precautionary attitude. He trans-
lates ecological economics in a working definition of sustainability:  
 
Sustainability is a relationship between dynamic economic systems and larger dy-
namic, but normally slower-changing ecological systems, in which: (a) human life can 
continue indefinitely; (b) human individuals can flourish; (c) human cultures can de-
velop; but in which (d) effects of human activities remain within bounds, so as not to 
destroy the diversity, complexity and function of the ecological life-support system. 
 
Following this definition, economic growth which is an increase in quantity cannot be 
sustainable indefinitely on a finite planet. Economic development which is an im-
provement in the quality of life without necessarily causing an increase in quantity of 
resources consumed may be sustainable (ibid.). Whenever one considers water as a 
finite resource, theoretical concepts of common pool resources management become 
relevant. On the other hand, whenever one views natural and human-made capital as 
substitutes rather than complements, neither factor can be limiting. In this research 
following Costanza’s precautionary attitude, water is considered as a finite, common 
pool resource for which there is no substitute. See the Figures 1.1 and 1.2 for an illus-
tration of respectively the limited availability of drinking water (Sanaa in Yemen) and 
desiccation of water bodies (Ossendrecht in the Netherlands). As the photographs 
illustrate, both the relatively fresh water rich and poor contries may suffer from water 
shortages, albeit different in characteristics and consequences.  
The second major challenge is the tension between individual free-riding behav-
iour and collective action. Despite a situation in which cooperation will secure mutual 
advantage, a rational actor knows that his individual behaviour will not influence the 
overall outcome significantly (Hay, 2002). Moreover, whenever others cooperate he 
will reap the benefits of their cooperation regardless of his participation. Tragically 
when all individuals behave rationally, no-cooperation arises and an outcome which is 
both collectively and individually suboptimal ensues (ibid.). A classical example of 
free-riding is the so-called tragedy of the commons as described by Hardin. Hardin (1968) 
states that when freedom of breed will not be abandoned, population growth will 
continue and it will lead automatically to a tragedy of the commons when the carrying 
capacity of natural resources is passed. There is no technical solution; it requires a 
fundamental extension in morality (ibid.). Hardin (1968: 1244; original italics) illus-
trates the tragedy by a sketch of a pasture which is open to all herdsmen: 
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It is to be expected that each herdsman will try to keep as many cattle as possible on 
the commons. [..] As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximise his gain. Ex-
plicitly or implicitly, more or less conscious, he asks ‘What is the utility to me of add-
ing one more animal to my herd?’ This utility has one negative and one positive 
component. 1) The positive component is a function of the increment of one animal. 
Since the herdsman receives all the proceeds from the sale of the additional animal, 
the positive utility is nearly +1. 2) The negative component is a function of the addi-
tional overgrazing created by one more animal. Since however, the effects of over-
grazing are shared by all the herdsmen, the negative utility for any particular decision-
making herdsman is only a fraction of –1. [..] Therein is the tragedy. Each man is 
locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit – in a world 
that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his 
own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom 
in the commons brings ruin to all.  
 
 
Figure 1.2: Desiccation of the water body Vennen Groote Meer (Netherlands;  
January 16, 2012; Aerolinephoto at the request of Evides Drinking Water Company) 
 
Since Hardin published his tragedy of the commons it has become customary to say that 
common ownership of property leads to wasteful practices and environmental degra-
dation (Needham, 2006). Bromley (1991) argues that the Hardin metaphor is both 
socially and culturally simplistic and historically false. It is false because there are ex-
amples of common property being managed responsibly for centuries (ibid.). Ostrom 
(1990) challenges theories that presume that individuals cannot organise themselves, 
cannot avoid producing suboptimal and in some cases disastrous results and always 
need to be organised by external authorities. She presents both successful and unsuc-
cessful examples of small-scale, long-enduring, self-governing common pool resources 
institutions. In her opinion, arrangements for common pool resources 
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management may be public, private and/or self-organising in nature (ibid.). In order 
to avoid over-exploitation of common pool resources which on the long term might 
be disastrous to all, collective-choice rules are required which are designed and ac-
cepted by multiple stakeholders at interrelated political levels.  
According to Ostrom (1990), all efforts to organise collective action whether by 
an external ruler, an entrepreneur or a set of principals who wish to gain collective 
benefits must address a common set of problems. These concern free-riding, solving 
commitment problems, arranging for the supply of new institutions and monitoring 
individual compliance with sets of rules (ibid.). Hay (2002) argues that both structure 
and agency (and especially their interplay) may account for triggers and barriers to-
wards collective-choice rule changes. Already chosen paths have lead to present insti-
tutions, a phenomenon labelled as path dependency (North, 1990; Pierson, 2000). 
Rule changes may be both intended (strategic) and unintended (instinctive) in nature 
and at the same time these may be hindered by conservative (f)actors (Hay, 2002). 
Agents acting in a routine matter will tend to reproduce existing structures and pat-
terns of social and political patterns over time, while actors rejecting norms and con-
ventions will tend to transform existing institutions and practices (ibid.). 
 
To summarise Section 1.2, IRBM faces the challenge of dealing with complexity and 
ambiguity. The holistic concept triggers substantive diversity and involves multiple 
stakeholders at interrelated political levels within (inter)national river basins. One can-
not assume that those stakeholders are blessed with perfect and complete information 
of their context. They have to make assumptions about their environment and about 
the future consequences of their actions and those of others if they are to act strategi-
cally. The ideas hold about their environment are, then, crucial to the way they act and 
hence to political outcomes (Hay, 2002). This refers to bounded rationality as defined 
by Simon (1957). Furthermore since actors are part of organisations that developed 
their own norms and values over time, they may think more about whether an action 
conforms to the norms and values of the institution than about what the individual 
consequences will be (Padt, 2007). By other means: is a strategy considered to be ap-
propriate? This refers to logics of appropriateness as defined by March and Olsen 
(1989). In the context of international river basins, acting locally, agreement might be 
more difficult to reach, since local stakeholders might be driven more directly by short 
term oriented self-interests and will (partly) suffer from a lack of a holistic river basin 
view (Mitchell, 2007). On the contrary, actors at a river basin level might loose the 
connection with local circumstances and priorities (ibid).  
In its search for sustainable development by collective action the IRBM concept 
embarks for ambiguity. As Fischer (2009: 175) argues, ambiguous meanings often 
serve important political functions: ‘By helping to bring together citizens with varying 
policy preferences, ambiguous meanings often facilitate cooperation and compromise.’ 
Ambiguous agreements are a common phenomenon in the context of the European 
Union (George, 2004: 115). ‘If every ambiguity had to be removed from treaties or 
legislation, agreement would never be reached’. As will be explained in the next 
section, the Water Framework Directive (henceforth WFD; European Communities, 
2000) serves as a speaking example of such an ambiguous agreement.  
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1.3 The Water Framework Directive: ambiguous ambitions 
 
Point of departure in this research is collective-choice rules for the sustainable use, 
development and management and use of Europe’s fresh water resources. As con-
cluded in Section 1.1, water may be considered a common pool resource. Common 
pool resources are subject to exhaustiveness and their use is not exclusive, since no-
body entirely owns them. A critical dilemma of common pool resources management 
is how individual users’ wishes and interests can be balanced with their common 
interests. Since the 1990s, IRBM has become one of the dominant paradigms in the 
European environmental policy domain. The WFD is both rooted in this policy dis-
course and an exponent of it. The WFD is the outcome of a delicate political process 
at the European level. It is the first environmental directive which has been concluded 
under the co-decision procedure between the European Parliament and the European 
Council of Ministers (Kaika, 2003). The final text has been the result of a delicate 
European negotiation process in which the European Parliament gradually obtained 
more power and in which non-governmental organisations gained more access to the 
informal European negotiation arenas (Kaika and Page, 2003). The Directive may be 
considered a mixture of the German tradition of detailed prescriptions and standards 
and the Anglo-Saxon philosophy of more generic frameworks (Knill and Liefferink, 
2007). Due to the large number of amendments by the EP, time pressure and last-
minute amendments by Member States in the final conciliation procedure, cross-
reference faults are noticeable in the adopted text (Interviews 40 and 53, Appendix I).  
As inspired by the Dublin principles on water and sustainable development 
(ICWE, 1992), the WFD acknowledges water both as a common pool resource and an 
economic good. The WFD embraces the three E’s of the sustainability definition of 
the United Nations, i.e. Economy, Environment and Ethics (Barraqué, 2003).  It calls 
for the achievement of three broad goals: adoption of an efficient economic policy 
(including full cost recovery from water users; rehabilitation, protection and enhance-
ment of the quality of the aquatic environment over the next 15 years; and making 
water policies more transparent by means of public information and participation 
(ibid.). Table 1.1 shows a brief overview of the content of the WFD’s articles. Read 
www.eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2000:327:0001:007
2:en:PDF for the full text of the Directive.  
Compared to the Global Water Partnership’s definition the WFD does not ex-
plicitly mention maximisation of economic and social welfare, but ‘promotes sustain-
able water use based on a long-term protection of available water resources’ (Euro-
pean Communities, 2000: 5). Recovery of costs for water services (Article 9) is a cen-
tral instrument in the WFD’s approach which combines the user and polluter pays 
principles (European Communities, 2000: 12-13).The WFD does not include an ex-
plicit definition of sustainability. Instead in its Article 4 the WFD implicitly acknowl-
edges a large range of water-related human activities as sustainable without clarifying 
their environmental, social and economic externalities (European Communities, 2000: 
9-11). Since sovereignty and subsidiarity are central within the European institutional 
context, these implicit notions open the door to multiple interpretations. In the WFD 
subsidiarity is defined as: ‘Decisions should be taken as close as possible to the 
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locations where water is affected or used. Priority should be given to action within the 
responsibility of Member States through the drawing up of programmes of measures 
adjusted to regional and local conditions.’ (Preamble 13, European Communities, 
2000: 2). 
 
Table 1.1: Overview of the WFD’s Articles (European Communities, 2000) 
Art.↓ Content↓ 
1 Purpose: a framework for the protection of inland surface waters, transi-
tional waters, coastal waters and groundwater; protection of aquatic ecosys-
tems and directly depended terrestrial ecosystems and wetlands; to promote 
sustainable water use based on a long-term protection of available water 
resources; progressive reduction of emissions of priority substances and 
cessation or phasing-out of emissions of the priority hazardous substances; 
contribution to mitigating the effects of floods and droughts. 
2 Definitions of terms used in the Directive. 
3 Coordination of administrative arrangements for river basin districts. 
4 Environmental objectives (including intrinsic provisions for deadline exten-
sions, lowering objectives and exemption conditions). 
5 Requirements for characterising the river basin district, reviewing the envi-
ronmental impact of human activity and conducting an economic analysis of 
water use. 
6 Register of protected areas lying within each river basin district. 
7 Requirements for designation, monitoring and protection of water bodies 
that are used for abstraction of drinking water. 
8 Requirements for monitoring of the status of surface water bodies, ground-
water bodies and protected areas. 
9 Requirements for recovery costs for water services. 
10 Provisions for the combined approach for point and diffuse sources of pol-
lution, including both emissions limit values and water quality objectives or 
standards. 
11 Requirements for the programmes of measures.  
12 Provisions for issues which can not be dealt with at Member State level.  
13 Requirements for the river basin management plans. 
14 Public information and consultation requirements. 
15  Reporting requirements. 
16 Strategies against pollution of water. 
17 Strategies to prevent and control pollution of groundwater. 
18  Implementation progress reporting obligations of the EC. 
19 Plans for future Community water policies legislation. 
20 Provisions for technical adaptations to the WFD.  
21 Provisions for the EC’s regulatory committee for implementation. 
22 Provisions for repeals/transitional provisions of prior water legislation. 
23  Provisions for penalties. 
24 Implementation deadlines. 
25 Date of entry into force (December 22, 2000). 
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The WFD’s ambiguity concerns both the sustainability paradigms and the governance 
and policy principles. See Table 1.2 for an overview of these as interpreted by the 
author by a textual analysis of the WFD. The interpretation of governance principles 
is inspired by the principles for effective water governance as defined by Rogers and 
Hall (2003: 27-29). Regarding its policy principles the WFD builds on the common 
environmental principles of the European Community (Preamble 11; European 
Communities, 2000: 2): 
 
As set out in Article 174 of the Treaty, the Community policy on the environment is 
to contribute to pursuit of the objectives of preserving, protecting and improving the 
quality of the environment, in prudent and rational utilisation of natural resources 
and to be based on the precautionary principle and on the principles that preventive 
action should be taken, environmental damage should, as a priority, be rectified at 
source and that the polluter should pay. 
 
Huitema and Bressers (2006: 3) argue that although the preamble of the WFD is 
‘humming with rhetoric about integrated water management and achieving sustainable 
status’, the issue of groundwater was too controversial to be fully incorporated. Fur-
thermore, ‘water quantity issues (flooding) are hardly regulated, despite having an 
obvious connection to water quality issues and despite having clear transboundary 
aspects’ (ibid.). However according to Barraqué (2003: 204), the WFD ‘offers an op-
portunity to generalise reasonable and equitable sharing between users to all European 
rivers, that is to move away from exclusively government-operated hydraulic and 
supply-side schemes towards more balanced supply-and-demand management, within 
each hydrographic district, by local user communities’. The river basin management 
approach may support this evolution. The WFD builds on the Helsinki Convention 
on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes 
(UN-ECE, 1992). The Directive further institutionalises river basins as the appro-
priate management units at the European level.  
The WFD provides a set of governance and policy principles which in an ideal 
world should be implemented by Member States in a coordinated and transboundary 
fashion. The voluntary nature of the international coordination provisions may be 
considered an Achilles heel of the WFD. Huitema and Bressers (2006) claim that al-
though the European Commission was envisioning the obligation to found river basin 
authorities at the sub basin level, Member States insisted to replace it by a suggestion. 
Van Rijswick and Havekes (2012: 246) add that ‘European law does not as yet provide 
an adequate solution’ for the ‘questions regarding shared responsibility on the one 
hand and the obligation of each Member State to fulfil European obligations on the 
other’. A second Achilles heel may be the weak cross-compliance arrangements. 
Although its preamble mentions the importance of cross-sector integration, the WFD 
does not include explicit rules and principles on the coordinated development and 
management of water, land and related resources. According to Huitema and Bressers 
(2006: 19) the WFD ‘does not really relate to issues of land use planning (maybe be-
cause this is an issue the Commission does not have a say in)’. 
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Table 1.2: The WFD’s sustainability paradigms and governance and policy principles 
Sustainability paradigms (location in the WFD text)↓ 
o water is both a common pool resource and an economic good (Preamble 1) 
o people, planet and profit (Preamble 12) 
o ecological economics/goods and services of ecosystems (Preamble 17, 24; Art. 1) 
o conventional economics/economic interests determine environmental protection 
ambition (Preamble 31, 32; Art. 4(3) and 4(5)) 
o conventional ecology (Preamble 42; Art. 1) 
o integrated approach for surface water & groundwater (Preamble 41; Art. 2(27)) 
o sustainable human development activities (Art. 4(3)) 
Governance principles↓ 
o the need for cross-sector integration mechanisms (Preamble 16 and 47) 
o subsidiarity (Preamble 13 and 18) 
o coherent, inclusive and communicative collective action (Preamble 14) 
o active involvement of all interested parties including users and general public (Pre-
amble 14 and 37; Art. 14) 
o openness, transparency and accountability (Preamble 30) 
o international, transboundary coordination (Preamble 35) 
o equity and accountability: comparable monitoring and common environmental 
quality standards and emission limit values for certain groups or families of pollut-
ants as minimum requirements (Preamble 42) 
o (inter)national river basin (districts) as appropriate management units (Art. 3) 
o accountability, inbuilt arbitration enforcing mechanisms: roles of the European 
Commission & Member States (Preamble 49 and 53; Articles 3 till 21, 23 and 24) 
Policy principles↓ 
o an integrated Community policy on water (Preamble 9) 
o prudent and rational utilisation of natural resources (Preamble 11) 
o precaution and prevention (Preamble 11) 
o environmental damage should be rectified at source (Preamble 11) 
o the polluter should pay (Preamble 11 and 38) 
o control of quantity securing good water quality (Preamble 19) 
o greater integration of qualitative and quantitative aspects of both surface waters and 
groundwaters (Preamble 20 and 34) 
o progressive reduction of emissions of hazardous substances and elimination of 
priority hazardous substances (Preamble 22 and 27; Articles 11k and 16) 
o no deterioration (stand still) (Preamble 26; Art. 4(5) and Art. 4(8) 
o combined approach of emission limit values and environmental quality standards 
(Preamble 40; Articles 10 and 16(8) 
o recovery of the costs of water services, including environmental and resource costs 
(Preamble 38) 
o one out, all out (Article 2(17; 19)) 
o no-shift of problems to other water bodies (Preamble 51, 53; Art. 4(8)) 
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1.4 Central theme and set-up of the dissertation 
 
This research is inspired by an interest in triggers and barriers for changes in 
collective-choice rules within the water policy domain at and across political levels. 
Central focus is the impact of the ambiguous ambitions in the WFD. The Directive 
offers a set of governance and policy principles to Member States for translating the 
IRBM paradigm into environmental objectives and management practices for all 
Europe’s surface and groundwater resources. The rule-altering potential of the Direc-
tive depends on how stakeholders in different policy domains will interpret and im-
plement its objectives and principles within the overall context of prior developed 
institutions. At the one hand logical inconsistencies from ambiguous claims and ac-
tions may trigger a predominant instrumental use, i.e. to protect the status quo. On 
the other hand, whenever ambiguous policy preferences and traditions are acknow-
ledged by multiple stakeholders as the point of departure in a search for common 
definitions and collective action, the Directive may trigger incremental rule changes.  
Chapter 2 introduces the theoretical framework. It explains the need for an ana-
lytical framework that both includes a collective-choice rules typology and interrela-
tions with other dimensions of a policy domain within the overarching context of 
generic political and social processes. The theoretical novelty of this research is the 
integration of the seven rule types of the Institutional Analysis and Development 
framework (henceforth IAD; Kiser and Ostrom, 1982; Ostrom, 1999, 2005) with the 
Policy Arrangement Approach (henceforth PAA; Van Tatenhove and Leroy, 2000; 
Leroy and Arts, 2006), as the elaboration of the latter’s rules of the game dimension. As 
will be argued, a more detailed operationalisation of this dimension enlarges the 
potential for an assessment of incremental collective-choice rules changes within a 
policy (sub) domain over time. For analytical purposes, as inspired by the work of 
Max Weber (1922), ideal-type collective-choice rules for IRBM are constructed based 
on practical experiences, literature review and interviews. These ideal-type rules serve 
as a benchmark instrument to track changes between the WFD’s drafting and negotia-
tion stage (in the 1990s) and its first implementation planning cycle (from 2001 to 
2009) within the multi-level governance context of transboundary river basins. 
Chapter 3 introduces the hypotheses, scientific and societal research aims and the 
research questions. Subsequently, central concepts are briefly defined and spatial and 
temporal choices are presented. The chosen triangulation of research methods is in-
troduced which includes a discussion of advantages and pitfalls of a participative and 
interpretative analysis. This research compares the first WFD implementation plan-
ning cycle at five interrelated political levels within the International Meuse River Ba-
sin District (European, multilateral, national, regional and local), with special emphasis 
on the most downstream riparian state (the Netherlands). How do actors who are 
involved in water policy implementation planning and decision-making processes at 
these political levels deal with the ambiguous nature and challenges of IRBM? How 
are the WFD’s environmental objectives, its exemption options and its governance 
and policy principles downloaded and incorporated into current water policy arrange-
ments in the Netherlands? Reversely, to which extent are the Dutch successful in  
up-loading their best practices to the European and multilateral arenas? In other 
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 words, what are the changes in collective-choice rules at different political levels as 
the outcome of interaction among actors, distribution of power and resources and 
dominant (and opposite) arguments?  
The Chapters 4 till 8 are the empirical heart of this book. Each chapter starts 
with a brief chronological reconstruction of the water policy implementation planning 
process during the 1990 to 2009 period. The second part of each chapter consists of a 
detailed analysis of the four dimensions of a policy arrangement with the rules of the 
game as the principal entrance. Subsequently, conclusions are drawn about potential 
triggers and barriers for observed (lack of) changes in collective-choice rules. As will 
be described in Chapter 3, the analyses and conclusions are based on a detailed review 
of meeting documents, research reports and articles, interviews and reflexive mirror 
sessions with involved stakeholders and peer researchers and (non-)participatory 
observations of meetings and conferences. 
Chapter 4 starts with the European water policy domain. After a brief overview 
of the WFD’s drafting and negotiation process (from 1995 to 2000), the environ-
mental objectives and the governance and policy principles are described, as formu-
lated in the official text and the related informal guidance documents of the Common 
Implementation Strategy (henceforth CIS; 2000 to 2009). Chapter 5 continues with an 
analysis of the first WFD implementation planning cycle at the multilateral level as 
coordinated by the International Meuse Commission. The national, regional and local 
levels in the Netherlands subsequently are covered by the Chapters 6 to 8. Chapter 8 
also includes observations on the bilateral coordination efforts made by public actors 
in the Flemish Region of Belgium and the Netherlands. Chapter 9 closes the story of 
this book by a reflection on the findings and by presenting the conclusions and 
recommendations of the research. 
  
  
 
Integrated River Basin Management: a multi-level governance game 
 for negotiating collective-choice rules (Leo Santbergen, 2005) 
 
 
 
Integrated River Basin Management: a strategic multi-stakeholder dialogue  
(Leo Santbergen, 2005)
 
  
 
 
- 2 - 
Ideal-type collective-choice rules and 
policy arrangements 
 
‘Belief in the possibility of change and renewal is  
perhaps one of the defining  characteristics 
 of politics and religions.’  Nelson Mandela (in: Crwys-Williams, 2010: 23) 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
As introduced in Chapter 1, IRBM is a holistic concept that aims for collective-choice 
rules on the sustainable use, development and management of interrelated water and 
land resources. Intrinsically, the concept is ambiguous hence invites a diversity of 
voices and interpretations. Depending on the specific physical, social, economic and 
political conditions of a river basin, IRBM may challenge present rules-in-law and 
rules-in-use. The IRBM concept has become one among dominant paradigms within 
the European environmental policy domain since the mid 1990s. The WFD offers a 
set of gover-nance and policy principles for translation of this paradigm into environ-
mental objectives and management practices for all Europe’s surface and groundwater 
resources. Due to both its laborious political drafting and negotiation process and the 
holistic character of the IRBM concept, the WFD is ambiguous in nature. Conse-
quently, like the paradigm it institutionalises the Directive opens the door to multiple 
interpretations such as expressed by the intrinsic exemption options in its core Article 
4 on environmental objectives. Given this background it is uncertain whether and if 
so, to which extent the WFD’s implementation process, which involves multiple 
stakeholders of Member States in shared international river basins, will lead to changes 
in current collective-choice rules. 
Since this research is inspired by an interest in triggers and barriers for collective-
choice rule changes within the water policy domain, there is a need for an analytical 
framework which includes a rules typology and, by the aid of related theories, informs 
about potential explanations for observed (resistance to) changes. As a first clue, the 
Policy Arrangement Approach (PAA; Arts, Van Tatenhove and Leroy, 2000; Leroy 
and Arts, 2006) offers such a framework by linking four dimensions within a tetrahe-
dron: (substantive and organisational) rules with policy discourses, actors (coalitions and 
oppositions) and division of resources and power (Liefferink, 2006: 60; Figure 2.1). Due 
to the indissoluble interrelatedness of the dimensions of the PAA, as a matter of 
principle, a researcher should address the entire tetrahedron (ibid.: 48). 
A second clue which provides the opportunity to further elaborate the rules of the 
game dimension, lies in the Institutional Analysis and Development framework (IAD 
framework; Kiser and Ostrom, 1982; Ostrom, 1999, 2005). The 2009 Nobel Memorial 
Price in Economic Sciences winner Elinor Ostrom and many of her peer researchers 
have developed the IAD framework over three decades of theoretical and empirical 
studies (for an extensive definition and illustration of the framework, read the seminal  
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book ‘Understanding Institutional Diversity’; Ostrom, 2005). The framework has its 
roots in studies on rules and games in governing common pool resources (Ostrom, 
1990; Blomquist, 1992; Ostrom, Gardner and Walker, 1994; Schlager, 1995) and in-
cludes (a definition of) seven rule types which may be applied to track and explain 
changes over time (Ostrom, 2005). Visit also http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc (the 
Digital Library of the Commons) for an extensive database of research projects and 
articles. Ostrom, Gardner and Walker (1994) argue that choices on collective action 
may not be studied in isolation but as a configuration. A change in any rule type may 
affect the others. Additionally, these rules are the outcome of interactions among 
actors in action situations which are influenced by exogenous variables: bio-
physical/material conditions, attributes of a community and rules-in-use (Ostrom, 
2011). 
 
Figure 2.1: The tetrahedron of a policy arrangement (Liefferink, 2006: 60). 
 
The theoretical novelty of this research approach is the integration of the seven rule 
types of the IAD framework with the PAA, as elaboration of the latter’s rules of the 
game dimension. A more detailed operationalisation of this dimension will enlarge the 
potential for an assessment of incremental collective rules changes within a policy 
(sub)domain over time. Since the rules dimension is the principal entrance of this 
research, Section 2.2 starts with an introduction to Ostrom’s rule types (Subsection 
2.2.1). In order to operationalise an assessment of continuity and change of rules 
during a certain period the concept of ideal-types will be applied (Weber, 1922; see 
Subsection 2.2.2 for a further description). Based on a literature review the Subsec-
tions 2.2.3 to 2.2.9 present ideal-type collective rules for IRBM, as constructed for the 
analytical purposes of this research. As the next step, Section 2.3 continues with the 
PAA, from its definition (Subsection 2.3.1) to specification of the three other dimen-
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sions: policy discourses (Subsection 2.3.2), actors (Subsection 2.3.3) and distribution of re-
sources and power (Subsection 2.3.4). Analytical questions for conducting an analysis of 
developments within these three dimensions will be presented. Finally, arrangements 
of a specific policy domain do not develop in isolation but within the context of long-
term processes in the political domain of society. Section 2.4 explains how this 
research interprets this institutional context by means of the multi-level governance 
concept (Marks, 1993; Bache and Flinders, 2004). Section 2.5 concludes this chapter 
with a synthesis. 
 
 
2.2 Collective-choice rules for Integrated River Basin Management 
 
2.2.1 The rule-types of Elinor Ostrom 
The term institution may refer to ‘many different types of entities, including both or-
ganisations and the rules used to structure patterns of interaction within and across 
organisations’ (Ostrom, 1999: 36). Institutions are normalising in the sense that they 
tend to embody shared codes, rules and conventions which may serve to constrain 
behaviour of political subjects (Brinton and Nee, 1998), or in the sense that they may 
define logics of appropriate behaviour in a given setting to which actors conform in 
anticipation of the sanctions in cases of non-compliance (March and Olsen, 1989). 
Van Tatenhove and Leroy (2000: 17) define institutionalisation ‘in its sociological 
meaning, referring to the construction and the preservation of day-to-day activities 
and interactions of actors in institutions within the context of processes of societal 
and political change’. More specifically they regard institutionalisation as ‘the process 
leading to the formation, deformation and reformation of policy arrangements’ (ibid.). 
The IAD framework takes an explicit agency centred definition of institutions as 
‘human-constructed constraints or opportunities within which individual choices take 
place and which shape the consequences of their choices’ (McGinnis, 2011: 170). 
Rules of the game are one of the four dimensions of a policy arrangement, as part of 
a configuration with actors, distribution of power and resources and policy discourses (Arts, Van 
Tatenhove and Leroy, 2000). Rules define the possibilities and constraints for policy 
agents to act within a certain policy domain. They express which norms are legitimate 
and how policy outcomes are achieved such as by which procedures, by which alloca-
tion of tasks and by which division of competences between actors and organisations 
(Arts et al., 2000). Involved stakeholders constantly draw upon rules that delimit the 
agents who are the “right” political players to be involved and those who are not. 
Additionally, they define the boundaries of policy coalitions: who is in and who is out, 
how one can get in and what the relationship with outsiders is (ibid.: 61; Ostrom, 
2005). Moreover, rules describe how the political game should be played: how issues 
may be raised; agendas set; interests articulated; policies formulated; decisions made; 
and measures implemented (Arts, Van Tatenhove and Leroy, 2000; Ostrom, 2005). 
Rules of the game relate to actors, resources and power and policy discourses respec-
tively by means of interaction rules, regulatory power and rules of governance (see Figure 2.1; 
Liefferink, 2006: 60). 
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According to Ostrom (1999: 50, as informed by Ostrom, Gardner and Walker, 1994) 
‘rules are shared understandings among those involved that refer to enforced prescrip-
tions about what actions (or states of the world) are required, prohibited or permitted’. 
Often a distinction is made between formal, written down rules (and formulated by 
legislatures, regulatory agencies and courts of justice) and informal, rules-in-use, of 
which many are not written down (North, 1990; Ostrom, 1990). In many common 
pool resources settings the working rules used by appropriators may differ conside-
rably from legislative, administrative or court regulations (Wade, 1988). ‘The differ-
ence between working rules and formal laws may involve no more than filling in the 
lacunae left in a general system of law. More radically, operational rules may assign de 
facto rights and duties that may even be contrary to the de jure rights and duties of a 
formal legal system’ (Ostrom, 1990: 51; italics added). These informal working rules 
pose severe challenges for the field researcher since many of those rules-in-use are not 
even conceptualised by agents as rules (Ostrom, 1999: 53). Hence, ‘in training re-
searchers to identify and measure institutions, we stress the concept of rules-in-use 
rather than focusing on rules-in form’ (ibid.: 37).  
Arts, Van Tatenhove and Leroy (2000) argue that it is obvious that the rules of 
the political game change continuously over time, partly as result of long-term societal 
processes such as political modernisation, partly caused by specific interactions among 
actors in tangible policy-making processes. One question is to which extent implicit, 
not written down rules of the game influence the outcome of a political process with 
regard to formalised written down rules. Another question refers to the rule-altering 
potential of current policy arrangements. Beck (1997) distinguishes rule-directed and rule-
altering politics; the former refers to politics within the nation state model and the 
latter to sub-politics in what he mentions as the global risk society. Elinor Ostrom 
(1999: 53) implicitly refers to path dependency by mentioning settings ‘where the 
rules-in-use have evolved over long periods of time and are understood implicitly by 
participants’. According to Victor Ostrom (1999: 383) ‘rules are not self-formulating, 
self-determining, or self-enforcing’. Stability of rule-ordered actions depends upon the 
shared meanings assigned to the words used to formulate a set of rules (Elinor Os-
trom, 2007). Without shared meanings when formulating rules, confusion may result 
about what actions are required, permitted or forbidden (Victor Ostrom, 1999).  
 
Kiser and Ostrom (1982) distinguish three tiers of decision making and the relations 
among them: constitutional, collective-choice and operational decisions. Ostrom (1999; 2005) 
has further elaborated the three tiers which are linked in a nested hierarchy, as part of 
the IAD framework. She emphasises: ‘Decisions made about rules at any one level are 
usually made within a structure of rules existing at a different level. Thus, institutional 
studies need to encompass multiple levels of analysis.’ (Ostrom, 1999: 37) Rules af-
fecting operational choice are made within a set of collective-choice rules that are 
themselves made within a set of constitutional-choice rules (see Ostrom, 1990: 50-55). 
Collective-choice rules are those used by appropriators, their officials or external 
authorities in making policies about how a common pool resource should be man-
aged. Decisions which are made in collective-choice situations directly affect opera-
tional situations. Decisions made in constitutional-choice situations indirectly affect 
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operational situations by creating and limiting the powers that can be exercised within 
collective-choice arrangements and by affecting the decision regarding who is repre-
sented and with what weight in collective-choice decisions (Ostrom, 1990: 192). In 
1999 Ostrom adds a fourth level of analysis of meta-constitutional choices (Ostrom, 1999: 
60). The meta-consitutional legel of analysis ‘encompasses long-lasting and often sub-
tle constraints on the forms of constitutional, collective, or operational choice pro-
cesses that are considered legitimate within an existing culture; many of these factors 
may not be amenable to direct change by those individuals under the influence of 
these cultural predispositions, but these cultural factors do change over time, in part as 
a consequence of changing patterns of behaviour’ (McGinnes, 2011: 173). 
Policy-making regarding the rules that will be used to regulate operational-level 
choices rarely takes place in a single arena. Actors of different networks will partici-
pate in several more or less related arenas within a nested hierarchy of institutional 
levels. Choices about (a change of) rules may be made by appropriators themselves 
and/or by government officials in bureaucratic structures, by elected representatives 
in local, regional or national legislatures and by judges in juridical arenas (Ostrom, 
1990). Networks and arenas may be both formal (legislatures, regulatory agencies, 
courts) and informal (gatherings, private associations, appropriation teams) in nature. 
Actor strategies will be the outcome of a combination of internal and external vari-
ables. Ostrom (1990; 2005) challenges theories in which “the individual’s internal cal-
culation process” only determines actor strategies. For example, Buchanan et al. 
(1978) argue that the general conclusion of public choice theorists is that institutions 
must be developed to restrain destructive utility maximising behaviour that serves the 
interests of particular individuals while adversely affecting the society as a whole. 
Hence, public choice theory does not lead to the conclusion that all collective action, 
all government action, is necessarily undesirable (ibid.). However, Ostrom (1986a and 
b) argues that despite its pretensions towards institutional design, public choice theory 
disregards or underestimates the effects of institutional factors in shaping actors’ 
preferences.  
In the IAD framework Ostrom (1999, as interpreted by Howlett and Ramesh, 
2003: 29) takes on board notions from actor-centred institutionalism, since this, unlike 
public-choice theory, takes into account the fact that rules, norms and symbols all 
affect political behaviour; that the organisation of governmental institutions affects 
what the state does; and that unique patterns of historical development constrain fu-
ture choices (Howlett and Ramesh, 2003: 29). Institutions do not only include formal 
organisations (bureaucratic hierarchies and market-life exchange networks) but also 
legal and cultural codes and rules that affect the calculations by individuals and groups 
of their optimal strategies and courses of action (ibid.). Ostrom (1990; 2005) perceives 
individuals as weighing expected costs and benefits in making decisions as these are 
affected by internalised norms and discount rates (ibid.). Finally, Ostrom (1990: 53-54) 
points at resistance to changes in rules: 
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Rules are changed less frequently than are the strategies that individuals adopt within 
the rules. Changing the rules at any level of analysis will increase the uncertainty that 
individuals will face. Rules provide stability of expectations and efforts to change 
rules can rapidly reduce that stability. Further, it is usually the case that operational 
rules are easier to change than collective-choice rules and collective-choice rules are 
easier to change than constitutional-choice-rules. 
 
In the design of the IAD framework Ostrom (2005) further elaborates the seven rule 
types as introduced by her prior definition of institutions as ‘the sets of working rules 
that are used to determine who is eligible to make decisions in some arenas, what 
actions are allowed or constrained, what aggregation rules will be used, what proce-
dures must be followed, what information must or must not be provided and what 
pay-offs will be assigned to individuals dependent on their actions’ (Ostrom, 1990: 
51). Table 2.1 sums the rule types and their definitions. The set of rules is a configura-
tion since the effect of a change in one rule type may depend upon the other rules-in-
use (Ostrom, 1999 and 2005).  
According to Meijerink and Van Tatenhove (2007), the rule types as defined by 
Ostrom (1990; 2005) may be applied both as an analytical framework (which rules are 
identifiable?) and a normative one (which rules should apply?). Entering the tetrahe-
dron via the rules dimension corner is a suitable strategy for studying the influence of 
institutional change on particular policy areas (Liefferink, 2006). One could think of 
the influence of evolving European Union rules on national institutions, often 
referred to as Europeanisation. Furthermore, starting from the rules dimension is 
helpful for an (ex ante or ex post) evaluation of the effect of the introduction of new 
rules or procedures on other dimensions of the policy arrangement (ibid.). Within this 
research, the WFD is considered as a new set of formal collective-choice rules at the 
European political level. Given sovereignty, subsidiarity and ambiguity around the 
European rules, Member States may translate these into their own collective- and 
operational-choice rules. The governance and policy principles in the official WFD 
text (and informal interpretations of the Common Implementation Strategy; see Chap-
ter 4) and their downloading by actors within and across Member States may include 
both triggers and barriers for changes of collective-choice rules.  
In the IAD framework of Ostrom (1999; 2005), the rule types may be applied to 
constitutional, collective-choice and operational (action) situations. However, scholars 
should be aware that the definitions and descriptions of Ostrom are mainly oriented 
to and derived from studying operational action situations such as. governing of common 
pool resources by local communities (as inspired by game theory). Consequently, for 
the purposes of this research a reformulation is considered necessary for application 
of these rule types at the collective-choice level. In order to ascend the abstraction 
ladder from operational choices to collective choices, the definitions of the seven rule 
types of Ostrom have been translated into collective-choice challenges in the implementa-
tion of the IRBM concept (see Table 2.2).  
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Table 2.1: Rule types in CPRM (Ostrom, 2005: 186-215) 
Type of rule↓ Definition↓ 
Scope:  Rules that define known outcome variables that must, must not or 
may be affected as a result of actions taken within an action situa-
tion. These rules affect the width of the outcome space (number of 
state variables affected) and specify the range on each outcome 
variable included in that space. 
Position: Rules that define (the number of) participants to which specific 
action sets are assigned at junctions in a decision making process. 
Positions are the links between participants and authorised actions. 
Most action situations contain more than a single position and sets 
of rules assign different kinds of authority to those in different 
positions.  
Boundary (entry 
or exit):  
Rules that define (1) who is eligible to enter a position, (2) the proc-
ess that determines which eligible participants may enter (or must 
enter) positions and (3) how an individual may leave (or must leave) 
a position. Hence, these rules affect the number of participants, their 
attributes and resources, whether they can enter freely and the 
conditions they face for leaving.  
Choice (prior 
labelled  as 
authority): 
Rules which specify what a participant occupying a position must, 
must not, or may do at a particular point in a decision process in 
light of conditions that have, or have not been met at that point in 
the process.  
Aggregation: Rules which determine who will participate in decision making, how 
much weight each participant will have relative to others and the 
specific formula to be used in adding up the contribution of each 
person’s decision to a final decision about the (proposed) action.  
Information: Rules that authorise channels of information flow among partici-
pants, assign the obligation, permission, or prohibition to communi-
cate to participants in positions at particular decision nodes and 
rules that authorise the language and form in which communication 
will take place.  
Pay-off: Rules which assign external rewards or sanctions to particular ac-
tions or particular readings on outcome state variables. As such they 
establish the incentives and deterrents for action. 
 
One may argue whether one needs all the seven rule types for an institutional analysis 
of a particular policy domain. Some authors have suggested that given the overlap 
between some of these types, certain types of rules alone can carry the analysis (Heil-
man, 1992; Sabatier, 1992; Huitema, 2002). For example, in his dissertation on 
hazardous waste siting decisions Huitema (2002) has reduced the number of rule types 
to five by integrating position and scope rules into choice rules. This research main-
tains all seven rule types, since the partly overlap is considered as potentially fun-
ctional. The distinction between scope, position and choice rules is related to a speci-
fication of particular aspects of IRBM, i.e. internal and external integration, river 
basins as organisational entities, the impact of property and user rights and the choice 
between supply and/or demand management (see Table 2.2). Whereas boundary rules 
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include access of actors to the decision-making processes, the aggregation rules cover 
the decision-making arrangements themselves. Ostrom herself implicitly opens the 
door to a diverse use of the rule types by mentioning that the seven rule types are to 
be understood as broad clusters in an ‘effort to bring some order to the massive num-
ber of specific rules that one could analyse’ (Ostrom, 2007: 11). 
 
Table 2.2: IRBM and challenges of collective-choice rules 
Type of rule↓ Challenges↓ 
Scope:  How to translate “river basins as the appropriate management units” 
with regard to current organisational structures and/or actor 
networks? What does internal integration (within the water policy 
domain) and external integration (across policy domains) mean for 
the nature of river basin legislation, policy documents and 
management plans? 
Position: How do (inter-)national river basin governance and policy principles 
affect property and user rights? By other means, given a specific 
institutional and hydro-geographical context which conditions 
should best apply to (acquisition and continuation of) rights to own 
and use water, land and other interrelated natural resources in a 
sustainable way? 
Boundary  
(entry or exit):  
Who should have access to the river basin management planning and 
decision-making process and who should not? What are conditions 
for entry and exit?  
Choice 
(authority): 
How to manage available fresh water resources in order to serve 
both different user functions and protection of the ecological life 
support system? How are qualitative and quantitative objectives of 
water resources legally anchored such as in relation to objectives for 
other natural resources?  
Aggregation: How to arrange decision-making at interrelated political levels within 
(inter)national river basins in order to reach common understanding 
for and broad public support for collective approaches? Who should 
agree with both adaptations of current and new rules? 
Information: Which types of information may be best collected and aggregated in 
order to arrive at common understanding and shared ownership over 
river basin management plans?  
Pay-off: What are collective rules supposed to deliver? What are the 
incentives and deterrents for deliverance? 
 
This research aims at analysing potential changes of collective-choice rules due to the 
introduction of the WFD. In order to be able to track and asses both the sort of and 
magnitude of changes, there is a need for an analytical benchmark. The concept of 
ideal-types as defined by Weber (1922) offers an appropriate entry.  
 
2.2.2 The ideal-type concept of Max Weber 
Studying processes of IRBM includes the methodological challenge to bridge the natu-
ral and social sciences. On the one hand the concept is about a search for objective 
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facts on the state and functioning of natural resources: the field of natural sciences. 
On the other hand these natural resources are subject to rules as formulated, imple-
mented and evaluated by multiple human actors with a diversity of norms, values and 
strategies: the field of social and political sciences. Values present a challenge to objec-
tivity; they make for a crucial difference between the natural and the social sciences 
(Eliaeson, 2002). Whereas the natural sciences focus on objective facts and causal 
chains of courses and their effects, the social sciences struggle with the intrinsic sub-
jective nature of its subjects such as with the value-load of all human observations and 
choices. For example, the ambiguous nature of the IRBM concept makes that there is 
not one common interpretation that serves all. Furthermore, a researcher’s own bias 
may colour the assessments, such as by emphasising the importance of some observa-
tions over others. At the methodological level values relate to the problems of inter-
subjectivity and incommensurability (Eliaeson, 2002). 
In his elucidating book ‘Max Weber’s Methodologies’ Eliaeson (2002: 12-15) ar-
gues that as influenced by nominalism and neo-Kantianism, Weber has tried to bridge 
the worlds of material reality and human construct. Other authors support this argu-
ment (Turner, 1990; Lepsisus, 1977). Eliaeson (2000: 12-13; original italics) explains 
that nominalism views concepts as ‘constructions of the human mind; that we our-
selves ascribe the meaning our concepts signify’. Concepts cannot be confused with 
reality. ‘Concepts are only names we attach to phenomena; conceptual insight as such 
does not provide any knowledge’. Additionally, Eliaeson (2002: 13) argues that ‘to the 
neo-Kantians, in a certain sense, science creates its own objects of knowledge and our 
knowledge is always a product of human activities and thus is never independent of 
us. Analytically derived concepts do not necessarily have anything to do with reality as 
such; they are merely the means for increasing our knowledge through instrumental 
and conventional methodological procedures.’ Eliaeson (2002: 12) argues that accord-
ing to Weber human beings cannot escape individual responsibility in the choice of 
values. ‘In the political process we cannot invoke the authority of science to guide us 
“all the way”.’ This points at scientific value-relativism (ibid.).  
Although Weber agreed with the anti-positivists that human society in its totality 
is inaccessible to naturalist analysis, he did not conclude that conceptual constructs 
and rational scientific procedure should be exclusively reserved for the natural 
sciences (Eliaeson, 2002). In an attempt to incorporate the methodological vigour of 
natural sciences, Weber (1922: 542) defined sociology as ‘a science which attempts the 
interpretative understanding of social action in order thereby to arrive at a causal ex-
planation of its course and effects’. Weber viewed social sciences as strictly empirical 
sciences which are the least fitted to presume to save the individual the difficulty of 
making a choice (Weber, 1922; 1949). Social scientists must live with competing value-
hierarchies. They are not free to choose but also enforced to choose (ibid.). According 
to Weber (1922; 1949) human action cannot be interpreted in purely rational terms 
due to the various disturbances created by prejudices, errors in thinking, factual errors 
in the course of making instrumental choices as well as the whole range of moods and 
other influences on actual situations. Eliaeson (2002: 29) sums Weber’s approach to 
social science: ‘Values, as such, have no place in scientific understanding except as 
subject matter; in addition, they serve as the vantage points for instrumental goal- 
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oriented action analysis’. According to Weber ‘values become the very criteria for 
objective selection, indicating both the possibility and limits of objectivity’ (ibid.: 30). 
Eliaeson (2002: 31) argues that Weber makes no claims to normative validity for any 
of the values that serve as his point of view. Furthermore, ‘the scientific community 
has a special responsibility to interpret the significant cultural values and their rele-
vance to current analyses’ (ibid.). 
Weber (1922: 191, 192 and 2000) has introduced the ideal-type as value-free, ana-
lytical human constructs: 
 
The ideal-type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of 
view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and 
occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged according to 
those one-sidedly emphasised viewpoints into a unified analytical construct. In its 
conceptual purity, this mental construct cannot be found empirically anywhere in re-
ality. It is a Utopia. Historical research faces the task of determining, in each indi-
vidual case, the extent to which this ideal-construct approximates to or diverges from 
reality. [..] …we should emphasise that the idea of an ethical imperative, of a ‘model’ 
of what ‘ought’ to exist, is to be carefully distinguished from the analytical construct, 
which is ‘ideal’ in the strictly logical sense of the term. [..] An ‘ideal-type’ in our sense, 
to repeat once more, has no connection at all with value-judgements and it has 
nothing to do with any type of perfection other than a purely logical one.  
 
In this research ideal-types are formulated for collective rules as they might (or might 
not) appear in the context of IRBM. These ideal-types collective rules should be un-
derstood as the author’s construct, as analytical units to compare real-life observations 
on the water policy domain at different political levels within an international river 
basin. They are applied instrumentally as a benchmark to track continuity and change 
in collective-choice rules during the periods before and after adoption of the WFD. 
The reader should bear in mind that these ideal-types are qualitative in nature and only 
meant to track the sort of and the extent of observable rule changes over time without 
any normative judgement. Furthermore, the concept’s application in the context of 
this research serves an attempt to grasp the diversity of potential appearances of 
IRBM.  
 
2.2.3 Scope rules 
 
Scope rules may concern both organisational choices (e.g. what type(s) of policies and 
management administrations rule the world?) and substantial ones (e.g. which attrib-
utes of a water resource are included and excluded?). More precisely, these rules define 
known outcome variables that must, must not or may be affected as a result of actions 
taken within an action situation (Ostrom, 2005: 208). Scope rules affect the width of 
the outcome space (number of state variables affected) and specify the range on each 
outcome variable included in that space (ibid.). The focus of this research is on the 
impact of hydrological boundaries on organisational structures, whereas for substan-
tive choices the focus is on levels of integration. For example, how are “river basins as 
the appropriate management units” to be matched with political jurisdictions, eco- 
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nomic principles and boundaries of social structures and networks? Will this central 
IRBM governance principle be covered by existing organisational structures only or 
does it trigger additional or completely new ones? Additionally, what are collective 
choices for internal integration (within the water policy domain) and external integra-
tion (across policy domains)? How do these choices affect the nature of river basin 
legislation, policy documents and management plans? 
 
The impact of hydrological boundaries on organisational scope rules 
IRBM as defined by the Global Water Partnership (2000), presumes that water re-
sources should be best managed at the level of (international) river basins. Conse-
quently, political decision making about these resources should be preferably organ-
ised following hydrological boundaries. History shows the intimate connection be-
tween the stability of a group of people, its economic and social development and the 
availability and reliability of water (Caponera, 1992). The first developed social group-
ings may be typified as hydraulic civilisations (ibid.; Solomon, 2010). Jaspers (2003) 
argues that since ancient times whenever serious competition around available fresh 
water resources arose, there has been breeding ground for institutional upstream-
downstream arrangements (ibid.).  
The river basin approach does not found its roots in hydrological concepts only. 
Advocates of ecosystem management have also embraced watersheds as near-
substitutes for ecosystems and as an appropriate physical landscape on which to put 
ecosystem management concepts into practice (Schlager and Blomquist, 2008). Saeijs 
(2006) relates the highly valuable ecosystems’ goods and services of river delta areas to 
high concentrations of people. For the sake of sustainable upstream-downstream rela-
tions, he stresses (multilateral) river basin institutions (ibid.). Also Folke et al. (2002) 
stress the importance of an ecosystem oriented approach since freshwater provides 
the foundation for any ecosystem function, which is a notion that has largely been 
neglected in the past. Falkenmark (2003: 38) argues that freshwater management and 
the management of ecosystems dynamics have to be integrated by viewing river basins 
as socio-ecohydrological catchments and ‘with full awareness of the different ethical 
and political dilemmas involved’.  
Some authors warn that there is nothing logical in the presumption of choosing 
river basins as management units. Schlager and Blomquist (2008: x) emphasise that for 
people to govern watersheds, they will have to make collective choices. ‘Collective 
choices are ultimately political choices. Thus, governing watersheds well requires em-
bracing politics’ (ibid.). The geographic river basin unit is imposed over the different 
forms in which societies had historically constructed their administrative units, their 
social interrelations and their political divisions (Barham, 2001). Schlager and Blom-
quist (2008: viii-ix) observe that due to differences between political and watershed 
boundaries, most watersheds (at least in the United States) ‘are governed and managed 
through complex, polycentric mixes of private and public bodies, of general-purpose 
and special district governments, of jurisdictions that lie within the watershed and 
jurisdictions that spill beyond it.’ Savenije and Van der Zaag (2000: 13) argue that 
‘river basins do not respect village, district, provincial and national boundaries’. They 
point at numerous attempts ‘to fit the water into these administrative and institutional  
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boundaries rather than to design institutions that fit the (physical and spatial character-
istics of the) resource’. Often an administrative vacuum may be the consequence when 
dealing with the management of water resources, especially at the transnational level 
(ibid.). Pre-existing management units are presented as causes of failure (Dourojeanni, 
2001) instead of departure points for designing management measures.  
Stone (2002: 355; original italics) argues that arguments about the “best size” for 
a jurisdiction must always be interpreted as arguments supporting a particular configu-
ration of power: ‘These strategies are all ways of changing who makes the decision. 
Each is a call for empowering a different set of people to make decisions and to have 
have jurisdiction over something’. The advocates of the river basin approach seized 
the right moment to make its perspective heard, taking advantage of the space created 
many years ago by water and environmental problems in international relations 
(Moreyra and Warner, 2007). The delineation of a river basin may be arbitrary (due to 
ignorance) or strategic (driven by interests), but not natural or neutral. Hence, catch-
ments and abstract catchment organisations should not be recommended as a panacea 
that could solve context-specific development problems (ibid.). Fischhendler and 
Feitelson (2003) argue that due to the common discrepancy between benefits and 
costs of cooperation at the basin level, other spatial levels are to be advanced in order 
to offset this discrepancy. As a result of globalisation, individualisation and the emer-
gence of the risk society (see Beck, 2005) a whole series of local, regional and global 
arrangements appeared, set up by actors from different spheres and domains across 
the traditional borders of nation states and their divides (Van Tatenhove, Arts and 
Leroy, 2000). Both global economies and trading processes are just as important as 
local hydrology in ameliorating serious local water circumstances (Allen, 2007). 
Opinions differ on the question whether generic-purpose administrations, func-
tional water management entities, a mixture of both or other institutional arrange-
ments (such as market-led initiatives, public-private partnerships and/or local self-
organisation) should pave the way to integrated river basin management. Despite the 
mismatch, Rogers and Hall (2003: 21-22) conclude that hydro-geographical bounda-
ries often provide opportunities for modern governance networks: ‘Although basins 
cut across jurisdictional boundaries and thus local government and other government 
entities which do not necessarily work together, the basin society (a river basin agency 
or commission) could require them to do so’. The Global Water Partnership (2000) 
emphasises coordination processes in which governments take the lead. Schlager and 
Blomquist (2008: 193) claim that [within the context of poly-centric governance net-
works] ‘governmental power is often needed to overcome free-rider tendencies, to 
raise funds and to make and enforce authoritative policies’. Solanes and Gonzalez-
Villareal (1999: 19-21) call for neutral, autonomous (non-user) agencies or ministries 
for water policy making, water allocation and programme and project evaluation. 
‘Where these functions are vested in institutions with functional responsibilities for 
specific water uses, or for discrete economic activities, water planning and manage-
ment might not be objective’ (ibid.). The ‘Rio Declaration on Environment and De-
velopment’ (UNCED, 1992) emphasises that for sustainable development a leading 
role of States should be supported by both public-private and public-civil partnerships 
and active involvement of local communities. Schlager and Blomquist (2008: 24) con- 
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clude that ‘institutional complexity in a watershed can be viewed as an intrinsically trait 
to be minimised, an intrinsically desirable trait to be maximised or a phenomenon that 
is intrinsically neither good nor bad but a fact of life and where the extent and kinds 
of complexity vary from one watershed to another’.  
 
In the case of international rivers the sovereignty principle and the transboundary 
principle are among the central governance arrangements (Savenije and Van der Zaag, 
2000). The transboundary prinicple stresses that upstream water users have a responsibil-
ity towards downstream users and reversely (ibid.). Due to the sovereignty principle which 
means that ‘each nation has the right to develop its own policies, laws and institutions 
and their own strategies for natural resources development and utilisation’, interna-
tional river basin authorities operate mostly without supranational authority (Savenije 
and Van der Zaag, 2000: 13). Berkes (2006) observes that actors at different adminis-
trative levels may share similar functions or responsibilities but these may not be tied 
together in any formal means through shared rules, strategies or actions, unless there 
is a formal linkage established. Often asymmetries between upstream and downstream 
riparian states are involved (Savenije and Van der Zaag, 2000; Meijerink and Wiering, 
2009). Caponera (1992) argues that the utilisation of shared water resources requires 
riparian states to acknowledge the principle of limited sovereignty. Nicol (1996) adds that 
decentralisation may not be limited to devolution of responsibilities to lower levels 
only, but may simultaneously involve the delegation of negotiation rights and respon-
sibility for broad policy formulation to higher levels. Savenije and Van der Zaag (2000: 
26) embrace this dual philosophy: ‘This is precisely what is aimed at when we establish 
river basin organisations: certain decisions can only be effectively made at the basin 
level, while other decisions could be made most usefully at a much lower level such as 
the sub-catchment.’ 
Pahl-Wostl (2008: 1-22) advocates a transition towards more decentralised adap-
tive water management as a systematic, collaborative, poly-centric process ‘for 
improving management policies and practices by [social and iterative] learning from 
the outcomes of  implemented management strategies’. Mitchell (2007: 60) stresses the 
importance of shared vision-building by linked multi-stakeholder platforms (abbrevi-
ated as MSPs) at the river basin and sub-basin levels as departure point for IRBM. All 
sub-basins and sectors (public, private and civil society) should be represented in the 
river basin platform. This platform provides the overall “big picture” perspective, 
considering a full range of values and (spatial) interests and associated conflicts, e.g. 
between upstream and downstream communities or between sectors. ‘To be effective, 
the members of a catchment-based MSP must report regularly to their constituents 
and represent the views of their constituents to the catchment – wide MSP.’ The sub-
basin MSPs must ensure that the strategies from the basin MSP make sense at a more 
local level (ibid.). Watson (2007) stresses the importance of collaborative governance 
systems. These systems are not required for every issue type or situation of river basin 
management. Perhaps as such, these systems are best understood as ‘useful additions 
that can compliment and improve the effectiveness of existing bureaucratic and coor-
dinated intergovernmental institutions rather than as their substitutes’ (Watson, 2007: 
44). Schlager and Blomquist (2008) add that collaborative partnerships heavily depend  
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on who chooses to be involved; involvement is a challenge to sustain during time; and 
consensus-based collaborative processes can also lead to a gridlock. Finally, Rockloff 
and Moore (2006) conclude that there is no guarantee that polycentric organisations 
will be more responsive or fairer than centralised ones but neither is the opposite 
necessarily true. 
Managing and protecting complex adaptive resource systems are challenging 
enough even if human uses, interests and values are not at stake. The addition of hu-
man beings brings an additional set of multiple levels (Lebel, Garden and Imamura, 
2005; Berkes, 2006). Just as the physical dimensions of a watershed or other ecosys-
tem appear at different levels, so do the multiple human uses and behaviours that 
occur in a watershed, complicating further the tasks of organising decision making, 
monitoring and enforcement (Adger, Brown and Tompkins, 2006). Consequently, 
institutional arrangements suited to decision making about complex adaptive systems 
may themselves need to exhibit some features of complexity and adaptability (Berkes, 
2006). Blatter and Ingram (2000: 464) mention that since common goods such as 
water are multidimensional (including drinking, shipping, power generation, irrigation, 
recreation, ecological functions, economic development etceteras) there is no one best 
size of a geographical area for governing water. ‘It is necessary to determine the most 
important function(s), create the government structure(s) corresponding to these 
functions and find some mechanisms to deal with the interdependencies and spill-
overs between these functions’ (ibid.). Schlager and Blomquist (2008: 20) argue that 
institutional richness may be preferable to institutional neatness: 
 
Multi-scale institutional arrangements, including small and local organisations linked 
horizontally with each other and vertically with large-scale organisations, may be able 
to achieve (1) close monitoring of local (subsystem) conditions; (2) representation of 
diverse interests associated with different physical components of the system as a 
whole; (3) error correction when management practices undertaken with respect to 
one element of the system create unanticipated negative effects elsewhere in the 
system; and (4) opportunities to communicate and exchange information across sub-
system elements and to discuss subsystem interactions and system-wide conditions 
without necessarily trying to manage all parts of the system with a comprehensive 
organisation. 
  
Schlager and Blomquist (2008: 103) argue that advocates of IRBM overlook the fact 
that an environment of complex adaptive systems (as watersheds are) works against 
comprehensive, integrated management. They mention that the transaction costs to 
appropriately account for the wide variety of circumstances within a watershed simply 
explode. ‘Comprehensive, integrated management at the watershed level taxes the 
cognitive abilities of people and generates burdensome levels of transaction costs’ 
(ibid.). Crabbé (2008) and Schlager and Blomquist (2008) conclude that introduction 
of a river basin approach creates new boundaries and coordination issues, for example 
between various levels and by creating new borders between (sub-)basins across ad-
ministrative territories. 
Table 2.3a shows the ideal-type collective-choice rules for organisational IRBM 
scope rules that have been constructed for the analytical purposes of this research. 
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These ideal-types are an attempt to cover the diversity of views from the aforemen-
tioned literature. Given the specific historical context of the studied river basin in this 
research (i.e. the Meuse) there is a bias towards a central role of governmental authori-
ties in coordinating river basin management planning and decision-making processes. 
Discriminating factors between the ideal-types are whether hydrological boundaries 
determine the structures/networks and (with regard to the international context) 
whether there are functional entities with or without supranational authority. One 
might argue that there is also an ideal-type of river basin authorities with cross-sector 
competences. This ideal-type is not expected to be observed in reality, since with re-
gard to international water law most states prefer the use of the term watercourse 
rather than river basin (Savenije and Van der Zaag, 2000: 23). ‘The latter concept 
comprises land areas, which are (also) governed by administrative, land use and other 
law. Letting land areas be governed by water law might lead to legal complexities.’ 
(ibid.) However, cross-sector aspects are dealt with under ideal-types for substantial 
IRBM scope rules (this Subsection; see Table 2.3c). Furthermore, the ideal-types for 
organisational scope rules do not deal with partnerships explicitly. These are supposed 
to be covered both implicitly by the terms ‘networks’ and ‘collaborative sub-basin 
communities’ and more explicitly by the ideal-types for boundary rules (see Subsection 
2.2.6). Finally, the structures and networks as mentioned in the ideal-type definitions 
may be hierarchical or polycentric in nature.  
 
Table 2.3a: Ideal-type collective scope rules for IRBM (organisational structures) 
Ideal-type A ↓ Ideal-type B↓ Ideal-type C↓ 
Water policy is imple-
mented by organisational 
structures and actor net-
works which are driven by 
social, economic and 
political factors that do not 
follow hydrological (river 
basin) boundaries. These 
structures/networks may 
be multi-purpose or 
sectoral in nature and are 
under parliamentary 
control. 
Water policy is imple-
mented by functional water 
agencies, committees and 
actor networks which 
follow hydrological (river 
basin) boundaries.  These 
functional entities and actor 
networks are controlled by 
parliamentary institutions. 
Water policy is imple-
mented by autonomous 
(sub) river basin 
authorities and/or com-
munities that are organised 
along hydrological 
boundaries. These 
authorities and 
communities are beyond 
parliamentary control and 
do have their own polity 
rules. 
 
 
Substantive scope rules: levels of integration 
IRBM aims to link the conservation, management and development of interrelated 
land-water resources. It requires cross-border and cross-sector coordination and col-
laboration ‘in order to maximise the resultant economic and social welfare in an equi-
table manner without compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems’ (Global 
Water Partnership, 2000: 22). The authors of the World Water Vision, Cosgrove and 
Rijsberman (2000:1), argue that: 
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Sustainable management of water resources requires systemic, integrated decision-
making that recognises the interdependence of three areas: 
1. Decisions on land use also affect water and decisions on water also affect the 
environment and land use.  
2. Decisions on our economic and social future, currently sectoral and frag-
mented, affect hydrology and the ecosystems in which we live. 
3. Decisions at the international, national and local levels are interrelated.  
 
IRBM is based on the water systems approach which links water system components 
(surface water and groundwater, riparian zones and sediment),  ecosystem characteris-
tics and (user) functions of water resources for the benefit of a comprehensive, 
integrated management approach (Global Water Partnership, 2000). Water manage-
ment and spatial planning are linked closely (Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning 
and the Environment, 2000: 22): ‘Water use, hydrological regimes, water quality and 
vulnerability to extreme events are all profoundly influenced by land use patterns in 
the river basin.’  Hence, land use activities should be tuned to the hydrological poten-
tial of a river basin; hydrological principles should therefore be incorporated in spatial 
planning (ibid.). Jaspers (2003: 81) argues that ‘the notion that different uses can be 
combined and work together on a basin-wide scale is probably the most salient benefit 
and incentive for cooperation’. Benefits can be shared which would not be possible 
without an integrated approach (ibid.). Many land use and socio-economic functions 
depend on the availability of water resources of sufficient quantity and quality. 
Reversely, those functions may impact the state and functioning of these wet common 
pool resources. Hence, integration of water management issues into other, related 
policy domains is one of the key challenges of IRBM (Mitchell, 1990; WWF, 2000; 
Santbergen, 2004; Watson, 2007; Heathcote, 2009).  
Janssens and Van Tatenhove (2000: 155) translate the integration discourse as 
being the tension between differentiation and integration which they consider two 
sides of the same coin: ‘Integration is the process in which separate parts are united, 
while differentiation refers to the splitting up into separate parts, which presupposes 
ways of specialisation in order to solve problems’. Mitchell (1990: 4-5; 2007: 52-53) 
distinguishes between integrated and comprehensive interpretations. At the strategic level it 
may be more appropriate to use a comprehensive approach which includes ‘the 
broadest array of variables, relationships and processes with implications for coordi-
nated management of aquatic and terrestrial resources’. Subsequently for operational 
choices, selection and integration of (f)actors within a river basin that are significant 
for solving the issues at stake may be more cost-effective (ibid.; Watson, 2007) 
Hooper, McDonald and Mitchell (1999) warn that integration may ask for significant 
transaction costs. The benefits should be capable of being identified or else the IRBM 
concept may become discredited (ibid.). While an integrated approach often will be 
needed when situations are characterised by complexity, uncertainty and conflict, it 
may not always be appropriate or even desirable (Fitzsimmons, 1996; Watson, 2007; 
Mitchell, 2007). Integration may not automatically lead to improved effectiveness of 
water resources management (Kindler, 2000: 313-314). ‘Fragmented and shared re-
sponsibilities are a reality and are always likely to exist’ (ibid.). Furthermore, there will 
be many situations in which relatively straightforward initiatives by one or coordinated  
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by a limited number of agencies will be sufficient to deal with an issue (Mitchell, 2007; 
Watson, 2007). 
Janssens and Van Tatenhove (2000: 155) analytically distinguish three elements in 
the integration discourse, namely the integration of policy aspects, the direction of 
integration and stages of integration. Firstly, the contents of policy, policy instruments 
and planning and organisational elements may be integrated (policy aspects). Secondly, 
integration can occur in internal, external and/or vertical direction (ibid.; original 
italics): 
 
Internal integration refers to the formulation of politics in which several sections, such 
as water, air and soil, within a policy domain are integrated. External integration applies 
to the coordination and integration of a policy domain with other policy domains.  
Horizontal integration is integration at the same administrative level, while vertical 
integration stands for integration between the administrative levels of national 
government, provinces and municipalities. 
 
Thirdly, different stages of integration may be distinguished which show increasing 
coherence: differentiation (no coherence between sectors that are fully independent); 
coordination (of procedures and administrative instruments by largely independent sec-
tors); cooperation (i.e. sectors are working together to formulate a partly mutual policy); 
and integration. Reaching integration, a new unity is created by merging of different 
sectors (Janssens and Van Tatenhove, 2000: 155-156). Finally, Janssens and Van 
Tatenhove (ibid.: 156) mention diagonal coordination which ‘refers to coordination 
procedures which cut through existing statutory systems in order to ensure close co-
operation between departments, tiers of government and if necessary private partners 
in the planning and realisation of complex and urgent strategic projects’. External (or 
cross-sector) integration is challenged by departments and ministries which are com-
petent in specific policy areas only, often represent diverging interests and define their 
policy objectives differently (Howlett and Ramesh, 2003). ‘New policies that innova-
tively deal with the complex nature of water resources management may be difficult to 
implement by sectoral institutions, which therefore may have to be reorganised.’ 
(Savenije and Van der Zaag, 2000: 15)  
  
A key term with respect to integration is redundancy. Administrative fragmentation may 
lead to overlapping competencies and or limited or no attention to certain issues. 
When duplication of efforts among administrations lead to ineffective, uncoordinated 
action, or when no action at all takes place (e.g. because nobody may feel responsible), 
one speaks of non-functional redundancy. Mitchell (2007: 53) refers to the “silo effect” or 
‘the tendency of agencies to take decisions only with regard to their own mandates 
and authority, without reference to those of other organisations’. Watson (2007: 34) 
argues that in essence, non-functional redundancy within the water sector has been 
regarded as the major institutional obstacle for IRBM. However, some degree of du-
plication and redundancy of organisational structures may aid reducing error prone-
ness and promoting (social) learning, which are required in managing complex adap-
tive systems like watersheds and ecosystems (Schlager and Blomquist, 2008). Efforts 
at comprehensive regulation through integrated agencies are part of ill-adapted  
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institutions and procedures for such systems (ibid.). Mitchell (2007) adds that divided 
and shared management responsibilities across administrative levels within a catch-
ment or an aquifer, are a key driver for initiating multiple stakeholder platforms for 
horizontal and vertical coordination. However, because of its complexity IRBM also 
invites centralisation (ibid.).  
Experiences from the USA’s federal system show that poly-centric structures of 
overlapping organisations ‘are one organisational option that can increase the likeli-
hood of checks on the persistent maintenance of maladaptive policies and practices’ 
(Schlager and Blomquist, 2008: 17). Overlapping organisations at larger levels can 
serve as forums for communication across local subsystems and as a check on local 
structures that behave in ways detrimental to other subsystems (Low et al., 2003). 
Thus, when overlap and/or duplication of efforts leads to social learning, synergetic 
and/or corrective action, functional redundancy takes place. Schlager and Blomquist 
(2008) argue that in addition to transaction costs considerations, people rationally may 
opt to create multiple organisations within a watershed because of the multiplicity of 
values, problems, relevant goals and scales. Lebel, Garden and Imamura (2005) distin-
guish the political level (watershed versus river basin versus other area), politics of 
position (related to the specific location within a given area) and the politics of place 
(related to the stakeholders’ identity, status and resources) as potential reasons for a 
multiplicity of organisational structures.  
IRBM requires functional redundancy, both within the water policy domain and 
across related policy domains. Although value-neutral, functional water policy and 
management authorities (Rogers and Hall, 2003; Solanes and Gonzalez-Villareal, 1999) 
may contribute to internal integration, on the contrary they may not be able to break 
down barriers for cross-sector (i.e. external) integration. For example, Hooghe and 
Marks (2003) denote that functionally defined organisational structures usually are not 
engaged in political trade-offs or bargaining among service priorities by constituency-
defined multiple service or multiple function organisations. Conflicts involving poli-
cies or performances by the former generally must be resolved in the juridical systems 
associated with the latter (ibid.). Schlager and Blomquist (2008: xi-xii) argue that ‘in 
order to cope with transaction costs, boundedly rational individuals construct multi-
ple, overlapping organisations that separately address limited goals and problems that 
would otherwise be impossible to achieve in a single, watershed-scale, general-purpose 
government.’ Watson (2007) observes a significant “implementation gap” since the 
idea of IRBM as unified management of water, land and related natural resources 
across entire river basins has rarely, if ever, been achieved in reality. Rogers and Hall 
(2003) add that hitherto the tools for river basin management, integrating land and 
water use have not been readily available to make this practical. Schlager and Blom-
quist (2008: 18) conclude that ‘a century of organisational behaviour research suggests 
that more nearly centralised organisations are susceptible internally to distortions of 
information and communications that can allow poor policies and practices to persist 
for undesirably long periods.’  
As a synthesis of the presented views in the scanned literature, Table 2.3b and 
2.3c present the constructed ideal-type rules for respectively internal integration and 
external integration.  
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Table 2.3b: Ideal-type collective IRBM scope rules (internal integration) 
Ideal-type A↓  Ideal-type B↓ Ideal-type C↓ 
Separate legislation, policy 
documents and manage-
ment plans for both water 
quality and quantity issues. 
Surface water and 
groundwater are dealt with 
in parallel. 
Legislation, policy 
documents and manage-
ment plans which includes 
parallel objectives and 
measures for both 
quantitative and qualitative 
aspects and for groundwa-
ter and surface water. 
Legislation, policy docu-
ments and management 
plans with integrated 
objectives and measures 
for interrelated surface and 
groundwater bodies, in-
cluding quantitative and 
qualitative aspects. 
 
Table 2.3c: Ideal-type collective IRBM scope rules (external integration) 
Ideal-type A↓ Ideal-type B↓ Ideal-type C↓ 
Separate legislation, policy 
documents and manage-
ment plans for water 
policy and other policy 
domains without linkages. 
Legislation, policy docu-
ments and management 
plans for other policy 
domains take into account 
water issues and reversely. 
Cross-sector, integrative 
policies and management 
plans. 
 
2.2.4 Position rules 
Positions are the connecting link between participants and authorised actions (Os-
trom, 2005: 193). These rules define (the number of) participants to which specific 
action sets are assigned at junctures in a decision process. Most action situations con-
tain more than a single position and sets of rules assign different kinds of authority to 
those in different positions. A position rule may state whether there is a defined num-
ber, no limit, a lower limit or an upper limit on the number of participants who hold a 
position (ibid.). Where position rules do not exactly specify the number of partici-
pants, it is entirely the operation of the boundary rules over time in conjunction with 
the type of goods and attributes of a community that affect the number of partici-
pants, their characteristics and their ease of entry and exit (Ostrom, 2005: 194).  
In this research position rules are viewed as user and property rights regimes for 
interrelated water and land resources. Regimes in use may bring along negative envi-
ronmental, social and/or economical externalities. These unaccounted for pressures 
and impacts are one major reason behind calls for IRBM. Consequently, one impor-
tant analytical question is how collective (inter-)national river basin governance and 
policy principles may affect the positions of owners and users of water and land. For 
states that share a river basin triggers and barriers for changes in these position rules 
depend on (1) the (stability of) prior user and property rights systems, (2) the degree 
to which the states manage to reach common interpretations of basic principles of 
international water law and (3) dominant views on the way(s) towards sustainable 
development.  
 
(1) Property and user rights systems 
Based on an extensive literature review Needham (2006: 30-51) claims that a property 
right is a social construct, a relationship between people - the person holding the right 
and all others. Whenever there is a person enjoying such a right, there is another 
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person with an associated duty. Without regulation of the relationship between rights 
and duties, a property right will cease to have any significance. Since property rights 
give or should give clarity, certainty and stability in the relationships between people, 
they tend to be stable over time. ‘When the rights are in landed property (land and 
buildings), the stability, coupled with the fact that buildings and other works on land 
can last a very long time, can mean that rights in land give continuity to the society.’ 
(ibid.) Property and user rights may be organised differently depending on the legal 
tradition of a riparian state (Barraqué, 2003, 2004; Needham, 2006). For example in 
the Anglo-Saxon tradition, the rights in the use of a resource are considered property, 
not the resource itself (ibid.; Denman, 1978). In the Continental tradition (which in-
cludes both the Napoleonic and the German legal systems), ‘it is the thing itself [e.g. a 
piece of land] which is the property and which can be owned’ (Needham, 2006: 35). 
‘If the owner of the thing splits off a right and authorises someone else to exercise it, 
it might be possible for that person to trade that right: but that right is not property.’ 
(ibid.) Bromley (1991) distinguishes between four types of property regimes, i.e. state 
property, private property, common property and non-property. From the perspective 
of sustainable development, non-property regimes might be the most challenging. 
Non-property refers to open-access resources for which there are no defined groups 
of users or owners and the benefits are available to everyone (Needham, 2006). 
Bromley (1991) argues that open access resources will tend to be over-exploited, since 
no-one may take concern for sustainable use and maintenance of these resources. 
Regarding water property and user rights, European history shows a juxtaposi-
tion of Roman and Germanic legal traditions in combination with different adminis-
trative traditions (centralised versus subsidiarity; Barraqué, 2004). Under the regime of 
the communitarian customary law of German tribes, water was considered as a thing 
in common use to be managed by common institutions like water tribunals. Ancient 
Roman law distinguished between three categories: waters common to everybody (res 
communes omnium; including flowing water), public waters (res publicae) and private 
waters (i.e. those privately owned; Caponera, 1992). Only a small part of water 
resources were considered private: rain water, groundwater and minor water bodies. 
Generally, the ownership of these waters was attached to the ownership of land. The 
landowner had an exclusive and unlimited right of use (and abuse) over such waters 
and this right of use was without any restriction, independently of the consequences 
that the use could cause to neighbouring lands (ius utendi et abutendi; ibid.). Barraqué 
(2004: 19) claims that despite their different legal histories ‘it can be shown that all 
Member States of the European Union combine the reinforcement of government 
authority on water uses and at the same time the development of water communities 
to reduce transaction costs in the allocation of water resources’. The category of 
waters considered as common property is gaining momentum (ibid.: 21). Huitema and 
Meijerink (2009: 4) argue that ‘even in countries where private property rights over 
water are strong and relevant, such rights are only valid if supported by government 
and only as far as they have not been superseded or pre-empted by a publicly esta-
blished system of rights and obligations’. 
Individual riparian states may show different mixtures of the three water re-
sources property regimes over time. These regime-combinations may deal differently  
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with the environmental, social and economical externalities of the uses of land and 
water resources within an (inter)national river basin. One may argue whether non-
property as defined by Bromley (1991) should be added. Barraqué (2004: 7) considers 
running water resources not as ‘free-for-all’, since ‘users of a river are usually well-
defined and in finite number’. This research takes the stance that for shared river ba-
sins in Europe where Member States (try to) coordinate their water policies and man-
agement approaches, at least these basins are acknowledged as common resources. 
However, the pitfalls of an open access nature might wait around the corner, espe-
cially for those transboundary basins wherein the stakeholders from the involved ri-
parian states do not manage to reach common interpretations of basic principles of 
international water law. 
 
(2) Basic principles of international water law 
Savenije and Van der Zaag (2000) argue that countries cannot begin to share a 
resource without agreement on basic legal principles. The 1815 Act of the Congress of 
Vienna established the principle of the freedom of navigation for all riparian states on 
the rivers they share on a reciprocal basis, as well as its priority over other uses (Sal-
man, 2007). Despite the growing competition with other uses, especially after the 
Second World War including the emergence of some basic customary rules, ‘there is 
still no universal treaty in force that regulates the non-navigational uses of inter-
national watercources’ (Salman, 2007: 625). For example, the different interpretations 
of the relationship between equitable and reasonable utilisation and the obligation not to cause 
significant harm are a major reason for the still insufficient number of parties that have 
both signed and ratified to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-
Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (Salman, 2007). Rogers and Leal 
(2010: 187-188) argue that ‘the failure to ratify it also says a lot about the desires of 
upstream countries not to cede sovereignty to a supranational body’. To bridge the 
gap, informal, customary international law has been developed by the International 
Institute of Law and the International Law Association, which are both scholarly non-
governmental organisations. Whereas the resolutions of the International Institute of 
Law mainly focus on the obligation not to cause significant harm to other riparian 
states (e.g. prohibition of acts that may cause pollution of international watercourses), 
the International Law Association essentially departs from the principle of equitable 
and reasonable utilisation of shared watercourses (Salman, 2007). This latter principle 
has been anchored in the widely acknowledged and frequently cited ‘Helsinki Rules on 
the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers’ (International Law Association, 1966) 
and has been incorporated in a number of formal, legally binding conventions, proto-
cols and treaties afterwards (Savenije and Van der Zaag, 2000).  
Although the Helsinki Rules have specified a number of (hydrological, social, 
economic and environmental) factors for determining the reasonable and equitable 
share for each basin state (International Law Association, 1966), it remains unclear 
how to relate and weigh the different externalities of water uses.  For example, Article 
5 of the Helsinki Rules requires that all relevant factors (in a specific international 
drainage basin) are to be considered together and a conclusion should be reached on 
the basis of the whole. These factors are prone to subjective interpretations by the  
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riparian states (Savenije and Van der Zaag, 2000). Postel (1992: 189) argues that there 
is a need for clearer criteria ‘by which to judge, for instance, what constitutes a reason-
able level of per capita water use given the total amount of water available in a river 
system and what constitutes a fair apportioning of water among nations sharing com-
mon sources’. The Helsinki Rules do not only include the right for a riparian State to 
use water, but also the duty to prevent ‘any new form of water pollution or any in-
crease in the degree of existing water pollution in an international drainage basin 
which would cause substantial injury in the territory of a co-basin State’ (International 
Law Association, 1966: 2). In case of violation of this duty, the causer should com-
pensate the injured and all reasonable measures should be taken to abate existing wa-
ter pollution (ibid.). Salman (2007) stresses the importance of the Helsinki Rules, since 
they are the first international legal instrument to include and equate rules for both 
navigational and non-navigational uses of international drainage basins and to address 
issues of cross-border groundwater bodies.  
To a large extent the Helsinki Rules are incorporated into the Convention on the 
Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses (United Nations, 
1997). It is a framework convention that aims at ensuring the optimal and sustainable 
utilisation, development, conservation, management and protection of international 
watercourses, for the benefit of present and future generations. Caflisch (1998: 15) 
illustrates the nature of compromise by mentioning that a number of downstream 
riparians considered the final text as ‘sufficiently neutral not to suggest a subordina-
tion of the no-harm rule to the principle of equitable and reasonable utilisation. On 
the contrary, a number of upstream riparians thought that formula ‘strong enough to 
support the idea of such subordination’ (ibid.). Based on a close reading of the Con-
vention, Salman (2007) concludes that the prevailing view in the international (water) 
law community is the subordination one. Savenije and Van der Zaag (2000: 25) and 
Shihata (1998: vii) respectively qualify the debate as one about a ‘false dilemma’ or a 
‘fictitious dichotomy’. Riparian stakeholders have rights and duties in the uses of wa-
tercourses. After all equitable distribution must take account of existing uses and the 
need to maintain the livelihood of the thereof dependent population (ibid).  
In 2004, the International Law Association have adopted the ‘Berlin Rules on 
Water Resources’, as revision of the 1966 Helsinki Rules and subsequent supplemental 
rules (International Law Association, 2004). The Berlin Rules are informed by devel-
opments since 1966 within international environmental law, human rights law and 
humanitarian law related to war and armed conflict. These rules apply to all water-
courses (both domestic and international drainage basins) and place the two principles 
of equitable and reasonable use and prevention of significant harm to other riparian states at an 
equal position (International Law Association, 2004: Article 12): 
 
1. Basin States shall in their respective territories manage the waters of an interna-
tional drainage basin in an equitable and reasonable manner having due regard for 
the obligation not to cause significant harm to other basin States. 
2. In particular, basin States shall develop and use the waters of the basin in order to 
attain the optimal and sustainable use thereof and benefits therefrom, taking into 
account the interests of other basin States, consistent with adequate protection of 
the waters.  
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Salman (2007: 636; italics added) argues that the approach of Article 12 contrasts 
sharply with that of previous, formal and informal international water law: ‘Thus, 
whereas the Helsinki Rules and the UN Convention establish and emphasise the right 
of each of the riparian states to a reasonable and equitable share, the Berlin Rules 
emphasise the obligation to manage the shared watercourse in an equitable and reason-
able manner.’ Some juridical experts indicate that the Berlin Rules actually render the 
principle of equitable utilisation subordinate to the no harm rule, reversing the estab-
lished principle of the Helsinki Rules (Bourne, 2004). Furthermore, the Berlin Rules 
much stronger elaborate on aims of sustainability and environmental protection by 
implicitly defining ‘water necessary to assure ecological flows or otherwise to maintain 
ecological integrity or to minimise environmental harm’ as one water use category 
(Article 15(2) and Article 24), and by inclusion of a separate chapter on protection of 
the aquatic environments (Chapter V; International Law Association, 2004). 
Whenever upstream and downstream states substantially differ of opinion about 
the interpretation of the aforementioned principles of international water law, sover-
eign forces may wait around the domestic corners to protect own water resources 
management practices and related land-use planning traditions. As concluded yet in 
Chapter 1, the absence of authority to enforce multilateral coordination may be con-
sidered an Achilles Heel of the European institutions. Savenije and Van der Zaag 
(2000) claim that the transboundary conception of limited sovereignty is an important 
precondition to reach common sense for the benefit of the sustainability aims of 
IRBM. Particularly this context invites a huge challenge of coordination of domestic 
land-use planning systems, since contrary to the environmental domain the European 
Commission has no formal competencies for policy initiatives in this sector. With 
regard to the downloading of the European governance and policy principles for 
IRBM, the question is to which extent riparian states view (further) incorporation of 
(transboundary) environmental, social and economical externalities within their land 
and water resources property and user rights regimes as necessary. Do they allow 
these externalities to alter the outlook of the sovereignty/subsidiarity medallion? The 
answers to these questions also relate to the dominant views on the ways towards 
sustainable development. 
 
(3) Preferred paths towards sustainable development 
The holistic and ambiguous nature of IRBM holds the danger of attracting a multitude 
of stakeholders who may use the concept instrumentally to justify their daily practices. 
Like sustainability it may turn into a buzzword serving multiple implicit and partly 
contradicting interpretations, without specifying common preconditions and require-
ments. For example the frequently cited definition of the Global Water Partnership 
(2000) may not harm anyone, since it mentions both a maximisation of economic and 
social welfare in an equitable manner and sustainability of vital ecosystems. Attractants 
may subscribe this Utopia while continuing businesses as usual (e.g. unconditional 
protection of prior user and property rights) which may compromise or support the 
abstract aims, depending on who’s definition to depart from. Rogers and Hall (2003) 
argue that development of water resources can lead to natural monopolies and major 
economic and physical side effects or externalities. As a barrier for collective arrange- 
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ments, ‘discussions of water rights usually focus upon the rights of the property right 
holder and ignore the contingent responsibilities which that holder has with regard to 
others in society who do not share the rights’ (ibid.: 18).  
River basins host a diversity of ecosystems which are essential and dynamic 
factors of both intrinsic ecological values and production for social and economic 
development (Costanza et all., 1997; Folke, 1997). These natural resources have the 
attributes of common pools, are finite of volume, hence require restriction of human 
activities within sustainability bounds (Costanza, 1991). Folke et al. (2002) stress the 
importance of safeguarding the resilience of these social-ecological systems, e.g. as 
expressed in terms of self-organisation, learning and adaptation. The earth’s history 
has clearly shown that human interferences in water system processes and land use 
patterns have a significant impact on ecological processes and ecosystems’ functions, 
goods and services (Global Water Partnership, 2000; Falkenmark, 2003). Basically, a 
river basin can be seen as a mosaic of partly incompatible land and water demands 
(SIWI, 2001). The IRBM aims are sincerely challenged by intensification of land and 
water resources uses, as driven by ongoing population growth, urban migration, glob-
alisation, industrialisation, efforts to alleviate poverty and hunger and increasing ex-
pectations (Saeijs and Van Berkel, 1995; Cosgrove and Rijsberman, 2000). Savenije 
and Van der Zaag (2000) argue that perhaps the opaqueness of system interactions 
over large distances within a shared international river basin may be the biggest 
issue to cope with. 
A major challenge of IRBM is to link sustainability’s planet, people and profit 
dimensions beyond solely focusing on individual developments and objectives within 
each dimension. There is a need for interrelated criteria of social, economical and 
ecological resilience and their translation into land and water resources property and 
user rights regimes. This challenge includes a threefold dilemma: (1) satisfying human 
needs while minimising the pollution load added and accepting the consumptive water 
use that is involved; (2) meeting ecological minimum criteria in terms of fundamental 
ecosystem determinants (i.e. environmental flow to be left uncommitted in the rivers, 
secure flood flow episodes and acceptable river water quality); and (3) to secure hydro-
solidarity between upstream and downstream societal and ecosystem needs (SIWI, 
2001). Falkenmark (2003) adds that flexibility, resilience and adaptability of social and 
political institutions will be needed to enlarge the ability to establish trade-offs and to 
define ecological “bottom lines” between social, ecological and economic uses of wa-
ter and related land resources. Costanza et al. (1997) advocate ecological economics in 
which protection of the ecological life support system (as expressed by water system 
functions, goods and services) is the fundament below social and economic systems. 
When one follows the philosophy of ecological economics, dramatic transformation 
of user and property rights may be required in order to prevent overuse and quality 
deterioration of interrelated land and water resources. Support for or resistance to-
wards such change of collective-choice rules will depend on, among other factors, 
prior formal property regimes and different cultural norms, values and traditions (Os-
trom, 1999). Water rights should not be unconditional but flexible and responsive to 
changing circumstances at both national and international level (Ministry of Housing, 
Spatial Planning and the Environment, 2000). 
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As a synthesis of the presented views in the studied literature, Table 2.4 presents the 
constructed ideal-type rules for collective position rules. 
 
Table 2.4: Ideal-type collective IRBM position rules  
Ideal-type A↓ Ideal-type B↓ Ideal-type C↓ 
Protection of prior water 
and land resources use and 
property rights without 
preconditions on environ-
mental, social and  
economic externalities. 
Conditional maintenance, 
alienation and acquirement 
of water and land resources 
use and property rights. 
Conditions include 
requirements to internalise 
social, economic and/or 
environmental externalities. 
Reallocation of water 
and/or land use and 
property rights, based on 
interrelated conditions of 
ecological resilience, 
economic efficiency and 
social equity. 
 
2.2.5 Boundary rules 
Boundary rules, or entry and exit rules define (1) who is eligible to enter a position; (2) 
the process that determines which eligible participants may enter (or must enter) posi-
tions; and (3) how an individual may leave (or must leave) a position (Ostrom, 2005: 
194). Hence, these rules affect the number of participants, their attributes and 
resources, whether they can enter freely and the conditions they face for leaving 
(ibid.). ‘The level or strictness of entry and exit costs is relative to the availability of an 
attribute or a resource in a community’ (Ostrom, 2005: 197). In this research 
boundary rules are interpreted as who has access to the river basin management plan-
ning and decision-making process and who has not? And who set the conditions for 
entry and exit? 
 
As a general condition to decide who preferably should enter a river basin manage-
ment planning and decision-making process, IRBM requires a framework where the 
different and often competing water related interests find a common ground and 
where multiple-sector stakes are regulated and balanced (Global Water Partnership, 
2000). In the overall context of calls for more responsive, participative and account-
able governments, the second Dublin principle (ICWE, 1992) stresses the need for a 
participatory approach in water resources development and management, involving 
users, planners and policy-makers at all political levels. As of the 1990s the IRBM 
concept echoes dimensions of distributed governance which has developed in 
response to disadvantages of both hierarchical and market-led governance models 
(Rogers and Hall, 2003: 11-13). It is rooted in the argument that ‘the State no longer 
believes it can solve societal problems acting alone, particularly socio-environmental 
ones and the private sector alone cannot address the problems of the poor and the 
environment’ (ibid.). Water policy and the process for its formulation must have as its 
goal the sustainable development of water resources and to make its implementation 
effective, the key actors/stakeholders must be involved in the process (Global Water 
Partnership, 2000). ‘A strategy for the management of shared river basins should be 
integrative, in the sense that it gives adequate attention to all relevant economic, social 
and environmental interests of riparian stakeholders.’ (Savenije and Van der Zaag, 
1998: 56) 
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Question is who are the key actors/stakeholders? Savenije and Van der Zaag (1998: 
56) take a broad stance by arguing that ‘the public should have an active voice in the 
management of river basins, since it is the public who have a stake in their develop-
ment’. Given international hydrological systems as multi-purpose, common property 
resources, it may not only be difficult to identify all the stakeholders, these will also 
express different preferences, priorities and economic interests (Rees, 2002). Bates et 
al. (1993) advocate that everyone affected by or affecting a water resource should be 
included in decision-making processes whether located within the watershed or not. 
Effective water resources governance will require the combined commitment of gov-
ernment and various groups in civil society, particularly at local/community levels, as 
well as the private sector (Rogers and Hall, 2003). Ingram et al. (1984) argue that the 
people who are most effected by watershed uses, which are most often geographic 
communities situated within the watershed, must be given greatest weight in decision 
making. For economic, political and cultural reasons, local communities situated 
within watersheds need to be represented in watershed decision making processes 
(Schlager and Blomquist, 2008). The boundary rules question is not a question with 
answers and implications that can be defined topographically only. ‘Neither defining 
communities of interest broadly nor giving pride of place to local, geographic com-
munities guarantees that a particular set of values will be pursued consistently over 
time as the watershed setting and its context change.’ (ibid.: 63) 
Based on a review of European and American cases, Solanes and Gonzalez-
Villareal (1999) argue that in most cases some sort of public organisation is effective 
for involvement of users. Public organisations may assure economies of scale and 
mandatory dispute resolution processes which is essential where a large number of 
diverse water users are involved (Hellinga, 1960). Rogers and Hall (2003: 35) stress the 
importance of partnerships in which ‘the key role of government and public sector 
workers is recognised as critical for the proper stewardship of water as a common 
pool resource’.  Shared benefits and costs for all parties should be the basis for nego-
tiations over shared waters (ibid.). Both Rogers and Hall (2003) and Schlager and 
Blomquist (2008) warn for the pitfall of quite large economic and social transaction 
costs of governance and mention that there is no single model of effective water 
governance. Rogers and Hall (2003) stress the importance of creating sub river basin 
societies. Such societies could both monitor and support government actions and 
policies or help to regulate public-private arrangements. Privatisation of water 
management tasks is a political sensitive issue, since in many countries this policy sub- 
domain is dominated by governmental actors. Savenije and Van der Zaag (2000: 29) 
distinguish between ‘the caretaker function’ and ‘the production function’ as related to 
the management of water resources. Caretaking concerns ‘safeguarding the national 
interests and assets’ (e.g. monitoring water rights, flood protection and multi-purpose 
works) and ‘is a typical role of government not suitable for privatisation’. The produc-
tion function involves the provision of water services (e.g. irrigation and drainage, 
water supply and sanitation). This function may be privatised whenever both the ex-
cludability and subtractability of the water resource are high, ‘and if there is no threat 
of monopoly formation or other market failures’ (ibid.). Public-private partnerships  
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may be more convenient for the production function instead of pure privatisation 
(Lincklaen-Arriëns, 1996). 
Since river basins are highly complex and dynamic socio-biophysical systems 
which generate water resources management issues characterised by high levels of 
uncertainty and conflict, intergovernmental coordination efforts will not suffice 
(Watson, 2007). In this context the key to success lies in the development of colla-
borative institutions in which a wide range of stakeholders (public, private and public) 
are engaged in a process of joint decision-making and problem-solving (Glasbergen, 
1998; Wondolleck and Yaffee, 2000; Verhallen, Warner and Santbergen, 2007). 
Watson (2007: 37) adds that, since there can be no single correct interpretation or 
application of IRBM, ‘some sort of collaborative institutional process is required in 
order to define problems, identify what is desired and achievable and to produce 
agreement as to how common goals will be achieved’. Successful implementation of 
IRBM policies requires less state-centric, collaborative governance systems which 
attempt to bridge the divide between the traditional bases of political power and other 
groups within civil society with interests in the management of land and water 
resources (Kooiman, 1993; Pierre, 2000). Collaboration may enable the avoidance of 
transaction costs that are associated with other methods such as command and 
control regulation (Watson, 2007). Collaboration may also improve organisational 
efficiency by limiting overlaps and duplication of effort. The success of collaboration 
will ultimately depend on the willingness of officials in government departments and 
agencies to engage and share decision-making power with private and civil stake-
holders (ibid.). Savenije and Van der Zaag (2000) point at the importance of active 
participation of stakeholders and the general public in order to elaborate solutions that 
are sustainable and equitable and to make national laws compatible with traditional 
norms and customs found at the local level.  
 
As a synthesis of the presented views in studied literature, Table 2.5 presents the con-
structed ideal-type rules for collective boundary rules. Different degrees of stakeholder 
participation as expressed by Arnstein’s ladder of citizen participation (1969), are no-
ticeable between these ideal-types.  
 
Table 2.5: Ideal-type collective IRBM boundary rules 
Ideal-type A↓ Ideal-type B↓ Ideal-type C↓ 
Access to the river basin 
management planning 
process is restricted to 
public actors only. Other 
stakeholders are informed. 
Non-governmental actors 
may have access to the river 
basin management planning 
process under conditions set 
by the public actors. 
Emphasis on co-thinking 
and consultation. 
Ample opportunities for 
all interested stakeholders 
to join the river basin 
management planning 
process, including co-
productions, co-decisions 
and self-realisation. 
 
2.2.6 Choice rules 
Choice rules partition possible actions of participants in an action situation into re-
quired, permitted and forbidden acts (Ostrom, 2005: 200). ‘The actions that partici-
pants must, must not, or may do are dependent both on the position they hold, prior  
44 CHAPTER 2 
 
actions taken by others and/or themselves and attributes of relevant state variables’ 
(ibid.). Choice rules affect the basic rights, duties, liberties and exposures of members 
and the relative distribution of these to all, by narrowing or widening the range of 
actions assigned to participants (Ostrom, 2005: 200-201). Choice rules may be trans-
lated into a more generic, overarching question: What is precisely allowed regarding 
the use, development and management of a common pool resource and what is not? 
Choice rules may influence distribution of power and resources and reversely. ‘Choice 
rules empower, but the power so created can be distributed in a relatively equal man-
ner or a grossly unequal manner. Choice rules thus affect the total power created in 
action situations and the distribution of this power.’ (Ostrom, 2005: 201)  
This research focuses on collective choices around development, management 
and use of fresh water resources. Given the decreasing fresh water availability per 
human being (Saeijs and Van Berkel, 1995; Cosgrove and Rijsberman, 2000), a major 
choice rules dilemma is how to manage available fresh water resources (in relation to 
land and other natural resources) in an economic efficient and social acceptable way. 
Furthermore, how may different user functions and protection of the ecological life 
support system be served both at the same time? One dimension of collective-choice 
rules for IRBM concerns conditions for supply and/or demand management. The 
second dimensions concerns the nature of the license system for water-related human 
activities. For example, how are qualitative and quantitative objectives on the sustain-
able use, development and management of water resources legally anchored (e.g. with 
regard to interrelations between surface water and groundwater bodies)? Or more 
bluntly: which human activities are allowed or not with regard to these objectives?  
 
Supply and demand management 
As stated in Subsection 2.2.4 on position rules, IRBM faces a major challenge of inter-
related social, economical and ecological resilience. The IRBM literature makes clear 
that a water supply oriented management approach alone will not suffice to cope with 
this challenge. Since river basins encompass both land and water, any IRBM strategy 
at least should take into account the multiplicity of links between the land and water 
components. IRBM views humans as embedded in eco-hydrological landscapes (Folke 
et al., 2002; Falkenmark, 2003). Consequently, interconnected and interdependent 
freshwater flows, crop production and other terrestrial ecosystem services should be 
managed in an integrated fashion taking into account upstream-downstream relations 
and river basin solidarity (Falkenmark, 1999; the World Bank, 1993). Rees (2002: 14, 
original italics) argues that land and water resources managers at all levels (from na-
tional agencies to individuals) ‘are able to engage in risk and cost shifting rather than 
genuine risk reduction’. She points at upstream-downstream asymmetries since, ‘given 
the nature of water as a hydrologically interconnected, multi-purpose resource’, up-
stream decisions and activities often generate quantitative and/or qualitative forms of 
risks for downstream populations (ibid.). Rogers and Leal (2010: 190) add that ‘large 
withdrawals of water [by upstream riparian states] typically create very difficult water-
allocation problems for the downstream countries’. Falkenmark (2003) diagnoses that 
present water institutions are to a large extent based on the assumption of unlimited 
availability of water resources, unrestricted room for waste disposal and ignorance of  
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systemic rules. Emphasis is on individual appropriation, without curing externalities 
(ibid.). 
IRBM requires a shift from a dominant focus on supply management to more 
demand management (Global Water Partnership, 2000). Concerning international 
river basins Savenije and Van der Zaag (2000) mention integrated supply and demand 
management among three critical elements for any IRBM strategy to establish sustain-
able solutions. An integrated approach combines reduction of losses at the supply side 
which increases the water yield (‘more crops and jobs per drop’) with efforts to dimi-
nish water demand (the World Bank, 1993; Cosgrove and Rijsberman, 2000). Savenije 
and Van der Zaag (2000: 31) define demand management as ‘the use of economic and 
legal incentives in combination with awareness raising and education to achieve more 
desirable consumption patterns, both in terms of distribution between sectors and 
quantities consumed’. It should be best coupled with an increased reliability of supply 
(ibid.). Whenever a river basin is not and may not become self-sufficient in terms of 
supply and demand  management, inter-basin transfers are frequently proposed as part 
of the solution (Solomon, 2010; Rogers and Leal, 2010). IRBM challenges these tradi-
tional options of large-scale hydraulic engineering which should be considered as a last 
resort. Options for cost-efficient, integrated supply- and demand management should 
be explored first. For example, more efficient use of rainwater for agricultural produc-
tion and increased recharge of aquifers through improved soil and water conservation 
measures may add to a more sustainable approach (Savenije and Van der Zaag, 1998). 
At the implementation level an integrated approach requires cross-sector and cross-
border integration (ibid.: 2000). In cases where demand substantially surpasses supply 
options permanently or periodically, choice rules may include a hierarchy of user 
functions.  
Supply and demand management within the context of international river basins 
asks for coordination by the riparian states which is based on principles of interna-
tional (water) law (see also Subsection 2.2.4 on position rules). In many shared river 
cases there will be a mixture of autonomously operating supply and demand systems. 
In each involved riparian state, arguments of social equity, economic efficiency and/or 
ecosystem protection all may play a decisive role in domestic traditions, often to dif-
ferent degrees. The specific physical, social, economic and political conditions of the 
states that share a river basin will largely influence the rate of success for arriving at 
common, cross-boundary, integrated supply and demand management rules. From an 
assessment of 14 interstate river compacts in western United States, Heikkila, Schlager 
and Davis (2011: 140) conclude that more extensive cross-scale linkages emerged ‘in 
those basins where states faced more severe challenges around water management, 
such as conflicts over water allocation, extreme weather events, or developing water 
storage projects’.  
Whenever severe water stress or water scarcity relates to upstream-downstream 
asymmetries, the challenge of shared arrangements may be hampered by prolonged 
controversy. In such cases external triggers may be helpful. For example, in the WFD 
negotiation process Portugal allied with Member States in the North of Europe on the 
issue of strict river basin management, partly because of the negative impact of the 
Spanish national hydrological plan on river flows at the downstream Portuguese side  
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(Kaika, 2003). Savenije and Van der Zaag (2000: 14) point at the sovereignty dilemma: ‘To 
what extent may individual countries develop and use resources found within their 
territories and to what extent do they have to consider interests of riparian countries 
and the ‘common interest’ of the river basin as a whole?’ Caponera (1992) argues that 
the utilisation of shared water resources requires riparian countries to acknowledge the 
principle of limited sovereignty. Rogers and Leal (2010: 191) point at the importance 
for political decisions on shared rivers to look beyond scientific-technical analyses ‘to 
take into account the qualitative benefits of resource sharing among coalitions’. Fur-
thermore they argue, ‘it is important to link the potential river settlement to other 
pending economic and social issues between and among countries’ (ibid.).  
 
As a synthesis of the presented views in studied IRBM literature, Table 2.6a presents 
the constructed ideal-type rules for choice rules (supply and demand management).  
 
Table 2.6a: Ideal-type IRBM choice rules (supply & demand management) 
Ideal-type A↓ Ideal-type B↓ Ideal-type C↓ 
Water supply management 
determines availability of 
fresh water for user 
functions. 
Mixed supply and demand 
management determines 
fresh water availability 
without a hierarchy in user 
functions. 
Integrated supply and 
demand management as 
expressed by a hierarchy 
in user functions. 
 
The nature of the licence system 
The nature of the licence system for water-related activities is a second dimension of 
collective IRBM choice rules. It expresses what is legally allowed or not with regard to 
the use, development and management of water resources, both with regard to the 
(potential) impact of activities on water quality and quantity and in relation to other 
natural resources. This dimension shows redundancy with the yet presented levels of 
integration dimension of the scope rules (see Subsection 2.2.3 for a detailed account). 
Within this research, the nature of the licence system is considered the formal, legal 
synthesis of choice rules with regard to internal and external integration. Table 2.6b 
presents the constructed ideal-type choice rules (nature of the licence system). 
 
Table 2.6b: Ideal-type IRBM choice rules (nature of the license system) 
Ideal-type A↓ Ideal-type B↓ Ideal-type C↓ 
Separate, parallel licences 
for quality and quantity 
objectives related to deve-
lopment, management and 
use of water resources. 
Licenses that integrate 
quantity and quality 
objectives related to deve-
lopment, management and 
use of water resources. 
Integrated licences for 
interrelated development, 
management and use of 
natural resources (e.g. air, 
water, land). 
 
The distinction (and redundancy) between scope rules and choice rules is considered 
functional since intentional, rhetoric wording in policy documents and management 
plans may significantly differ from their legally binding interpretations as expressed by 
the license conditions for regulating human activities. For example, when a policy-
making community decides to conduct integrated environmental policies plans, this  
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decision does not necessarily include the choice to integrate different types of licenses 
into one new system.  
 
2.2.7 Aggregation rules 
Aggregation rules are necessary whenever stakeholders at multiple positions have 
partial control over the same set of action variables. They determine who will partici-
pate in decision making, how much weight each participant will have relative to others 
and the specific formula to be used in adding up the contribution of each person’s 
decision to a final decision about the (proposed) action (Ostrom, 2005: 202). Aggre-
gation rules concern which arrangements count for rule alterations, such as the formu-
lation and adoption of water policy and management plans. Within the context of 
IRBM a major collective-choice challenge concerns how to arrange decision-making at 
interrelated political levels within shared (inter)national river basins with the aim to 
reach common understanding and broad public support for collective-choice rules? 
Who should make and who should agree with adaptations of prior rules or new rules?  
 
Howlett and Ramesh (2003: 7) argue that studying public policy processes is a com-
plex and difficult task which should go beyond official records of government deci-
sion-making (e.g. as expressed by laws, acts, regulations and promulgations). Besides 
the record of concrete choices, any such analysis should also encompass the realm of 
potential choices and choices which are not made (Howlett, 1986; Lukes, 2005). This 
necessarily involves analysis of the complex array of state and societal actors involved 
in decision-making processes and their capacities for action (Howlett, 1986). Jenkins 
(1978 as cited in Howlett and Ramesh, 2003: 6) defines public policy as ‘a set of inter-
related decisions taken by a political actor or group of actors concerning the selection 
of goals and the means of achieving them within a specified situation where those 
decisions should, in principle, be within the power of those actors to achieve’. The 
answer to the question who will participate in decision-making on development, 
management and use of river basins and how much weight each participant will have 
relative to others, depends on several factors such as the dominant (juxtaposition of) 
governance style(s) within a state, the prevailing policy making style(s) within a par-
ticular policy domain, the particular social, economic and physical conditions, configu-
rations of resources, power and influence (e.g. among bureaucracies in different policy 
domains), access to information and constitutional choices (Howlett and Ramesh, 
2003; Liefferink, 2006; Warner and Verhallen, 2007; Padt, 2007). 
In general state actors play a central role in planning and decision-making on 
public policies (Allison and Halperin, 1972; Howlett and Ramesh, 2003). This certainly 
is true for water policy domain in the Netherlands (Van de Ven, 2004: Havekes, 2008) 
and the other states that share the Meuse River Basin (e.g. Meijerink, 1999). The 
ability of domestic states to make and implement policies strongly depends on two 
organisational dimensions: autonomy and capacity (Howlett and Ramesh, 2003: 60-
61). Autonomy refers to the degree of the state’s independence from self-serving and 
conflicting social pressures, e.g. as exerted by interests groups and economic actors.  
In addition the state must also have the capacity to make and implement effective 
policies, which is a function of its organisational coherence and expertise (ibid.). 
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Departments and agencies may have different and conflicting interests and interpreta-
tions of the same issue at stake and how these differences are resolved has an impact 
on what policies are adopted and how they are implemented (Howlett and Ramesh, 
2003). The capacity of states to operate autonomously from social pressures does not 
only depend on its own organisational strengths and weaknesses, but also on the or-
ganisational coherence and expertise of social and economic interests groups and 
other non-governmental organisations. The more fragmented prominent social groups 
are, the weaker the state’s ability to mobilise them towards the resolution of societal 
problems (ibid.). Contemporary trends like globalisation, decentralisation, privatisation 
and calls for active stakeholders’ participation have an impact on interrelations 
between the state, civil society and market (Van Tatenhove, Arts and Leroy, 2000), 
hence may influence the relative weight of public, private and civil actors in decision-
making such as on river basin management plans. 
 
Generally, aggregation rules may be classified as non-symmetric or symmetric. In non-
symmetric cases, a single person (e.g. an expert or dictator) or a small subgroup may 
be allowed to select as well as avoid any of the feasible actions – full active and block-
ing capacity (Ostrom, 2005). In the case of symmetric aggregation rules multiple par-
ticipants have joint control over action decisions, ranging from allowing any one au-
thority member to make the decision for the collectivity (i.e. the anyone rule) to requir-
ing all those given joint authority to agree prior to a decision (i.e. the unanimity rule; 
Buchanan and Tullock, 1962). Howlett and Ramesh (2003: 163) point at different 
levels of involvement and influence of actor categories at different stages of a public 
policy life-cycle. In theory virtually any member of the policy universe could become 
actively involved in the agenda-setting process, while at the stage of policy formulation 
there is a tendency to include only those state and societal actors who are members of 
a specific policy subsystem. ‘When it comes time to decide on a particular option, 
however, the relevant group of policy actors is almost invariably restricted to those 
with the capacity and authority to make binding public decisions’ (ibid.). 
In IRBM literature consensus is most commonly presented as the appropriate deci-
sion making rule, since it produces more legitimate and acceptable solutions than 
other forms of decision making because all participants must consent to a proposal 
before it is adopted (Schlager and Blomquist, 2008). In essence, consensus is an 
unanimity rule which has the potential to impede collective action by empowering 
each individual with a veto (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; Schlager and Blomquist, 
2008). According to its advocates consensus holds the promise of reaching sensible 
and fair decisions without the conflict and strategic behaviour characteristic of tradi-
tional approaches (Schlager and Blomquist, 2008: 68). In opposite, hierarchical deci-
sion making based on science and professional standards of conduct is also often 
advocated for IRBM aims, ‘avoiding the difficult negotiations, compromises and 
trade-offs that so often characterise watershed management’ (ibid.; Mitchell, 2007). 
Scharpf (1997: 144) points at joint decision traps ‘in which the beneficiaries of the status 
quo can block all reforms, or at least ask for exorbitant side payments’. Coglianese 
(1999) mentions the danger of a search for the lowest common denominator; as such 
consensus among a select group will not always equate to socially optimal policy  
IDEAL-TYPE COLLECTIVE-CHOICE RULES AND POLICY ARRANGEMENTS 49 
 
 
 
(ibid.). Combinations of consensus and majority voting emerge in settings where the norm 
of reciprocity operates and participants expect to be in the minority position at varying 
times (Scharpf, 1997). Although voting has the added value of allowing collective 
action to occur, especially among large numbers of people even in the face of conflict, 
it is purchased at the expense of permitting the exploitation and domination of minor-
ity interests (Ostrom, 1987). Advocates of consensus point at the zero sum game 
(what is gained by one side is lost to the other) that may result from majority voting 
rules (Schlager and Blomquist, 2008).  
Regarding IRBM decentralisation and subsidiarity are often mentioned (Global Water 
Partnership, 2000; Rees, 2002; Rogers and Hall, 2003). Jaspers (2003) argues that 
direct and active participation of stakeholders can be facilitated better in a system of 
decentralised decision-making. Nicol (1996) argues that decentralisation simul-
taneously may involve devolution of responsibilities to lower administrative levels 
(with the aim of technical capacity building and participation) and delegation of nego-
tiating rights and responsibility for broad policy formulation to higher levels. Savenije 
and Van der Zaag (1998: 58) argue that IRBM ‘requires strengthening capacities at the 
highest and lowest levels within a basin’. Commitment at the highest political levels is 
necessary as well as active participation of stakeholders and the general public (ibid.). 
One major rationale behind decentralisation is ‘to bring river basin management as 
close as possible to the individual citizens and facilitate local variation in response to 
differing local conditions and preferences’ (Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and 
the Environment, 2000: 15).  
As a synthesis of the presented views in studied literature Table 2.7 presents the 
constructed ideal-type rules for collective aggregation rules. 
 
Table 2.7: Ideal-type collective IRBM aggregation rules 
Ideal-type A↓ Ideal-type B↓ Ideal-type C↓ 
Independent decision-
making on water policy 
and management plans at 
different administrative 
levels within a river basin. 
Asymmetric, top-down 
decision-making on water 
policy and management 
plans at different  
administrative levels within 
a river basin: lower levels 
have to comply with the 
rules from the higher levels. 
Symmetric, consensus 
based decision making on 
water policy and manage-
ment plans at different 
administrative levels: 
mixed top-down and 
bottom-up rules. 
 
2.2.8 Information rules 
Information rules arrange information flow channels among participants. They assign 
the obligation, permission, or prohibition to communicate to participants in positions 
at particular decision nodes and the language and form in which communication will 
take place (Ostrom, 2005: 206). One major collective-choice challenge of IRBM is to 
collect, aggregate and present information in such a way that river basin management 
plans are acknowledged and supported by a majority of public, private and civil stake-
holders. A critical dimension of this challenge is the types of information that are 
considered legitimate in combination with the nature of the collection and aggregation 
process. The focus of this research is on this critical dimension. 
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Chapter 1 has introduced the social life of the IRBM paradigm: an evolution from 
supply-driven technology and infrastructure-based management approaches towards 
calls and experiments for more interactive, participatory and reflexive processes in 
which facts and values of multiple stakeholders intermingle. In the former, a technical-
scientific rationale dominates the policy-target oriented information gathering and aggre-
gation process. Empirical data are predominantly collected and interpreted by scien-
tists and governmental officials as decision-supportive information which at the same 
time serves as the basis for assessment and evaluation of the state and functioning of 
river basins. The latter points at a social interaction perspective in which policy net-
works of multiple, interdependent and relatively autonomous stakeholders define the 
rules of the information gathering and aggregation process (Driessen, Goverde and 
Leroy, 2007). Participation of non-governmental stakeholders enriches the decision-
making process with relevant viewpoints, interests and information about water-
related issues that could not have been generated otherwise (Teisman, 2001). Social 
interaction helps to rule out overlooking important information which in turn may 
improve the decisions (ibid.). A social interactive perspective acknowledges the 
continuous struggle about the interpretation of information and the status of know-
ledge (Glasbergen, 1998). Verhallen, Warner and Santbergen (2007: 269-270) label the 
social interactive perspective as a mixed-mode model, in which ‘both values and facts 
guide the substantive processes’. The mixed-mode model acknowledges inherent 
differences in position and power and views conflicts as inherent part of transforma-
tive processes. Such processes may be typified as a ‘mix of learning and fighting’ in the 
search for ‘consensus with representation of divergence’ (ibid.). 
Fischer (2009: 7) argues that within the context of industrialised western societies 
‘policy analysis evolved to narrowly assist government officials with information and 
analysis relevant to public decision-making’. The institutions and practices of these 
societies are dominated by professional knowledge, leaving decision-makers, politi-
cians and citizens largely dependent on the validity and reliability of the knowledge and 
competencies of involved experts (Dahl, 1989; Fischer, 2009). Additionally, neo-liberal 
arguments have triggered a strong focus on economic efficiency and cost-benefit analyses 
(Fischer, 2009). In the case of a financial crisis such economic arguments become 
more dominant. Several authors point at a (growing) lack of trust in experts as one of 
the critical issues in contemporary politics (Giddens, 1990; Beck, 1995; 
Jasanoff, 2006). Fischer (2009: 3) relates this lack of trust to a generic societal recog-
nition of the limitations from expert-driven policy making: The past decades have 
shown ‘that experts are themselves incapable of answering many of the pressing ques-
tions, at least with sufficient degrees of certainty, not to mention supplying workable 
solutions’. Furthermore, the scientific knowledge turned out not to be the ‘neutral, 
objective phenomenon that it has long purported to be’ (ibid.). Nowotny (2003: 151) 
emphasises the ‘inherent transgressiveness’ of expertise: 
 
First, it [expertise] must address issues that can never be reduced to be purely 
scientific and purely technical and hence must link up with diverse practices, institu-
tions and actors. Second, it addresses audiences that are never solely composed of 
fellow-experts, whose expectations and modes of understanding reflect the 
heterogeneous experience of mixed audiences. 
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Fischer (2009) argues that experts do not work in isolation from social and political 
institutions. Formal knowledge and the technologies derived from science are both 
embedded in social identities, norms, discourses and institutes (Jasanoff, 2004). Fur-
thermore, hierarchies of practitioners are organised in significant part around their 
own internal power structures, interests and status claims (Kuhn, 1962). Within the 
context of societal calls for democratic governance and public participation, the need 
for more deliberatively oriented policy analysis is often expressed (Fischer and 
Forester, 1993; Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003). De Bruijn and Ten Heuvelhof (2002) 
emphasise the importance of negotiated knowledge from interactive processes be-
tween analysts and other stakeholders, in order to improve the quality of analysis and 
decision-making. Fischer (2009) advocates deliberative dialogues as part of participa-
tory policy inquiry such as between experts and citizens, since the latter may possess 
relevant situational information that has to be taken into account by the former. Not 
only may lay people bring in relevant social and empirical experiences to the planning 
and decision-making process, decision-makers frequently depend on their legitimisa-
tion and motivation for effective implementation of environmental polices and regula-
tions (ibid., Sillitoe, 2007). Decisions based on limited and contested information will 
provoke strong reactions from stakeholders and will polarise decision making (Van 
Bueren, Klijn and Koppenjan, 2003).  
The entire discourse on democratisation of expertise and socially robust knowledge ‘is fo-
cused on the basic dilemma between democratic legitimacy by representation (vote) 
and the legitimacy conveyed by rationality on the basis of certified knowledge’. 
(Weingart, 2008: 132) The challenge is to make the process of knowledge production 
more integrated into the social context while at the same time to preserve the auton-
omy and independence of science (Nowotny, Scott and Gibbons, 2001). The axiom is 
that robustness of knowledge increases when research has been infiltrated and im-
proved by social knowledge (ibid.). Context refers to social and political concerns and 
‘the values and interests of lay publics that are directly or indirectly affected by scien-
tific knowledge’ (Weingart, 2008: 137). Jasanoff (2003) points at the danger that par-
ticipation may become an instrument to challenge scientific points on political 
grounds, for example by stakeholders who have more skills and means to lobby and 
influence politicians than average lay publics. Framing and learning are important 
concepts in promoting more meaningful interaction among policy-makers, scientific 
experts, corporate produces and the public (ibid.).  
In the context of IRBM multi-stakeholder processes that deal with ambiguous is-
sues should offer room for problem (re-)framing from the start (Warner and Verhal-
len, 2007). Dewulf et al. (2005: 117-118) add that whenever dealing with ambiguous 
situations, social learning, negotiation and conflict management strategies become 
more important, ‘because the relation between different stakeholders and their frames 
is at stake’. In ambiguous situations the structure of a problem is at stake, not the 
value of certain parameters. In other words: what are the relevant parameters or even 
which problems should be tackled? ‘What is ambiguous is the meaning of a situation 
and which frame should be applied to make sense of it.’ (ibid.) Putnam and Holmer 
(1992) mention reframing for the process of redefining the common problem domain 
and tuning and connecting the frames of different stakeholders. In this process 
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ambiguity is not only to be considered as problematic and negative, it is also an oppor-
tunity for change (Dewulf et al, 2005). In the reframing process ‘actors learn to under-
stand the paradigms, metaphors, mindset or mental models that underpin how they 
operate. Insight is gained on the relationship between one’s own problem and prob-
lems of others.’ (Warner and Verhallen, 2007: 28) Such a process might lead to an 
integrative process in which collective frames develop (Aarts and van Woerkum, 
2002). 
Within social learning processes the acknowledgement and exploration of inter-
dependencies by stakeholders is a prime condition (Steyaert and Jiggins, 2007). Social 
leaning may be interpreted as a multi-stakeholder process in which contextualisation 
of scientific knowledge happens, for example by confronting facts and values of ex-
perts with these of lays. Steyaert and Jiggins (2007: 580) mention a ‘learning paradox’ 
with regard to incomplete information about the state and functioning of ecosystems 
(ibid.: 580): the fragmentary knowledge of stakeholders and the related diverse percep-
tions ‘may constrain or even block learning processes’. ‘On the other hand, learning 
processes are needed to change these perceptions and to build more adequate shared 
understanding that enables concerted action.’ 
 Fischer (2009) argues that most deliberative approaches are problem- and con-
flict-oriented and take established social and political configurations of resources and 
power for granted. For transformation to happen, deliberations on these configura-
tions should be included which requires anticipation and procedures for dealing with 
conflicts and emotions. Furthermore, tacit assumptions should be uncovered by a 
deliberative learning process (ibid.). Schön (1983: 296-297) calls for a new ‘reflective 
contract’ by which the client and the practitioner agree to conduct a joint inquiry, 
relevant to a situation for which the client is seeking help. Fischer (2009) mentions 
empowerment of local communities, a genuine (self-) reflexive spirit, tolerance for 
ambiguities, a set of ethical guidelines, political support from above and room for 
emotional intelligence and empathy as essential elements for initiation and facilitation 
of transformative learning processes. Transformative processes ask for rethinking the 
role of the educator, the trainer, the expert and the policy-maker (ibid.). Steyaert and 
Jiggins (2007) mention various roles for researchers in social learning processes, i.e. 
observer, facilitator and co-researcher. However, a set of agreed upon criteria for de-
termining what constitutes success and failure of group deliberations is not available 
yet (Rowe and Frewer, 2005).  
 
In analysing policy networks one should include the macro- or meta-constitutional 
context, e.g. economic development, political cultures, societal customs and traditions 
and other policy networks (Glasbergen, 1989). Within the context of international 
river basin districts, given the multi-level nature of policy planning, decision-making 
and implementation processes, such an analysis is extremely complicated in nature. 
Marteijn (in De Wit, 2008; translation from Dutch added) illustrates the dilemma of 
handling incomplete information in multilateral coordination within the Meuse River 
Basin:  
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There are so many images about one single river. How difficult – or on the contrary 
how easy – must it be to decide on the Meuse River when you know only part of the 
images? [..] What do we actually know from each other? How can we think of trans-
boundary measures or solutions if our knowledge is limited to our own administra-
tive territory? 
 
The absence of supranational authority and the presence of language barriers, differ-
ent cultures, traditions and legal arrangements pose additional challenges to the man-
agement of information collection and aggregation processes. Savenije and Van der 
Zaag (2000: 34) point at the important role of technical experts as the locus of institu-
tional memory in shared river basins. Apart from their disciplinary training and 
knowledge, ‘they may have been involved in cross-border negotiations much longer 
than their superiors in (elected) political positions’ (ibid.). In the case of tense relations 
between riparian states, negotiated, relevant information could defuse a controversy 
based on wrong assumptions (Bulloch and Darwish, 1993). Priscoli (1990) argues that 
conflicts generated by data disagreements may be the easiest to solve. Consequently, 
negotiations between riparian states in conflict should best start with resolving the 
information issue (ibid.). ‘Lack of appropriate information often gives rise to simpli-
fied assumptions held by riparians about each other.’ (Savenije and Van der Zaag, 
2000: 34) One may question to which extent this specific international context invites 
a predominant scientific-technical rationale over a more social interactive one.  
As a synthesis of the presented views in studied literature, Table 2.8 presents the 
ideal-type collective IRBM information rules as constructed for this research.  
 
Table 2.8 Ideal-type collective IRBM information rules 
Ideal-type A↓ Ideal-type B↓ Ideal-type C↓ 
The river basin 
management planning 
process (definition of 
means and ends) is 
predominantly driven by 
expert information and 
knowledge from the natural 
sciences. Validity and 
reliability are central criteria 
for legitimised information 
and knowledge. 
The river basin manage-
ment planning process 
(definition of means and 
ends) is predominantly 
driven by expert informa-
tion and knowledge from 
the economic sciences. 
Cost-benefit ratios and 
economic efficiency are 
central criteria for 
legitimised information 
and knowledge. 
The river basin manage-
ment planning process 
(definition of means and 
ends) is driven by 
information and knowledge 
from multiple disciplines 
and both from experts and 
lays. Joint fact finding and 
social robustness are central 
criteria for legitimised 
information and knowledge. 
 
2.2.9 Pay-off rules 
Pay-off rules assign external rewards or sanctions to particular actions or particular 
readings on outcome state variables. As such they establish the incentives and deter-
rents for action (Ostrom, 2005: 207). In interaction with other rule types, pay-off rules 
affect the net benefits and costs that will be assigned to particular combinations of 
actions and outcomes (ibid.). In the context of IRBM, to arrive at the Holy Grail of a 
social, ecological and economic resilient world of shared river basins, one has to deal 
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with (to name but a few): upstream-downstream asymmetries, free-riding behaviour, 
non-functional redundancy and bounded rationality. IRBM includes the major chal-
lenge ‘to identify development strategies whereby all riparians eventually benefit from 
an equitable allocation of costs and benefits’ (Savenije and Van der Zaag, 2000: 14). 
Kirmani and Le Moigne (1997: 1) argue that riparian cooperation in international river 
basins may pay-off, since ‘goals of economic development, poverty alleviation and a 
sustainable environment cannot be effectively achieved without developing and 
utilising shared water resources’. How to arrive in Utopia? Which ideal-type incentives 
and deterrents for collective, concerted action may be constructed from available 
literature?  
 
Ison, Röling and Watsson (2007) distinguish three governance mechanisms for dealing 
with environmental problems: (1) regulations, incentives and penalties which aim to 
modify detrimental human activities; (2) relying on the invisible hand of the market or 
adjusting market forces through fiscal policies; and (3) raising awareness through the 
dissemination of information. Savas (1977, 1987) argues that in the case of common-
pool resources, the government should establish property regimes through licensing to 
prevent their depletion. However, rewards and sanctions from laws and regulations 
alone may not suffice for full public support, hence for effective compliance with 
collective-choices (Howlett and Ramesh, 2003). The extent to which formal institu-
tions are acknowledged and supported by informal customs, norms, values and tradi-
tions may serve as a more reliable indicator for evaluating the formers’ pay-off. For 
example, there may be differences in how water users perceive their entitlements to 
water and what their (user) rights are according to formal laws and regulations (ibid.).  
For shared, international river basins, Kirmani and Le Moigne (1997: 1) point at 
historical factors, physical differences, political realities and socio-economic variations 
which will have to be considered as part of the setting in which issues of efficiencies, 
distribution, equity and rights are addressed. For example, ‘some riparians have tended 
to utilise as much water as possible to establish prior water rights while others who 
started late feel deprived of their fair share’ (ibid.). Savenije and Van der Zaag (1998: 
32) point at an increasing awareness of the importance of public participation in river 
basin planning and decision-making processes: ‘Plans, when implemented, often 
encounter a reality on the ground which was not anticipated; requiring the reworking 
of implementation strategies; or else local actors may circumvent or simply ignore new 
policies and new plans.’  Howsam (1996: 378) argues that the ‘abolition of customary 
rights can be destructive of the principle of user participation’. Traditional legal 
systems may include some important lessons for legal reform (ibid.).  
The fourth principle of the Dublin Statement stresses that, since water has an 
economic value, it should be recognised as an economic good (ICWE, 1992). Gupta 
(2009) mentions a conflict within the global water policy community between those 
who view water predominantly as a common pool resource (in relation to human 
needs) and those who view water as an economic good. The latter perception stems 
from the neo-liberalism and private sector management discourses (ibid.). It has trig-
gered a marketisation process and the use of economic instruments (e.g. water pricing 
for recovery of costs for water services, social cost-benefit analyses) as stimuli to 
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comply with collective-choice rules. Schuijt (2003) views economic valuation as a process 
of strategically behaving actors. Within such processes policy instruments are seldom 
ideologically and distributionally neutral (Majone, 1989). Depending on the specific 
institutional context, similar approaches may lead to different pay-off and reversely, 
‘various approaches may be abstractly equivalent in the sense that, given sufficient 
information and total institutional flexibility, they can be shown to produce an effi-
cient allocation of the available resources’ (Majone, 1989: 119).  
Friedman (1953: 301-319) argues that it is necessary to examine the particular in-
stitutional arrangements when choosing among different economic approaches, hence 
to introduce additional non-economic criteria like administrative and political feasi-
bility. Persuasive arguments about the appropriate ranking of values ‘are certain to be 
at least as important as technical analyses in determining one’s preferences’ (Majone, 
1989: 120). Schuijt (2003: 33) warns that ‘economic value is purely based on people’s 
explicit willingness-to-pay or willingness-to-accept estimates for ecosystems goods or 
services’. Other means will be required to estimate the value of those goods and 
services for which humans are not willing to pay or accept (ibid.). 
Turner, Peace and Bateman (1994) argue that economic value must not be confused 
with total ecosystem value which includes both primary and secondary values. The 
primary value is the value of a healthy ecosystem as the basis for life support on earth 
(Schuijt, 2003). Secondary value includes the range of user en non-user functions 
which depend on a healthy ecosystem, i.e. is the utilisation value. Economic value only 
captures this secondary value (ibid.). De Groot (1992) adds that different types of 
ecosystem values exist such as ecological value, social-cultural value and intrinsic 
value, which cannot be fully captured by economic value. Different stakeholders, for 
strategic motives, may (try to) over- or underestimate the economic value of 
functions, goods and services of ecosystems at stake (Schuijt, 2003). Daily (1997) ar-
gues that regarding goals of ecological sustainability, fair distribution of resources and 
property rights and efficient allocation of resources, economic valuation only deals 
with the third goal which is insufficient for informing decisions about preferable 
policy alternatives. Furthermore, according to Hanley and Spash (1993) many 
environmental effects are irreversible. A cost-benefit analysis incorporates benefits in 
nature that are lost for a certain period of time while in reality these benefits are lost 
forever (ibid.).  
Pearce and Turner (1990) emphasise that through economic valuation a mone-
tary value is placed on environmental assets that may stimulate public awareness of 
the value of the world’s ecosystems. Since valuation of ecosystem services is some-
thing one does implicitly when a choice concerning the environment has to be made, 
their translation into economic terms may help making these values more explicit and 
recognisable for planning and decision-making processes (Costanza et al., 1997; 
Schuijt, 2003; Saeijs, 2006). The difficulty is that, although people’s decisions for pro-
tecting a common pool resource may be motivated by altruism and ethical considera-
tions, these motivations may not be quantifiable in prices (Stevens et al., 1991). In 
addition Schuijt (2003: 46) argues that ‘pricing can also give the opposite effect: if the 
benefits of a natural resource are less than the benefits of project development in a 
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cost-benefit analysis, decisions based on such an analysis may result in the destruction 
of this natural resource.’  
Although introduction of both water pricing systems (e.g. on the use and pollu-
tion of water resources) and economic valuation instruments in river basin manage-
ment planning may be an important step, methodological inconsistencies and institu-
tional barriers for including opportunity costs and environmental externalities still will 
have to be solved (Schuijt, 2003; Van der Arend, Broekhans and Van der Veeren, 
2010). Rees (2002; 8) argues that charging systems can reduce or increase the risk of 
supply shortage or pollution damage. The outcome depends on the way these systems 
affect the demand for water or waste water discharge services (ibid.). Savenije and Van 
der Zaag, 1998: 49) emphasise that although economic incentives are important in-
struments for demand management, they should be embedded in a broader context of 
educational, administrative, legal and political actions ‘to influence demand while safe-
guarding equity principles’. Gowdy (1997) warns that markets do not automatically 
lead to sustainable outcomes. They cannot show whether a natural system is 
approaching its limits and fail to see the context or interconnection between species as 
well as resource quality (ibid.). Instead, a system of democracy should be utilised to 
allocate natural resources as part of the legislative process (Sagoff, 1998).  
 
Within shared river basins, actors face the challenge how to find ways of turning po-
tential conflicts into constructive cooperation and to turn what is often perceived as a 
zero-sum game (in which one party gains and  another looses) into a win-win outcome 
(Postel, 1992). Wondolleck and Yaffee (2000) argue that the key to success lies with 
the development of collaborative institutions in which a wide range of stakeholders 
are engaged in a process of joint decision-making and problem-solving. In order to 
arrive at collective choices, Watson (2007) emphasises the importance of collaborative 
networks of public, private and civil stakeholders who all are willing to invest finan-
cial, human and intellectual resources. Generally, people will be more eager to invest 
in collective arrangements whenever they expect trade-off opportunities such as in the 
context of shared rivers when riparian states acknowledge upstream-midstream-
downstream interdependencies and realise that not all interests are incompatible. Also, 
when started from a common vision for an entire river-basin, joint investments of 
riparian states or investments by one riparian state at the territory of another, may be 
more cost-efficient and sustainable than parallel investments by individual riparian 
states (e.g. Ruijgh-van der Ploeg and Verhallen, 2002). Meijerink (1999) argues that the 
opportunity for trade-offs may increase when the scope is tactically enlarged to issues 
from outside the water policy domain. As such, riparian states may exchange problem-
solving capacity at a reciprocal basis. On the other hand, whenever power asymme-
tries are large and available fresh water resources scarce, trade-off opportunities might 
be much more difficult to discover and/or establish.  
Saeijs (2006) argues that working with natural processes instead of against these 
will pay-off for all on the long run, since generally all human interference may induce 
additional investments such as for mitigation and compensation of the loss of eco-
system’s capacity to deliver goods and services. This requires a change of both the 
attitude of hydraulic engineers and public perception. For example, not to consider 
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floods as a waste and threat, but to acknowledge that floods may be highly productive 
in agricultural terms (Savenije and Van der Zaag, 2000).   
As a synthesis of the presented views in studied literature Table 2.9 presents the 
ideal-type collective IRBM pay-off rules which are constructed for this research. 
 
Table 2.9: Ideal-type collective IRBM pay-off rules 
Ideal-type A↓ Ideal-type B↓ Ideal-type C↓ 
Rewards and sanctions 
from laws and regulations 
are major drivers for 
compliance with collec-
tive-choice rules (e.g. as 
expressed by standards 
and license  
conditions). 
Economic incentives and 
market forces are major 
drivers for compliance with 
collective-choice rules.   
(Sub-)Basin communities 
voluntarily invest resources 
(human, financial, 
expertise) as collaborative 
capital for compliance with 
collective-choice rules. 
 
Rules configuration 
To conclude Section 2.2, Ostrom (2005) stresses that scholars need to analyse the 
effects of a full rules configuration rather than assume they can study the impact of 
one rule at a time – while assuming that the other rules are randomly distributed. The 
focus of this research is on an analysis of the translation of a set of collective 
European organisational and substantive principles by actors at interrelated political 
levels within the international Meuse River Basin. The aim is to track changes in a full 
rules configuration over time, not to isolate individual rule types. An observed rules 
configuration at a specific moment never walks alone. It may be considered the 
outcome of interactions between dominant and opposing policy discourses, as 
expressed by actors at multiple levels and across policy domains within the context of 
a particular configuration of power and resources and in interaction with pre-existing 
rules. Consequently, this research needs a more encompassing analytical framework. 
The Policy Arrangement Approach (PAA; Arts, Van Tatenhove and Leroy, 2000; 
Liefferink, 2006; Leroy and Arts, 2006) offers such a framework.  For the aims of this 
research the seven rule types of Ostrom are incorporated in the PAA as elaboration of 
its rules dimension. The next section introduces and explains the PAA. 
 
 
2.3 The Policy Arrangement Approach (PAA) 
 
2.3.1 Definition 
The Policy Arrangement Approach (PAA) has been developed by Dutch scholars in 
environmental policy sciences. It is an attempt to provide for a value-neutral, analytical 
framework which links structural, long-term processes in the social and political con-
text with daily strategies and practices of diverse actors in a particular policy domain 
(Leroy, Arts and Van Tatenhove, 2003; Klaver et al., 2003). The founding fathers aim 
to counterbalance the predominantly agency-centred and managerial approaches 
within the Dutch environmental policy sciences since the 1980s (Leroy, Arts and Van 
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Tatenhove, 2003). They stress that ‘the research-based nucleus of the policy arrange-
ment approach lies in the determination of an explanation behind the dynamics (and 
the stability) within a given policy domain, by departing from the interplay between 
actors and structures’ (Leroy, Arts and Van Tatenhove, 2003: 19; translation from 
Dutch added). In addition they introduce the concept of political modernisation in an 
attempt to grasp dominant developments in the overall political and societal context 
(Van Tatenhove, Arts and Leroy, 2000). The rationale behind the PAA has not been 
the development of a new theory about policy, management and politics, but ‘the 
integration of parts of existing substantial theories’ (Leroy and Arts, 2003: 97). The 
added value of the analytical framework lies in ‘the combination of the robust terms 
and themes from these theories and in the rejection of their demonstrable weak-
nesses’. (ibid.: 98)  
A policy arrangement is understood as the (temporary) substantive and orga-
nisational stabilisation of a policy domain which consists of four dimensions (Arts, 
Van Tatenhove and Leroy, 2000; Liefferink, 2006; Leroy and Arts, 2006; Wiering and 
Arts, 2006): 
  
o actors and their coalitions and oppositions involved in the policy domain; 
o the division of resources between these actors, leading to differences in power 
and influence, where power refers to the mobilisation of and deployment of the 
available resources and influence to who determines policy outcomes and how;  
o rules of the game currently in operation, in terms of formal procedures of deci-
sion making and implementation as well as informal rules and ‘routines’ of inter-
action;  
o current policy discourses, where discourses entail the argumentation lines of the 
actors involved with regard to substantive and organisational aspects, as ex-
pressed by world views and paradigms, policy and governance principles and op-
erational rules and practices. 
 
The concept policy arrangement links long-term processes of political and social 
change with day-to-day policy making processes (Van Tatenhove, Arts and Leroy, 
2000).  It combines two distinguishable, complementary ways of analysis. The first 
level of analysis (structural social change) focuses on the formation of policy arrange-
ments as a result of both changing relations between state, market and civil society 
and an evolution from government to governance (ibid.). Secondly, analysis at the 
level of interaction emphasises the arguments actors use in interaction, the norms and 
values actors stand for, their problem definitions and their concepts of the society-
nature relationship and societal and political responsibilities (Van Tatenhove, Arts and 
Leroy, 2000). One way to delineate a policy domain is to focus (1) on the way in 
which a specific policy issue is formally institutionalised in a political system (minis-
tries, departments, policy plans, laws and regulations, etceteras) and (2) on the way in 
which these formal boundaries are used and challenged by the relevant players in the 
field (Arts, Van Tatenhove and Leroy, 2000). Any stabilisation of a policy domain may 
be temporary, as arrangements evolve, either by policy innovations on the ground or 
by processes of political modernisation. Also policy arrangements may develop and 
evolve at different levels of policy making: local, national and international (ibid.). 
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By relating the (influence of) strategic considerations and goals of actors at one side 
and the broader social and political context on the other side, the policy arrangement 
approach offers a comprehensive framework for analysis and interpretation of devel-
opments within a given policy domain over time (Bogaert, 2004). The framework aims 
for balancing the attention to both substantive as organisational dimensions, in order 
to avoid radical social-constructivism (in which power and structure only gain rele-
vancy by perceptions of actors) or structural determinism (ibid.). Liefferink (2006: 48) 
stresses that the four dimensions are inextricably interwoven: they do not just sum up 
to define a policy arrangement.  
The interrelatedness of the four dimensions can be symbolised by a tetrahedron, 
in which each of the corners represents one dimension (see Figure 2.1 in Section 2.1). 
Any change in one of the dimensions may induce change in other dimensions. For 
example: the appearance of new actors or a change in the constellation of coalitions 
may add new elements to the prevalent discourse or lead to another distribution of 
resources and/or rules of the game. As a consequence of the indissoluble interrelated-
ness, the analysis of a policy arrangement should in principle address the entire tetra-
hedron (Liefferink, 2006). The four-dimensional analysis of a given policy domain 
allows for different analytical perspectives as dependent on the research question. 
Each perspective will highlight different aspects of the arrangement and requires its 
own methodology (ibid.). The challenge within any research that departs from the 
PAA is to choose a principal entrance, a corner to enter the tetrahedron, without los-
ing sight on the interrelations with the other dimensional corners and with the courage 
to limit oneself in a particular research focus.   
 
The PAA is not only a promising analytical framework which has triggered diverse 
empirical case studies, it is also subject to a critical debate. Critiques focus on three 
main topics: (1) the nature of and too generic conceptualisation of political modernisa-
tion; (2) the implicit explanatory potential of the combination of (parts of) existing 
theoretical concepts; and (3) the limited predictive value of the framework. Regarding 
the first topic Hajer (2003: 53; translation from Dutch added) argues that within the 
PAA ‘political modernisation is considered too deterministically (at least includes this 
pitfall) as a macro-sociological impact variable and too less as manifestation of con-
crete practices’. Glasbergen (2003: 79) questions whether political modernisation 
refers to factual developments or to a normative ideology. Illustrated by a study of 
diverse cases within the Dutch institutional context he concludes the latter. Political 
modernisation, he argues, should be understood as an ideology in which environ-
mental objectives are subordinate to financial-economical interests. Additionally, con-
trary to the suggestion of the ideology, the state still remains the most crucial actor 
with regard to the realisation of societal change (ibid.).  
According to Herweijer (in Klaver et al., 2003: 86), the PAA’s elaboration of (po-
litical) modernisation is too comprehensive whereas the distinctiveness is too limited. 
For example, no distinction has been made between social, juridical and political mod-
ernisation (ibid.). The term needs further development and clarification (Spaargaren in 
Klaver et al., 2003: 90). The founding fathers answer that their application of political 
modernisation is meant in a purely instrumental, analytical way (Leroy and Arts, 2003). 
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They admit that the term requires theoretical refinement and empirical clarification, 
e.g. within the European context by inclusion and elaboration of the multi-level gov-
ernance concept (ibid.). This research, inter alia, aims to contribute to such further 
elaboration by the choice for a multi-level governance case-study within the context of 
a transboundary European river basin. See Section 2.4 for a brief introduction to 
multi-level governance and Chapter 3 for a description of the chosen research frame-
work. 
With regard to the second critique, Herweijer (in Klaver et al., 2003: 85-86) 
points at the still limited explanatory power of the PAA, due to the predominantly 
implicit hypotheses. Hajer (2003: 54) adds that the PAA combines concepts of the 
“classical” and “new” political sciences in a seemingly eclectic way, at least without a 
sufficiently explicit argumentation of theoretical choices. The explanatory power of 
the PAA could be enlarged by a modelling of the coherence among its four dimen-
sions (Herweijer in Klaver et al., 2003: 85). One may argue whether this second 
critique relates to the (over?) ambitious intentions of the PAA founding fathers to pay 
sufficiently balanced attention to both the role of actors and structures and substan-
tive and organisational factors. The inventors have opted for ‘an intellectual fruitful 
middle position’ at the crossroad of relevant paradigms and theoretical concepts, in 
order to both prevent radical stenches and profit from the strengths of all these 
approaches (Leroy and Arts, 2003: 99). ‘The PPA is developed in a critical debate with 
and inspired by a large number of recent developments in general sociology, environ-
mental sociology, management sciences, policy sciences, politics and international 
relations’ (Leroy, Arts and Van Tatenhove 2003: 16).  
Given these two critiques one may question whether all these theoretical con-
cepts from different backgrounds may be combined in an unproblematic and scienti-
fically sound way. For example, what are the criteria for the selection of “robust terms 
and themes” from the rich diversity of theoretical concepts? One major challenge is to 
make the theoretical choices more explicit and to further operationalise the relations 
between the four dimensions for empirical scrutiny. This research picks up the second 
part of this challenge by the detailed operationalisation of the rules dimensions at the 
collective-choices level in combination with an assessment of developments in the 
other three dimensions over time. 
The third critique concerns the limited predictive value of the PAA. Ringeling (in 
Klaver et al., 2003: 84-85) concludes that so far, the PAA has focused predominantly 
on policy making processes and too less on implementation and maintenance. He 
plies for a more comprehensive empirical analysis of actual governance styles and 
practices of policy making and steering (ibid.). Herweijer (in Klaver et al., 2003: 85-86) 
regrets the limited explanatory and predictive capital of the analytical approach. To his 
opinion the emphasis is put too one-sidedly on discursive changes as trigger for policy 
changes. A more fundamental identification of explanatory mechanisms should add to 
a more proactive contribution towards anticipating policy change (ibid.). Although the 
emphasis of the PAA primordially remains at scientifically sound empirical-analytical 
analysis of policy structuration and change processes, the potential for formulating 
policy interventions could be enlarged (Klaver et al., 2003). The PAA’s dimensions 
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offer four principal entrance points in combination with further conceptualisation of 
trends in the political and societal context (ibid.). The prescriptive potential of the 
PAA lies in the combination of a rich diversity of variables which are not considered 
in isolation, but as a configuration (Leroy and Arts, 2003). Whenever the theoretical 
argumentation and the analytical operationalisation reach an adequate quality level, the 
prescriptive application of the PAA may be increased as a logic next step (ibid.). Arts 
and Goverde (2006: 69-92) have picked up the conceptual challenge by presenting an 
instrument for evaluation and intervention which is compatible with the PAA. The 
instrument which is inspired by concepts of governance capacity and congruency is an 
attempt to add a normative framework to the PAA (ibid.). However, Arts and Leroy 
(2006: 279) conclude that this normative model has not widely been applied yet. ‘We 
consider it a theoretical and methodological innovation for the PAA now that should 
be validated by empirical research at a later stage’ (ibid.). 
The limited instrumental, prescriptive value may also relate to the observation 
that, so far, the PAA predominantly offers a framework for non-incremental policy 
developments (see Klaver et al., 2003; Leroy and Arts, 2003). Especially overall politi-
cal and societal developments are difficult to manipulate by policy interventions 
(Leroy and Arts, 2003). By focusing on trends in long-term political and societal proc-
esses it overlooks more short-term, incremental changes within a given policy domain. 
This research aims to add to the potential for analysing incremental changes within a 
policy domain by a detailed operationalisation of the rules dimension. As presented in 
Section 2.2 seven ideal-type rules for Integrated River Basin Management (IRBM) 
have been derived from the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) frame-
work. These analytical units show some degree of redundancy, which is considered 
functional for observing incremental changes.  
 
The principal entrance of this research is the rules of the game corner. Collective-choice 
rules on the sustainable use, development and management of water (in relation to 
other related natural resources) are shaped by the continuous interplay among prior 
rules, policy discourses, actor coalitions and oppositions and configurations of 
resources and power within the overall physical, social, economic and political con-
text. Within this research the WFD is interpreted as a set of European collective-
choice IRBM rules and principles (with regard to both organisational and substantive 
issues) that enters the International Meuse River Basin District in December 2000. 
The transformative impact of this framework will depend on how its rules and princi-
ples will be interpreted, translated, negotiated and/or transformed into collective-
choice rules by networks of multiple actors at and across the interrelated multilateral, 
bilateral and domestic political levels. This research questions whether and to which 
extent do these new European requirements challenges prior collective-choice rules 
within the water policy domain. Potential explanations for continuity or change of 
rules will be explored by means of theories around the PAA’s dimensional corners.  
The Subsections 2.2.3 till 2.2.9 already provided for ideal-type IRBM collective-
choice rules. By means of these ideal-types the seven rule types of Elinor Ostrom may 
be assessed at different political levels within the International Meuse River Basin 
District before and after introduction of the WFD. As such the ideal-types act as a 
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benchmark to track continuity and (incremental) changes of rules over time. As a next 
step in this Chapter the Subsections 2.3.2 till 2.3.4 will introduce the three other 
dimensions of the PAA: policy discourses, actors (coalitions and oppositions) and the 
division of resources and power. These Subsections are informed by notions from a 
range of theories in the political and social sciences (as thoroughly presented by Hay, 
2002; Meijerink and Van Tatenhove, 2007; and Padt, 2007) and analytical frameworks 
of the policy process (as compared by Schlager, 1999; Meijerink, 2005; Crabbé, 2008 
and Meijerink and Huitema, 2009). Potential triggers and barriers for institutionali-
sation of the new set of European rules and principles may become noticeable from 
the interactions within the configuration of the four PAA’s dimensions. Be aware that 
the prior rules (before adoption of the WFD) will be assessed by means of the ideal-
types of the Subsections 2.2.3 till 2.2.9. Hence, within this Section 2.3 there is no sub-
section on the rules dimension. 
 
2.3.2 Policy discourses 
The term discourse as applied in the social sciences goes beyond the use of language 
in everyday speech, discussion and/or modes of talking (Van den Brink and Metze, 
2006). It is more specific in nature (ibid.). Discourse can be defined as ‘a specific en-
semble of ideas, concepts and categorisations that are produced, reproduced and 
transformed into a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to 
physical and social realities’ (Hajer, 1995: 44). Similarly, Dryzek (2005: 9) defines a 
discourse as: 
 
[..] a shared way of apprehending the world. Embedded in language, it enables those 
who subscribe to it to interpret bits of information and put them together into co-
herent stories or accounts. Discourses construct meanings and relationships, helping 
to define common sense and legitimate knowledge. Each discourse rests on assump-
tions, judgements and contentions that provide the basic terms for analysis, debates, 
agreements and disagreements.  
 
Thus understood, discourse refers to a set of concepts that structure the contributions 
of participants in a discussion, as embedded in language (Hajer, 2006). Based on these 
two discourse definitions and structuration theory (Giddens, 1984 and 1990), the 
founding fathers of the PAA define policy discourses as ‘dominant interpretative 
schemes, ranging from formal policy concepts to popular story lines, by which 
meaning is giving to a policy domain’ (Arts, Van Tatenhove and Leroy, 2000: 63).  
Fischer and Forester (1993) argue that qualitative social research has a lot to gain 
from the extra dimension that discourse analysis offers since it pays explicit attention 
to meaning and arguments. Discourse analysis ‘provides instruments to describe the 
shared or divided meanings and the sometimes minimal changes in these meanings 
and arguments, which often stay out of sight with institutional analysis of [actors’] 
interests’ (Van den Brink and Metze, 2006; 14). Hajer (2006: 70, original italics) links 
notions on meanings and arguments to power and dominance through discourse coa-
litions: ‘a group of actors that, in the context of an identifiable set of practices, shares the us-
age of a particular set of story lines over a particular period of time’. Practices are to 
be understood as ‘embedded routines and mutually understood rules and norms that 
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provide coherence to social life’ (ibid.). Discourses that become dominant may be a 
trigger for institutional change or as Hajer (2006: 70) argues: 
 
[..] We thus have a simple two-step procedure for measuring the influence of a dis-
course: if many people use it to conceptualise the world (discourse structuration) and 
if it solidifies into institutions and organisational practices (discourse institutionalisa-
tion). If both criteria are fulfilled we argue that a particular discourse is dominant. 
 
Hajer’s ideas on politics as a struggle for discursive hegemony come close to those of 
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999). They argue that advocacy coalitions of private and 
public actors across political levels struggle for dominancy of their policy core beliefs. 
The battle for dominant policy discourses may be one explanation for observed insti-
tutional dynamics (Liefferink, 2006; Padt, 2007).  Dryzek (2005) challenges the hege-
monic assumption. In the case of environmentalism he observes a variety of dis-
courses, sometimes complementing one another, but often competing, which all may 
inform both informal and formal practices (ibid.). Also Huitema (2002: 12) who has 
conducted a detailed discourse analysis of hazardous waste policy decision processes 
in the United Kingdom, Netherlands and Canada, doubts the assumption of the single 
discourse hegemony: 
  
I speak of a possible mixture of discourses, because I do not believe that one 
discourse will necessarily be hegemonic in the sense that Hajer meant it. For certain, 
one discourse on facility siting may be very relevant at the collective choice level at 
some point in time, but this may rapidly change and be completely different at the 
operational level. 
 
Regarding the policy discourse dimension, the PAA has been influenced significantly 
by Hajer’s conceptualisation (Arts, Van Tatenhove and Leroy, 2000). Central in 
Hajer’s argumentative approach are discourses, story lines and discourse coalitions. 
His approach focuses on the constitutive role of discourses in political processes and 
allocates a central role to the discoursing subjects, in the context of the idea of duality 
of structure (Hajer, 1995). Storylines are defined as narratives on social reality through 
which elements of many different domains are combined and that provide actors with 
a set of symbolic references that suggest a common understanding (Hajer, 1995). 
Storylines are essential elements in the clustering of knowledge, the positioning of 
actors and the creation of coalitions amongst the actors within a given policy domain 
(ibid.). Discourse coalitions are defined as ‘the ensemble of (1) a set of storylines; (2) 
the actors who utter these storylines; and (3) the practices in which this discursive 
activity is based. Storylines are here seen as the discursive cement that holds a dis-
course coalition together’. (Hajer, 1995: 65) 
Arts, Van Tatenhove and Leroy (2000) define policy discourses as interpretative 
schemes of actors that help them to understand and give meaning to environmental 
problems and to design possible strategies and tactics to tackle them. In general a 
policy arrangement can be characterised by one dominant policy discourse, the con-
tent of which is continuously challenged by (elements of) competing discourses (ibid.). 
Informed by Foucault and Giddens the main theoretical thesis of this argumentative 
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approach is ‘that one can observe how the institutional practices in the environmental 
domain work accordingly to identifiable policy-discourses that through their storylines 
provide the signpost for action within these institutional practices’ (Hajer, 1995: 264). 
In interaction arguments and information are exchanged which leads to changes in 
definitions of reality and through that to changed patterns of interaction (Van Taten-
hove, Arts and Leroy, 2000).  
 
The discourses dimension links with the resources and power dimension through 
discursive power (Liefferink, 2006). Dryzek (2005: 9) argues that discourses are bound up 
with political power: ‘Sometimes it is a sign of power that actors can get the discourse 
to which they subscribe accepted by others.’ The other way around, discourses can 
themselves embody power in the way they condition the perceptions and values of 
those subject to them, such that some interests are advanced, others suppressed (Fou-
cault, 1980). The impact of a discourse can often be assessed from both the policies as 
issued by governments or intergovernmental bodies and in institutional structures 
(Dryzek, 2005: 20). ‘Beyond affecting institutions, discourses can become embedded 
in institutions.’ Sometimes discourses may take indirect effects on the policies or 
institutions of government such as individuals and communities who create an alter-
native political economy based on self-sufficiency. Furthermore, there may be direct 
impacts on society and culture ‘without having to pass through formal institutions or 
public policies’. For example, feminism has changed the division of labour in house-
holds (ibid.). Whether discourse coalitions may alter actual rules configurations 
depends on the power and resources of these coalitions (Hajer, 1995).  
According to discursive approaches rules change may occur when actors succeed 
in attracting other actors to a certain policy discourse (Crabbé, 2008).  Dryzek (2005) 
argues that the more complex a situation, the larger is the number of plausible per-
spectives upon it. He refers to environmental problems as interconnected and multi-
dimensional, hence complex. Since they are by definition found at the intersection of 
ecosystems and human social systems, they are double complex (ibid.). Dewulf et al. 
(2005) argue that whenever multiple and interdependent users of natural resources 
frame issues in very different ways, ambiguity will result, i.e. the coexistence of two or 
more equally plausible interpretation possibilities. Consequently, integrated manage-
ment of natural resources requires dealing with frame differences as part of a conti-
nuous process of negotiation and social learning, in a reciprocal way by mutually 
acknowledging frames and connecting them. ‘Some or all parties will have to revise, 
enlarge or reframe the way they relate to the issues and to each other, in order to 
support mutual understanding and common action.’ (ibid.: 115)  
One may even argue that the vaguer (or more ambiguous) a policy discourse is, 
the more open it is to different interpretation frames, the greater its mobilising capa-
city and the more impressive its consensus ability is (Arts, Van Tatenhove and Leroy, 
2000; Crabbé, 2008). Following this argument, the degrees of interpretation freedom 
with regard to the organisational and substantive rules and principles of the WFD, 
offers opportunities for mobilising capacity and consensus building. Storylines, being 
the attractive and often seductive one-liner versions of policy discourses, may enable 
various or even opposing policy actors to join forces (Arts, Van Tatenhove and Leroy, 
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2000). The risk underneath these seductive one-liner versions may be that substantial 
differences in opinions and perceptions among stakeholders (on both means and 
ends) are hidden under a thin layer of verbal consensus. Consequently, joint forces 
may turn out to be opportunistic, short term alliances and/or may hold the danger of 
symbolic planning outcomes (Hendriks et al., 1999).   
From an analytical perspective not only the resources and power dimension, but 
also the rules of the game dimension closely relates to the policy discourse dimension 
(Liefferink, 2006). Whenever (a coalition of) actors succeed(s) to convince or overrule 
others of the importance to conceptualise an issue by means of a preferred set of 
storylines, these may challenge the current configuration of rules. Discourses may be 
interpreted as preferences or prescriptions for certain types of institutional arrange-
ments, since different discourses may emphasise different actors, different roles, 
different relations and different methods of interest aggregation (Huitema, 2002). 
Linking up with the rules dimension, entering the policy arrangement tetrahedron 
from the corner of policy discourses offers opportunities for empirical analysis at two 
different levels. The first level refers to general ideas about the organisation of society, 
particularly the relationship between the state, market and civil society, i.e. about the 
preferred mode of governance (Liefferink, 2006; see rules of governance in Figure 2.1). 
Such ideas clearly exceed specific policy issues or sectors. Through the views of actors 
involved however, they may have an impact on specific policy arrangements. The 
second level concerns ideas about the concrete policy issues at stake, such as the 
character of the problem, its causes and possible solutions. Discourses at this level 
imply substantive strategic positions of actors in the arrangement (ibid.). For this  
second (substantive) level, this research suggests to add policy principles between the 
policy discourses and rules of the game dimensions in Figure 2.1. Groups of actors 
around one particular discourse (so-called discourse coalitions) may be discerned at 
both levels, substantive and organisational (Liefferink, 2006).   
 
The seven rule types of the IAD framework cover both substantive and organisational 
aspects within a nested hierarchy of four levels of action situations, i.e. meta-
constitutional, constitutional, collective-choice and operational (Ostrom, 2005; 
McGinnis, 2011). As elaboration of the policy discourse dimension of the PAA,  
Wiering and Arts (2006) sketch a three-layered discursive body. The ontological nu-
cleus of this body includes deeply rooted views and paradigms on how to rule the 
world, which are very resistant to change, e.g. as solidified by constitutions. With  
regard to a given policy (sub)domain, a normative skin of policy and governance prin-
ciples covers the nucleus. These principles reflect the collective-choices for coping 
with a (set of interrelated) policy issue(s). Although these principles, whenever institu-
tionalised in certain organisational entities and policy programmes, may dominate 
during a long period of time, they may be altered relatively more easily than constitu-
tional choices. The third discursive layer concerns the strategic coating, i.e. operational 
rules and daily practices which may be adapted soon as new insights have developed. 
The discursive body of a specific policy (sub) domain must be viewed in the overall 
political and socio-economic context, as captured by political modernisation (Van 
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Tatenhove, Arts and Leroy, 2000) and the meta-constitutional level of analysis            
(Ostrom, 2005; McGinnis, 2011). 
The three discursive layers come close to the tripartite, hierarchical structure of 
belief systems in the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) as developed by Sabatier 
and Jenkins-Smith (1999: 121-122). They distinguish deep core beliefs, policy core beliefs and 
secondary beliefs. The deep core of a shared belief system includes ontological and 
normative beliefs which operate across virtually all policy domains and which are very 
resistant to change. Policy core beliefs ‘represent a coalition’s basic normative 
commitments and causal perceptions across an entire policy domain or subsystem’ 
(ibid.). These beliefs may be considered the normative skin of collective-choices such 
as regarding the appropriate division of authority between governments and markets, 
the level of government best suited to deal with the problem and the basic policy 
instruments to be used. ‘The ACF assumes that policy core – not deep core – beliefs 
are the fundamental glue of coalitions because they represent basic normative and 
empirical commitments within the domain of specialisation of policy elites’ (Sabatier 
and Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 121-122).  
Finally, secondary aspects of a coalition’s belief system point at a large set of nar-
rower, near-surface beliefs concerning the seriousness of the problem or the relative 
importance of various causal factors in specific regions, policy preferences, the design 
of specific institutions to tackle a problem and the evaluations of various actors’ per-
formance (ibid.). Secondary beliefs may be considered the strategic coating, as ex-
pressed by operational rules and practices. ‘The basic argument of the ACF is that, 
although policy-oriented learning often alters secondary aspects of a coalition’s belief 
system, changes in the policy core aspects of a governmental program require a per-
turbation in no-cognitive factors external to the subsystem.’ (Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith, 1999: 123) Secondary belief aspects are assumed to be more readily adjusted in 
light of new data, new experience, or changing strategic considerations, e.g. by across-
coalition, policy-oriented learning (ibid.: 122).  
Since policy discourses may concern both organisational and substantive issues, 
all seven rule types of Ostrom may have a link with this dimension. For example, posi-
tion and boundary rules (who is in a position to act and who is not) reflect power asym-
metries which may on the one hand support prevailing discourse coalitions and on the 
other hand may provoke discourse oppositions to flourish and gain more influence. 
Choice rules point at actions which are and which are not allowed, e.g. as embedded in 
and influenced by dominant policy discourses. Aggregation rules may reflect and/or 
influence discursive power relations. Information rules affect the availability and access 
to certain information channels as such reflect and/or affect power asymmetries 
among discourse coalitions and oppositions. Pay-off rules establish incentives and deter-
rents for action which may affect dominancy of certain discourse coalitions and/or 
oppositions. Scope rules may reflect discursive power (which issues are included or 
excluded?) and reversely, discursive power changes may induce scope rules change 
(which ideas become dominant?).  
Within this research, the seven rule types of the IAD framework (Ostrom, 2005) 
are studied at the collective-choice level, i.e. what is the impact of the WFD’s gover-
nance rules and policy principles on water policy arrangements at interrelated political 
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levels within the International Meuse River Basin District? To which extent does this 
European water policy discourse challenge current collective-choice rules?  
These collective-choice rules at the European level relate to the normative skin of 
the discursive body which is informed by both constitutional choices and operational 
rules and daily practices of actors in the Member States of the European Union in 
interaction with actors in the European institutions. Regarding the policy 
discourses dimension, the following questions guide the analysis of this research: 
 
 What are the dominant and opposing arguments on governance and policy prin-
ciples in the water policy domain at interrelated political levels within the Interna-
tional Meuse River Basin District before and after adoption of the Water Frame-
work Directive? 
 Which potential explanations do (lack of) changes in these arguments over time 
deliver with regard to observed continuities and/or changes in collective-choice 
rules? 
 
2.3.3 Actors 
Scholars in social and political sciences have to deal with the classic divide between 
structure and agency, or duality of structure, as addressed extensively by Giddens 
(1984; 1990). Many theories seem to struggle with this duality and approach it from 
different stances. Some theories emphasise the intentions, reasons and motives of 
acting agencies, while other theories mainly stress structures and their dominance over 
agents. See for an extensive introduction to the rich palette of theories: Sabatier (1999: 
6-12); Hay (2002: 1-54); Howlett and Ramesh (2003: 20-49); Padt (2007: 19-24);    
Meijerink and Van Tatenhove (2007: 185-198) and Crabbé (2008: 24-25). This re-
search departs from the conclusion that both structure and agency (in their undeniable 
relations and interactions) need to be included in any analysis of institutional deve-
lopment within a policy domain during a certain time period. Both the PAA and the 
IAD framework embrace this conclusion hence, also for this argument, are considered 
appropriate analytical tools. 
The IAD framework is often mentioned as an example of rational-choice institu-
tionalism. The framework, however, goes beyond the limitations of the (too) narrowly, 
agency-centred rational-choice theory. Rational-choice theory denies the existence of any 
kinds of action other than the purely rational and calculative by self-interested indi-
viduals (Scott, 2000). Individual actors are considered to have a clear and transitive 
hierarchy of preferences such that in any given context there is only one optimal 
course of action available to them (Hay, 2002). For rationalist models, context deter-
mines conduct and structure determines agency (ibid.). Rational-choice models show 
great difficulties in explaining collective action, the origins of social norms (especially 
those of altruism, reciprocity and trust) and social structures (Scott, 2000; Hay, 2002). 
Rational-choice institutionalism aims to balance more between structure and agency. It ‘is a 
family of frameworks focusing on how institutional rules alter the behaviour of in-
tendedly rational individuals motivated by material self-interest’ (Sabatier, 1999: 8). 
Although the IAD framework has part of its roots in rational-choice theory (e.g.   
gaming), Ostrom (2005: 64) explicitly takes on board a broader view: 
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Instead of completely independent decision making, individuals may be embedded in 
communities where unobserved norms of fairness and conservation may change the 
structure of a situation dramatically. Within these situations participants may adopt a 
broader range of strategies than expected using an assumption of a narrow self-
interest. Further, individuals may change their strategies over time as they learn about 
the results of past actions. 
 
In the IAD framework action situations are central as the “black box” in which policy 
choices are made by actors in interaction and as influenced by exogenous variables, i.e. 
biophysical conditions, attributes of the community and rules-in-use (McGinnis, 
2011). The rules-in-use include formal rules (or rules on paper), the repertoire of 
norms, strategies and rules being used on a regular basis by participants and property 
rights. Attributes of the community point at all relevant aspects of the social and 
cultural context, within which an action situation is located, i.e. trust, reciprocity, 
common understanding, social capital and cultural repertoire. (ibid.) The IAD frame-
work aims to explain for degrees of collective action, e.g. around the management of 
common pool resources. 
Within the rational-choice institutionalism family, whereas historical institutionalism 
points at the importance of path dependency (North, 1990; Pierson, 2000), sociological 
institutionalism focuses on the impact of norms and values of organisation as developed 
over time (March and Olson, 1989). Institutions tend to reproduce themselves and 
may harden their profile of values even when their environment changes (Peters, 
2005). They do not automatically adapt to structural societal and political changes and 
this may lead to suboptimal performance, for example by legitimising prevailing poli-
cies rather than changing them (March and Olson, 1989). If so, this implies that poli-
tics may become highly symbolic and that the so-called rational decision-making be-
comes little more than a ritual (ibid.). This however, does not imply that actors cannot 
intervene in the allocation of resources and the set of rules. Rationalists believe that 
games can be designed purposefully by changing the institutional constraints (North, 
1990). If there is a logical need for an institution, it will be created by rational interven-
tion of actors. This view holds that structure follows strategy (Parsons, 1995). 
Given path dependency, actors are socialised within institutional settings which 
define informal rules and procedures (Rosamond, 2000). Accordingly, logics of appropri-
ateness (March and Olson, 1989; Hall and Taylor, 1996) and bounded rationality (Simon, 
1957) may better explain political behaviour than those which assume instrumental 
self-interest (Hay, 2002). Or as Padt (2007: 21) describes logics of appropriateness: ‘If 
an institution is effective in influencing the behaviour of its members, those members 
will think more about whether an action conforms to the norms and values of the 
institution than about what the individual consequences will be’. Bounded rationality 
refers to the fact that human rationality is limited in terms of incomplete and frag-
mented knowledge, observation and communication, memory of the human mind, 
attention spans and the psychological and organisational environment (Simon, 1957).  
The IAD framework acknowledges path dependency, bounded rationality and 
logics of appropriateness. For example, inclusion of rules-in-use and property rights 
point at historical paths chosen. Additionally, common understanding, social capital 
and cultural repertoire implicitly refer to logics of appropriateness. Furthermore, the 
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limits of agency (in its interaction with structure) are expressed by the framework’s 
formulation of outcomes: ‘Outcomes are generated by the conjuncture of the outputs 
of a given action situation, other closely related action situations and exogenous influ-
ences that may not always be subject to effective control of human intervention.’ 
(McGinnis, 2011: 176). Also the PAA acknowledges the dual relationship between 
structures and agents by considering institutionalisation as the ongoing processes of 
transformations by which structures are (re)produced in interaction with agencies 
(Van Tatenhove and Leroy, 2000). Within this approach, institutionalisation ‘refers 
primarily (a) to the phenomenon whereby over time day to day actors’ behaviour so-
lidifies into patterns and structures, whereas these patterns in turn structure day to day 
actors’ behaviour’ (Leroy and Arts, 2006: 7). ‘As a consequence and secondly, the 
concept refers (b) to the gradual sedimentation of meanings into rules of behaviour 
and organisational structures, that in turn reproduce and recreate these meanings’ 
(ibid.). Institutions are ‘more or less commonly accepted rules of the game, coalitions, 
discourses and problem definitions, acknowledged and legitimised in the context of a 
policy arrangement’ (Van Tatenhove and Leroy, 2000: 20).  
 
The PAA includes explicit attention to agency by inclusion of the actors’ dimension, 
as informed by theories on policy networks (Rhodes, 1984; Marsh and Rhodes, 1992; 
Kickert, Klein and Koppenjan, 1997), discourse coalitions (Hajer, 1995) and advocacy 
coalitions (Sabatier, 1988; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999). In the framework’s ap-
proach of the actor dimension, coalitions and oppositions are central. As actors do 
not act individually in policy practices but most of the time in concert, it is useful not 
to focus on individuals or on single organisations but on (inter-organisational) coali-
tions (Arts, Van Tatenhove and Leroy, 2000). Each coalition consists of a number of 
actors who share interpretations of a policy discourse and/or resources, in the context 
of the rules of the game. Some coalitions may support the dominant policy discourses 
or rules of the game, while others might challenge these (supporting versus challeng-
ing coalitions) (ibid.). In public administration science policy networks are defined as 
more or less stable patterns of social relations between interdependent actors, which 
take shape around policy problems and/or policy programmes (Kickert, Klein and 
Koppenjan, 1997). Following this perspective, joining a policy coalition is considered a 
strategic choice by actors, aiming to achieve their goals and therefore looking for part-
ners with whom policy interpretations are shared and an acceptable consensus can be 
reached (Arts, Van Tatenhove and Leroy, 2000). As long as there is no shared percep-
tion of the content of the problem, it is difficult to be sure about the strategies other 
parties will develop and it will also be difficult to decide upon one’s own course of 
action (Van Bueren, Klijn and Koppenjan, 2003; Ostrom, 2005).  
An important step in building coalitions and oppositions concerns framing of 
problems by multiple actors in the agenda-setting stage of a policy life cycle (Howlett 
and Ramesh, 2003). Prevailing frames are not always widely, or as strongly, held by all 
important policy actors, hence the agenda-setting process is very often one in which a 
clash of frames occurs (Bleich, 2002). True, Jones and Baumgartner (1999) point at 
policy change which may be induced by policy opponents who manage to fashion new 
policy images, e.g. by successfully exploiting multiple venues that are generally present  
70 CHAPTER 2 
 
in a policy domain. When advocates of policy change actively search for venues, this 
strategic behaviour is called venue shopping (ibid.) Kingdon (1995), in his Multiple 
Streams Framework, introduces policy entrepreneurs, i.e. stakeholders who (try to) make 
use of windows of opportunity through which acknowledgement and framing of 
problems, identification and selection of potential policies to deal with the problems 
and political developments come together. Policy entrepreneurs connect certain issues 
to preferred solutions and actively try to ascertain political support for their problem-
solution combinations (Crabbé, 2008; Meijerink and Huitema, 2009). As such, policy 
entrepreneurs may be key actors in building coalitions and oppositions.  
Within an advocacy coalition parties share a set of normative and causal beliefs 
(i.e. deep core values and policy beliefs) and show a non-trivial degree of coordinated 
behaviour to realise their objectives and policy proposals (Sabatier, 1988). A basic 
argument of the ACF is that core and policy beliefs of an advocacy’s coalition’s policy 
and policy program are resistant to change (Dudley and Richardson, 1996). Sabatier 
and Jenkins-Smith (1999) mention that for radical transformations of core values and 
policy beliefs, a perturbation external to the policy subsystem is necessary such as 
changes in socio-economic conditions, public opinion, in systemic governance 
coalitions or policy decisions and impacts from other subsystems. Learning within and 
across advocacy coalitions may account for incremental change of secondary aspects 
of a belief system, e.g. the less than subsystem-wide beliefs concerning problems, 
causes and remedies (ibid.; Meijerink, 2005). Supporting conditions for cross-coalition 
learning are analytically tractable issues, an intermediate level of informed conflict and 
the presence of professional forums prestigious enough for members of opposing 
coalitions to participate in (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). 
From an institutional perspective, the formation and development of policy coa-
litions is linked to processes of political modernisation in which globalisation and 
individualisation are among the central elements (Arts, Van Tatenhove and Leroy, 
2000). The process of political modernisation is paralleled by the involvement of ever 
more private and public actors in national and international environmental politics, 
thereby inducing the broadening of policy coalitions (ibid.). The broadening of 
coalitions takes place in two directions, as both horizontal interrelations (at one poli-
tical level) and vertical interrelations (between different levels) have grown (Arts, 
1990). Also local-global coalitions may occur, a process which may be labelled as 
trans-nationalisation of policy coalitions (Hoogenboom, 1988). Arts, Van Tatenhove 
and Leroy (2000) ask whether the nation-state retreats in favour of international and 
sub-national levels in the face of globalisation and European integration. And if so, 
how are policies made and implemented in this system of multi-level governance? 
(ibid.) Although this research does not choose the role of the nation state as the cen-
tral research topic, it will include observations of the role of the Dutch national gov-
ernment as one important agent.  
Entering the policy arrangement tetrahedron at the actors’ corner, research ques-
tions can be theoretically inspired, for instance by macro-theories on changes in the 
relationship between the state, market and civil society, or more practice-oriented, 
focusing on the roles, positions and strategies of actors (Liefferink, 2006). 
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In the tetrahedron, actors and discourses meet in discourse coalitions, actors and rules in 
rules of interaction and actors and power in relational power (see Figure 2.1 in Section 2.1). 
Within the PAA the IAD’s rule types may be considered as a configuration of inter-
action rules, as informed both by structure as well as agency. The WFD’s governance 
and policy principles may challenge prior rules configurations within Member States. 
Given the no generalisable nature of IRBM different political, social, economic 
and/or physical contexts (e.g. within, shared international river basins) may ask for 
local tailor-made solutions, as the outcome of more or less participatory processes in 
which multiple actors are involved and supposed to arrive at collective choices. Key-
words to link actors with the seven IAD’s rule types are coalitions and oppositions as 
illustrated (in a no-limitative way) by the analytical questions of Table 2.10.  
 
Table 2.10: Analytical questions relating actors and IRBM collective-choice rule types 
Type of rule↓ Actors↓ 
Scope:  Are there coalitions of actors (at and across interrelated political 
levels) who advocate transformation of existing or introduction of 
new organisational structures for (integrated) river basin management 
If so do they manage to convince or overrule opposing coalitions?  
Position: To which extent are coalitions of actors (at and across interrelated 
political levels) who aim for reallocation of user and property rights, 
challenged by oppositions? 
Boundary  
(entry or exit):  
To which extent may public, private and civil actors (at and across 
interrelated political levels) have access to (coalitions for) policy im-
plementation planing and decision-making? Who oppose such 
access? 
Choice  
(authority): 
Do coalitions of actors (at and across related political levels) strive 
for integrated supply and demand rules for the benefit of all? To 
which extent do coalitions oppose an integrated approach?  
Aggregation: Does symmetric decision-making by coalitions of actors (at and 
across related political levels) take place and which role does the 
subsidiarity principle play? 
Information: What kind of information do dominant coalitions of actors (at and 
across related political levels) support in the river basin management 
planning and decision-making process? For example, to which extent 
does expert knowledge dominate the process and is lay knowledge 
included?  
Pay-off: What are trade-off opportunities that may trigger coalitions of actors 
to invest in collaborative capital for collective arrangements on the 
sustainable use, development and management and use of shared 
water resources? Does a majority of actors express shared ownership 
of the (objectives and measures in the) river basin management 
plans? 
 
 
To conclude this Subsection, for the purpose of this research the rules of the game are 
the principal entrance into the policy arrangement tetrahedron. The seven rule types 
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of the IAD framework (Ostrom, 2005; see Table 2.1 in Subsection 2.2.1) are inter-
preted as collective-choices which at the same time may guide and be challenged by 
actor coalitions and oppositions in river basin management planning and decision 
making processes. The actual configuration of rules may be abandoned, transformed 
or (re-)invented due to multiple (strategically operating) actors who may turn out to be 
active policy entrepreneurs (in the search for change) or their opponents (aiming to 
protect the status quo). The interactions between all these actors at and across interre-
lated political levels within an international river basin should be understood in the 
context of dual interaction with structural features which include both triggers and 
barriers for rule changes. Coalitions and oppositions are keywords in the analysis of 
the actor dimension, as guided by the subsequent questions: 
 
 Which (types of) actor coalitions and oppositions do we notice at interrelated 
political levels within the International Meuse River Basin District before and af-
ter introduction of the Water Framework Directive? Are these policy discourse 
and/or resources coalitions? 
 Which potential explanations do (lack of) changes in actor coalitions and opposi-
tions over time deliver regarding the observed continuities and/or changes in col-
lective-choice rules? 
 
The concept of policy entrepreneurs refers to ‘certain individuals and organisations that 
potentially effect policy change (“change agents”)’ and their strategies (Huitema and 
Meijerink, 2009: 8). Although this concept offers an interesting option for an in-depth 
analysis of the actors’ dimension, it would go beyond the principal entrance of this 
research which is incremental change in the collective-choice rules configurations 
within the water policy domain in a particular time period. For the aims of this re-
search an identification of actors’ coalitions and oppositions is considered sufficiently 
detailed. Furthermore, an in-depth analysis of diverse individual actors and organisa-
tions at and across interrelated political levels within the International Meuse River 
Basin District would require a significant research effort on its own.  
 
2.3.4 Resources and power 
Similar to other policy implementation processes, one important question in IRBM is 
who have the power, resources and influence to plan, decide and act and who have 
not. The concept of power may be approached from an one-dimensional, two-dimensional, 
or three-dimensional view (Lukes, 2005). The central assumption of the one-dimensional view 
is the primacy of decision-making on observable, overt controversial issues, as ex-
pressed by competing and collaborating interests groups in the political process.  
Subjective interests are seen as policy preferences revealed by political participation 
(ibid.). Dahl (1957) describes this ‘intuitive [one-dimensional] view of the power rela-
tion’ as ‘to involve a successful attempt by A to get B to do something he would not 
otherwise do’.  
The two-dimensional view adds the unarticulated, covered or suppressed interests 
and includes potential issues and nondecision-making (Lukes, 2005). In this view, 
(subjective) interests are seen as policy preferences or grievances (of which people 
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might even be mistaken about or unaware of) (ibid.). Bachrach and Baratz (1970) 
claim that power shows two faces, one for decision-making and one for nondecision-
making. Both should be regarded as attempts of a person or a group to limit the scope 
of the political process (ibid.). They refer to Schattschneider (1960: 71) who argues 
that ‘all forms of political organisation have a bias in favour of the exploitation of 
some kinds of conflicts and the suppression of others’. Consequently, ‘Some issues are 
organised into politics while others are organised out’ (ibid.). Contrary to the one-
dimensional view interests groups are not thought of as free-forming, voluntary, com-
petitive, or autonomous, for they depend on the state for recognition and support in 
return for a role of in policy-making (Schmitter, 1977; Howlett and Ramesh, 2003). 
Pal (1993) points at states, that often maintain special ties with (and even may sponsor 
the establishment of) certain interests groups, e.g. for reasons of co-optation or ac-
commodation.  
In his three-dimensional view, which he presents as a radical one, Lukes (2005: 25-29) 
adds two elements. Firstly, control over the political agenda does not necessarily take 
place through decision-making, since ‘the bias of the system can be mobilised, 
recreated and reinforced in ways that are neither consciously chosen nor the intended 
result of particular individuals’ choices’. Moreover the bias of the system is also, most 
importantly sustained ‘by the socially structured and culturally patterned behaviour of 
groups and practices of institutions which may indeed be manifested by individuals’ 
inaction’. The phenomena of collective action and systemic or organisational effects 
may serve as examples. Secondly, Lukes (2005: 27, 59), in addition to actual conflicts, 
stresses the (importance of) various ways of suppressing latent conflicts within society: 
‘…that the most effective and insidious use of power is to prevent such conflict from 
arising in the first place’.  In rhetoric wording: ‘Indeed, is it not the supreme exercise 
of power to get another or others to have desires you want them to have – that is, to 
secure their compliance by controlling their thoughts and desires?’ (ibid.) Lukes (2005: 
28, original italics) defines latent conflicts as deriving from ‘…a contradiction between 
the interests of those exercising power and the real interests of those they exclude. The 
excluded may not express or even be conscious of their interests, an argument which 
does not ‘assume that the absence of grievance equals genuine consensus.’ (ibid.)   
The PAA departs at least from a two-dimensional view on power. In this analyti-
cal framework power has to be regarded on the one hand, as the ability of actors to 
mobilise resources and on the other hand, as a relational and a structural phenomenon 
of social and political systems (Arts, Van Tatenhove and Leroy, 2000). Power is about 
the asymmetrical distribution of resources (structural phenomenon) revealing itself in 
relations of autonomy and dependency between actors (relational phenomenon). The 
more these relations of power are objectified in institutional mechanisms and routines 
- fixing, so to speak, the allocation of competencies, qualifications, revenues and posi-
tions - the more natural and obvious domination seems (Frouws, 1993). Stakeholders 
strive to maintain and transform their social or physical environment by achieving 
certain policy outcomes. Such outcomes may be achieved not only by determining 
political decisions but also by dominating public debates, defining policy issues, setting 
agendas or even changing the rules of the game, either at national or at international 
level (Arts, Van Tatenhove and Leroy, 2000). With the attention to outcomes not only  
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from decision-making the founders of the PAA also seem to be informed by Lukes’ 
arguments on the third dimension of power. However, they do not (explicitly) express 
themselves about the questions of latent conflicts, real interests of the excluded and 
the issue of the excluded who may not express or even be conscious of their interests.  
 
Entering the policy arrangement tetrahedron at the corner of division of power and 
resources, three analytical perspectives become visible: relational power (i.e. the linkage 
with actors), discursive power (i.e. the linkage with policy discourses) and regulatory power 
(i.e. the linkage with rules of the game; Liefferink, 2006: 60; see Figure 2.1 in Section 
2.1). The empirical analysis to be undertaken in this perspective comes close to the 
British school of policy network analysis (as defined by Rhodes, 1984; Marsh and 
Rhodes, 1992). The core idea of a policy network analysis is that actors around a given 
policy issue are to different degrees dependent upon each other for resources, e.g. 
money, information or political legitimacy. Different resource coalitions may be iden-
tified. In one policy arrangement money may be the central stake while in another 
arrangement the exchange of for instance knowledge and expertise may be crucial 
(Liefferink, 2006). In the policy game resources can be seen as weapons, i.e. actors 
attempt to determine outcomes with the help of resources but at the same time as 
prizes, i.e. during the process actors attempt to improve their situation by changing 
the distribution of resources to their advantages (Rhodes, 1986).  
 
Rules play an ambiguous role, since they are based upon both formal and informal 
arrangements. On the one hand they can be used strategically, i.e. as legal resources, in 
the policy game. On the other hand they are not, as for instance money or personnel, 
exclusively controlled by certain actors. Rules can be changed nevertheless by actors 
who have the power to do so (Liefferink, 2006). The same actually goes for dis-
courses. Discourses can be used as weapons for gaining for instance political 
legitimacy. Without being under any actor’s exclusive control some actors may be able 
to change the content of the narratives prevailing in the arrangement or even to intro-
duce wholly new ones. Such discursive power is often based upon political legitimacy 
and in turn may induce legitimacy (ibid.) Power and influence are intrinsically related 
but there is no one-to-one relationship between them, as policy actors may decide not 
to make use of their resources and/or fail to achieve the outcomes they wanted.  
 
As expressed by regulatory power, the observed rules configuration at a certain moment 
in time at a given political level may reflect the division of resources and power at that 
level and interconnected other levels. Consequently, the detailed analysis of the seven 
rule types of the IAD framework may include implicit notions on incremental changes 
in resources and power. These implicit notions may be made more explicit by primary 
observations on this dimension. By combining observations on both dimensions a 
functional redundant research approach is aimed for. The reader should be aware that 
regulatory power may be expressed both by formal, written down rules and informal, 
unwritten customs, traditions and approaches. Furthermore, any change in the rules 
configuration may challenge distribution patterns and processes of resources and 
power and reversely. For example, boundary, position, choice and aggregation rules may 
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reflect the outcome of relational and regulatory power. And scope rules may be linked to 
discursive power. Table 2.11 illustrates the relations between division of resources and 
power and collective-choice rules for IRBM by means of a (no-limitative) series of 
analytical questions. 
 
Table 2.11: Analytical questions on resources/power and IRBM collective-choice rules 
Type of rule↓ Configuration of resources and power↓ 
Scope:  To which extent do different stakeholders acknowledge hydrological 
boundaries as point of departure for river basin planning and 
decision-making? Which stakeholders (are willing to) invest financial, 
human and/or technical capital in cross-sector integration attempts? 
Position: To which extent are powerful stakeholders willing and able to 
influence the (re-)allocation of uses and property rights, as based on 
principles of ecological, social and economic resilience? 
Boundary (en-
try or exit):  
Are there powerful actors who allow or hinder other actors (at and 
across interrelated political levels) to join the river basin planning and 
decision-making process? Which resources do public, private and 
civil actors bring in (e.g. money, expertise and human capital)? 
Choice (autho-
rity): 
To which extent does the distribution of resources and power sup-
port collective choices for sustainable development, management and 
use of shared, natural resources? 
Aggregation: To which extent does the division of power and resources support 
symmetric decision-making by at and across related political levels? 
How does it influence the subsidiarity principle and (limited) 
sovereignty principles? 
Information: Which types of information are gathered and aggregated? For exam-
ple, do powerful experts allow local lay knowledge to be included? 
Pay-off: Which role do market forces play a role in compliance checking for 
collective-choice rules?  
 
Although this research does not aim to elaborate all the questions of Table 2.11 in 
detail, this list will serve as a checklist to spot remarkable developments in the distri-
bution of resources and power in the studied period. In addition to the detailed analy-
sis of the rules dimension, two overall analytical questions are formulated in order to 
make the implicit notions on the distribution of resources and power more explicit: 
 
 Which changes are observed in the division of resources and power in the water 
policy domain at interrelated political levels within the international Meuse River 
Basin District before and after introduction of the Water Framework Directive? 
 Which potential explanations do (lack of) changes in the division of resources and 
power over time deliver regarding observed continuities and/or changes in collec-
tive-choice rules? 
 
It should be noted that power (in terms of resources and capacities) is relatively easy 
to assess, whereas it is very hard to measure political influence (Wiering and Arts, 
2006). This research does not analyse changes in influence since this would require a  
76 CHAPTER 2 
 
particular research approach on its own such as a social network analysis. To perform 
a social network analysis at different political levels would go beyond the principal 
scope of and available means for this research process.  
 
 
2.4 River basins and multi-level governance 
 
Van Tatenhove and Leroy (2003) argue that in order to understand change and sta-
bility in any policy domain, it will be necessary to combine an analysis of strategic 
conduct with an institutional analysis which includes processes of transformation 
within the political domain of society. Informed by Held (1989) they apply a broad 
concept of the political domain, defined as ‘the setting in which different agencies and 
organisations (from the state, market and civil society) produce and distribute re-
sources (power and domination) and meaning (discourses) to shape public life’ (Van 
Tatenhove and Leroy, 2003: 157-158). With regard to the broader political domain, 
several authors (e.g. Van Tatenhove and Leroy, 2003; Kooiman, 2003) mention a shift 
from government to governance, due to tendencies of globalisation, decentralisation, 
privatisation and (calls for) multi-stakeholder participation. Governance relates to the 
broad social system of governing which includes but is not restricted to the perspec-
tive of government as the main decision-making political entity (Rogers and Hall, 
2003). Kooiman (2003: 4) views governance as the totality of theoretical conceptions 
on governing. Subsequently, he provides for a definition of governing (ibid.): 
 
Governing can be considered as the totality of interactions, in which public as well as 
private actors participate, aimed at solving societal problems or creating societal 
opportunities; attending to the institutions as contexts for these governing 
interactions; and establishing a normative foundation for all those activities. 
 
A central presupposition of the IRBM concept is that (inter)national river basins are 
the most appropriate political level to arrive at collective-choice rules for the sustain-
able use, development and management of interconnected (ground- and surface) wa-
ter resources. Since what happens at a specific political level within a river basin may 
impact the rules configurations at other political levels (and reversely), any institutional 
analysis of a particular river basin should include structure and agency at all these in-
terdependent political levels.  
To grasp governance processes within the European context, Marks (1992) has 
phrased multi-level governance. Related to developments in EU structural policy following 
its major reform in 1988 he defines multi-level governance as ‘a system of continuous 
negotiation among nested governments at several territorial tiers’ (Marks, 1993: 392). 
Multi-level refers to the increased interdependence of governments at different territo-
rial levels (vertical dimension), while governance expresses the growing interdependence 
between governments and non-governmental actors at various territorial levels 
(horizontal dimension; Bache and Flinders, 2004). Rosenau (2004: 31) concludes that 
governance is a broader concept than government. The latter refers to formal rule 
systems of governments (local, regional, national and international).  
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Governance ‘refers to any collectivity, private or public that employs informal as well 
as formal steering mechanisms to make demands, frame goals, issue directives, pursue 
policies and generate compliance’ (ibid.). Jessop (2004: 52) mentions that ‘in broad 
terms governance refers to mechanisms and strategies of coordination adopted in the 
face of complex reciprocal interdependence among operationally autonomous actors, 
organisations and functional systems’. The state apparatus could be described ‘as 
based on “government + governance” and as exercising “governance in the shadow 
of hierarchy”‘(ibid.). Jessop (2004; 57) further elaborates the differences between gov-
ernment and governance: 
 
On the one hand, the sovereign state can be seen as the quintessential expression of 
hierarchy (imperative coordination) because it is, by definition, the political unit that 
governs but is not itself governed. Hence, beyond the sovereign state, we find the 
anarchy of interstate relations and/or the heterarchy of a self-organising international 
society. And, on the other hand, it is primarily concerned with governing activities in 
its own territorial domain and defending its territorial integrity against other states. In 
contrast, governance is based on reflexive self-organisation (networks, negotiation, 
negative coordination, positive concerted action) rather than imperative coordina-
tion. And it is concerned in the first instance with managing functional interdepend-
encies, whatever their scope (and perhaps with variable geometries), rather than as 
with activities occurring in a defined and delimited territory. 
 
In the European integration debate both neo-functionalists and intergovernmentalists 
focus on interactions between the national and the supranational levels (Bache and 
Flinders, 2004). Neofunctionalists argue that supranational actors and interests groups 
have a significant role in shaping EU decisions. Intergovernmentalists emphasise the 
centrality of sovereign states in the European policy making process. Informed by the 
policy networks approach Marks has added the influence of actors at the sub-national 
level (ibid.) Based on a review of a broad array of governance literature, Marks and 
Hooghe (2004) notice two central claims. Firstly, the dispersion of governance across 
multiple jurisdictions is both more efficient than and normatively superior to, central 
state monopoly. Secondly, in order to internalise variations in the territorial reach of 
policy externalities, governance must be multi-level (Marks and Hooge, 2004). For 
example, in the context of river basin management some issues could be better dealt 
with at the European level (e.g. product regulation in relation to safeguarding a level 
playing field), at the multilateral table (e.g. equitable distribution of fresh water in pro-
longed periods of droughts), at the national level (tariff setting for cost-recovery of 
water services) and the local level (organising stakeholder participation for cleaning up 
a specific water system). 
 
Bache and Flinders (2004) ask what implications multi-level governance does have for 
the power, position and role of the nation state. As is often assumed, does multi-level 
governance point at an erosion of the nation state or does it lead to a transformation 
or reorganisation of state power? In the context of the European Union, globalisation, 
integration and regionalisation are frequently mentioned as eroding factors for the 
power, position and role of the nation state. However, according to Sbragia (1992: 
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274, 289) governments ‘will continue to be central actors’ because ‘the territorial 
claims that national governments represents … are exceedingly strong’. And, ‘the 
importance of national boundaries as key organisers of political power and economic 
wealth in the European Community’ is not to be underestimated (ibid.). Keohane and 
Nye (2000: 12) argue that ‘the nation state is being supplemented by other actors - 
private and third sector…in a more complex geography’. Also Rosenau (2004: 33) 
argues that ‘States are still among the main players on the global stage but they are no 
longer the only main players’.   
In the multi-centric world states face challenges to their continuing authority and 
legitimacy (Evans, 1997; Rosenau, 2004). Jessop (2004: 63-69) poses three proposi-
tions about changes in statehood in advanced capitalist societies: (1) de-nationalisation 
of territorial statehood; (2) de-statization of the political system; and (3) the inter-
nationalization of policy regimes. These three trends should not be understood as 
excluding a continuing and central political role for nation states. But the role ‘is nec-
essarily redefined as a result of the more general re-articulation of the local, regional, 
national and supranational levels of economic and political organisation (ibid.). The 
state is no longer the sovereign authority (Jessop, 2004: 71). It is just one of the par-
ticipants in the pluralistic guidance system of negotiated decision-making, to which it 
contributes its own distinctive resources (ibid.). 
Casella and Weingast (1995) challenge the nested hierarchical structure of the na-
tion state, since this structure has no obvious economic rationale and is opposed by 
economic forces. Peters and Pierre (2004: 83) ague that multi-level governance is not 
controlled from above ‘as tends to be the rule in hierarchical systems’. Instead trans-
national institutions engage in direct communication with subnational actors or vice 
versa. In these multi-level games especially national actors may be concerned over loss 
of control over subnational institutions whilst simultaneously being expected to be 
able to ensure compliance with the policies, rules and programs of international insti-
tutions (ibid.). According to Jordan (2001) multi-level governance is not a theory but 
provides a description of the European Union. Although a mobilisation of subna-
tional authorities takes place (e.g. by Europe’s regional development policy), multi-
level governance overstates the autonomy and influence of subnational authorities 
(ibid.). Rooted in the American metropolitan context Ostrom, Tiebout and Warren 
(1961: 831) have introduced polycentricity as a term for the coexistence of ‘many centres 
of decision-making that are formally independent of each other‘. Public choice stu-
dents argue that instead of conceiving authority in neatly defined local, regional, na-
tional and international layers, each public good or service should be provided by the 
[task-specific] jurisdiction that effectively internalises its benefits and costs (Marks and 
Hooghe, 2004: 21). Rosenau (2003) mentions Spheres of Authority (SOAs) which include 
both formal and informal rule systems. These spheres are embedded in a context of 
contradictory forces of globalisation, centralisation and integration on the one hand 
and localisation, decentralisation and fragmentation on the other hand (Rosenau, 
1997).  
Marks and Hooghe (2004: 24) argue that task-specific jurisdictions are a common 
feature of international regimes. Such jurisdictions are ‘ubiquitous in efforts to inter-
nalise transnational spillovers in the absence of authorative coordination’ (ibid.). 
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Börzel and Risse (2003) conclude that except for international political economy, na-
tion states seem reluctant to provide private actors with true governance authority 
beyond their control. At the transition zone of national and international authority, 
task-specific jurisdictions tend to dominate (Marks and Hooghe, 2004). The European 
Union which is mainly a general-purpose jurisdiction, ‘is an exception that proves the 
rule’ (ibid.: 25). Transnational governance arrangements are usually task-specific and 
overlap with existing jurisdictions for solving particular collective action problems 
(Marks and Hooghe, 2004). ‘It is extremely difficult to tie national states into authora-
tive transnational jurisdictions that are general-purpose, rather than designed around 
particular policy problems.’ (ibid.: 25) Task-specific jurisdictions are widespread at the 
local level, for example where local communities face depletion of a common pool 
resource (Ostrom, 1990; Keohane and Ostrom, 1995; Marks and Hooghe, 2004). Al-
though governments often will be cautious to lose steering control, the mixture of 
general-purpose jurisdictions and task-specific jurisdictions may offer private and civil 
stakeholders diverse opportunities to (try to) influence policy planning and implemen-
tation processes.  
 
To conclude this Subsection, arrangements within a given policy domain are embed-
ded in the political domain of society, hence may reflect macro-scale developments 
over time. Within the European context the multi-level governance concept is an 
attempt to grasp the complex, multilayered institutional context of policy planning and 
decision-making processes at interconnected political levels. The IRBM concept as 
defined by the WFD considers (inter)national river basins as the appropriate units to 
arrive at collective arrangements. This research aims to sufficiently catch the meta-
institutional context by assessing and comparing the rules configurations within the 
water policy domain at different interrelated political levels within an international 
river basin during a twenty years period (from 1990 to 2009). The International Meuse 
River Basin District has been chosen as the theatre for analysis. Its multilateral com-
mission may be qualified as a clear example of a task-specific jurisdiction in the transi-
tion zone of national and international authority. 
 
 
2.5 Synthesis 
 
This research is inspired by an interest in triggers and barriers for changes in collec-
tive-choice rules within the water policy domain at and across political levels. The 
point of departure is the IRBM concept which aims at the sustainable use, develop-
ment and management of interrelated land-water resources. The WFD introduces a 
set of rules and principles at the European level, both organisational and substantive, 
in order to improve the quality (and quantity) of all surface and ground water systems 
in relation to sustainable human activities. The Directive has been formulated, negoti-
ated and adopted in an era in which IRBM has become one of the dominant para-
digms in the environmental policy domain. Due to both its laborious political drafting 
and negotiation process and the holistic character of the IRBM concept, the WFD is 
ambiguous in nature. Since the WFD opens the door to multiple interpretations it is 
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uncertain whether and if so, to which extent the WFD’s implementation process will 
challenge current rules configurations, especially among Member States that share 
international river basins. 
The central question of this research is, to which extent do the new European 
collective-choice rules challenge prior rules in the water policy domain. To answer this 
question two analytical frameworks have been presented which in combination allow 
both for assessment of trigger and barriers of collective-choice rules over time, as well 
as informs about potential explanations. The first framework is the PAA (Van Taten-
hove and Leroy, 2000; Liefferink, 2006; Arts and Leroy, 2006) which links four 
dimensions within a tetrahedron, i.e. (substantive and organisational) rules with policy 
discourses, actors (coalitions and oppositions) and division of resources and power  
(Liefferink, 2006: 60; see Figure 2.1 in Section 2.1). The principal entrance of this 
research is the rules of the game corner, since the focus is on (triggers and barriers for) 
changes of collective-choice rules on the sustainable use, development and manage-
ment of interrelated land-water resources. These rules are shaped by continuous inter-
action between actors, discourses, current rules as developed over time and distribu-
tion of power and resources on the one hand and driving forces in the broader physi-
cal, social, economic and political context on the other hand. A second clue lies in the 
IAD framework (Kiser and Ostrom, 1982; Ostrom, 1999, 2005). The IAD framework 
has its roots in studies on rules and games in governing common pool resources and 
includes (a definition of) seven rule types which may be applied to track and explain 
incremental changes over time (see Table 2.1 in Subsection 2.2.1).  
The theoretical novelty of this research is integration of the seven rule types of 
the IAD framework with the PAA, as elaboration of the latter’s rules of the game 
dimension. Based on a review of IRBM literature the seven rule types of the IAD 
framework have been translated into ideal-types (as defined by Weber, 1922). These 
ideal-types serve as an analytical benchmark to track incremental rule changes over 
time. By comparing the observations on rules in the era before and after adoption of 
the WFD, the degree of change may become traceable. Subsequently, analysis of 
developments within the other three dimensions of a policy arrangement may account 
for potential explanations for (triggers and barriers) of observed rules changes. Since 
the WFD’s river basin management approach focuses on shared river basins within 
the overall political domain of the European society, its implementation depends on 
coherence among policy arrangements at all involved, interdependent governance 
levels. Therefore for the aim of this research, the degrees of rules changes will be as-
sessed for both the interdependent political levels within the International Meuse 
River Basin District (multilateral, national, regional and local) and the European level. 
As a next step, Chapter 3 will present the (methodological choices behind the) re-
search framework before plunging into the empirical data of the Chapters 4 to 8. 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: ‘t Merkske Brook is the only WFD water body within the territory of the  
Brabantse Delta Water Management Authority for which the Good Ecological Status is 
considered feasible and affordable before the end of 2027 (Wim Zweep, 2006) 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Members of the General Assembly of the Brabantse Delta Water Management 
Authority played the the WFD implementation simulation game  
(Leo Santbergen, May, 24, 2007) 
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Research approach 
 
‘A credible inquiry generally has the effect on its readers of a mosaic image; often imprecise in terms of 
defining boundaries and specific relationships but very rich in providing depth of meaning and richness 
of understanding.’ Erlandson et al. (1993: 30) 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
As introduced in Chapter 1 the departure platform for this research is the Integrated 
River Basin Management (IRBM) concept. The river basin as a management or plan-
ning unit has gone through several stages since its western “discovery” in the 18th 
century to its advent as the overriding concept behind European water policy (Molle, 
2009). The concept has been interpreted in various ways to support different world 
views and has served diverse interests (ibid.). Although IRBM has been formally insti-
tutionalised at the level of the European Union by adoption of the Water Framework 
Directive (WFD), its ambiguous nature has remained unaltered. Fischer (2009: 175) 
argues that ambiguous meanings often have important political functions: 
 
Seeking to satisfy different interest groups at the same time, government policies fre-
quently compromise a sequence of ambiguous claims and actions that contain logical 
inconsistencies. […] What they [technocratic policy analysts] have generally missed, 
however, is the degree to which ambiguity enables conflicting groups to find ways to 
live with their differences. By helping to bring together citizens with varying policy 
preferences, ambiguous meanings often facilitate cooperation and compromise.  
 
Stone (2002: 157) points at the centrality of ambiguity in politics especially as 
expressed by symbols actors refer to. She argues that ‘a type of policy analysis that 
does not make room for the centrality of ambiguity in politics can be of little use in 
the real world’. Following the argumentation lines of Fischer and Stone, the ambiguity 
of the IRBM concept may be considered an essential feature for its political survival. 
Furthermore, whenever ambiguous meanings facilitate cooperation and compromise, 
incremental changes of collective-choice rules may be expected over radical shifts. The 
opposite may also be truth: whenever ambiguous claims trigger sharp polarisation (for 
example among political parties), radical rules change may come from a significant 
change of those in power (such us after parliamentary elections).  
This research is driven by a desire to understand how interpretation differences 
of an ambiguous policy concept may trigger or hinder changes in collective-choice 
rules that it advocates. The author’s professional job as WFD implementation coor-
dinator at the Brabantse Delta Water Management Authority offers a good opportu-
nity for an in-depth, inside-out analysis of the Dutch water policy domain within the 
European context by means of a participatory and interpretative research approach. 
As described in Chapter 2 this research works with a hybrid analytical framework 
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which incorporates the seven rule types of the Institutional Analysis and Development 
(IAD) framework (Kiser and Ostrom, 1982; Ostrom, 1999, 2005) into the Policy 
Arrangement Approach (PAA; Arts, Van Tatenhove and Leroy, 2000; Leroy and Arts, 
2006). Since the IRBM paradigm such as expressed by the WFD portraits river basins 
as the appropriate cross-border planning and management units, this research opts for 
a multi-level governance study. It questions what may be the changes in collective-
choice rules as triggered or hindered by interactions among actors with their dominant 
and opposing argumentation lines and the distribution of power and resources at dif-
ferent interrelated political levels within a shared river basin. The International Meuse 
River Basin District has been selected as the geographical and political research 
territory with a special focus on the Netherlands as the most downstream riparian 
state. 
Section 3.2 presents the research hypotheses, the scientific and societal aims and 
the central research question with the related operational questions. Subsequently, 
Section 3.3 sketches the analytical approach including the spatial and temporal delinea-
tion and triangulation. Since the researcher is also actor within the process that is 
analysed, Section 3.4 elaborates on both the added value and pitfalls of the chosen 
participatory, interpretative research approach. Section 3.5 closes this chapter by 
means of a synthesis of the chosen research approach. 
 
 
3.2 Hypotheses, aims and questions 
 
3.2.1 Hypotheses 
This research starts with the observation that since the mid 1990s the IRBM concept 
has become a dominant paradigm in European water policy discourses. The concept is 
defined and interpreted differently by actors at multiple political levels who represent 
a diversity of world views, policy Utopias and operational practices. Consequently, the 
IRBM paradigm is considered both a hybridisation of life philosophies as well as an 
instrument (no blueprint method) to arrive at collective-choice rules on the sustainable 
use, development and management of shared interrelated land-water resources, within 
the overall context of social, economic and political values and driving forces. At first 
glance, the IRBM paradigm seems to be the target of a community of mysterious 
stakeholders, who move about like amoebas by extending finger-like projections of 
protoplasm (the so-called pseudo feet). One may not predict exactly which values and 
driving forces when, how and why cause the stakeholders’ movements into certain 
directions. The WFD is an attempt to guide their direction into a common European 
interpretation of IRBM with the aim to harmonise its implementation. This Directive 
offers a set of legally binding requirements, as expressed by its governance and policy 
principles (see Table 1.2 in Section 1.3), environmental objectives and intrinsic exemp-
tion options (see Article 4, European Communities, 2000: 9-11).  
As a political construct of multiple actors the WFD includes elements from dif-
ferent (ideal-type) governance models and substantive world views. Consequently, the 
WFD’s wording is ambiguous and offers considerable degrees of interpretation free-
dom. For example, the text mentions water both as a common heritage and an 
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economic good. At the WFD’s core are the environmental objectives (Article 4) which 
will have to be realised while at the same time required management practices may not 
lead to ‘significant adverse effects’ on the ‘wider environment’ or ‘equally important 
sustainable human development activities’ (European Communities, 2000: 9). Given 
the Directive’s ambiguous wording its common European implementation strategy 
may be expressed by different voices. Without sufficient room for interpretation 
diversity the WFD would not even have been adopted by the politicians (read Subsec-
tion 4.2.2 for a detailed account of the delicate drafting and negotiation process). 
These ambiguities may become a trigger or barrier for attempts to alter current collec-
tive-choice rules in a search for more integrated river basin policies and management 
approaches. The outcome of the WFD’s implementation process will largely depend 
on how a diversity of stakeholders in Europe’s shared rivers, within their historically 
grown institutional context, will (strategically) interpret and download the laboriously 
negotiated European formulations. Given sovereignty and subsidiarity, it is up to the 
Member States how far they swim together and to which extent they transform both 
prior domestic policies and operational rules and practices. 
In order to provide for a meaningful scientific contribution to the evaluation of 
multi-stakeholder processes which deal with dilemmas of sustainable development, 
this research opts for an in-depth and inside-out longitudinal assessment of one inter-
national European river basin district. Given both the complexity of collective-choice 
rules configurations and their development over time and the particular physical, po-
litical, social and economic context of individual river basins, a comparison of more 
river basins would be too demanding in terms of time and resources (in the context of 
an individual PhD assignment). A comparably detailed assessment for several interre-
lated political levels within one international river basin is already a major job for one 
researcher to perform. Additionally, whenever the researcher has a long time series of 
practical experiences from within a particular river basin, it will bring along much less 
the danger of unbalanced conclusions. It also brings in the option of analysing link-
ages across political levels within such a river basin which is a major challenge of the 
IRBM concept. Based on these considerations the International Meuse River Basin 
District has been opted for as the researcher’s arena (see also Subsection 3.3.2 regard-
ing the spatial characterisation). 
 
The history of river basin management coordination efforts by Belgium and the 
Netherlands shows a long record of conflicts and distrust (Meijerink, 1999; 2008). 
Multilateral agreements on both the Scheldt and Meuse Rivers could only be agreed 
upon after both enlarging the actor field with France and by tactical linking of issues 
across policy domains (ibid.). Before the WFD’s adoption progress in the Inter-
national Commission on Protection of the Meuse River against Pollution (ICPM) has 
been laborious in nature (read Chapter 5 for a detailed account). The position of the 
Netherlands as most downstream riparian state makes it the demanding party in most 
issues where upstream-downstream asymmetries play a role. Besides, differences in 
domestic political traditions and planning- and decision-making cultures may hinder 
transboundary coordination efforts (Eppink, 1998; Mostert, 1998; Santbergen, Prins 
and Niesing, 1998; Meijerink, 1999; Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov, 2010). Given 
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this context, one may not expect strong triggers for changes of collective-choice rules 
for these particular two river basins due to the introduction of the WFD.  
On the opposite, experts and high-ranking officials in France, Germany and the 
Netherlands have allied in the early drafting stages as advocates of a more integrated, 
river basin management approach (Melis and Boudewijn, 2002). Positive coordination 
results from the international Rhine River Basin were expected to pay off for a 
common European approach of transboundary water systems. These Dutch public 
actors who considered themselves as European forerunners, have been very active in 
attempts to upload Dutch principles and practices. Consequently, after the WFD’s 
introduction, one may expect rule-altering potential to become noticeable in the multi-
lateral coordination process for the International Meuse River Basin District.  
Furthermore, given their perception of being a forerunner one may expect limited or 
no changes of prior domestic rules in the Dutch water policy domain. Given both the 
European institutional context of subtle political compromises and the long path to-
wards success in the Rhine River Basin, one may expect any rule changes to be incre-
mental.  
 
3.2.2 Aims and questions 
The central scientific aim of the research is to explore the triggers and barriers for 
changes in collective-choice rules on the sustainable use, development and manage-
ment of water resources. This shall be shown by analysing the impact of the interpre-
tation of the policy and governance principles, the environmental obejectives and 
exemption options of the Water Framework Directive (WFD) at interrelated political 
levels within the International Meuse River Basin District. Since the WFD may be 
considered both as the output of and input to societal and political calls for (more) 
integrated water resources management at the level of (inter-)national river basins, it is 
impossible to distract its “pure” impact on a prior rules configuration. Therefore, this 
research does not concentrate on such an unravelling process, but focuses on the 
impact of the WFD in a more instrumental sense. The Directive is considered as a set 
of “new” European rules, principles and objectives which have come out of a delicate 
political melting process of settled and new policy discourses in which Member States 
attempted to upload their implementation practices and wishes. As such, the Direc-
tive’s requirements may not be entirely new and may surprise a Member State, since 
the original upload may have been transformed in a more or less convenient fashion. 
Consequently, the analysis of this research may elucidate certain (barriers and/or trig-
gers for) changes in collective-choice rules but may not relate them one-to-one to the 
introduction of the WFD. 
In this sense the Directive is considered a sublimation moment in a process of in-
cremental change within the European environmental policy domain. Read Subsection 
4.2.1 for a detailed account of the evolution of the European environmental policy 
domain and its water sub-domain. As described in Chapter 2 the seven rules of the 
IAD framework have been translated into ideal-type collective-choice rules for IRBM, 
as a value-free benchmark to compare observed configurations before and after adop-
tion of the WFD. These ideal-type collective-choice rules are considered the analytical 
elaboration of the rules of the game dimension of the PAA. Subsequently, potential 
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 triggers and barriers for observed rule changes are detected by means of an analysis of 
the developments in the other three PAA dimensions: policy discourses, actors  (coalitions 
and oppositions) and the distribution of resources and power.  
As a bye-catch, by combining practical experiences as a water policy adviser with 
theoretical insights of a scientific research this dissertation wishes to contribute to 
deliberations on how to efficaciously organise multi-stakeholder processes for compli-
cated issues in contemporary river basin management (societal research aim). The chal-
lenge of the societal research aim lies not in the provision of a universal blueprint 
method, since this will not be an appropriate answer to the diversity of institutional 
histories and circumstances and given the particular context of the chosen spatial re-
search area. The word “efficacious” points at desirable process conditions for multi-
stakeholder dialogues which may be initiated by public and/or non-governmental 
actors in an attempt to both confront facts with values and to move beyond the dis-
advantages of a merely scientific rational or a solely communicative process approach. 
Given the practical experience and personal curriculum of the author until the time of 
writing there is a special interest in and an undeniable bias towards, the roles that 
public officials may play in such dialogues.  
 
The central question of this research is how continuity or change in collective-choice 
rules for water resources management at interrelated political levels within the Interna-
tional Meuse River Basin District, after adoption of the European Water Framework 
Directive, may be explained. The adoption of the WFD is considered a milestone in 
the history of the European environmental policy domain, since it legally anchors the 
IRBM concept in an attempt to harmonise the use, development and management of 
Europe’s groundwater and surface water resources. As such the Directive is con-
sidered a sublimation moment of different definitions and interpretations of the 
IRBM concept which has become a dominant paradigm in the European water policy 
sub-domain.  
The ambiguity of the European translation of the IRBM concept is most clearly 
expressed by the WFD’s Article 4 which includes several terms and exemption 
options that open the door to multiple interpretations (European Communities, 2000: 
9-11). Additionally, the Directive’s policy and governance principles which are scat-
tered throughout the text are multi-interpretable as well. As one option the discursive 
ambiguity may be used by actors in an instrumental way, i.e. to support the status quo, 
hence may act as a barrier for changes in the rules configuration. As another option 
ambiguous meanings may facilitate cooperation and compromise, hence may trigger 
common definitions and/or rule changes which are accepted by actors with diverse 
world views, preferences and interests. The rule-altering potential of an ambiguous 
policy discourse may not happen in isolation from its interplay with developments in 
the other three dimensions of a policy arrangement. Furthermore, driving forces in the 
broader physical, social, economical and political context (during the studied time 
period) may limit or enforce this rule-altering potential.  
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The central research question is dissected in three operational research questions: 
 
1. Which are the observed collective-choice rules before and after adoption of the 
Water Framework Directive? 
2. What are the remarkable developments in policy discourses, actors (oppositions 
and coalitions) and the distribution of resources and power before and after adop-
tion of the Water Framework Directive? 
3. Which potential explanations for observed continuity or change of collective-
choice rules may be derived from the interplay between rules and developments in 
policy discourses, actors and the distribution of resources and power at the inter-
related political levels over time? 
 
The operational questions are answered for all studied political levels in the Interna-
tional Meuse River Basin District (see Subsection 3.3.2 regarding the spatial and tem-
poral delineation). The Chapters 5 to 8 present the answers to the operational research 
questions for each individual political level. For question 1 the ideal-types rules as 
defined in Chapter 2 serve as a benchmark instrument. The final Chapter 9 compares 
the observations for the individual political levels and discusses the potential impact of 
linkages across these levels. This final chapter also returns to the central research 
question and research aim before jumping to the conclusions and recommendations. 
Several interviewees have expressed the added value of inclusion of a brief chrono-
logical reconstruction. Therefore the author has decided to include two main parts in 
the empirical chapters. Each chapter will start with a chronological reconstruction of 
the water policy implementation planning process before and after introduction of the 
WFD. The second part will present the analysis of the four dimensions of the Policy 
Arrangement Approach (PAA) concerning the studied period. Depending on the in-
terests of the reader one may opt to read the first or the second part of a selected 
empirical chapter (or both). 
From a methodological point of view this research tests the explanatory power of 
the hybrid analytical construct, i.e. the combination of the IAD framework with the 
PAA. The added value of this combined approach comes from both the detailed 
elaboration of the seven rule types of the former and the richness of the related 
theories of the latter. Since each of the four dimensions of a policy arrangement may 
be informed by a diversity of theories, the obvious pitfall for a curiosity driven re-
search cat is to drown in a swamp of eclectic interpretation options. Given the 
primary entrance of the PAA tetrahedron at the rules of the games dimension, another 
challenge is to provide for a balanced assessment of the other three dimensions. An 
adequate delineation of the research approach aims to avoid these pitfalls. 
 
 
3.3 Delineation 
 
3.3.1 Definition of central concepts 
Since this research aims for a value-free assessment of continuity and change of col-
lective-choice rules, at least as much as possible, it does not want to depart from any  
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particular normative definition of involved concepts. It acknowledges that interrelated 
multi-level and multi-stakeholder processes within an international river basin district 
concern the confrontation of diverse definitions and interpretations. To provide 
transparency from the onset regarding the studied concepts, definitions which should 
be understood as points of departures for analysis are presented here.  
Ambiguity is understood as ‘the quality of being open to more than one interpreta-
tion’ or ‘not having one obvious meaning’ (Oxford Dictionary of English, 2003). It is 
considered a central element of politics (Stone, 2002), which is not necessarily a good 
or a bad thing but an intrinsic feature of human life and politics. Ambiguities may lead 
to inconsistencies in policies or facilitate cooperation and compromise (Fischer, 2009). 
This research starts with a generic interest in the impact of ambiguity on water policy 
formulation and its implementation. 
There are several formulations which try to grasp the diversity of interpretations 
attached to the concept of institutions. Within this research the term institution refers to 
‘many different types of entities, including both organisations and the rules used to 
structure patterns of interaction within and across organisations’ (Ostrom, 1999: 36). 
It is this definition which is central in the IAD framework (Ostrom, 2005; McGinnis, 
2011) and which mainly focuses on interrelated rules configurations at different levels 
of analysis. Ostrom (1999: 36-39) sums the challenges of studying institutions. One of 
the most difficult problems is how to identify and measure them. ‘Because institutions 
are fundamentally shared concepts, they exist in the minds of the participants and 
sometimes are shared as implicit knowledge rather than in an explicit and written 
from’. In training researchers to identify and measure institutions, Ostrom stresses the 
concept of rules-in-use rather than focusing on rules-in-form. The IAD framework 
departs from the acknowledgement that ‘regularised human behaviour occurs within a 
wide diversity of rule-ordered situations that share structural features such as markets, 
hierarchies or firms, families, voluntary associations, national governments and inter-
national regimes’. Therefore a study of institutional development requires ‘multiple 
inputs from diverse disciplines’. Furthermore, there is a nested structure of rules 
within rules which may challenge any analysis of institutions (ibid.). As introduced in 
Subsection 2.2.1 Kiser and Ostrom (1982) distinguish three tiers of decision making 
and the relations among them: constitutional, collective-choice and operational deci-
sions. Rules affecting operational choice are made within a set of collective-choice 
rules that are themselves made within a set of constitutional-choice rules (Ostrom, 
1990). Ostrom (2005) adds a fourth level of analysis of meta-constitutional choices. 
Finally, ‘at any one level of analysis, combinations of rules, attributes of the world and 
communities of individuals involved are combined in a configural rather than an addi-
tive manner’ (Ostrom, 1999: 37). 
Within the IAD framework, rules are defined as ‘shared understandings among 
those involved that refer to enforced prescriptions about what actions (or states of the 
world) are required, prohibited or permitted’. (Ostrom, Gardner and Walker, 1994; 
Ostrom, 2005: 36) Operational-choice rules point at the ‘implementation of practical deci-
sions by those individuals who have been authorised (or allowed) to take these actions 
as a consequence of collective-choice processes’ (McGinnis, 2011: 173). Collective-choice 
rules are ‘the processes through which institutions are constructed and policy decisions 
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made by those actors authorised to participate in the collective decisions, according to 
the procedures as established by constitutional-choice processes’. Constitutional-choice-
rules mean ‘the processes through which collective-choice procedures are defined, 
including legitimising and constituting all relevant collective entities involved in collec-
tive- or operational-choice processes. The meta-constitutional level of analysis encompasses 
long-lasting and often subtle constraints on the forms of constitutional-choice, collec-
tive-choice or operational-choice processes that are considered legitimate within an 
existing culture.’ Many of the cultural factors may not be amenable to direct change by 
those individuals under their influence but these do change over time, in part as a 
consequence of changing patterns of behaviour. (ibid.) The meta-constitutional level 
of analysis may be compared with the macro-institutional context in the Policy Ar-
rangement Approach. The seven rule-types as defined by Ostrom (1999; 2005) have 
been derived from studying several cases of common pool resources management. In 
this research they serve as an analytical tool to assess continuity and change of collec-
tive-choice rules in the water policy domain over time. See Table 2.1 in Subsection 
2.2.1 for definitions of these rule-types.  
As described by the previous two chapters Integrated Water Resources Management 
(IWRM) is an ambiguous holistic concept which may be considered as an instrument 
to arrive at collective-choice rules for the sustainable use, development and manage-
ment of water resources. Without opting for any normative assumptions this research 
takes the definition of the Global Water Partnership as analytical point of departure 
for this research: ‘a process which promotes the coordinated development and man-
agement of water, land and related resources, in order to maximise the resultant eco-
nomic and social welfare in an equitable manner without compromising the sustain-
ability of vital ecosystems’ (Global Water Partnership, 2000: 22).  This definition em-
braces three ambiguous challenges: coordinated development and management of 
natural resources; welfare maximisation in an equitable manner; and sustainable, vital 
ecosystems. Although the definition literally relates sustainability to ecosystems only, 
from the manifold subsequent publications on the concept’s interpretation and im-
plementation IWRM should be understood as a three-dimensional sustainability chal-
lenge. Planet, people and profit should be combined within the context of trans-
boundary river basins as social-ecological systems (Falkenmark, 2003), as is the central 
topic of Integrated River Basin Management (IRBM).  
Many definitions of Integrated River Basin Management (IRBM) presuppose that 
hydro-geographically defined river basins are the ideal units for the design and imple-
mentation of collective-choice rules. Obviously, this presupposition neglects the ap-
parent misfit with social, economic and political boundaries. Furthermore, many of 
these definitions include notions on Utopias for planet, people and profit dimensions 
without providing clear guidance on their interrelations. This research departs from 
the acknowledgement of an actual mismatch between river basins and other policy 
and management units, the calls for more (internal and cross-sector) integration and 
multi-stakeholder processes and the diversity of perceptions around IRBM and its 
ambiguous terms and ambitions.  
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Sustainable development is another highly ambiguous concept. Its most frequently cited 
definition is the one of the Brundlandt Commission (WCED, 1987: 43): ‘development 
that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future genera-
tions to meet their own needs’. Blewitt (2008: ix-x) sums the challenges related to 
dealing with ambiguities of the concept: 
 
Sustainable development is a process that requires us to view our lives as elements of 
a larger entity. It requires a holistic view of looking at the world and human life. It 
requires recognition that other people may not see things like this at all and will have 
different perceptions, values, philosophies, aims and ambitions. It requires an under-
standing that the world is multi-faceted, fragmented and complete. [..] Maybe the 
best way to view sustainable development is as a collage or a kaleidoscope of shapes, 
colours and patterns that change constantly as we ourselves change. [..] Sustainable 
development warrants an attitude of mind that welcomes change, difference, 
creativity, risk, uncertainty, a sense of wonder and a desire and capacity to learn. 
 
Sustainable development faces a similar mismatch between systems’ boundaries as 
IRBM. For example, Grainger (2004) distinguishes several ecological and socio-
political levels. Institutions at different socio-political levels may affect the ecological 
systems at different levels in specific ways. For example, a small town or village com-
munity may not act sustainable if sustainability is understood in isolation from either 
wider ecological or political processes or other towns, villages and surrounding rural 
areas (ibid.). Robinson and Tinker (1997) argue that one of the main obstacles for 
developing a common conceptual framework on sustainable development is the lack 
of genuine consensus among experts as to how ecological, economic and social sys-
tems relate to one another. Blewitt (2008: 27) adds that ‘different individuals, commu-
nities, pressure groups, institutions and governments are likely to view sustainability 
and sustainable development from different perspectives’. This research acknowledges 
that on a range from ecocentrism to anthropocentrism there are different views and 
strategies to cope with the challenge of interlinking the planet, people and profit 
dimensions of sustainable development. Ratner (2004: 62) argues that the sustaina-
bility concept is meaningful, ‘not because it provides an encompassing solution to 
different notions of what is good, but for the way it brings such differences into a 
common field of dispute, dialogue and potential agreement as the basis of collective 
action’. Following this line of thought this research views sustainable development as 
a major process challenge for public and non-governmental actors who may argue 
about, try to share and/or negotiate over both facts and values. 
In this research IRBM and sustainable development both are considered as  
governance challenges to deal with ambiguities at multiple interrelated political levels. As 
expressed by Kooiman (2003: 4) governance can be seen as ‘the totality of theoretical 
conceptions on governing’. Governing may be defined as ‘the totality of interactions, in 
which public as well as private actors participate, aimed at solving societal problems or 
creating societal opportunities; attending to the institutions as contexts for these gov-
erning interactions; and establishing a normative foundation for all those activities’ 
(ibid.). Multi-level governance has been phrased by Marks (1992) to capture developments 
in EU structural policy following its major reform in 1988. He defines multi-level  
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governance as ‘a system of continuous negotiation among nested governments at 
several territorial tiers’ (Marks, 1993: 392). ‘Multi-level’ refers to the increased interde-
pendence of governments at different territorial levels (vertical dimension) while ‘gov-
ernance’ expresses the growing interdependence between governments and non-
governmental actors at various territorial levels (horizontal dimension; Bache and 
Flinders, 2004). Rosenau (2004: 31) concludes that governance is a broader concept 
than government. The latter refers to formal rule systems of governments (local, re-
gional, national and international). Governance ‘refers to any collectivity, private or 
public, that employs informal as well as formal steering mechanisms to make de-
mands, frame goals, issue directives, pursue policies and generate compliance’ (ibid.).  
Within the Northern-American context, the polycentric governance concept has been 
developed, which has also informed the IAD framework (Schlager and Blomquist, 
2008; Dragos Aligica and Boettke, 2011). Polycentricity is ‘a system of governance in 
which authorities of overlapping jurisdictions (or centres of authority) interact to de-
termine the conditions under which these authorities, as well as the citizens subject to 
these jurisdictional units, are authorised to act as well as the constraints put upon their 
activities for public purposes’ (McGinnis, 2011: 171-172). A polycentric system of 
governance is multi-level, multi-type, multi-sectoral and multi-functional. Multi-level 
points at local, provincial, national, regional and global units of governance. Multi-type 
distinguishes between ‘general purpose nested jurisdictions (as in traditional federal-
ism) and ‘specialised cross-jurisdictional political units (such as special districts)’. 
Multi-sectoral means that public, private, voluntary, community-based and hybrid kind 
of organisations may be involved. Multi-functional indicates that the concept ‘incor-
porates specialised units for provision (selection of goals), production (or co-
production), financing (taxes, donors), coordination, monitoring, sanctioning and 
dispute resolution’ (ibid.).  
This research acknowledges the different natures of governance but chooses the 
actor arenas at a (nested) hierarchy of political levels which are initiated by govern-
ments as the units for analysis, i.e. the WFD implementation planning structures at the 
European, multilateral and Dutch national, regional and local levels. It takes on board 
the involvement of non-governmental actors but does not aim to make an assessment 
of all potential sectoral and functional entities as identified by the polycentric gover-
nance concept. Since competent authorities in the Member States are primarily 
responsible for timely compliance with the WFD’s requirements and since, at least 
within the context of the European environmental policy domain, these authorities 
should be understood as governmental entities, this research approach comes close to 
the multi-level governance concept as explained by Bache and Flinders (2004). 
The term stakeholder has its origin in organisational theory. The classic definition 
of a stakeholder is ‘any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the 
achievement of the organisation’s objectives’ (Freeman, 1984: 46). Friedman and Miles 
(2006) distinguish narrow and broad definitions of a stakeholder which depends on 
the chosen strategic and normative considerations. In general, narrow definitions refer 
to humans (individuals or groups) as defined and acknowledged by a corporation, 
whereas broader definitions may include entities (not restricted to humans) outside a 
corporation who may not even be aware of affection relations with a corporation. The 
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stakeholder concept has moved beyond organisational theory only and has grown in 
popularity among policy-makers, regulators, non-governmental organisations, business 
and the media (ibid.). The term actor is used interchangeably with stakeholder in collo-
quial language but has a slightly different connotation (Ramírez, 1999). For example, 
system analysts refer to an actor as ‘a person who carries out one or more of the activi-
ties in the system’ (Checkland, 1981: 312). The word actors stresses that stakeholders 
are active and interact with each other (Grimble and Wellard, 1997). With societal calls 
for more transparency and interactive policy-making since the 1960s and 1970s, the 
stakeholder concept has entered the European environmental policy domain. Stake-
holders are individuals, groups or institutions that are concerned with or have an in-
terest in the water resources and their management (World Bank, 1993). They include 
all those who affect and/or are affected by the policies, decisions and actions of the 
system (Grimble et al., 1995). With regard to environmental issues: plants, animals and 
humans all may be considered stakeholders, although the former two are not able to 
speak for themselves. Generally, theories on multi-stakeholder processes make a dis-
tinction in public, private and civil stakeholders and emphasise the stakes of present 
and future generations (Warner and Verhallen, 2007). 
 
3.3.2 Spatial and temporal choices  
 
Spatial features 
The principal focus of this research is at potential explanations for continuity and 
changes of collective-choice rules at interrelated political levels within a particular 
international river basin district. The aim is not to provide for conclusions that may be 
applied to international river basins in general. The International Meuse River Basin 
District, as delineated for implementation of the WFD, has been selected as spatial 
unit of analysis. Many public actors in this district, including the author, are also in-
volved in the adjacent International Scheldt River Basin District. Furthermore, the 
territory of the (Dutch) Brabantse Delta Water Management Authority, which is the 
studied local political level in this research, is situated in the transition zone of both 
river basin districts (1/5 Scheldt and 4/5 Meuse).  This territory also borders the 
Flemish Region of Belgium which is one of the riparian states in both river basins. 
Although the main focus is on political levels within the International Meuse River 
Basin District some observations on the Scheldt neighbour will be included as well. 
Consequently, this Subsection also provides basic spatial features for the International 
Scheldt River Basin District. Figure 3.3 shows a map of both districts.  
The source of the Meuse River is situated at an altitude of 384 m in Pouilly-en-
Bassigny in France (IMC, 2005b). Its length from its source to its mouth in the North 
Sea is 905 km. The most important sub-basins in the international basin are those of 
the following tributaries: the Chiers, the Semois, the Lesse, the Sambre, the Ourthe, 
the Rur, the Schwalm, the Niers, the Dommel and the Mark. Several of these sub-
basins are transboundary (IMC, 2005b). The downstream Mark sub-basin is shared by 
the Flemish Region of Belgium and the Netherlands and includes a major part of the 
territory of the Brabantse Delta Water Management Authority. The Meuse River is a 
typical example of a rain fed river (IMC, 2005b; De Wit, 2008). Its flow depends on  
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Figure 3.3: Map of the International Scheldt (West) and Meuse (East) River 
Basin Districts (Source: DGRNE on behalf of the IMC and ISC) 
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precipitation; considerable fluctuations may occur between the seasons and the years. 
Part of the river basin includes hilly areas with an impermeable soil. There, precipita-
tion in tributary basins may flow rapidly into the Meuse and result in sudden flash 
floods. The limited rainwater retention in the soil in the middle section of the basin 
leads to low flows during drier periods. High river flows generally occur in winter and 
spring. Variations in flow may appear abrupt, resulting in floods that last from a few 
days to several weeks. This was the case in 1993 when a maximum flow of 3100 m³/s 
was measured in Eijsden (border measuring station between the Walloon Region of 
Belgium and the Netherlands). Summer and autumn are mainly characterised by 
longer periods of low flows in a range from10 to 40 m³/s at Eijsden (ibid.). 
Like the Meuse River the Scheldt River is a typical rain fed lowlands river. In the 
1990 to 2001 period the average annual precipitation in the Scheldt River Basin Dis-
trict has been 820 mm (De Weer, Dieltjens and Latour, 2005). Given the relatively 
small scale of this European river there are no big differences in precipitation through 
the seasons. Contrary to the Meuse one may not distinguish a particular wet and dry 
season (ibid.). The average annual discharge of the Scheldt (at the Dutch-Belgium 
border) amounts up to 110 m3/s (Van Eck, 1999) whereas the average annual dis-
charge of the Meuse River (at its mouth towards the North Sea) is 350 m3/s (De Wit, 
2008). The Scheldt district is situated between the western border of the Meuse Dis-
trict and the North Sea. Table 3.1 shows some basic features for both river basin dis-
tricts (based on IMC, 2009 and De Weer, Dieltjens and Latour, 2005). The water bod-
ies in both river basins are subject to extensive human interventions which support a 
diversity of activities. The most important user functions are drinking water supply, 
domestic water uses, agriculture, industry (including hydropower generation; only in 
the Meuse Basin), navigation (for leisure and transportation goods), recreation, living 
ecosystems and landscape values (IMC, 2005b; De Weer, Dieltjens and Latour). In 
both basins nuclear power plants require cooling water from the river.  
 
Table 3.1: Basic features of the International Meuse and Scheldt River Basin Districts 
Riparian State ↓ Meuse River  Basin District Scheldt River Basin District 
 Area 
(km2)↓ 
Inhabitants  
(x 1000)↓ 
 
# WFD 
surface 
water 
bodies ↓ 
Area 
(km2)↓ 
Inhabitants  
(x 1000)↓ 
# WFD 
surface 
water  
Bodies ↓ 
France: 8.919  671 157 18.486 4.640 64 
Luxemburg: 65  43 3 - - - 
Walloon Region: 12.300  2.189 257 3.770 1.210 79 
Flemish Region: 1.596 416 20 11.991 5.583 182 
Brussels Region: - - - 161 959 3 
Netherlands: 7.500 3.500 155 2.008  463 56 
Germany: 3.984 1.994 228 - - - 
Total→ 34.364 8.813 820 36.416  12.800 325 
This table includes data from the IMC (2009) and De Weer, Dieltjens & Latour (2005). 
 
The 8.8 million inhabitants in the International Meuse River Basin District consume 
drinking water produced from ground- and surface water. In this respect, the district 
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is self-supporting. On the contrary, the Scheldt River Basin is not self-supporting. 
Without both water transfers from the Meuse River Basin (such as to Brussels, Ant-
werp and a part of the Zeeland Province (the Netherlands) and extensive exploitation 
of groundwater resources, there would be a shortage of drinking water in the Scheldt 
River Basin (Saeijs and Santbergen, 1998). Substantial quantities of Meuse water are 
exported by pipes or canals to provide drinking water to about 6 million people living 
outside the basin (IMC, 2005b). Despite the generic self sufficiency in the Interna-
tional Meuse River Basin District, water shortages (in dry periods) are mentioned as an 
important problem with regard to the ecological functioning of the Meuse River and 
its tributaries (IMC, 2005d).   
The important multilateral water management issues as formulated by the com-
petent (governmental) authorities in both international river basin commissions show 
many similarities (IMC, 2000d; ISC, 2009). The International Meuse Commission 
(henceforth IMC) explicitly mentions the negative environmental affects of hydro-
morphological alterations for the benefit of navigation and hydropower, with special 
attention to fish migration (IMC, 2000d). The IMC includes restoration of hydro-
morphological features. Water pollution reduction is of major concern of both com-
missions. The IMC points at flood protection and the issue of water shortages and 
emphasises the need for synergy between the flood protection programme and im-
plementation of the WFD (ibid.). The International Scheldt Commission (henceforth 
ISC) mentions flood prevention and drought management (ISC, 2009).  Qualitative 
and quantitative threats of groundwater bodies are a challenge for both commissions. 
The ISC explicitly includes process issues, i.e. coordinated monitoring, information 
exchange on cost-effective measures and transnational cooperation on measures for 
integrated management and tuning of environmental objectives (ibid.). 
Figure 3.4 shows a map of the territory of the Brabantse Delta Water Manage-
ment Authority, as located in the transition zone of the Meuse and Scheldt Rivers and 
the North Sea (the so-called Southwestern Delta). In the WFD implementation re-
ports, this territory is named as Brabant-West. This may be confusing given that West-
Brabant is the geographical name for the western part of the territory only. The terri-
tory covers 170,767 ha and involves 810,000 inhabitants as spread over 21 municipali-
ties (www.brabantsedelta.nl as visited on May, 18, 2012). 25 WFD surface water bod-
ies have been delineated, including ‘t Merkske with the potential quality of a natural 
water system (i.e. a lowlands brook system that partly forms the border between the 
Flemish Region of Belgium and the Netherlands; see Figure 3.1 at page 82). At the 
eastern border the territory of the adjacent Dommel Water Management Author-
ity.starts. The Mark River, as connected with the Vliet River, drains into Lake 
Volkerak at the border between the International Meuse and Scheldt River Basin Dis-
tricts. The southern, border-crossing part of the territory is a gently sloping, sandy 
Pleistocene area of about 1,000 km2 (Witter, Van Stokkom and Hendriksen, 2006).In 
this Pleistocene area at the Dutch-Belgian border, the height is about 20 to 25 m 
above sealevel, while the cities of Breda, Roosendaal and Bergen op Zoom are situ-
ated more or less at sealevel. The clay polders in the northern Holocene, downstream 
part of the basin are situated at or slightly below sealevel (-1 m; ibid.).  
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Figure 3.4: Map of the territory of the Brabantse Delta Water Management Authority 
(Drafted by Joris van Buul, 2012) 
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Human interferences for making the runoff capacity more efficient (with regard to 
socioeconomic development) have alterered the natural flow characteristics and re-
lated ecological state and functioning of the Mark River and the majority of its tribu-
taries dramatically. The driving forces for the hydro-morphological alterations, of 
which many have been considered irreversible in the first WFD implementation plan-
ning cycle, were the need for more space and better drainage conditions, due to eco-
nomic and population growth and intensification of land use (in particular the mod-
ernisation of agriculture after World War II; Witter, Van Stokkom and Hendriksen, 
2006). The stream flow area of the Mark has increased more than threefold as a result 
of the river being deepened and widened. The river has been shortened by 7.5% and 
its hydraulic resistance decreased because a number of sharp bends were removed 
(ibid.).  
Witter and Raats (2001) sum the side-effects on the hydraulic functioning of the 
river system: an increase in peak discharges by about 40%; a shift in the winter balance 
resulting in more runoff and less storage; a decrease in mean surface water and 
groundwater levels in the upstream part of the basin by about 20 cm; and a decrease in 
river bank storage capacity by about 20 km2 as floodplains have been converted into 
polders. The combination of pollution and significant hydromorphological alterations 
have contributed to the substantial WFD assignment: the overall ecological state and 
functioning of the water bodies in the territory is evaluated as insuffient to bad (Van 
den Berg and Postma, 2009). Due to expected climate change and without additional 
measures, issues of floods and droughts  occur more frequently in the future. 
 
Temporal features 
The studied period runs from 1990 to December 2009. It includes the starting-up 
process of the multilateral coordination efforts in the International Meuse River Basin, 
the drafting and negotiation process of the WFD and the first WFD implementation 
planning cycle. The first cycle ends with publication of the first generation river basin 
management plans for the 2010 to 2015 period. In the International Meuse River 
Basin multilateral coordination has been started in the 1990’s, after conclusion of both 
the Helsinki Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses 
and International Lakes (UN-ECE, 1992) and the Treaty on Protection of the Meuse 
River against Pollution (Anonymous, 1994). The multilateral starting up process paral-
leled the drafting and negotiation stage of the WFD.  
The author has his working experience in both the Scheldt and Meuse River 
Basins since 1991. Before the start of the formal multilateral commissions for these 
two river basins the author has been the secretary of the International Study Group 
(ISG). The ISG has acted as an informal platform for collection and comparison of 
information and practical experiences on water management issues (with a special 
focus on water quality and ecology) in the Scheldt River Basin. The platform operated 
in the shadow of the formal multilateral negotiations and had the unwritten assign-
ment to pave a smooth way to a fast start up of the foreseen multilateral commission. 
Although the focus of the ISG has been the Scheldt River and its main tributaries, 
many of the involved experts and officials were also active in the Meuse River Basin. 
In 1994 after publishing its final report (Santbergen, 1994), the ISG has been disman 
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tled. The author continued his career as a member of the Dutch delegation in work-
ing-groups of the then International Commission on Protection of the Scheldt River 
against Pollution (ICPS). In this position he has supported the establishment of the 
international secretariat at Antwerp. Since October 2005 the author works as policy 
adviser and WFD implementation process coordinator in one of the regions within 
the Dutch part of the Meuse River Basin (Brabant-West, which is the territory of the 
Brabantse Delta Water Management Authority). Given his personal history, the author 
has easy access to first-hand data and involved stakeholder networks. 
Within this research the adoption of the WFD is predominantly viewed as an ex-
ogenous factor to the research area, introducing a “new” set of policy and governance 
principles for IRBM as instrument to arrive at collective-choice rules for the sustain-
able use, development and management and use of water resources. To frame deve-
lopments as internal, endogenous or inside versus external, exogenous or outside 
implicates certain strict boundaries of policy domains. Such boundaries are often diffi-
cult to draw (Wiering and Crabbé, 2006). As an example, since some Dutch actors 
have been simultaneously active within the European and Dutch policy arenas, the 
WFD may not entirely be considered as an exogenous factor. Since the scientific aim 
is to assess continuity or change of collective-choice rules as triggered by the WFD, it 
is considered necessary to include observations from the Directive’s drafting and ne-
gotiation stage. Consequently, the empirical analysis of this research starts with a his-
torical reconstruction of the period 1990 to 2000. In this period river basins have been 
acknowledged as appropriate units for water resources management and the WFD has 
been formulated, negotiated and adopted. In the Chapters 4 to 8 the seven rule types 
of Ostrom will be assessed for all studied political levels and developments in the 
other three dimensions of a policy arrangement will be presented as well. The same 
will be done for the 2001 to 2009 period which is the first WFD implementation 
planning cycle. The empirical observations end in December 2009 when the first gen-
eration river basin management plans have been adopted.  
Within this research the focus is on multi-stakeholder platforms (henceforth 
MSPs) as representative discursive arenas within policy actor networks at a (nested) 
hierarchy of political levels within the International Meuse River Basin District. These 
MSPs have been initiated and chaired by governmental actors. Since rules configura-
tions are formed and challenged in policy planning and implementation processes at 
interrelated and politically delineated spatial levels, this research opts for both a dia-
chronic (or longitudinal) as well as a parallel mode of analysis. A diachronic approach 
is the equivalent of a video shot which records the motion of the object in question: it 
emphasises the process of change over time (Hay, 2002). Having his working-
experience in the Meuse River Basin the researcher considers himself as one of the 
actors in continuous motion, hence able to provide detailed video shots of at least the 
local and regional levels. At the same time it is a parallel analysis since the water policy 
arrangements at all studied political levels are dissected for the same time-period. The 
studied political levels include the European Water Directors (and its related Strategic 
Coordination Group), the multilateral coordination efforts by the IMC and the Dutch 
national, regional and local water management coordination platforms. 
100 CHAPTER 3 
 
3.3.3 Sources for data collection: triangulation 
This research may be typified as a multi-level case study, since it aims for a detailed 
analysis of a policy implementation process at different, interrelated political levels 
within one international river basin district. ‘The case study is a type of research dur-
ing which the researcher tries to gain a profound insight into one or several objects or 
processes that are restricted in time and space’ (Verschuren and Doorewaard, 1999: 
163). The restriction in space concerns the territory of the International Meuse River 
Basin District (including some observations from the adjacent Scheldt River Basin 
District). Time is delineated as the 1990 to 2009 period. A case study is characterised 
by (1) a small number of research units; 2) labour-intensive data generation; (3) more 
depth than breadth; (4) a selective, strategic sample; (5) qualitative data and research 
methods; and (6) an open observation on site (Verschuren and Doorewaard, 1999: 
164).  
In depth analysis of five political levels within one international river basin dis-
trict invites a qualitative research method in which ‘the emphasis will not be put on 
counting and calculating on the basis of the observation results, but on comparing and 
interpreting these results’ (Verschuren and Doorewaard, 1999: 164). For example, this 
case study includes a qualitative discourse analysis of a multi-stakeholder and multi-
level policy implementation planning process, in the search for dominant and oppos-
ing argumentats. It is explorative in an attempt to unravel what happened with the 
same implementation subject (the Water Framework Directive) at several interrelated 
places at the same time. Presented paradigms, governance and policy principles and 
collective-choice rules are not meant as attributes or indicators in a natural scientific 
sense of quantitative research. They are applied as qualitative tools for analysing the 
WFD implementation processes at the studied political levels.  
An in-depth case study may be performed by using various labour-intensive 
methods for generating data (Verschuren and Doorewaard, 1999). It invites a triangu-
lation of methods: combining individual with group interviews, (non-) participatory 
observations and a content analysis of textual and audio-visual material (Verschuren 
and Doorewaard, 1999). In addition, triangulation of sources is highly recommended 
(ibid.). The selection of the case within this research is strategic and not at random. 
The focus is on an inside-out, in-depth analysis of one particular river basin the author 
is familiar with and, for example, not on a comparison of several river basins. Open, 
on site observations are an important component in the chosen approach. In this 
research data collection is performed by a triangulation of methods and sources of 
information which means that a subject or case can be viewed best from different 
angles in order to obtain a balanced collage of video shots which is not biased by one 
person only. ‘One reason for this [triangulation] is that the various sources, viewed 
from the research objective and research issue, each have their own advantages and 
disadvantages’ (Verschuren and Doorewaard (1999: 125). Punch (2005: 241) explains 
the logic of triangulation: ‘The findings from one type of study [method] can be 
checked against the findings deriving from the other type.’ 
This research combines desk research (primary and secondary document analysis) 
with oral interviews, a written argumentation survey and (non-) participative observations of meet-
ings. 53 oral interviews have been conducted (see Appendix I for the list of interview-
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ees). Furthermore, several short conversations with diverse stakeholders have been 
performed in the context of attended meetings. A written argumentation survey has 
been organised which means that involved stakeholders were invited to fill in a de-
tailed questionnaire (31 participants; see Appendix IIa for a list of participants). By 
qualitative analysis of the interviews and the written statements, the range of views 
and argumentations of diverse stakeholders could be obtained in a relatively short 
time. Appendix IIB presents the questions from the survey. Since the interviews and 
the written argumentation survey have been conducted on a confidential basis, refer-
rals in the text will be generally unless the participants have approved otherwise. Non-
participative observations mean that the researcher attends the meetings without 
causing interferences. Participative observations mean that (a) periodically the re-
searcher shares his observations with the platform members and provides them with 
advice on process architecture/rules of the game and/or (b) the researcher is one 
stakeholder himself in the platform. Mirror sessions with different stakeholders (in-
cluding peer researchers) have been organised by the researcher (or peer researchers) 
to exchange and discuss observations and opinions (see Appendix III for an overview 
of these reflexive sessions and participants). Finally, the national WFD programme 
leader has organised periodical reflection sessions with WFD researchers and PhD 
students. The results of these sessions have been published as a booklet of essays on 
dilemmas, best practices and recommendations for the WFD’s implementation proc-
ess (Van der Arend et al., 2010; in Dutch). Appendix IV summarises the studied 
multi-stakeholder platforms and applied sources of information at the studied political 
levels. See Figure 3.2 (page 82) for an illustration of a local multi-stakeholder dialogue. 
 
 
3.4 The researcher and participative, interpretative analysis 
 
A researcher who aims to unravel the meaning of argumentation lines and strategies 
of multiple actors in relation to continuity and change of collective-choice rules within 
a given policy domain in which he or she is one of the involved actors, automatically 
gets involved in an interpretative analytical approach (as defined by Yanow, 1993; 
2000). ‘As meanings are not directly observable, the realm of meaning has to be ap-
proached through reflection and interpretative analysis’ (Fischer, 2003: 139). Case-
study research is common to mainstream social science, for example with an emphasis 
on interpretation of the social meanings held by actors under investigation (Fischer, 
2003). Interviewing, observing and document analysis are the primary data collecting 
methods in such an interpretative case-study approach (ibid.). These primary methods 
are supported by observation of political deliberations, interest and community group 
activities and the undertakings of implementing agencies (Yanow, 1996).  
This research can be characterised as a participative, interpretative analysis in 
which the researcher aims to take advantage of his privileged position as one of the 
inner circle, local governmental actors in the WFD implementation process. This posi-
tion offers direct access to primary information sources, ample opportunities for con-
versations and interviews with a diversity of stakeholders and options for both partici-
patory and non-participatory observations. The principal aim of this research is to  
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reconstruct a complicated transboundary policy implementation process, as value-free 
as possible, in order to detect triggers and barriers for change of collective-choice 
rules during a studied period. Given the dual role of the author in the studied process, 
both as researcher and local governmental stakeholder, there is a challenge of dealing 
with the undeniable personal bias and impact of his actions. 
The main advantage of a participative, interpretative approach is the potential for 
an inside-out, in-depth analysis of a (politicised) policy formulation, negotiation and 
implementation process, which may point the finger at informal, unwritten rules-in-
use in addition to and interacting with formal, written down rules (as emphasised by 
Ostrom, 1999, 2005). Or, as Fischer (2003: 141, 142) puts it, ‘In the world of politics, 
the “real” reasons and motives for an action – as opposed to those officially offered - 
are as important as the action itself.’ Fischer (2003: 149) describes the rationale behind 
such an inside-out analysis: 
 
With this information the analyst builds an interpretative context for analysing social 
and political actions. Knowing which words or actions have importance can only 
come from such familiarity with the situation – understanding what is significant to 
political stakeholders and other policy-relevant publics. This familiarity is obtained 
through social interaction with the participants, in particular with the help of meth-
odological techniques such as participant-observation and ethnography.   
 
A major challenge of an interpretative analysis in which non-participative observations 
are combined with participative observations lies in continuous awareness and ac-
knowledgement of the impact of the role of the researcher on the interpretation of the 
collected data. Conform the range of naturalistic research roles (Gold, 1958), this re-
searcher may be sometimes complete observer (of platform meetings in which he is 
not an member), observer as participant (of platform meetings in which he is not a 
member, but incidentally consulted by members), participant as observer (of platform 
meetings in which he is a member and at the same time observes the other members) 
and complete participant (e.g. when conducting advices for the daily board and gen-
eral assembly of the water management authority). Although the researcher should be 
aware of the possible effects of the chosen role on the interpretation of data (Punch, 
2005), this triangulation of research roles offers opportunities for a creative approach 
of information sources (Verschuren and Doorewaard, 1999).  
Another major challenge of qualitative, interpretative analysis is the credibility or 
trustworthiness of the researcher’s conclusions (Mishler, 1990). The research conclusions 
should reflect the diversity of constructed realities by involved stakeholders: ‘[..] a 
credible outcome is one that adequately represents both the areas in which these reali-
ties converge and the points on which they diverge’ (Fischer, 2003: 154). An assess-
ment and its conclusions should be traceable and understandable for both involved 
stakeholders and interested parties outside the studied case area. Lincoln and Guba 
(1985) argue that a qualitative assessment should provide its audience with evidence to 
show that findings could be repeated, if it were replicated with the same or similar 
respondents in the same or similar context. Whereas qualitative researchers in general 
focus on credibility of their findings, empirical analysts focus on the validity of their 
results (Fischer, 2003). Verschuren and Doorewaard (1999: 170) argue that a qualita- 
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tive case study approach often is stronger in its internal validity, whereas the external 
validity of the result is often under pressure. ‘If there are fewer cases studied, the more 
difficult it is to declare the results of applicable to the whole situation or to similar 
cases’ (ibid.). Fischer (2003: 155) argues that ‘the qualitative inquirer’s concept of 
credibility is a more accurate conceptualisation of what goes on in quantitative re-
search under the labels of validity and reliability’. The main difference is that ‘empirical 
analysts turn to their body of peers in the relevant scientific community to establish 
the credibility of their research’, whereas ‘the qualitative researcher takes the subjects 
themselves as a reference point’. In both cases the same logic is applied of ‘interpreta-
tion and persuasive argumentation rather than proof and demonstration per se’ (ibid.). 
According to Yanow (2000: 8) an interpretative approach emphasises the treat-
ment of differences as ‘different ways of seeing, understanding and doing based on 
different prior experiences’. Discrepancies between expectations and present experi-
ence should be considered as a potential source of insight. A conflict ‘is produced in 
the juxtaposition of the analyst’s “estrangement” from the analytical situation and his 
or her growing familiarity with that situation’ (ibid.). The more the researcher gets 
involved with his subject, the easier it may become to loose the required distance or 
helicopter view. Within the context of this research there is synergy in the researcher 
as policy implementation adviser on the one hand and his role as analyst of the proc-
ess in which he is involved on the other. Both roles require insight in arguments and 
strategies of different stakeholders involved. Furthermore the role of adviser necessi-
tates that the researcher does not allow his own preferences and expectations to un-
duly influence the presentation of information (including the pro’s and con’s) for a 
range of options to be acted upon by the politicians of the daily board and the 
interests’ representatives in the general assembly of the water management authority.  
Five methodological steps have been taken to strike the balance between inside 
familiarisation with the studied process and its context and sufficient distance for an 
as value-free as possible, credible analysis. The reconstruction of the (integrated) river 
basin management planning process in the 1990 to 2009 period, as based on a  
systematic reading of the meeting documents from the multi-stakeholder platforms at 
the five interrelated political levels (see Appendix IV for an overview), is the first im-
portant methodological step. This reading concerns an assessment of dominant argu-
ments about water policy and governance principles, environmental objectives and 
exemption options and identification of collective-choice rules. As the second step, the 
process reconstruction and the subsequent (non-)participative observations of the first 
WFD’s implementation planning cycle have been compared with findings of peer 
researchers who have studied the same period, both in the Netherlands and in other 
European Member States. Thirdly, so-called mirror sessions have been organised to 
present and discuss the research findings. Fourthly, by means of qualitative interviews 
and a written argumentation survey, perceptions, argumentation lines and strategies of 
diverse stakeholders have been registered and interpreted. Finally, group meeting ob-
servations have been discussed with the observed. This triangulation of information 
sources and methods and comparison with findings from other researchers is con-
sidered adequate to avoid the pitfalls of the chosen participative research approach. 
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3.5 Synthesis 
 
Figure 3.5 summarises the research approach as presented in this Chapter. This 
research aims to assess incremental changes in collective-choice rules at five inter-
related political levels within the International Meuse River Basin District (the Euro-
pean, multilateral and Dutch national, regional and local) during the period 1990 to 
2009. The particular focus is at the impact of the WFD, more specifically its IRBM 
wording, related governance and policy prinicples and its environmental objectives 
and exemption options. Central in the research approach is the combination of two 
anlytical frameworks. The seven rule types of the Institutional Analysis and Develop-
ment framework (IAD; scope, boundary, position, choice, aggregation, information 
and pay-off) have been incorporated into the Policy Arrangement Approach (PAA) as 
the latter’s rules of the game dimension. 
 
 
Figure 3.5: the analytical framework as designed for this research 
 
Based on a review of IRBM literature, the author has constructed three ideal-types for 
each of the seven rules (see the Tables 2.3a till 2.9 in Chapter 2).These ideal-types 
serve as an analytical benchmark to track incremental changes over time. By compar-
ing the observations on rules in the era before and after adoption of the WFD (1990 
to 2000 and 2001 to 2009 respectively), the degree of change may become traceable. 
Subsequently, analysis of developments within the other three dimensions of the PAA 
(policy discourses, actors and resources and power) may account for potential expla-
nations for (triggers and barriers) of observed rules changes. Chapter 4 continues with 
the process reconstruction and the empirical analysis for the European political level. 
  
 
 
  
 
Informal meeting of the EU Water Directors and the European Commission at Hotel 
Krasnapolsky in Amsterdam on December 2 and 3, 2004 
 
 
The Dutch Presidency of the Amsterdam meeting with in the middle Bob Dekker, the EU 
Water Director of the Netherlands (Source for both photographs: Ministry of Transport, 
Public Works and Water Management)
  
 
- 4 - 
Ambiguous ambitions at the European Level 
 
‘Although the European Commission agreed that the new text proposal had become somehow compli-
cated (like a matryoshka), it considered this compromise between the wishes of both the Council of 
Environmental Ministers and the European Parliament inevitable.’ (Fragment of an internal 
Dutch memorandum, June 20, 2000)   
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This first empirical chapter provides for an analysis of the origin of the ambiguous 
ambitions in the Water Framework Directive (WFD; European Communities, 2000) 
and the subsequent interpretations in the guidance documents and policy summaries 
of the Common Implementation Strategy (CIS). Due to the politically complicated, 
multi-stakeholder context, European institutions are driven by ambiguous ambitions. 
The WFD is no exception that proves the rule. This directive is the first environ-
mental one that has been subject to the co-decision procedure as introduced by the 
Amsterdam Treaty. Following this procedure, the European Parliament (EP) has 
seized the moment in order to enlarge its influence (Kaika and Page, 2003). The 
European Commission (EC), the Member States and the EP needed two conciliation 
rounds to prevent a series of laborious drafting and negotiation years from ending 
without a directive at all (Interviews 40 and 43; Appendix I). Numerous, sometimes 
last minute, textual amendments had to be approved to make a political compromise 
possible (ibid.). Given this context, it may not come as a surprise that the WFD is 
highly ambiguous in nature.  
Section 4.2 explains the WFD as a hybrid construct in the European environ-
mental policy domain. Subsection 4.2.1 starts with a historical overview of the Euro-
pean environmental policy domain, followed by a brief characterisation of three waves 
of European water policy legislation. Subsequently, the Subsections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 
present a reconstruction of both the WFD drafting and negotiation stage and the CIS. 
Since Dutch, French and German public actors have been very active in trying to 
upload domestic practices and traditions to the European level, this reconstruction is 
important to understand better the context of subsequent implementation processes 
at interrelated political levels within the International Meuse River Basin District. 
However, this research does not aim to repeat the analysis as published by British 
scholars (Kaika and Page, 2003; Page and Kaika, 2003; Kaika, 2003). Given the central 
research focus on the Netherlands as the most downstream Member State in the In-
ternational Meuse River Basin District, this research adds observations from both 
interviews with involved Dutch actors and an analysis of their documents.  
As a next step, Section 4.3 particularly explores the extent of changes in the con-
figuration of collective-choice rules for Integrated River Basin Management (IRBM) at 
the European level over the 1990 to 2009 period. The author’s observations are inter-
preted as ideal-type IRBM rules (with regard to scope, position, boundary, choice,  
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aggregation, information and pay-off) before and after adoption of the WFD. The 
interpretations are predominantly based on an analysis of the official WFD text and 
the CIS meetings’ reports and documents, as well as secondary analysis and the 
aforementioned interviews (see Appendix I for an overview of the interviewees). In 
the search for potential triggers and barriers for changes in collective-choice rules, 
Section 4.4 assesses dominant and opposing argumentation lines around the WFD’s 
governance and policy principles and its environmental objectives and exemption 
options. Furthermore, developments in both, the identified coalitions and oppositions 
of actors, as well as the division of resources and power are presented. Finally, Section 
4.5 closes this chapter with a synthesis that provides for potential explanations of 
observed changes in and/or continuation of collective-choice rules for IRBM at the 
European level. As explained in Chapter 2, potential explanations may come from the 
interaction between developments in the rules of the game dimension and the other 
three dimensions of a policy arrangement over the studied period and theories that are 
related to each of these dimensions. 
 
 
4.2 The WFD a hybrid construct in environmental policy 
 
4.2.1 Development of the environmental policy domain  
The European environmental policy domain has gradually developed from a series of 
incidental measures (to overcome non-tariff trade barriers) towards a sophisticated, 
multilevel governance system in which policy-making powers are shared between 
supranational, national and sub-national actors (Jordan, 2001; Hildebrand, 2005). In-
formed by Hildebrand (2005) and Knill and Liefferink (2007), four phases of envi-
ronmental policy development within the European Union may be distinguished. This 
research adds a fifth one related to the uncertainty that derives from both the 
enlargement of the European Union with respectively ten and two new Member 
States in 2004 and 2007 and the global financial crisis since 2008. See Table 4.1 for a 
brief characterisation of the five phases.  
The first phase runs from 1957, when six European states (Italy, Germany, Bel-
gium, France, the Netherlands and Luxembourg) signed the Treaty of Rome (as legal 
foundation under the European Economic Community; henceforth EEC), to 1971.  
The overriding objective of the then EEC was to harmonise national laws in order to 
abolish trade barriers between the Member States (Hildebrand, 2005). The Treaty did 
not include explicit, formal legal provisions to support any Community-wide action on 
the environment even though indirect common interpretations offered some room for 
manoeuvre (ibid.). A broad interpretation of the ‘raising of the standard of living’ 
wording of its Article 2 ‘allowed environmental legislation to be “smuggled” into 
Community law (Burchell and Lightfoot, 2001: 34). All environmental initiatives had 
to be directly connected to the objective of economic cooperation and development 
(Rehbinder and Stewart, 1985; McGrory, 1990). The pace of environmental protection 
was essentially set by strongly environmentally oriented Member States (Hildebrand, 
2005). McGrory (1990) qualifies the common environmental measures in this period 
as incidental to the overriding economic objective.  
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Table 4.1: Phases in the development of the European environmental policy domain 
Phase↓ Brief characterisation ↓ 
I:  
1957 to 
1971 
Incidental Environmental Measures: 
 Italy, Germany, Belgium, France, the Netherlands and Luxembourg sign 
the Treaty of Rome on the European Economic Community. 
 No legal basis for environmental action, incidental initiatives relate to 
the common market and ‘raising of the standard of living’. 
II: 
1972 to 
1986 
The Responsive Period: 
 The 1972 Stockholm UN Conference on the Human Environment. 
 Fear of competitive distortions in the Common Market by differences 
in environmental standards, environmental disasters, growing public 
awareness and improving living conditions are drivers for environ-
mental action. 
 Establishment of the Directorate-General on the Environment. 
 Interpretations by the ECJ on environmental provisions as linked to the 
setting up or operation of the internal market. 
 Adoption of the first three environmental actions programmes (includ-
ing principles and objectives of environmental policy) and directives. 
III: 
1987 to 
1991 
Legal Basis and Initiative: 
 The Single European Act (SEA*) provides for a legal basis of European 
environmental policy development and the European Parliament (EP) 
gets more access to decision-making by the cooperation procedure. 
 De jure consolidation of de facto developed environmental policies. 
 Significant increase in initiatives and legal statutes. 
IV: 
1992 to 
2004 
Consolidation and Integration:  
 The Maastricht Treaty on the European Union (1992) expands qualified 
majority voting to most environmental issues. Sustainable growth is 
added as one of the main Community objectives. The importance of in-
tegration of environmental considerations into other policy sectors is 
stressed. 
 The Amsterdam Treaty (1997) introduces the co-decision making pro-
cedure by which the European Parliament (EP) receives more influence.  
 Increased attention to the impact of proposed accession of new Mem-
ber States overshadows other issues like environmental protection. 
Consolidation efforts of prior legislation prevail over new initiatives. 
V:  
2005 
onwards 
Uncertainty by Enlargement and the Global Financial Crisis: 
 2004/2007: Enlargement of the EU with twelve new Member States.  
 Global financial crisis since 2008 overshadows environmental issues and 
may trigger a potential slow-down of environmental policies. 
 Uncertainty about the impact of new power balances & governance 
rules on environmental policies, as introduced by the 2007 Lis-
bonTreaty. 
*) The SEA (European Communities, 1987 into force since 01-7-1987) was the first major 
revision of the 1957 Treaty of Rome. A core element of the SEA was to create a Single Market 
within the EU by 1992. The SEA reformed the legislative process by introducing the coopera-
tion procedure between the European Council and the European Parliament and by extending 
qualified majority voting to new policy domains. 
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Hildebrand (2005) argues that one cannot yet appropriately speak of institutionalisa-
tion of environmental protection. ‘This is hardly surprising given the political climate 
of the time, with the green movement largely in its infancy and environmental prob-
lems not seen as salient political issues’ (Burchell and Lightfoot, 2001: 35). 
The 1972 Stockholm UN Conference on the Human Environment marks the 
start of the second phase. This international event has put environmental concerns 
high on the European political agenda (Burchell and Lightfoot, 2001). At their subse-
quent Paris Summit, the EU Heads of States invited the Community institutions to 
develop an action programme on the environment, which resulted in the First Pro-
gramme of Action on the Environment (Commission of the European Communities, 
1973). From the studied literature, four potential drivers for the introduction of a 
common environmental policy during the second phase (from 1972 to 1986), become 
noticeable. The first driver is the fear that trade barriers and competitive distortions in 
the Common Market could evolve out of different environmental standards (Johnson 
and Corcelle, 1989). Secondly, subsequent environmental catastrophes have triggered 
the increased international politicisation of environmental problems and also have 
underlined the cross-border nature of certain forms of environmental pollution (Lief-
ferink, Lowe and Mol, 1993; Hildebrand, 2005). Thirdly, increasing public protest 
against environmental destruction triggered a considerable degree of pressure upon 
elected government officials (Hildebrand, 2005). Fourthly, the literature frequently 
makes reference to the Preamble and Article 2 the Treaty of the European Union, i.e. 
the goal of improving the European living conditions (Knill and Liefferink, 2007).  
Despite unfavourable legal conditions it is remarkable that, by the mid 1980s, not 
only had three subsequent environmental action programmes been passed (including a 
constant broadening of environmental objectives and activities), but also around 200 
binding legal acts primarily in the form of directives and regulations (Weale, 1996). 
Gradually, European environmental policy had developed into an independent policy 
domain, even without having a relevant legal basis (Knill, 1995; Sbragia, 2000). 
Whereas the First Programme of Action on the Environment (Commission of the 
European Communities, 1973) introduced eleven principles of environmental policy, 
the Third Programme of Action on the Environment (Commission of the European 
Communities, 1982) acknowledged the importance of environmental resources as a 
fundament for further economic and social development and emphasised the need for 
an overall strategy to incorporate environmental considerations into other policy sec-
tors (Hildebrand, 2005). 
Throughout the 1970s environmental policy continued to develop but in a very 
ad hoc and incremental manner, according to the whims of the Member States (Len-
schow, 2004). Haigh (1996) viewed the early 1970s as the ‘dark ages of EU environ-
mental policy’, since unanimous voting in the Council of Environmental Ministers 
(henceforth the Council) meant standards developed at the pace of the most reluctant 
state or coalition of states. The lowest common denominator ruled decision-making in 
the Council, within the context of weakly developed supranational institutional and 
legal structures (Jordan, 2005). Democratic oversight by the EP and national parlia-
ments remained weak and inconsistent and national pressure groups concentrated  
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efforts on domestic affairs as the thought locus of environmental policy (Burns, 2005; 
Mazey and Richardson, 2005).  
Since the early 1980s, the number of pieces of environmental policies began to 
expand more rapidly, since the EC successfully took the standards promoted by the 
then leader Member States for proposals which reached further than the lowest com-
mon denominator of state preferences (Jordan, 2005). Koppen (2005: 67-86) describes 
how rulings by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the 1960s and 1970s helped to 
legitimise the EC’s opportunistic initiatives, to create new opportunities for the EP 
and to tighten the legal framework of compliance with the EU rules. Hildebrand 
(2005: 29) characterises European environmental policy in the second phase as ‘a “re-
sponsive” one in the sense that it evolved according to the momentary economic, 
political and social circumstances’. The lack of a sound legal basis caused uncertainty 
and a more incoherent than an integrated approach (ibid.).  
The third phase (1987 to 1991) is primarily characterised by the legal and institu-
tional consolidation and further development of environmental issues into a common 
policy domain. Although the Single European Act (SEA; European Communities, 
1987) was rooted more in economic than environmental policy motives (i.e. comple-
tion of the internal market), it acknowledged environmental policy as a legitimate 
European domain (Hildebrand, 2005; Knill and Liefferink, 2007). The explicit men-
tioning of EU environmental policy in the Treaty ultimately only confirmed in legal 
terms what already had been accomplished de facto in the preceding years, e.g. as 
expressed by the subsequent environmental action programmes. Gradually the EP 
obtained more power within the European institutions. The SEA’s cooperation pro-
cedure (Article 95) enhanced the EP’s right to participate in the legislative process 
(ibid.). Lenschow (2005a) denotes that the European Commission seized the moment 
to gradually generate an extensive corpus of common policies.  Haigh and Baldock 
(1989: 12) mention three different ways in which the SEA has affected Community 
environmental policy: (1) through majority voting and the cooperation procedure; (2) 
through the objective of completing the internal market; and (3) through the new legal 
provisions as basis for environmental policy development. In addition, Jordan (2005) 
argues that in the 1980s, a relatively rapid and profound transformation took place in 
the development of European environmental policy, as encouraged by rising levels of 
public concern for environmental matters in (then) “greener” Member States such as 
Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark. ‘Between 1989 and 1991 the EU adopted 
more environmental statutes than in the previous 20 years combined’ (ibid: 6). 
The fourth phase (from 1992 to May 2004) starts with adoption of the Treaty on 
the European Union (Maastricht Treaty) which introduces ‘sustainable and non-
inflationary growth respecting the environment’ as one of the basic common tasks 
(European Economic Communities, 1992: 2). Furthermore, the Treaty has reinforced 
the requirement that environmental protection should be integrated into other Euro-
pean policy sectors (Wilkinson, 1997). It has expanded the qualified majority decision 
making rule (instead of unanimity) for environmental issues in the Council. Subse-
quently, the introduction of the co-decision procedure by the Amsterdam Treaty 
(European Communities, 1997) is among the more influential shifts in this phase. It 
replaces the cooperation procedure and provides the EP and the Council with equal  
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power including a true veto right (Judge, Earnshaw and Cowan, 1994). The Amster-
dam Treaty results in a general strengthening of environmental policy concerns vis-à-
vis other policy areas of the Community. This holds in particular for the position of 
the then Directorate-General Environment amongst other DGs (Haigh and Lanigan, 
1995). Since the Amsterdam Treaty, the EC has elaborated strategies for integration of 
environmental protection requirements into EU policies such as energy, transport and 
agriculture (Lenschow, 2002). Within these strategic documents, the EC stresses the 
need for horizontal coordination between various DGs and vertical coordination be-
tween various tiers of government from the local to the European level (ibid.).  
The 1998 Cardiff Summit of Heads of State and Government ‘has set off a proc-
ess aiming at better integration of environment objectives and sustainable develop-
ment into central Community policy sectors which are the drivers behind economic 
development’ (Common Implementation Strategy, 2001: 10). Priority areas for action 
for DG Environment are integration into regional policy, agricultural policy, fisheries 
policy, development policy, marine policy and other sectors (e.g. energy, transporta-
tion and internal market; ibid.: 11). For example, since the mid-1990s environmental 
considerations have formed a key component in the successive reforms of the Com-
mon Agricultural Policy (henceforth CAP), which have encouraged more environ-
mental friendly farming practices (Dühr, Colomb and Nadin, 2010). In spite of these 
integration attempts, the “greening of EU policies” has been rather slow and limited 
(ibid.; Burchell and Lightfoot, 2001). Sbragia (2000: 299) mentions three reasons 
which may account for this laborious integration process: (1) the political priority 
given to economic growth, employment and competitiveness; (2) the relatively weak 
position of DG Environment among other sector DGs; and (3) the sometimes reluc-
tant attitudes of Member States.  
Zito (1999) states that the increasing legal and institutional “anchoring” of the 
European environmental policy paradoxically goes hand in hand with stagnating po-
litical dynamics. Knill and Liefferink (2007) add two observations. Firstly, problems 
associated with environmental protection no longer have the same priority on the 
political agenda of the EU and most member states as in the 1980s and early 1990s. A 
general slow-down in economic growth in the beginning of the 1990s, the persistent 
problem of high unemployment and increased competition in the wake of interna-
tional market liberalisation may account for the priority shift (ibid.; Young and Wal-
lace, 2000). Consequently, the political commitment to impose stringent and intrusive 
regulations through command and control processes has diminished very significantly 
(Sbragia, 2000). Secondly, the main focus of EU environmental policy is no longer on 
the definition of legally binding limits. The EU increasingly focuses on more flexible 
and less harmonisation-oriented regulatory concepts, which allow the member states 
greater room to manoeuvre with regard to the implementation of policies (Knill and 
Liefferink, 2007; Knill and Lenschow, 2000). Since the end of the 1990s the main EU 
focus shifts towards accession procedures and institutional reform in the light of the 
2004 and 2007 enlargements of the EU. And although these enlargements have led to 
an expansion of common environmental standards to in total 12 new Member States, 
regional cohesion, economic growth, competitiveness and employment have preoccu-
pied the Member States’ governments most (Dühr, Colomb and Nadin, 2010). Inte 
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gration of environmental protection objectives into other EU sector policies has been 
insufficient so far, as the goal of environmental sustainability has remained subservient 
to the social and economic priorities (ibid.; Jordan and Schout, 2006).  
Finally, the fifth phase starts with the May 2004 enlargement of the European 
Union with ten new Member States from Eastern Europe. In this phase reflections on 
a reorganisation of the European governance rules result in the adoption of the Lis-
bon Treaty (European Union, 2007b) which has become into force in December 
2009. The impact of the enlarged set of actors and shifts in governance rules on the 
future direction of and priority-setting within the European environmental policy 
domain is highly uncertain. Additionally, the global financial crisis (since 2008 to 2012 
at the time of writing) may have significant impact on available financial resources for 
environmental policies. At the same time, climate change has become an explicit pri-
ority of the European Union, e.g. as expressed by the establishment of the new Direc-
torate-General for Climate Action in February 2010. Within the CIS, the DG Envi-
ronment has drafted the Guidance Document No. 24 ‘River Basin Management in a 
Changing Climate’ (European Communities, 2009g). Whereas the global financial 
crisis may trigger a generic slowdown of environmental policy, the policy discourse on 
sustainable river basin management in the context of climate change may trigger new 
initiatives. Om the one hand, due to the EU’s enlargement, one may expect new 
Member States to incorporate European environmental policy requirements. On the 
other hand the EU’s predominant focus on socio-economic development remains, 
especially in times of financial crisis. Deliberations on and investments for saving the 
Euro (and the entire European integration project) may overshadow initiatives for rule 
alterations in the environmental policy domain. 
 
Three European water policy waves 
With regard to European water policy development, generally three waves are distin-
guished. Between 1970 and 1990 the European institutions have launched several 
directives on the reduction and prevention of water pollution, based on a preliminary 
regulatory approach. The yield of this first wave of European water legislation is a 
kaleidoscope of sector directives including water quality standards for surface water, 
bathing water, fish water, shellfish water and drinking water, which partly cover the 
same issues (Kallis and Nijkamp, 2000; Grimeaud, 2001).  Notwithstanding this legis-
lative bloom, in 1990 the EU still faced major problems with water pollution in gen-
eral and eutrophication in particular. A second wave of water legislation evolved (from 
1991 to 1999) which primarily aimed at emissions reductions, e.g. directives on Urban 
Waste Water Treatment (European Communities, 1991a), the Nitrates Directive 
(European Communities, 1991b) and the Directive concerning Integrated Pollution 
Prevention and Control (IPPC; European Communities, 1996) (Kallis and Nijkamp, 
2000; Grimeaud, 2001). The numerous water policy regulations from the first and 
second wave gave rise to criticism about the lack of consistency (Dworak et al, 2007). 
The WFD (European Communities, 2000) marks the start of the third wave of 
water policy regulation (Kallis and Nijkamp, 2000; Grimeaud, 2001; Kaika, 2003; 
European Parliament, 2007) and has been drafted and adopted in the fourth phase of 
environmental policy development (see Subsection 4.2.1). This directive is the product  
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of an incremental, laborious political negotiation process in an era, starting with the 
1992 December Edinburgh meeting of the European Council, in which the European 
institutions look for a “better regulation” and “better law-making”. In particular, the 
then European Council reached agreement on guidelines to implement the subsidiarity 
principle and measures to increase transparency and openness in the decision-making 
process of the Community (European Communities, 1992b). Although fast results 
were hindered by complexity and lack of political support, simplification of EU legis-
lation gradually has become one of the main contemporary priorities in the European 
arenas. The environmental policy domain has become the first test case. The WFD 
has been adopted ‘in order to concentrate, rationalise and standardise, as well as im-
prove the efficiency of European water protection legislation’ (Dworak et al., 2007: ii). 
Given its 72 pages including some detailed technical annexes one may argue to which 
extent the WFD actually has become an example of simplification of EU legislation. 
However, that is not the topic of this dissertation. No doubt the WFD can be charac-
terised as an ambiguous attempt to harmonise river basin management approaches in 
Europe. It is an instrument which offers room for multiple interpretations of its prin-
ciples, environmental objectives and exemption options as the subsequent Subsections 
4.2.2 and 4.2.3 will describe. 
 
4.2.2 Formulation, negotiation and adoption of the WFD 
Appendix V provides a brief chronological reconstruction of the drafting and negotia-
tion process of the WFD. The seeds for the WFD were sown at the Community Wa-
ter Policy Ministerial Seminar in Frankfurt in 1988. In the conclusions water is de-
clared a precious resource which must be carefully managed and priced accordingly 
(Commission of the European Communities, 1988). The Ministers express the impor-
tance of guidelines for integrated water management (water quantity and quality) and 
development of a policy for rational use of water resources. They call for new Com-
munity legislation which covers ecological quality of surface waters. More specifically, 
they stress the need for a combined approach of quality objectives and emission stan-
dards, the importance of adequate waste water treatment infrastructure, the need for 
measures to reduce pollution from diffuse sources (nutrients and pesticides by agricul-
ture in particular) and integration of water policy (as part of an overall environmental 
policy) with industrial, agricultural and regional policies (ibid.). Furthermore, by its 
resolution of June 28, 1988, the Council of Ministers asked the EC to submit propos-
als on improvement of ecological quality in the Community’s surface waters (Euro-
pean Communities, 2000: 1). The declaration of the 1991 Ministerial Groundwater 
Seminar at The Hague ‘recognised the need for action to avoid long-term deteriora-
tion of freshwater quality and quantity and called for a programme of actions to be 
implemented by the year 2000 aiming at sustainable management and protection of 
freshwater resources’ (ibid.). 
During the early 1990s a number of debates took place on several aspects of EU 
water policy. Issues raised were implementation costs versus (too limited) achieve-
ments (so far), a too mono sector approach, ongoing revisions of existing directives 
(e.g. drinking and bathing waters, hazardous substances) and concerns about the pres-
sure from the ECJ. In the broader social and political context, there are calls for 
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simplification and integration of European legislation, more subsidiarity and better 
access to environmental information (e.g. as expressed by the 1998 Aarhus Conven-
tion; UN-ECE, 1998). Between 1988 and 1995, the EC drafted several versions of an 
ecological quality directive, aiming at legally binding, uniform European water quality 
standards. High-ranking officials and ministers in several Member States fear high 
socio-economic implementation costs and loss of autonomy due to such a new direc-
tive. Dutch water officials fear another mono sector directive, whilst they ply for more 
coherence, transparency and integration of the existing legislation (Interviews 30 and 
43, Appendix I). In this era, partly induced by growing dominance of policy discourses 
such as integrated water resources management, sustainability and simplification and transparency, 
there were several calls for integrated, flexible and adaptive frameworks and more 
participative approaches.  
January 26, 1995, at an expert meeting in Brussels, the Dutch national govern-
ment launches its position paper on ‘the Commission Proposal on Ecological Water 
Quality (EQW) and the integration of European Water directives’ (Ministry of Trans-
port, Public Works and Water Management, 1995a). At this meeting, French and 
Dutch water policy experts agree to organise an informal bilateral meeting of their EU 
Water Policy Directors. On February 15, 1995, both directors expressed not to be in 
favour of the EC’s idea to arrive at a sectoral directive on a basic European ecological 
water quality. Instead they opted for a more integrated approach of European water 
policy legislation in order to increase transparency and with sufficient implementation 
room for the Member States (subsidiarity). They stressed the importance of a cross-
border river basin management approach. As a next step, the French EU Water Direc-
tor invited his counterparts of the Netherlands, United Kingdom, Germany and Spain 
(the then EU Presidency) for an informal meeting at Paris (April 7, 1995). After dis-
cussion of the Dutch position paper, the five Water Directors decided to draft a joint 
discussion paper on the desirable future EU water policy. The French would urge the 
EC to organise an informal meeting with the Water Directors from all 15 Member 
States (with the aim to convince the EC of the need of a different approach). The 
British EU Water Director woul draft a proposal for the joint paper. May 1995 the 
first draft of the discussion paper appeared, soon followed by a second Dutch posi-
tion paper ‘Environmental framework Directives of the European Union – Ideas on 
Coherence and Suggestions for a Logical Basic Structure’ (Ministry of Housing, Spatial 
Planning and the Environment, 1995).  
The EC invites the 15 Water Directors for a first informal meeting at Brussels 
(June 19, 1995). At this meeting, the final draft of the joint paper (Summerton, 1995a) 
is discussed. The EC stresses that the primary issue is not the lack of coherence, but 
the delays with implementation of existing water-related directives by the Member 
States. At the end of this laborious meeting, the EC (reluctantly, according to the 
Dutch delegation minutes) agrees to prepare a strategic document on future EU water 
policy. In turn, the EC asks the EU Water Directors to come forward with examples 
of where there is a lack of coherence in the current corpus of EU water legislation. In 
June 1995 a public hearing of the EP and a Council meeting take place, both on water 
policy. The overall conclusion is that there is a need for a fundamental review of 
Europe’s water policy legislation. At the second informal meeting of the EC with the 
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EU Water Directors at Brussels (October 18, 1995), the then Environmental Com-
missioner presents DG Environment’s discussion document on European Commu-
nity Water Policy (DG Environment, 1995). Also, the British memorandum with ex-
amples of a lack of coherence in EU water policy (Summerton, 1995b) is discussed. 
Under growing pressure of the EP, the Council and the EU Water Directors of the 
Member States, on February 21, 1996, the EC releases a Communication on European 
Community Water Policy setting out the leading principles for a water framework 
directive (Commission of the European Communities, 1996). Directly after the Com-
munication, the EC starts an open consultation round and invites specific interests 
groups and organisations to participate (Kaika, 2003). As reaction to this Communica-
tion, the EU Water Directors of France, United Kingdom, Germany and the Nether-
lands prepare a joint document: ‘Summary of Discussions about Guidelines for a Wa-
ter Policy of the Union’ (Roussel et al., 1996). After consideration of the remarks from 
the informal, open consultation procedure (which ends in May 1996), the EC launches 
its first draft proposal for the Water Framework Directive early December.   
The first draft proposal is discussed informally with technical experts and the EU 
Water Directors. In February 1997, the EC adopts the final version of its first pro-
posal on the Water Framework Directive (Commission of the European Communi-
ties, 1997a). The next step includes both an extensive inter-service consultation round 
in which most other Directorate-Generals participate and a mandatory consultation of 
the Economic and Social Committee and the EP. Again discussions follow with the 
EU Water Directors and also the EP cautiously takes notices of the proposed text. 
Although the EC incorporates several remarks into its amended proposal of Novem-
ber 1997 (Commission of the European Communities, 1997b), a number of major 
issues remain to be solved: the organisational interpretation of international river basin 
management coordination, a quantification of the good ecological status, the imple-
mentation terms, the incorporation of the Dangerous Substances Directive 
(76/464/EEC), the scope and arrangements for (full) cost recovery for water services 
and arrangements for tackling many small sources of diffuse pollution. Among all the 
Member States the Netherlands show to be the most anxious for wor-ding that may 
point at legally binding objectives and requirements. Given the large ambition gap 
between the EP and the Council of Environmental Ministers, the EP deliberately 
delays the procedures with the aim of bringing the WFD under the co-decision proce-
dure of the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty (Kaika, 2003; Interviews 40 and 43, Appendix I).  
The WFD is the first environmental directive that is designed under the co-
decision procedure of the Council and the EP (as introduced by the 1997 Amsterdam 
Treaty). This has made the WFD an important test case for the EP in attempts to 
increase its power and influence. As thoroughly reconstructed by Kaika and Page 
(2003), a delicate political power game follows between the EP (with a prevailing fo-
cus on environmental interests and supported by environmental NGOs), the Council 
of Ministers (with a dominant focus on socio-economic interests and supported by a 
strong industrial and agriculture lobby) and the DG Environment in the European 
Commission (officially in a neutral position but with close connections to some envi-
ronmental NGOs). Finally, after laborious political negotiations and last-minute edit-
ing in the so-called conciliation procedure, on June 28, 2000, both the Council and the  
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EP agree on a compromise text (ibid.; Interviews 40 and 43, Appendix I). Kaika and 
Page (2003) conclude that ‘As the significance of the directive became more evident, 
the debate over its details became increasingly confrontational. Once the economic 
costs of tightening environmental regulations and the ecological risks of reconsidering 
existing environmental regulations became transparent, the process of amendment 
became intense.’ Also Dutch actors mention the delicacy and toughness of the draft-
ing and negotiation process (Melis and Boudewijn, 2002; Interviews 40 and 43, Ap-
pendix I). Being the product of a compromise, the final text offers much room for 
interpretation differences. As Kaika (2003: 311) concludes: ‘Most of the controversial 
passages have been hedged in such a way that member states can interpret them in 
different ways. This makes the implementation phase immensely important and gives 
particular executive powers to the actors who will participate in this phase.’  
 
Héritier, Knill and Mingers (1996) conclude that in the context of the European envi-
ronmental policy domain, “regulatory competition” between Germany and the United 
Kingdom was (and to some extent still is) a main factor. The principles of precaution 
and action at the source lie at the heart of the emission-oriented German conception 
of environmental policy (Weidner, 1987; Knill and Liefferink, 2007). Regardless of 
local conditions which might vary, the Best Available Technology (BAT) should be 
used uniformly in order to reduce the emission of pollutants (ibid.) In contrast, the 
British philosophy stresses that the objective is not the prevention of emissions at 
(almost) any price, but rather the definition of an optimal, i.e. most cost-effective, way 
of managing the environment (Weidner, 1987; Jordan, 1993; Knill, 1995). The opti-
mum may fluctuate depending on local circumstances, the cost of the preventive 
technology and the economic situation of the company (ibid.). While German regula-
tory models dominated the 1980s, policies emphasising the quality of the environment 
and the local context and conditions have gained influence since the 1990s. More 
recent EU policies thus coincide to a greater extent with the British notions (Knill and 
Héritier, 1996; Sbragia, 2000). The official WFD text seems to confirm this evolution. 
While the initial EC’s ideas mainly focused on legally binding water quality objectives, 
the final negotiation result shows a more general framework including economic tools 
and principles. Although the environmental objectives are still at the heart of the 
WFD (Article 4; European Communities, 2000: 9-11), the intrinsic exemption options 
offer room for both specific local and regional conditions and circumstances and eco-
nomic costs and benefits considerations.  
Due to the aforementioned shifts in power balance related to the co-decision 
procedure, the growing access of non-governmental actors in the drafting process, the 
increasing influence of British implementation notions and early fear for severe socio-
economic consequences in several Member States, the WFD may be characterised as a 
hybrid political construct.  For example, it includes both potentially high ecological 
ambitions and options for exemptions. From a juridical point of view, Van Rijswick 
(2010) and Page and Kaika (2003) qualify the WFD as one among the most compli-
cated and difficult interpretable pieces of legislation in the European environmental 
policy domain. However, it is an innovative directive with many positive elements and 
innovation challenges for the future management of Europe’s fresh water resources  
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(ibid.; Van der Arend and Wiering, 2010: 1-4). The question is to which extent the 
directive’s intrinsic interpretation ambiguities will become triggers or barriers for 
changes in collective-choice rules for Integrated River Basin Management (IRBM) at 
different political levels within Europe’s river basins. As a first indication, interpreta-
tions and definitions of the Common Implementation Strategy (CIS) may serve.  
 
4.2.3 The Common Implementation Strategy (CIS) 
The informal meeting of the then French and Dutch EU Water Directors in February 
1995 may be considered the date of birth of the periodical meetings of the European 
Commission’s DG Environment with all Europe’s Water Directors. At these meetings 
the idea for the Common Implementation Strategy (CIS) develops. The main aim of 
the CIS (which officially has been launched at Stockholm in May 2001) is to allow a 
coherent and harmonious implementation of the WFD, e.g. by filling in interpretation 
gaps from the drafting and negotiation stage. The main focus is on methodological 
questions related to a common understanding of the technical and scientific implica-
tions of the WFD. In the CIS, several non-legally binding guidance documents have 
been produced showing ‘an informal consensus position on best practice agreed by all 
partners’ (see Appendix VI for an overview of the guidance documents until 2009). 
In the first years (from 2000 to 2002) emphasis within the CIS lies on the re-
quirements for the river basin characterisation reports (the so-called Article 5 reports) 
and testing, application and validation of related guidance documents in so-called pilot 
river basin projects. The use of economic instruments is an important issue in this 
phase. The extensive guidance document on water and economics (the so-called 
WATECO document; European Communities, 2003a) is the first one and considered 
a benchmark for subsequent guidance documents (on analysis of pressures and im-
pacts; identification of heavily modified water bodies; reference conditions of inland 
surface waters; typology and classification of transitional and coastal waters and tools 
for assessment and classification of groundwater). Also information sharing (such as 
the use of geographic information systems and intercalibration of domestic monitor-
ing programmes) and best practices in river basin management receive considerable 
attention. The focus of the guidance documents predominantly is on internal issues of 
the water policy (sub-) domain. Cross-sector policy issues are not profoundly dis-
cussed, except for linking water to economics – although this linkage mainly concerns 
pricing mechanisms for water services.  
In the second CIS phase (from 2003 to 2005), the EU Water Directors and the 
European Commission (EC) try to limit the administrative burden and increase effi-
ciency by a simplification of the organisation. All issues are regrouped into four work-
ing groups, named Ecological Status, Integrated River Basin Management, Groundwa-
ter and Reporting. Additionally, two Expert Advisory Forums (EAFs) are initiated 
which prepare the draft daughter directives on groundwater (European Union, 2006) 
and priority substances (European Union, 2008). Economic methodological aspects 
are further elaborated and the CIS partners struggle with the lack of monitoring data. 
The EU Water Directors stress that pragmatic solutions need to be developed which 
bridge the gap between the technical and scientific possibilities and the formal re-
quirements. They clearly express their preference for developing a decentralised 
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Geographical Information System. They also agree that large numbers of small water 
bodies may be grouped for reporting in order to limit administrative burden. Not all 
groundwater bodies for abstraction of water use (other than for drinking water pro-
duction) will have to be designated. 
The EU Water Directors and the EC gradually enlarge the scope to cross-sector 
policy issues. DG Environment presents a working document on tools within the 
CAP which may support the implementation of the WFD (DG Environment, 2003). 
The EU Water Directors and the EC agree on the added value of EU activities on 
flood prevention and protection. The EU Water Directors accept to include the ma-
rine strategy in their mandate and recognise the increasing importance of climate 
change for water policy. However, with regard to climate change, a comprehensive 
compilation of existing information and knowledge is considered a necessary prereq-
uisite for further discussion.  According to the EC and the EU Water Directors agri-
culture will be one of the central issues for a successful WFD implementation. There-
fore, DG Environment initiates a series of workshops involving agriculture and envi-
ronment experts in order to share views and to enhance the links between agriculture 
and water policy taking into account the experiences of the pilot river basin exercise. 
In addition, both the Member States and the EC agree to seek discussion and close 
cooperation between the relevant authorities on agriculture and water policy. For ex-
ample, a Strategic Steering Group with representatives of DG Agriculture and Rural 
Development and DG Environment is initiated which reports to the Water Directors. 
One guidance document is drafted on assessment of eutrophication in the context of 
different European directives (European Communities, 2009f) and one on the man-
agement of wetlands in the context of the WFD (as proposed by a coalition of envi-
ronmental NGOs; European Communities, 2003l). Finally, electronic reporting sheets 
are developed which will be part of a Water Information System for Europe (WISE). 
The EU Water Directors support a pragmatic development of WISE which will be 
integrated in a wider environmental reporting concept.  
Analysing the CIS process in 2005, three remarkable conclusions may be drawn. 
Firstly, the EC concludes that the submitted Article 3 and 5 reports are so diverse, 
that it may be very difficult to conduct a balanced compliance checking analysis. Sec-
ondly, the EU Water Directors adopt the conclusion of a Dutch presentation con-
cerning an analysis of WFD key issues - as derived from comparison of the Article 5 
reports. Based on figures up to 2004, the conclusion is that the condition of Europe’s 
aquatic ecosystems is to some extent more worrying than anticipated or hoped for. 
This is partially due to the non-achievement of objectives under other environ-
mental/water legislation and the considerable lack of information regarding many 
aspects. Thirdly, the EU Water Directors approve the ‘Discussion Document on En-
vironmental Objectives under the Water Framework Directive’ (European Communi-
ties, 2005b). From this document it becomes clear that the use of exemptions (Article 
4) should not be considered as derogations but as an integral part of the WFD sys-
tematic for a staged compliance (European Communities, 2005b: 16; italics added):  
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It is therefore unlikely that Member States will be able to address all the problems 
facing the water environment in a single planning cycle. The Directive allows for this 
by incorporating the use of exemptions as an integral part of the river basin planning process. 
The exemptions provide the means by which Member States can prioritise action to 
improve the water environment over a series of planning cycles. 
 
In line with this common interpretation of exemptions, at a workshop on the WFD 
and hydromorfology (Prague, October 2005), the Water Directors propose to apply a 
more practical approach for defining Good Ecological Potential for heavily modified 
water bodies. The pragmatic approach starts with defining feasible mitigation meas-
ures instead of reference conditions. Finally the EC agrees with this alternative ap-
proach, in addition to the original, more theoretical one. Several actors mention that 
gradually the EC acknowledges the mismatch between the high environmental objec-
tives ambition and the severe socio-economic consequences of full compliance in 
2015. Hence, the exemptions gradually evolve into a regular prioritisation instrument 
(Interviews 18, 43, 46, 51 and 52, Appendix I; Ten Heuvelhof et al., 2010). 
In the third CIS phase (from 2006 to 2009), the focus shifts to improvement of 
implementation comparability, simplification and transparency of European water 
policy and enforcement of cross-sectoral policies integration. The Water Directors of 
the EU25 Member States, with the exception of Denmark, adopt the (informal) decla-
ration on WFD and Agriculture. With regard to internal integration, the scope is 
enlarged to floods, water scarcity and droughts. The EU Water Directors recommend 
enforcement of coordination and integration of implementation activities of older 
directives (e.g. Urban Waste Water Treatment, Nitrates) into the CIS. Activities on 
developing common understanding of environmental objectives and exemptions 
should be continued with high priority. The intercalibration exercise continues and 
further streamlining of (electronic) reporting and monitoring is supported. Remarka-
bly the Integrated River Basin Management working group disappears.  
At the first European Water Conference (Brussels, March 2007), from its first 
WFD implementation progress report, the EC concludes both a poor legal WFD 
transposition (19 Member States with major shortcomings) and poor performance of 
the economic analyses (low level of information on cost-recovery in different sectors; 
Commission of the European Communities, 2007a and b). In addition hardly any 
information is available on application of Article 4.7 (i.e. an inventory of new foreseen 
activities which may be allowed notwithstanding detrimental impact on the environ-
mental objectives). The EC states that climate change should not be an excuse to hide 
poor water management practices. Notwithstanding the CAP reform, diffuse pollution 
from agriculture will remain one of the main challenges for improving water quality in 
the EU. Changes in production patterns (e.g. bio-fuels) will put further pressure on 
EU waters. EU transport and energy policy have started integrating requirements of 
EU water policy. Challenges for transport (navigation) and energy (hydropower) poli-
cies remain to further reduce negative impacts on the aquatic environment. Finally, 
Member States could benefit more from the (enlarged) opportunities within the Re-
gional Development and Cohesion Fund to include water policy objectives (ibid.).  
The EP releases a study report on ‘simplification of European Water Policies’ in 
which the CIS and WISE are mentioned as good examples (Dworak et al., 2007). 
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In June 2007 the coalition of environmental NGOs – as lead by the European 
Environmental Bureau (EEB) and the World Wide Fund for nature (WWF) - has 
submitted a complaint on the definition of water services by 11 Member States (in-
cluding the Netherlands). Subsequently, the EC asks those Member States for addi-
tional information.  
In June 2008 the EU Water Directors approve the key-messages in the discussion 
document on disproportionate costs in relation to environmental objectives and ex-
emptions (Common Implementation Strategy, 2008). Different views exist on the 
issue of disproportionate costs. Some Member States wish to take into account ability 
to pay, others stress that this reason is not explicitly mentioned in the WFD. The EU 
Water Directors agree that application of the disproportionate costs argument should 
not water down the WFD’s ambitions. They stress that applying the exemptions 
should not be the rule but exceptional. Furthermore, they suggest that the effects of 
past expenditures should be analysed in more detail as, to their opinion, the costs of 
basic measures cannot be considered when deciding on disproportionate costs. The 
Strategic Steering Group on WFD and Agriculture has established a catalogue of 
measures and a network of pilot river basins. However, some EU Water Directors 
indicate their concerns on the lack of ambitions in the agricultural sector to include 
WFD measure in the rural development programmes.  
December 2008 the EU Water Directors and the EC agree that compliance 
checking is a joint responsibility. The outcome of the exercise should be accessible to 
the wider public, for example by producing a strategic document on European water 
management. The compliance checking should be based on the requirements of the 
Directive and on comparable, good quality data of the Member States. The reports 
drafted by the multilateral river basin commissions should be taken into account in the 
compliance checking assessment for (draft) domestic river basin management plans. 
The EU Water Directors once again stress the need for Member States to work with 
the agriculture sector to include important measures (e.g. buffer stripes) in the river 
basin management programmes. Some Member States indicate they do not expect an 
influence of the financial crisis on the capacity to implement measures linked to WFD, 
while others fear that this will have a (dramatic) negative impact. They agree that the 
importance of the water sector for sustained economic development should be used 
as an argument, since the lack of investments for water policy objectives may have 
serious negative implications, particularly in the context of climate change. 
In 2009 the EU Water Directors and the EC conclude that the CIS should work 
more on dissemination of its products to the wider public, e.g. by producing more 
understandable summaries. Alternative working methods for future Water Directors 
meetings could be explored in order to encourage a wider participation of all Member 
States (seminars, parallel sessions, etceteras). The EU Water Directors highlight the 
importance of a continuous involvement of the EC at all levels. In turn, the EC 
stresses that the allocation of sufficient financial and human resources by the Member 
States is a prerequisite for a successful continuation of the CIS. The involvement of 
river basin commissions and national and international experts should be encouraged 
more in the CIS process. The EU Water Directors consider the update of the Rural 
Development Programmes following the CAP Health Check (i.e. an evaluation of its  
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results) a one-off opportunity to improve the funding of water protection measures 
linked to agriculture. European level discussions on effective buffer stripes and na-
tional implementation of good agriculture and environmental conditions are desirable.  
 
To conclude this Subsection, both DG Environment and the EU Water Directors of 
the Member States have invested their (water policy and management related) exper-
tise into the informal Common Implementation Strategy (CIS). Although the CIS has 
delivered several technical guidance documents, discussion papers and policy summa-
ries that may support WFD implementation planning at interrelated political levels, 
both the interpretation gaps after the laborious WFD drafting and negotiation process 
and the ambiguities around the environmental ambitions are not dissolved. As an 
indication, the CIS so far could not prevent (the first) 21 infringement cases of the EC 
against individual Member States (including the Netherlands) on non-conformity with 
specific WFD requirements. While both the EU Water Directors and the EC stress 
that the high environmental ambitions should not be watered down, they commonly 
interpret the WFD’s exemption options as regular prioritisation instruments for a 
staged compliance until ultimately 2027.  
Furthermore, although the disclaimer in all guidance documents mentions ‘an in-
formal consensus position on best practice agreed by all partners’, at the same time it 
emphasises that ‘the document does not necessarily represent the official, formal posi-
tion of any of the partners’, including the European Commission (European Commu-
nities, 2003a to l, 2005a to d, 2007a to c, 2009a to g and 2011). Given the persistent 
ambiguities around the interpretation of the WFD’s governance and policy principles, 
one may wonder to which extent the offered room for manoeuvre may trigger or 
prevent changes in collective-choice rules for IRBM at the European, as well as the 
multilateral and domestic political levels. Section 4.3 continues with an analysis of the 
degree of changes in observed rules at the European political level (before and after 
adoption of the WFD). 
 
 
4.3 The WFD and European rules of IRBM 
 
The IRBM paradigm, as defined in the 1992 Helsinki Convention on the Protection 
and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and Lakes (UN-ECE, 1992), has been a 
central model in the negotiations on the WFD from the start (Saager, 2001). This 
section explores to which extent the IRBM paradigm, as translated into governance 
and policy principles within the official WFD text and as interpreted by the informal 
CIS guidance documents, triggers changes or continuation of collective-choice rules in 
the European water policies (sub-) domain. For the purpose of the analysis, the ideal-
type rules as defined in Chapter 2 serve as a benchmark instrument to compare obser-
vations on the WFD drafting and negotiation period (from 1990 to December 2000) 
with those on the first WFD implementation planning cycle (from 2001 to December 
2009).  
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4.3.1 Scope rules 
As defined in Section 2.2.3, scope rules may concern the geographic area, the type of 
organisational structures and networks and the issues to be decided on. For the aim of 
this research a distinction is made between organisational and substantive scope rules. 
Concerning the former the focus is on the impact of hydrological boundaries on or-
ganisational structures/actor networks, whereas for the latter the focus is on the levels 
of integration. For example, are “river basins as the appropriate management units” 
translated into functional agencies and to which extent may these entities operate 
autonomously? Additionally, what are collective choices for internal integration (of 
issues within the water policy domain) and external integration (of issues across policy 
domains)? To what extent do these choices affect the nature of river basin legislation, 
policy documents and management plans? 
 
Organisational scope: the impact of hydrological boundaries 
The WFD emphasises (transboundary) river basin(s) (districts) as the appropriate units 
for integrated management of European groundwater and surface water resources 
(and related terrestrial ecosystems). River basin districts are defined as ‘the area of land 
and sea, made up of one or more neighbouring river basins together with their associ-
ated groundwaters and coastal waters, which is identified under Article 3(1) as the 
main unit for management of river basins’ (European Communities, 2000: 6). Article 
3(4) legally binds the Member States to ‘ensure that the requirements of this Directive 
for the achievement of the environmental objectives established under Article 4 and in 
particular all programmes of measures are coordinated for the whole of the river basin 
district’ (ibid.: 8). Given sovereignty and subsidiarity, it is up to the individual Member 
States how to implement the WFD adequately and timely for (parts of) river basin 
districts within their territories. For coordination within international river basin 
districts, they may use existing organisational structures stemming from international 
agreements (ibid.). At the early proposal drafting stage, the EC attempted to enforce 
multilateral coordination committees. Due to opposition by the majority of Member 
States, Article 3 has become more voluntary in nature. Since the WFD neither 
provides for far reaching, legally binding specifications and common definitions, nor 
calls for supranational, autonomous authorities, it is up to the Member States how far 
they swim together.  
The WFD advocates a switch to more sustainable, balanced and equitable water 
use by means of river basin management, predominantly based on hydrological 
boundaries. By organising water management administrations around hydrological 
units instead of existing political administrative boundaries, all water may be covered, 
independent of its political jurisdiction (Page and Kaika, 2003).  As such, river basin 
management plans may become strong drivers for multilateral cooperation as well 
(ibid.). This notion of river basins as the appropriate units for water policy arrange-
ments denies the (potential) mismatch with (a context of) more dominant political, 
economic and social system boundaries. Besides, especially multilateral coordination 
may be considered an Achilles heel, given Europe’s relatively weak supranational 
options. A close look at the WFD’s requirements for the programmes of measures 
(Article 11 and Annex VI; European Communities, 2000: 13 till 15 and 64-65) and the  
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river basin management plans (Article 13 and Annex VII; European Communities, 
2000: 16 and 66-67) shows that the focus primarily is on measures within the authority 
of water policy and management administrations. Also the informal CIS guidance 
documents mainly focus on issues that are directly related to the management of 
groundwater and surface water, hence implicitly support the advocacy for (functional) 
water management units based on hydrological boundaries.  
Article 13 of the official WFD text expresses the ambition to arrive at ‘single in-
ternational river basin management plans’ for international river basin districts falling 
entirely within the European Community (European Communities, 2000: 16). ‘Where 
such an international river basin management plan is not produced, Member States 
shall produce river basin management plans covering at least those parts of the inter-
national river basin district falling within their territory to achieve the objectives of 
this Directive’ (ibid.). Article 4(8) of the formal WFD text emphasises interrelations 
across upstream, midstream and downstream water bodies with its implicit no-shift 
principle (European Communities, 2000: 11):  
 
When applying paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7, a Member State shall ensure that the ap-
plication does not permanently exclude or compromise the achievement of the ob-
jectives of this Directive in other bodies of water within the same river basin district 
and is consistent with the implementation of other Community environmental legis-
lation.  
 
The CIS supports the call for integrated, cross-border river basin management plans. 
The Planning Process Guidance Document (European Communities, 2003k: 13-14) 
includes a range of possible planning types which reflect the visions of initiating 
(competent) authorities, from ‘plain rational-instrumental’ to ‘interactive with an open 
eye for the power of fundamental debate’. The former relates to a top-down problem 
definition by authorities in which implementation plans – as defined by public actors – 
follow ‘[..] a target-means rationality’. Private actors may participate during implemen-
tation (ibid.). Interactive planning types point at collaborative coalitions of public and 
private actors, who define the problems and take care of preparation and implementa-
tion of the plans. In this sense, ‘policy making means: on the basis of a powerful dis-
course, regrouping of actors and means with the aim of achieving certain targets (e.g. 
“water service”)’ (European Communities, ibid.: 14). However, this guidance docu-
ment stresses that ‘water planning has to be considered a systematic, integrative and 
iterative process to improve and support a sound management of water resources. It is 
not an objective of the WFD in itself’ (European Communities, 2003k: 9; italics added). The 
overall methodological approach should be tuned to specific regional and national 
circumstances and (long-established) planning traditions of the Member States (ibid.: 
3, 10) and planning processes in other policy domains (ibid.: 9). Additionally ‘the dif-
ferent planning types can occur at the same time in a certain region’ (ibid.). Although 
the guidance document supports river basins as the appropriate (water  resources) 
management unit, it points at likely spatial conflicts with other policy domains 
(European Communities, 2003k: 17): ‘By creating a spatial unit for water management, 
based on river basins, it is likely that spatial conflicts will occur with other policy 
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sectors that have a significant impact on water, but are structured along administrative 
and political boundaries.’  
 
The observations point at ideal-type B collective-choice scope rules at the European 
level in the 1990 to 2009 period (see Table 4.2a). Both the WFD and the CIS advocate 
functional management coordination structures which follow (sub-) river basin 
boundaries. Given sovereignty and subsidiarity as prevailing governance principles, the 
European institutions are cautious not to express supranational ambitions; at least not 
explicitly. Instead, the emphasis is on (enforcement or creation of) multilateral and 
bilateral structures which are coordinated by public actors of involved Member States.  
 
Table 4.2a: Ideal-type organisational IRBM scope rules (European level) 
Ideal-type rules↓ 1990 to 2000↓ 2001 to 2009↓ 
A: Water policy is implemented by organisational 
structures and actor networks which are driven by 
social, economic and political factors that do not 
follow hydrological (river basin) boundaries. These 
structures/networks may be multi-purpose or 
sectoral in nature and are under parliamentary 
control.  
  
B: Water policy is implemented by functional water 
agencies, committees and actor networks which 
follow hydrological (river basin) boundaries.  These 
functional entities and actor networks are controlled 
by parliamentary institutions. 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
C: Water policy is implemented by autonomous 
(sub) river basin authorities and/or communities 
that are organised along hydrological boundaries. 
These authorities and communities are beyond 
parliamentary control and do have their own 
polity rules. 
  
Legend: The research observations come closest to ideal-type B rules as expressed by the ‘X.  
 
There is no difference with the studied period before adoption of the WFD, which 
may not come as a surprise, since the WFD has been formulated in the spirit of the 
1992 Helsinki Convention. Be aware that this analysis accounts for the water policy 
(sub-) domain. In the broader institutional context of European sector policies, river 
basins do not play a major role in planning and decision-making. For example, the 
major European funds mainly concentrate on (transnational) regions and agriculture. 
Environmental issues are included in some of the programmes within these funds 
without large influence on their overall structure (Dühr, Colomb and Nadin, 2010: 
270-294 and 310-324). Incidentally, river basins do become visible in innovative 
transnational spatial planning and territorial cooperation initiatives, such as for the 
Baltic Sea and the Danube (Dühr, Colomb and Nadin, 2010: 226-227). Generally, 
within the European institutions, policy sector implementation coordination structures 
and networks are not driven by hydrological boundaries.  
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Substantive scope: internal integration  
The official WFD text may be considered a strong formal trigger for integration of 
water-related issues within the water policy institutions (i.e. internal integration). Arti-
cle 1 explicitly mentions surface water and groundwater, the protection of both terri-
torial and marine waters, links protection of aquatic ecosystems to terrestrial ecosys-
tems and wetlands and although not in depth, touches the field of anticipating floods 
and droughts (European Communities, 2000: 5-6). The primary aim of the WFD is to 
establish a framework for the protection of inland surface waters, transitional waters, 
coastal waters and groundwater which thereby contributes to ‘the provision of the 
sufficient supply of good quality surface water and groundwater as needed for sustain-
able, balanced and equitable water use’ (ibid.). The focus is mainly ecological and 
hydrological, including water pricing instruments (Article 9; European Communities, 
2000: 12-13) as a first step to bridge the worlds of water politics and economics. 
According to Article 6 (European Communities, 2000: 12), Member States shall 
ensure the establishment of a register of ‘all areas lying within each river basin district 
which have been designated as requiring special protection under specific Community 
legislation for the protection of their surface water and groundwater or for the 
conservation of habitats and species directly depending on water’. Article 7 (European 
Communities, 2000: 12) mentions that groundwater bodies must be identified which 
are used or intended to be used for the abstraction of more than 10 m3 of drinking 
water a day (or serving more than 50 persons) as an average. Groundwater bodies 
where abstraction takes place for other uses should be identified as well, but only 
when they cross the boundary between two or more Member States or when they are 
identified as being at risk or failing to meet the Article 4’s environmental objectives 
(ibid.). 
In the CIS, the EC, the EU Water Directors of the Member States, national ex-
perts and interests groups further elaborate the WFD’s internal integration ambitions. 
All the CIS’ guidance documents include the same text box to emphasise integration 
as a key concept underlying the WFD (see Text Box 4.1). The guidance documents 
cover a broad array of issues from within the water policy domain and explicitly link 
these with economic and financial instruments. For cost-efficiency reasons (e.g. to 
limit the administrative implementation reporting burden) Member States shall iden-
tify surface water and groundwater bodies as reporting and compliance checking units 
through which the integration aspects should become noticeable (European Commu-
nities, 2003b: 2-3):  
 
The “water body” should be a coherent subunit in the river basin (district) to which 
the environmental objectives of the directive must apply. Hence, the main purpose 
of identifying “water bodies” is to enable the status to be accurately described and 
compared to environmental objectives. [..] At the same time, an endless subdivision 
of water bodies should be avoided in order to reduce administrative burden if it does 
not fulfil any purpose as regards the proper implementation of the Directive. In 
addition, the aggregation of water bodies may, under certain circumstances, also help 
to reduce meaningless administrative burden, in particular for smaller water bodies.  
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Text Box 4.1: Integration: a key concept underlying the Water Framework 
Directive (European Communities, 2003a to l, 2005a to d, 2007a to c, 2009a 
till g and 2011; original emphasis) 
The central concept to the Water Framework Directive is the concept of integration 
that is seen as key to the management of water protection within the river basin district: 
 Integration of environmental objectives, combining quality, ecological and 
quantity objectives for protecting highly valuable aquatic ecosystems and ensuring a 
general “good” status of other waters; 
 Integration of all water resources, combining fresh surface water and groundwa-
ter bodies, wetlands, coastal water resources at the river basin scale; 
 Integration of all water uses, functions and values into a common policy frame-
work, i.e. investigating water for the environment, water for health and human con-
sumption, water for economic sectors, transport, leisure, water as social good; 
 Integration of disciplines, analyses and expertise, combining hydrology, hy-
draulics, ecology, chemistry, soil sciences, technology, engineering and economics 
to assess current pressures and impacts on water resources and identify measures 
for achieving the environmental objectives of the Directive in the most cost-
effective manner; 
 Integration of water legislation into a common and coherent framework. The 
requirements of some old water legislation (e.g. the Freshwater Fish Directive) have 
been reformulated in the Water Framework Directive to meet modern ecological 
thinking. After a transitional period, these old Directives will be repealed. Other 
pieces of legislation (e.g. the Nitrates Directive and the Urban Wastewater Treat-
ment Directive) must be coordinated  in river basin management plans where they 
form the basis of the programmes of measures; 
 Integration of all significant management and ecological aspects relevant to 
sustainable river basin planning including those which are beyond the scope of the 
Water Framework Directive such as flood protection and prevention; 
 Integration of a wide range of measures, including pricing and economic 
and financial instruments, in a common management approach for achieving 
the environmental objectives of the Directive. Programmes of measures are defined 
in River Basin Management Plans developed for each river basin district; 
 Integration of stakeholders and civil society in decision making, by promot-
ing transparency and making information accessible to the public and by offering 
an unique opportunity for involving stakeholders in the development of river basin 
management plans; 
 Integration of different decision-making levels that influence water re-
sources and water status (these could be at local, regional or national level), for 
an effective management of all waters; 
 Integration of water management by different Member States, for river basins 
shared by several countries, existing and/of future Member States of the European 
Union. 
 
The analysis of the CIS documents shows that despite the WFD’s detailed delineation 
criteria, Member States have different views on the interpretation and consequently 
practical application of the term water body. In their aim for harmonisation and 
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developing common understanding of the definition, the EC and the EU Water 
Directors struggle with a subsidiarity dilemma. On the one hand Guidance Document 
2 (‘Identification of water bodies’; European Communities, 2003b) offers room for a 
pragmatic, flexible and iterative approach by referral to to a diversity of specific re-
gional and national circumstances within the European Union. On the other hand the 
guidance document makes clear that the identification of water bodies must be consis-
tent and coordinated within a river basin district. In particular, international river basin 
districts need to develop common approaches for the whole river basin (ibid.). ‘In the 
end, it is a matter for Member States to decide on the basis of the cha-racteristics of 
each River Basin District.’ (ibid.: 9) Furthermore, ‘the scale chosen for a particular 
“water body” will have influence on the management of active involvement of stake-
holders and the public’ (ibid.: 10). The question whether an element of surface water is 
significant regarding the WFD’s objectives leaves domestic interpretation room.  
The inclusion of groundwater bodies adds to the complexity of the integration 
ambitions, since they are more difficult to delineate. Their boundaries do not easily 
match hydrological surface water boundaries. Furthermore, the nature of the chosen 
water bodies system invites ambiguity, since the narrow focus on major water systems 
may hinder the more comprehensive river basin management philosophy in which 
relations between smaller and bigger water systems (internal integration) and between 
water systems, spatial development processes and socio-economic systems (cross-
sector integration) are central. In this respect the WFD seems to be caught within the 
water policy (sub-) domain since it provides no explicit objectives and rules on cross-
sector integration, although does mention the importance of it. Van Rijkswick and 
Havekes, 2012: 104) argue that, given the existence of daughter directives and a num-
ber of prior water-related directives that remain in force, ‘it would therefore be in-
correct to describe the WFD as a fully integrated approach’.  
This research denotes a predominant WFD focus on internal integration 
arrangements. In principle, the Directive concerns all groundwater and surface waters 
in Europe, both qualitatively and quantitatively. According to some Dutch officials 
and experts, the WFD has become far too thick for a general framework. Water quan-
tity issues (like flood prevention and management) are insufficiently included and the 
Directive includes cross-reference errors, due to the large number of (partly in-
coherent) amendments by the EP (Melis and Boudewijn, 2002; Interviews 40 and 53, 
Appendix I). Criticizers mention an integration deficit given the too one-sided atten-
tion towards water quality issues. Both Saager (2001) and Saeijs (2006) argue that, due 
to required unanimity of votes for water quantity issues (rule in the 1992 Maastricht 
Treaty), the EC considered a short term political agreement on a water framework 
directive, fully including water quantity issues, unfeasible. However, WFD’s Article 1 
opens the (back) door to water quantity issues in offering a framework for the protec-
tion of inland surface waters, transitional waters, coastal waters and groundwater 
which, amongst other purposes, ‘contributes to mitigating the effects of floods and 
droughts’ (European Communities, 2000: 5).  
In the course of the CIS, the EC and the EU Water Directors agree on the added 
value of EU activities on flood prevention and protection. The Water Directors accept 
inclusion of the marine strategy in their mandate. Although they mention the potential 
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impact of climate change, the Water Directors do not address explicit activities on this 
issue until June 2007. The Water Directors welcome an initiative on droughts, given 
the negative impact of water shortages in the summer of 2003. The observations point 
at an evolution from ideal-type A rules towards ideal-type B rules (see Table 4.2b). 
The WFD clearly marks the beginning of a third wave of European water policy in 
which internal integration tendencies are enforced (as introduced in Subsection 4.2.1). 
The internal integration exercise has not been completed yet by adoption of the WFD. 
Although the significance of relations between surface water and groundwater bodies 
is mentioned in the WFD, no rules are provided for integrated environmental objec-
tives for (the management of) related surface and groundwater bodies. Besides, more 
detailed rules for the management of groundwater bodies have been concluded seven 
years later, with the adoption of the parallel, though closely related, Groundwater 
Directive (European Union, 2006).   
 
Table 4.2b: Ideal-type internal integration rules of IRBM (European level) 
Ideal-type rules↓ 1990 to 2000↓ 2001 to 2009↓ 
A: Separate legislation, policy documents and man-
agement plans for both water quality and quantity 
issues. Surface water and groundwater are dealt with 
in parallel.  
 
X 
 
x 
B: Legislation, policy documents and management 
plans which include parallel objectives and measures 
for both quantitative and qualitative aspects and for 
groundwater and surface water. 
 
 
 
X 
C: Legislation, policy documents and management 
plans with integrated objectives and measures for 
related surface and groundwater bodies, including 
quantitative and qualitative aspects. 
  
Legend: The research observations come closest to ideal-type A and B rules as expressed by 
the ‘X’. The ‘x’ points at a reduced resemblance of the observations with ideal-type A rules 
after adoption of the WFD.   
 
Substantive scope: external integration 
Whereas the WFD explicitly focuses on internal integration issues, by means of de-
tailed Articles and the integration text box in the CIS guidance documents, referral to 
cross-sector integration is more implicit and in generic wording. For example, the 
WFD’s Preamble expresses the importance of ‘further integration of protection and 
sustainable management of water into other Community policy areas such as energy, 
transport, agriculture, fisheries, regional policy and tourism’ (European Communities, 
2000: 2). The directive is mentioned as a ‘basis for a continued dialogue and for the 
development of strategies towards a further integration of policy areas’ and ‘can also 
make an important contribution to other areas of cooperation between Member 
States, inter alia, the European spatial development perspective (ESDP)’ (ibid.). De-
spite these argumentations, the WFD does not include explicit arrangements for 
cross-sector policies making and integration. Coordination talks between the EU Wa-
ter Directors, DG Environment and other DGs on water and agriculture and 
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water and regional development, do not alter the predominant emphasis within the 
CIS on internal integration issues. At the end of 2009, the cross-sector integration 
intentions are not translated yet into strong incentives for opening up the water policy 
box and salient internalisation of wet elements into other policy domains.  
Parallel to the WFD drafting and negotiation process, a European spatial devel-
opment approach has been considered as a method of securing ‘convergence and 
coordination between various sectoral policies’ (which may have spatial impacts) 
through a territorial development strategy (Commission of the European Communi-
ties, 1998b: 7). Due to sovereignty and subsidiarity, several Member States have re-
sisted (and prevented) spatial development to become a formal objective of the Euro-
pean Union (Dühr, Colomb and Nadin, 2010). To a large extent, the European Spatial 
Development Perspective has been influenced by traditions and spatial planning ap-
proaches by France and the Netherlands (ibid.). A comparison by the European 
Commission implicitly points at the cross-sector integration challenge: in all EU coun-
tries planning is just one sector of government activity that rarely has any special influ-
ence over the activities of other departments other than the competence to regulate 
physical development. It is often a relatively weak sector (Commission of the Euro-
pean Communities, 1997c).  
Statement 47 of the WFD’s Preamble expresses the cross-sector integration in-
tentions while cryptically pointing at the limited authority of DG Environment: ‘This 
Directive should provide mechanisms to address obstacles to progress in improving 
water status when these fall outside the scope of Community water legislation, with a 
view to developing appropriate Community strategies for overcoming them’ (Euro-
pean Communities, 2000: 5). Interpreted more positively, this statement may open up 
windows for cross-sector initiatives. Van Rijswick and Havekes (2012: 103) argue that 
one consequence of the broad nature of the WFD’s overall objectives (as expressed by 
Article 1; European Communities, 2000: 5-6) is, ‘that the relationship with other pol-
icy areas becomes particularly apparent’. In conclusion, current practices at the Euro-
pean level point at dominance of ideal-type B collective rules for external integration 
(see Table 4.2c) such as cross-sector compliance checks and inter-services consulta-
tions.  
 
Table 4.2c: Ideal-type external integration rules of IRBM (European level)  
Ideal-type rules↓ 1990 to 2000↓ 2001 to 2009↓ 
A: Separate legislation, policy documents and man-
agement plans for water policy and other policy 
domains without linkages. 
 
 
 
 
B: Legislation, policy documents and management 
plans for other policy domains take into account 
water issues and reversely. 
 
X 
 
X 
C: Cross-sector, integrative policies and manage-
ment plans. 
  
Legend: The research observations come closest to ideal-type B rules as expressed by the ‘X’. 
 
For example, both the 1992 Maastricht Treaty (European Communities, 1992a) and 
the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty (European Communities, 1997), explicitly include 
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integration of environmental aspects into all EU policies as one of the common pri-
orities (framed as Environmental Policy Integration (EPI); Jordan and Schout, 2006). 
However, given a formal divide in sector competencies, the European institutions do 
not aim for integrative policies documents that cover issues of different directorate-
generals at once. Instead, individual documents per directorate-general dominate the 
scene. Additionally, during the CIS neither DG Environment nor the the EU Water 
Directors are able to provide for strong triggers for cross-sector arrangements. 
 
4.3.2 Position Rules 
As introduced in Subsection 2.2.4, within the context of this research, position rules 
relate to the question as to how do collective (inter-)national river basin governance 
and policy principles affect the positions of owners and users of water and land. Or 
reversely, which conditions should apply to acquisition, continuation and termination 
of rights to own and/or use (interrelated) water and land resources, in order to com-
ply with common principles of ecological, social and economic resilience? Three ideal-
types of collective position rules have been distinguished (see Table 4.3). 
 
The WFD’s Article 1 relates sustainability to ‘a balanced and equitable water use’ 
(European Communities, 2000: 6). The Preamble mentions that ‘This Directive 
should provide for such a [overall] framework [of action] and coordinate and integrate 
and, in a longer perspective, further develop the overall principles and structures for 
protection and sustainable use of water in the Community in accordance with the 
principles of subsidiarity’ (ibid.: 2). The official WFD text offers a rich mixture of 
phrases that may be interpreted as a diversity of paradigms with regard to sustainabil-
ity and from which the ambiguous nature of the directive becomes readable (see also 
Table 1.2 in Section 1.3). For example, water is both mentioned as a common pool 
resource and as an economic good. Sustainability has several connotations: people, 
planet and profit; ecological economics, goods and services of ecosystems; conven-
tional economics, public interests determine environmental protection ambitions; 
conventional ecology; and sustainable human development activities. Both the official 
WFD text and the CIS guidance documents do not include specific notions on trans-
lation of these sustainability views into domestic property and user rights systems.  
Meijerink and Wiering (2009) mention an ecosystem oriented interpretation of 
the integrated river basin management paradigm as predominant in the WFD. Scrutiny 
of the WFD’s text shows that, obviously, this interpretation is ambiguous in nature. 
Whereas the Preamble (1) addresses water as a common pool resource, Article 4.3 
protects a number of human activities which are labelled as sustainable, but at the 
same time may be the reason for the directive’s existence. Navigation, recreation, 
water storage (for drinking water supply, power generation or irrigation), water regula-
tion, flood protection and land drainage are not sustainable by definition and may 
cause detrimental effects on the state and functioning of aquatic (and related ter-
restrial) ecosystems. The statement of the EU Water Directors on the future of 
Europe’s Water Policy (European Water Directors, 2005: 1-2) expresses that, although 
the WFD mentions both maintenance of human uses and compliance with 
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environmental objectives, it provides no clear messages on interlinkages and rules of 
the game in order to actually be able to meet both at the same time (italics added):  
 
The results of this first comprehensive [Article 5] characterisation were encouraging 
and challenging at the same time. On the one hand, the success rate demonstrated 
that the implementation of the WFD can be done in time and the reports constitute 
an essential basis for integrated and sustainable water management. On the other 
hand, the results of the analysis clearly demonstrated that there is a wide range of issues 
that need to be addressed in order to maintain not only the [human] uses but also to enable the 
achievement of the WFD objectives within the timetable foreseen. 
 
The introduction of water pricing instruments aims at sustainable, balanced and equi-
table water use. These instruments are an attempt to link economic efficiency with 
social equity and ecological resilience, hence offer potential for an evolution towards 
ecological economics (as defined by Costanza, 1991). Considering water as a common 
pool resource means effects of human activities remain within bounds, so as not to 
destroy the diversity, complexity and function of the ecological life support system 
(ibid.). Considering water as a common pool resource, the EP proposed to start the 
Preamble with the statement that ‘water is not a commercial product like any other 
but instead is a part of Europe’s heritage which belongs to the peoples of the Euro-
pean Union and ought, therefore to be protected’ (Kaika and Page, 2003: 320). In the 
summer of 1999, remarkably the EC opposed inclusion of this statement. This objec-
tion has been indicative of the shift within the Commission ‘towards giving high prior-
ity to the idea of water as an economic good and subsequently to water pricing as a 
key tool for environmental protection’ (ibid.; Kaika, 2003). 
For a framework, the WFD includes very detailed technical prescriptions and the 
EC’s prior strive for a directive on ecological standards still is visible in the environ-
mental objectives (Article 4; European Communities, 2000: 9-11). However, economic 
interests also survived in the same Article’s 4 “escape” options on implementation 
time extensions (Article 4.4), on lowering objectives (Article 4.5) and on allowing new 
water system modifications (Article 4.7). So far, the European institutions have opted 
for a middle of the road position where planet, people and profit gather, without 
providing explicit clues on their interlinkages.  
 
The observations in this research point at ideal-type B position rules at the European 
level (see Table 4.3). One may argue that it is not appropriate to fill in this table at the 
European political level, since the European institutions have no formal authority to 
interfere in the domestic user and property right systems. However, there is an 
indirect influence, such as whenever implementation of European environmental 
governance and policy principles actually requires changes by Member States in land 
and water uses patterns within the delineated European regions. Furthermore, think 
about the impact of European policies and related funds that guide food production 
and rural development. For example, the CAP initially was highly protectionist and 
interventionist (Fouilleux, 2010). In the context of the post-1945 food shortages, the 
reconstruction ambitions and the security concerns of the Cold War, it aimed for 
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increasing productivity and achieving European self-sufficiency. The principle of 
guaranteed prices for agricultural products triggered large-scale (over-)production. 
Due to the international trade negotiations, the sustainable development discourse and 
the increased participation and influence of environmental activists, subsequent CAP 
reforms paved the way for inclusion of social and environmental externalities (ibid.). 
Since the 1999 CAP reform internalisation of these externalities is aimed for by the 
rural development policy (as the so-called second pillar of the CAP; European 
Communities, 1999).  
As described in Subsection 4.2.1, the European environmental policy domain has 
evolved from concerns to overcome trade barriers and competitive distortions only 
into its own institutions. Gradually, integration of environmental objectives into other 
policy sectors has become one of the European priorities (see also the examination of 
the EU’s environmental credentials by Burchell and Lightfoot, 2001). Against this 
historical background, it is apparently logical that the WFD and the CIS documents 
include notions on economic valuation and political weighing of social, economic and 
environmental externalities. Together with generic cross-compliance rules, these no-
tions indicate that property and user rights are not unconditioned with respect to so-
cial, economic and environmental externalities. 
 
Table 4.3: Ideal-type collective-choice IRBM position rules at the European level 
Ideal-type rules↓ 1990 to 2000↓ 2001 to 2009↓ 
A: Protection of prior water and land resources use 
and property rights without preconditions on envi-
ronmental, social and economic externalities. 
 
 
 
 
B: Conditional maintenance and acquirement of 
water and land resources use and property rights. 
Conditions include requirements to internalise so-
cial, economic and/or environmental externalities. 
 
X 
 
X 
C: Reallocation of use and property rights, based on 
interrelated conditions of ecological, economical and 
social resilience. 
  
Legend: The research observations come closest to ideal-type B rules as expressed by the ‘X’. 
 
4.3.3 Boundary rules 
As defined in Subsection 2.2.5, in the context of this research, boundary rules are 
interpreted as who has access to the river basin management planning process and 
who has not? What are conditions for entry and exit? What are the degrees of partici-
pation for different stakeholder categories? Three ideal-types of boundary rules have 
been distinguished (see Table 4.5). 
The WFD has been drafted and negotiated in the period when the European in-
stitutions, in their White Paper on European Governance, acknowledged that many 
Europeans were losing confidence in the ‘poorly understood and complex system to 
deliver policies that they want’ (Commission of the European Communities, 2001: 3). 
As a medicine, the White Paper introduces five principles of good governance: open-
ness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence. The WFD’s Article 14 
should be understood as expression of the participation principle (ibid.: 10): 
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The quality, relevance and effectiveness of EU policies depend on ensuring wide par-
ticipation throughout the policy chain – from conception to implementation. Im-
proved participation is likely to create more confidence in the end result and in the 
Institutions which deliver policies. Participation crucially depends on central gov-
ernments following an inclusive approach when developing and implementing EU 
policies. 
 
The White Paper does not provide detailed arrangements for neither ‘ensuring wide 
participation throughout the policy chain’, nor ‘an inclusive approach’. Proportionality 
and subsidiarity, open communication and easy access to transparent information, 
interactive planning processes, multi-level partnerships and voluntary agreements, 
expert advice, a stronger culture of consultation, dialogue, evaluation and feedback are 
considered key-elements (Commission on the European Communities, 2001).   
The WFD’s Article 14, albeit in different wording, echoes the tenth principle of 
the ‘Rio Declaration on Environment and Development’, which expresses the ratio-
nale for public participation in environmental decisions (United Nations, 1992a: 5):  
 
Environmental issues are best handled with the participation of all concerned citi-
zens, at the relevant level. At the national level, each individual shall have appropriate 
access to information concerning the environment that is held by public authorities, 
including information on hazardous materials and activities in their communities and 
the opportunity to participate in decision-making processes. States shall facilitate and 
encourage public awareness and participation by making information widely avail-
able. Effective access to judicial and administrative proceedings,including redress and 
remedy, shall be provided. 
 
Agenda 21 adds that public actors ‘should establish innovative procedures, pro-
grammes, projects and services that facilitate and encourage the active participation of 
those affected in the decision-making and implementation process’ (United Nations, 
1992b: 88-89). The participation principle has been further institutionalised by the adop-
tion of the Aarhus ‘Convention on access to information, public participation in 
decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters’ (UN-ECE, 1998). The 
‘encourage the active involvement of all interested parties’ wording in the WFD’s 
Article 14 seems to be taken from Agenda 21, although its implications do not be-
come clear. Actually, the wording is rather confusing with regard to the provisions in 
the article. The title of Article 14 better covers the content of the article which mainly 
focuses on formal procedures for ‘public information and consultation’ on three writ-
ten products in the river basin management planning process, i.e. a timetable and 
work programme for production of the plan, an interim overview of the significant 
water management issues identified in the river basin and draft copies of the river 
basin management plan (European Communities, 2000: 16). 
Why the WFD’s Article 14 includes the ‘active involvement’ wording? Should it 
be interpreted as an implicit attempt to go beyond formal information and consulta-
tion procedures? The related informal Guidance Document n˚ 8 on Public Participa-
tion (European Communities, 2003h) suggests larger ambitions, since it reflects a  
AMBIGUOUS EUROPEAN AMBITIONS 135 
 
 
 
broad range of participation literature and methods, from one-way information 
towards interactive planning and social learning. As they have to comply with the 
subsidiarity and sovereignty principles however, European policy makers are very 
cautious not to affect any domestic arrangements. They stay close to Article 14 but 
also offer room for implementation differences by stressing that the public partici-
pation process shall be organised and adapted to particular national, regional and local 
circumstances (European Communities, 2003h). Nonetheless, the guidance document 
cautiously goes beyond the ambition of Article 14, when it mentions that ‘encouraging 
the first [participation in the development and implementation of plans] should be 
considered the core requirement for active involvement. The latter two forms [shared 
decision-making and self-determination] are not specifically required by the Directive 
but may often be considered as best practice’ (ibid.: 20). 
 
Early 1998 the European Commission decides to directly involve environmental 
NGOs in the process of amending the draft WFD, but without clarifying the legal and 
institutional status of their involvement (Scheuer, 2001). However, these actors had 
important early access to draft legislation and to key civil servants at the Commission 
(Kaika and Page, 2003). DG Environment and the EU Water Directors point at the 
importance of continuation of the ‘unprecedented open coordination’ which has led 
to the adoption of the WFD (Common Implementation Strategy, 2001: 2):  
 
There was a strong support to a continuation of this unprecedented open coopera-
tion on implementation issues, which have traditionally been dealt with individually 
by Member States and without the active involvement of the Commission. An open 
and transparent process is necessary as part of a new partnership working method 
and to ensure a maximum of efficiency for the implementation process. 
 
Furthermore, the cooperation should go beyond the horizon of public actors. From 
the start of the CIS, both the EC and the EU Water Directors of the Member States 
consider stakeholder involvement highly important. ‘The basic idea is to promote an 
open, clear exchange of views and concerns between all the parties directly respon-
sible for the implementation of the framework directive and the ones who will be 
interested or affected by it.’ (Common Implementation Strategy, 2001: 14-15) With 
Candidate Countries (for entry to the European Union), back-to-back meetings with 
the EU Water Directors meetings are organised. Water is considered a key issue in the 
context of accession from institutional, technical and financial points of view.  
In November 2001, selection criteria are chosen for active involvement of inter-
ests groups and NGOs in the CIS (Common Implementation Strategy, 2003a). A 
distinction is made between ‘level 1 organisations’ (with participation rights) and ‘level 
2 organisations’ (with information rights only). First level organisations have observer 
rights for meetings of the Strategic Coordination Group (SCG; that prepares the 
meetings of the EU Water Directors and the EC) and can nominate experts to partici-
pate in working groups and/or pilot river basin projects (i.e. (trans-) national projects 
which aim to test the guidance documents for their practical feasibility). A level 1 or-
ganisation is a European umbrella organisation of national or regional organisations, 
has a specific profile with regard to community water policy and has demonstrated its 
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policy profile and relevance in the past (ibid.).  Level 2 organisations are those organisa-
tions that do not fully meet all level 1 criteria. These organisations are not allowed to 
participate in the SCG meetings, but they have full access to the (WFD part of) CIRCA 
(= Communication and Information Resources Centre Administrator 
(http://circa.europe.eu), a virtual, collaborative workspace for actors and partners of 
the European institutions). In addition, they may provide written contributions 
indirectly via their representatives in the SCG and/or directly to EC officials. In any 
case, interest groups and NGOs are not allowed to attend the meetings of the EU 
Water Directors. 
Based on the selection criteria, the EC and the respective working group leaders 
decide who is in and who is out and inform the SCG about the decisions (Common 
Implementation Strategy, 2003a). For efficiency reasons, the number of organisations 
that may attend the SCG meetings is limited to a maximum of 35. Organisations are 
grouped in thematic clusters of similar interests, for which a maximum number of seats 
are agreed (see Table 4.4 for the division of seats). Participating in the SCG meeting 
implies that stakeholders get organised in such a way that the maximum number of seats 
for each meeting are not exceeded. A meeting attendant may also bring in the points of 
other stakeholders whenever a certain overlap of interests exists. Appendix VII shows 
an overview of the accepted organisations and their level of involvement. In a letter to 
the then Swedish Chair of the SCG, the European Environmental Bureau (EEB) 
expresses its sincere support for the proposed strategy for participation of NGOs in 
the CIS (Hey, 2001). For efficiency reasons (available human and financial resources) 
the EEB considers attendance of the meetings of the SCG as most appropriate (ibid.). 
At the end of the first WFD implementation planning cycle, the EEB/WWF coalition 
concludes that the WFD implementation process is strong in ‘starting a reform 
process, by working across borders and engaging organised groups’ (Scheuer, 2009: 4).  
 
Table 4.4 Seats division for stakeholder categories in the Strategic Coordination Group 
Stakeholder category↓ Maximum number of reserved seats in 
the Strategic Coordination Group↓ 
Agriculture: 3 
Energy: 3 
Industry: 3 
Navigation: 3 
Water supply and waste water: 3 
Environmental NGOs: 6 
Other NGOs (legitimate uses of 
water): 
4 
International governmental organi-
sations: 
10 
Total → 35 
 
The options for active stakeholder involvement also concern the highly influential 
Expert Advisory Forums (EAFs). For these platforms, that discuss complicated 
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technical issues and prepare proposals for daughter directives of the WFD, the EC 
refers to the spirit of open consultation and involvement that was employed in the 
preparations of the proposal for the WFD and the proposal for a list of priority sub-
stances. The EC views the EAF as Consultative Forums in which multiple stake-
holders may participate, including actors in Member States, NGOs, outside experts, 
representatives of socio-economic interests groups and members of the EP.  
As expressed yet in Subsection 4.2.2, the WFD has been formulated and adopted 
in an era in which there were calls and initiatives to both enlarge access to and increase 
transparency of the European institutions. As a part of this evolution, the WFD draft-
ing process has been the first example within the European environmental policy 
domain in which the EC’s DG Environment has (further) widened its windows to 
private and civil actors. However, public actors at the European and domestic levels 
condition the access rules and degrees of stakeholder involvement. In the CIS the 
public actors continue with the prior boundary rules. These observations point at 
ideal-type B collective-choice boundary rules during the 1990 to 2009 period  
(see Table 4.5). 
 
Table 4.5: Ideal-type IRBM boundary rules at the European level 
Ideal-type rules↓ 1990 to 2000↓ 2001 to 2009↓ 
A: Access to the river basin management planning 
process is restricted to public actors only. Other 
stakeholders are informed. 
 
 
 
 
B: Non-governmental actors may have access to the 
river basin management planning process under 
conditions set by the public actors. Emphasis lies on 
co-thinking and consultation. 
 
X 
 
X 
C: Ample opportunities for all interested stake-
holders to join the river basin management planning 
process, including co-productions, co-decisions and 
self-realisation. 
 
 
 
 
Legend: The research observations come closest to ideal-type B rules as expressed by the ‘X’. 
 
4.3.4 Choice rules 
As introduced in Section 2.2.6, for the aim of this research, two indicators for obser-
vation of choice rules change have been defined. The first indicator concerns water 
supply and demand rules. Three ideal-types have been identified for this indicator, 
ranging from a focus on water supply only to integrated demand and supply manage-
ment, in which a hierarchy of functions applies, as conditioned by fresh water avail-
ability and protection of the ecological life support system (see Table 4.6a). The sec-
ond indicator expresses the nature of license system. Ideal-types range from separate, 
parallel licenses for quality and quantity objectives for the development, management 
and use of water resources, towards licenses integrated licenses for interdependent 
natural resources (including water; see Table 4.6b).  
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Supply and demand management 
With regard to supply and demand management, ambiguities in the European 
approach become noticeable from the Preamble in the official WFD text (European 
Communities, 2000: 1-5). In its fourth statement, the EP and the Council of Envi-
ronment Ministers notify that water resources in the Community are under increasing 
pressure from the continuous growth in demand for sufficient quantities of good 
quality water for all purposes. The supply of fresh water is acknowledged as a service 
of general interest in Europe (statement 15). Furthermore statement 23 points at the 
need for common principles to promote sustainable water use and statement 24 men-
tions that good water quality is important to secure the drinking water supply for the 
population. For recovery of the costs of water services, an economic analysis of water 
services will be necessary, based on long-term forecasts of supply and demand for 
water in the river basin district (statement 38). Remarkably the WFD’s main text fails 
to mention demand management, while supply of fresh water is emphasised as a 
general interest service. However, its Annex VI mentions the option of demand man-
agement in the list of supplementary measures which Member States may choose 
from (European Communities, 2000: 64). 
Article 1 of the WFD (European Communities, 2000: 5) mentions the promotion 
of ‘sustainable water use based on a long-term protection of available water resources’ 
among the main purposes of the WFD. It also points at ‘the provision of the suf-
ficient supply of good quality surface water and groundwater as needed for sustain-
able, balanced and equitable water use’ (ibid.: 6). The WFD does not provide a more 
detailed definition of ‘sustainable, balanced and equitable water use’ which opens the 
door to interpretation differences. Furthermore Article 1 includes protection and 
enhancement of ‘the status of aquatic ecosystems and, with regard to their water 
needs, terrestrial ecosystems and wetlands directly depending on the aquatic ecosys-
tems’ among the WFD’s main purposes (European Communities, 2000: 5). The 
Directive is not enterly clear how to guide political choices with regard to the interre-
lations between sustainable water use and ecosystem protection. For example, the 
WFD’s core Article 4 predominantly focuses at detailed requirements for the chemical 
and ecological state of surface water bodies and the quantitative and chemical state of 
groundwater bodies. Although Article 8.1(i) of the WFD prescribes monitoring of ‘the 
volume and level or rate of flow’ of surface water ‘to the extent relevant for ecological 
and chemical status and ecological potential’ (European Communities, 2000: 12), its 
environmental objectives do not include quantitative criteria for surface water bodies.  
Part of the explanation for the ambiguity in the WFD’s general and environ-
mental objectives is the political sensitive nature of water quantity issues at the Euro-
pean level. The wording of the Preamble’s statement 19 may be interpreted as a 
cautious attempt to take water quantity issues on board (European Communities, 
2000: 2; italics added): 
 
This purpose [improving the aquatic environment] is primarily concerned with the 
quality of the waters concerned. Control of quantity is an ancillary element in secur-
ing good water quality and therefore measures on quantity, serving the objective of ensuring good 
quality, should also be established. 
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A similar attempt becomes noticeable from the ‘contributes to mitigating the effects 
of floods and droughts’ wording in Article 1 (European Communities, 2000: 5). Van 
Rijswick and Havekes (2012: 358) argue that ‘the WFD does not yet provide for con-
crete rules on water use or allocation during shortages or treshold values in times of 
drought’. They advise to include a ‘good quantitative surface water status’ in the 
environmental objectives of Article 4 in relation to limitation of water shortages (ibid.: 
361). At the time of adoption of the WFD a ply for overall principles has been the 
maximum politcial compromise possible, as expressed by Statement 41 of the 
Preamble (European Communities, 2000: 4; italics added): 
 
For water quantity, overall principles should be laid down for control on abstraction 
and impoundment in order to ensure the environmental sustainability of the af-
fected water systems. 
 
With regard to supply and demand management, Member States shall include the 
following ‘basic measures’ in their programmes of measures (Article 11(3); European 
Communities, 2000: 14): 
 
(c) measures to promote an efficient and sustainable water use in order to avoid 
compromising the achievement of the objectives specified in Article 4; 
(e) controls over the abstraction of fresh surface water and groundwater and im-
poundment of fresh surface water, including a register or registers of water abstrac-
tions and a requirement of prior authorisation for abstraction and impoundment. 
These controls shall be periodically reviewed and, where necessary, updated. Member 
States can exempt from these controls, abstractions or impoundments which have no 
significant impact on water status;  
(f) controls, including a requirement for prior authorisation of artificial recharge or 
augmentation of groundwater bodies. The water used may be derived from any sur-
face water or groundwater, provided that the use of the source does not compromise 
the achievement of the environmental objectives established for the source or the 
recharged or augmented body of groundwater. These controls shall be periodically 
reviewed and, where necessary, updated; 
 
Given the political sensitivity as related to the importance of water supply for socio-
economic development and the lack of supranational authority of the European insti-
tutions on the issue, before adoption of the WFD, the EU had no common policy on 
fresh water supply and demand management. At a meeting of the European Water 
Partnership, the Executive Director of the European Environment Agency argues that 
too often responses of national and regional governments around Europe to limited 
availability of water resources have shown investments in ‘unsustainable projects such 
as bigger and more reservoirs, water transfers and desalination plants’ (McGlade, 
2008). Instead of crises management by supply management, these public actors must 
take action to reduce water demand (ibid.). The WFD, albeit cautiously and circum-
vented by ambiguity, has taken on board notions of both demand management and 
supply management without providing rules with regard to their interlinkages. Al-
though the WFD includes notions on the interdependencies between quality and 
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quantity, an explicit and clear European common perspective on integrated demand-
and-supply management seems beyond its horizon. 
Triggered by figures on increased suffering from droughts between 1976 and 
2006, the widespread droughts event of 2003, the climate change debates and the 
WFD’s integration discourse, the EC sends a communication to the EP and the 
Council ‘addressing the challenge of water scarcity and droughts in the European 
Union (Commission of the European Communities, 2007c). It mentions full imple-
mentation of the WFD as ‘a priotity in order to addess mismangement of water 
resources’ (ibid.: 3).The communication marks a discursive evolution towards a stra- 
tegy for integrated fresh water supply and demand management (ibid.: 4; original 
emphasis): 
 
Water saving must become the priority and all possibilities to improve water effi-
ciency must therefore be explored. Policy making should be based on a clear water 
hierarchy. Additional water supply infrastructures should be considered as an option 
when other options have been exhausted, including effective water pricing policy and 
cost-effective alternatives. Water uses should also be prioritised: it is clear that public 
water supply should always be the overriding priority to ensure access to adequate 
water provision. 
 
In conclusion, the observations point at an evolution from ideal-type A rules before 
adoption of the WFD towards ideal-type B collective choice rules on supply and 
demand management afterwards (see Table 4.6a). The European strategy for water 
scarcity and droughts, for which the WFD’s integration discourse is among the impor-
tant triggers, expresses the need for more integrated supply and demand rules (ideal-
type C). However, the strategy ‘opt for legislation at the level of the Member States 
and not at EU level’ (Van Rijswick and Havekes, 2012: 357). As such the water 
scarcity discourse goes beyond the WFD’s rules for supply and demand management.  
 
Table 4.6a: Ideal-type IRBM choice rules (supply and demand; European level) 
Ideal-type rules↓ 1990 to 2000↓ 2001 to 2009↓ 
A: Water supply management determines avail-
ability of fresh water for user functions. 
X 
 
x 
 
B: Mixed supply and demand management deter-
mines fresh water availability without a hierarchy 
in user functions. 
  
X 
C: Integrated supply and demand management, as 
expressed by a hierarchy in user functions. 
  
Legend: The research observations come closest to ideal-type A and B rules as expressed by 
the ‘X’. The ‘x’ points at a reduced resemblance of the observations with ideal-type A rules 
after adoption of the WFD.  
 
Nature of the licence system 
Given the previous analysis of wording on supply and demand management and the 
wording of the internal integration part of subsection 4.3.1 (scope rules), it may not 
come as a surprise that there is no European legislation on water quantity licensing.  
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Within this context the WFD also strictly focuses on water quality as a shared compe-
tency of the European institutions and the Member States (again see statement 19 of 
the WFD’s Preamble; European Communities, 2000: 2). Statement 34 of the Preamble 
may be interpreted as another attempt for integration, for it points at ‘a need for a 
greater integration of qualitative and quantitative aspects of both surface waters and 
groundwaters, taking into account the natural flow conditions of water within the 
hydrological cycle’  for the purposes of environmental protection (ibid.: 4). Statement 
40 of the Preamble (ibid.: 4) introduces a combined approach with regard to pollution 
prevention and control (as continuation of prior European water policies on inte-
grated pollution prevention and control), i.e. control of pollution at source through 
the setting of emission limit values and environmental quality standards. Additionally, 
common environmental quality standards and emission limit values for certain groups 
or families of pollutants should be laid down as minimum requirements in Commu-
nity legislation (Statement 41; ibid.). According to Statement 42, pollution through the 
discharge, emission or loss of priority hazardous substances must cease or be phased 
out (ibid.). The WFD aims ‘to achieve a level of protection of waters at least equiva-
lent to that provided in certain earlier acts, which therefore should be repealed once 
the relevant provisions of this Directive have been fully implemented’ (Statement 51; 
ibid.: 5).  
With sovereignty and subsidiarity as central governance principles, it is up to the 
Member States as to how to implement the common European principles for qualita-
tive and quantitative protection of Community waters. On the one hand, the WFD 
does not include explicit prescriptions for the nature of the domestic licences systems 
for water-related activities and for obvious political reasons predominantly focuses on 
quality objectives. On the other hand the WFD’s statement that ‘control of quantity is 
an ancillary element in securing good water quality’ is clear about the interdepen-
dencies with regard to water resources. Its inclusion may be interpreted as an implicit 
ply for a more integrated legislative approach, similar to the explicit combined 
approach for water quality and emission standards. In this context, it is illustrative that 
the integration box in the informal guidance documents refers to the need for a more 
integrated and coherent legislative framework for water (although without further 
specification).  
These observations point at an evolution from ideal-type A rules (between 1990 
and 2000) towards ideal-type B rules (between 2001 and 2009; see Table 4.6b). Besides 
by discursive statements about the relevancy of a more integrated legislative approach, 
this evolution becomes noticeable most clearly in the requirements for the programme 
of measures. Subarticles 11(3e) and 11(3f) prescribe authorisation and control systems 
with regard to respectively abstraction and impoundment of fresh surface water and 
groundwater bodies and artificial recharge and augmentation of groundwater bodies, 
as related to significant impact on water status (European Communities, 2000: 14). 
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Table 4.6b: Ideal-type IRBM choice rules (licence system’s nature; European level) 
Ideal-type rules↓ 1990 to 2000↓ 2001 to 2009↓ 
A: Separate, parallel licences for quality and quantity 
objectives related to development, management and 
use of water resources. 
 
X 
 
 
X 
B: Licenses that integrate quantity and quality objec-
tives related to development, management and use 
of water resources. 
  
X 
C: Integrated licences for interrelated development, 
management and use of natural resources (e.g. air, 
water, land). 
  
Legend: The reseacrh observations come closest to ideal-type A and B rules as expressed by 
the ‘X’. The ‘x’ points at a reduced resemblance of the observations with ideal-type A rules 
after adoption of the WFD.  
 
4.3.5 Aggregation rules 
As defined in Section 2.2.7 a major challenge of IRBM concerns how to arrange deci-
sion-making at interrelated political levels within shared (inter)national river basins 
with the aim to reach common understanding and broad public support for collective-
choice rules. The aggregation rules may appear in different ways, as expressed by the 
identified ideal-types (see Table 4.7). The aggregation question ‘who should make and 
who should agree with adaptations of prior rules and with new rules?’ shows redun-
dancy with boundary rules. For the purpose of this research, the question who is 
involved in planning and decision-making and to which degree (e.g. information, con-
sultation and co-decision) is covered under boundary rules (see Subsection 4.3.3). The 
aggregation rules concentrate on the coherence between and the nature of decision-
making rules at different administrative levels within a river basin. 
 
The official WFD text clearly embraces calls in the broader social and political context 
for more transparency, better access to environmental information and opportunities 
for (active) participation of non-governmental stakeholders. The Preamble’s State-
ment 14 stresses that ‘the success of this Directive relies on close cooperation and 
coherent action at Community, Member State and local level as well as on infor-
mation, consultation and involvement of the public, including users’ (European 
Communities, 2000: 2). Statement 46 adds that ‘to ensure the participation of the 
general public including users of water in the establishment and updating of river ba-
sin management plans, it is necessary to provide proper information of planned meas-
ures and to report on progress with their implementation with a view to the invol-
vement of the general public before final decisions on the necessary measures are 
adopted’ (ibid.: 5). WFD’s Article 14 seems to be contradictory in nature, perhaps due 
to the delicate political drafting and negotiation process. Although its Subarticle 1 
starts with ‘Member States shall encourage the active involvement of all interested 
parties in the implementation of this Directive, in particular in the production, review 
and updating of the river basin management plans’, what follows is more consistent 
with the Article’s title, i.e. public information and consultation (European Communi-
ties, 2000: 16).  Subarticle 2 expresess that written comments to documents that are  
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made available by the Member States (i.e. a timetable and work programme for the 
production of a river basin management plan; an interim overview of the significant 
water management issues identified in the river basin; and draft copies of the river 
basin management plan), are a prerequisite ‘to allow active involvement and consulta-
tion’ (European Communities, 2000: 16). However, Article 14 does not further specify 
active involvement, such as with regard to aggregation rules.  
Subsection 4.2.2 has showed that, due to the co-decision procedure of the 
Amsterdam Treaty (European Communities, 1997), the EP increased its influence in 
the formulation, negotiation and adoption of the WFD. Besides, in the formulation 
stage, DG Environment of the European Commission has invited groups of stake-
holders to contribute to draft documents. At the CIS stage, the SCG takes care of the 
policy linkages among the working groups and drafting groups, discusses outstanding 
(technical) issues and exchanges information on European projects and pilot river 
basin testing projects (Common Implementation Strategy, 2001; RIZA, 2003). To 
avoid non-functional redundancy by CIS working groups, both the SCG and repre-
sentatives of working groups take care of coordination, e.g. by means of cross-
participation. Every two years a work programme is prepared (Common Implementa-
tion Strategy, 2001). The SCG evaluates the outcome of the different working groups 
and prepares documents and reports for the Water Directors’ meetings and provides 
guidance to the key activities. Consensus is the decision-making rule within the 
common implementation strategy (ibid.). During the 2000 to 2002 period, in the case 
of disagreements, minority views could lead to a veto on the finalisation of a given 
guidance document (Common Implementation Strategy, 2003b: 7):    
 
The reasons for such situations to occur were manifold. On the one hand, the issues 
for discussion were not only of technical nature but also related to legal interpreta-
tion and political considerations. This situation was complicated by the fact that the 
aim of the CIS process is to promote “best practices” of implementation which may, 
in some cases, go beyond the legal requirements of the directive. On the other hand, 
the description of clear and concrete guidance may limit the flexibility that is neces-
sary to develop different approaches for the specific national, regional or local 
circumstances. 
 
If no consensus can be achieved, the diverting views should be reflected in a trans-
parent way (Common Implementation Strategy, 2001; 2003b).  
The EC takes care of the minutes of the SCG meetings. Any delegation may 
comment on the draft summary record, the presented working documents or on any 
item on the agenda of the meeting. The EC, the Presidency and the SCG are jointly 
responsible for the efficient and effective preparation of issues for the EU Water Direc-
tors meetings. Finally, the EU Water Directors decide on publication, testing and ap-
plication of the guidance documents (Common Implementation Strategy, 2001; RIZA, 
2003). High-ranking officials of the Member States and/or the EC lead the working-
groups which include participants of other interested Member States, Candidate 
Countries, stakeholders and NGOs. Private and civil stakeholders are invited when 
they can contribute to the work with a specific expertise. The involvement of Euro-
pean Economic Area-countries, the European Environment Agency and 
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EUROSTAT is considered important for the success of the process (Common Im-
plementation Strategy, 2001; 2003b). Contrary to the working groups, the EAF have a 
more formal character. The proposals by the EAF are subject to the co-decision pro-
cedure between the Council of Ministers and the EP. The EU Water Directors are 
informed on their progress and products and may not explicitly be asked to approve 
them (RIZA, 2003).  The CIS may not prejudice the formal committee procedure of 
WFD’s Article 21 (Common Implementation Strategy, 2001). This WFD Article pro-
vides the European Commission with a regulatory committee that assists compliance 
checking (European Communities, 2000).   
Clear criteria for aggregation of water bodies should be agreed at river basin dis-
trict level and in a transparent way. The EAF on Reporting elaborates the details on 
whether and how aggregation of water bodies for the purpose of reporting is possible 
(European Communities, 2003b). According to the ‘discussion document on envi-
ronmental objectives under the Water Framework Directive’ (European Communities, 
2005b), a harmonised, comparable and transparent approach for the application of the 
exemptions and the cost-effectiveness assessment should be coordinated within (mul-
tilateral) river basin districts and Member States. The appropriate level of application 
of assessments may be different for specific issues. The document points at the duty 
of the EC to ensure that such an approach is taking place in-between member states 
and in-between river basin districts (ibid.). The decision-making process differs for 
chemical and ecological status criteria. Specific criteria for the good chemical status, 
both for surface water and groundwater bodies, are decided on by the EP and the 
Council of Ministers. The EC prepares the proposals. Regarding the good ecological 
status, Member States are required to develop their national classification schemes 
which should be consistent with the Annex V provisions in the WFD (see European 
Communities, 2000: 33-63). In order to compare these national classification systems, 
the results of the so-called intercalibration exercise will have to be agreed by the Regu-
latory Committee established under Article 21 (European Communities, 2005b; 2011). 
In order to integrate WFD requirements into Rural Development Programmes 
(and to link them with measures in the agricultural sector) level differences will have 
to be overcome. The DG Environment (2003: 18) concludes that ‘the cooperation 
between the competent authorities for Rural Development Planning and the water 
authorities in Member States and regions need to be further ensured and even 
strengthened’. Reversely, ‘competent authorities for rural development planning need 
to be involved in the drafting of river basin management plans. According to the sub-
sidiarity principle, it will be the task of Member States to ensure this coordination 
between authorities, but also between Member States themselves’ (ibid.). The ‘Final 
Paper about Co-operation and participation at the interface of EU Agricultural and 
Water Policies’ (Dworak et al., 2006) includes remarkable observations on level link-
ages. Within border-crossing river basins, stakeholders in the water and agricultural 
sectors take part in participatory processes at all levels. Hence, the transfer of knowl-
edge and information across these levels is of utmost importance. However, as 
Dworak et al. (2006: 8 and 22) observe: 
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While the policy arena at lower governance levels is influenced by decisions and 
 processes on higher levels through the establishment of frameworks and over-
arching policies, there is still a considerable degree of independence between the re-
spective activities. Linkages between processes do not necessarily exist. [..] The mode 
and instruments of participatory activities also vary among those levels. Past 
experience has shown that the local level plays a crucial role for effectively involving 
key actors from the agricultural sector and establishing successful cooperation.  
 
The WFD has been drafted and negotiated in a transition period towards more open, 
transparent and participatory policy processes at the European level. However, not-
withstanding the WFD’s call for cross-sector policy integration and ample options 
within the CIS for co-thinking (and more limited also for co-production) by private 
and civil stakeholders, final decisions on interpretation of WFD’s definitions, terms 
and requirements, primarily take place within the inner circle of the water policy 
domain. As such, high-rank officials and experts of the Member States and the EC 
pull the strings, like in the meetings of the EU Water Directors and the Article 21 
Committee. On the other hand, participation of experts from private and civil stake-
holders in the CIS working groups and pilot river basin projects points at more 
bottom-up influences. Notwithstanding serious cross-sector coordination efforts, such 
as by means of a Strategic Steering Group on the WFD and Agriculture, the WFD 
and the CIS do not alter existing European cross-compliance procedures dramatically. 
These observations point at juxtaposition of ideal-type B and C aggregation rules at 
the European level over the 1990 to 2009 period (see Table 4.7).  
 
Table 4.7: Ideal-type, collective-choice IRBM aggregation rules at the European level 
Ideal-type rules↓ 1990 to 2000↓ 2001 to 2009↓ 
A: Independent decision-making on water 
policy and management plans at different 
administrative levels within a river basin. 
 
 
 
 
B: Asymmetric, top-down decision-making on 
water policy and management plans at different 
administrative levels within a river basin: lower 
levels have to comply with the rules from the 
higher levels. 
 
X 
 
X 
C: Symmetric, consensus based decision making 
on water policy and management plans at 
different administrative levels: mixed top-down 
and bottom-up rules. 
 
X 
 
X 
Legend: The research observations come closest to ideal-type B and ideal-type C rules as ex-
pressed by the ‘X’. 
 
4.3.6 Information rules  
As argued in Subsection 2.2.8, one major collective-choice rule challenge of IRBM is 
to collect, aggregate and present information in such a way that river basin manage-
ment plans are acknowledged and supported by a majority of interested public, private 
and civil stakeholders. A critical dimension of this challenge is the types of 
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information that are considered legitimate in combination with the nature of the col-
lection and aggregation process. The focus of this research is on this critical dimen-
sion. Three ideal-type information rules have been identified (see Table 4.8). 
 
The screening of both the text of WFD and its related guidance documents points at a 
predominant technical-scientific rationale which intermingles with a socio-economic 
rationale. As in the era before adoption of the WFD, validity, reliability, costs-benefits 
ratios and economic efficiency are central criteria for legitimised expert information 
and knowledge at the European level.  As concluded in the Subsections 4.3.3              
(boundary rules) and 4.3.5 (aggregation rules), the DG Environment has opened up its 
window for more active contributions by environmental NGOs and socio-economic 
interests groups both at the WFD drafting and implementation stages. Notwith-
standing the decision-making primacy for the DG and the EU Water Directors, ample 
opportunities are offered for informal information exchange, early consultation, 
co-thinking and (more limited) co-productions. Although non-governmental actors 
have expressed their gratitude for the increased openness and transparency, the highly 
politicised context of the European institutions could not prevent classic divides and 
controversies around facts, figures, policy ambitions and related socio-economic con-
sequences. Position papers and letters of interests groups are clear indicators for those 
disagreements, although they could also be interpreted as part of negotiation strategies 
and rituals. On the other hand, the disclaimer in the CIS guidance documents point at 
a remarkably broad informal consensus on the (predominantly) technical issues 
(European Communities, 2003a to l, 2005a to d, 2007a to c, 2009a to g and 2011): 
 
This technical document has been developed through a collaborative programme in-
volving the European Commission, all the Member States, the Accession Countries, 
Norway and other stakeholders and Non-Governmental Organisations. The docu-
ment should be regarded as presenting an informal consensus position on best prac-
tices agreed by all partners. However, the document does not necessarily represent 
the official, formal position of any of the partners. Hence, the views expressed in the 
document do not necessarily represent the views of the European Commission. 
 
Generally, controversies have been tackled by making different opinions explicit (such 
as between environmental NGOs and the hydropower industry) or by searching for 
compromises (e.g. between WWF and the Netherlands on the contents of the gui-
dance document on the role of wetlands).   
 
From a scrutiny of the texts from WFD’s Article 14 (European Communities, 2000: 
16) and the CIS guidance document on public participation (European Communities, 
2003h), a remarkable inconsistency becomes apparent. The former stresses informa-
tion and consultation on implementation planning timetables, an overview of signifi-
cant water management issues and (draft) river basin management plans, without ex-
plicitly mentioning the Article 5 reports (European Communities, 2000: 16). The latter 
stresses the importance of joint fact finding for the Article 5 river basin characterisa-
tion exercise, in order to arrive at common sense about the present state as of the 
water resources (European Communities, 2003h). As such, joint fact finding for the  
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Article 5 reports is considered a first step for shared ownership of the subsequent 
river basin management plans (ibid.). Furthermore the guidance document on public 
participation reflects a broad range of participation literature and methods, some of 
which may lead to a fear (by the public actors) of lack of control. For example, the 
social learning, co-decision and self-determination options in the informal guidance 
document seems to reach (far) beyond the legally binding information and consulta-
tion requirements in the official WFD text. As they comply with the subsidiarity and 
sovereignty principles however, European policy makers are very cautious not to af-
fect any domestic institutional arrangements. That is why these informal European 
consensus options are to be chosen or neglected by domestic actors, as determined by 
their own traditions, choices and preferences. 
Although the guidance document on public participation plies for interactive and 
participatory approaches (European Communities, 2003h), the (traditions of the) 
European institutions do not trigger a complete opening up of the stakeholder process 
at the European level, such as for the drafting of the CIS guidance documents. This 
process remains dominated by inner circle experts and officials in the water policy 
sub-domain (Common Implementation Strategy, 2003a: 2): 
It is evident that the close cooperation and the improvement of information ex-
change between the WFD implementation process and the relevant international or-
ganisations and networks will improve the dissemination of results, the harmonisa-
tion of approaches and the avoidance of duplication of efforts. At the same time, it 
must be recognised that the countries of the wider and enlarged EU are the driving 
forces behind the joint implementation process. Therefore, the status of participation 
of such organisations should be clearly in the role of “observers” with the main aim 
to ensure efficient information exchange.  
 
The CIS guidance documents are targeted to those experts and water managers who 
are directly or indirectly implementing the WFD. After approval by the Water 
Directors and the EC, guidance documents are made publicly available. In practice, 
the guidance documents are prepared by small drafting teams of inner circle actors of 
the water policy sub-domain. Other actors are informed and consulted in working 
groups, conferences and pilot river basin activities and are supposed to bring in rele-
vant information. Some actor coalitions (e.g. of environmental NGOs and the hydro-
power industry) bring in position papers at the SCG meetings. Access to information 
in Europe’s virtual office (CIRCA) is restricted to experts and representatives in 
Member States, EEA countries, accession and candidate countries and stakeholders’ 
representatives. Example of a co-production is the guidance document on the role of 
wetlands in the WFD, as proposed by a coalition of environmental NGOs (European 
Communities, 2003l).  
The ‘Strategic Guidance on the Principles and Communication of the First [Article 
5] Analysis’ (European Communities, 2005a: 14) mentions that ‘it should also be 
checked whether other data holders, such as water suppliers or local NGOs, may have 
some valuable information which, if properly quality assured, can complement the exist-
ing data in order to improve the quality of the assessment.’ This guidance document also 
points at legitimisation arguments (ibid.: 15):  
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Where data gaps are identified that are likely to have significantly affected the results of 
the analysis, the analysis should be appropriately reviewed, updated and completed in 
the period 2005 to 2008.  A comprehensive review of the analysis must be completed 
in 2013.  Such a prioritised “closing of the gap” will lead to a higher degree of certainty 
and knowledge for the preparation of the “programme of measures” and thereby re-
duce the risk of non-targeted and expensive measures and facilitate the public participa-
tion process by demonstrating that the proposed measures are well founded and justi-
fied. 
 
In the document, the EC plies for appropriate communication strategies by the Member 
States, preferably coordinated at the river basin district level: ‘If possible, involve stake-
holders in the fact finding for the analysis and take account of their information and 
contributions, before the [Article 5] report is finalised’ (ibid.: 16). 
At the second European Water Conference (Brussels, April 2009), the 
EEB/WWF coalition presents results of an interim survey on the contents of draft 
river basin management plans of individual Member States. In this inquiry environ-
mental NGOs often express fragmented, poorly presented information in the draft 
river basin management plans. They mention lack of coherence and transparency in 
the objective setting and appraisal of measures and poor information about proposed 
budgets and capacities (Scheuer, 2009). However, those NGOs also observe that in 
general authorities of Member States have improved communication with and in-
volvement of key stakeholders in the WFD implementation process (ibid.). On the 
contrary, the environmental NGOs are largely dissatisfied with the quality of the con-
sultation processes. Due to a lack of inclusion in the drafting process (in 15 of 22 
cases), the NGOs are not convinced that the river basin management plans’ consul-
tation will create shared ownership (ibid.).  
From the moment that they became more incorporated into the formal amend-
ment process (early 1998), NGOs feared for too many opt out options for Member 
States, given the degrees of interpretational freedom of central terms in WFD’s Article 
4 (Kaika and Page, 2003). ‘In other words the NGOs were always alert for what they 
saw as the danger of allowing the new directive to replace the obligations of existing 
directives with a more relaxed regulatory regime, which would allow Member States 
voluntary compliance rather than legal obligations’ (ibid.: 317-318). April 2009 the 
EEB/WWF coalition still fears the pitfall of an “interpretation freedom trap”, since in 
many of the 29 surveyed draft river basin management plans deadline extensions and 
lower objectives are proposed, ‘although often no or little information is provided 
about 2015 objectives and the selection of measures’ (Scheuer, 2009: 4).  
The observations in this research point at a juxtaposition of ideal-type A and B 
collective-choice information rules at the European level (water policies sub-domain) 
in the 1990 to 2009 period (see Table 4.8). The WFD drafting process and the CIS 
both are dominated by experts and a mixture of a scientific-technical and socio-
economic rationale. The WFD’s implementation is not considered to be dealt with by 
lay know-ledge. Although the opportunities for non-governmental stakeholders to (try 
to) influence the European water planning process have gradually increased over time, 
with the CIS as one clear example, (classic) controversies around facts, figures, 
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ambitions and socio-economic consequences have not entirely disappeared. Viewed 
positively, the informal consensus on best practices by involved multiple-stakeholder 
experts might be an indicator for development of broad support for common solu-
tions. On the contrary, from a more sceptical stance, one might wonder what the ac-
tual consensus is about when nobody formally subscribes the guidance documents. 
The critical remarks by the EEB/WWF coalition make clear that at least the environ-
mental NGOs still have serious doubts about the actual impact of the WFD.  
 
Table 4.8 Ideal-type IRBM information rules at the European level 
Ideal-type rules↓ 1990 to 2000↓ 2001 to 2009↓ 
The river basin management planning process (defi-
nition of means and ends) is predominantly driven 
by expert information and knowledge from the 
natural sciences. Validity and reliability are central 
criteria for legitimised information and knowledge. 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
The river basin management planning process  
(definition of means and ends) is predominantly 
driven by expert information and knowledge from 
the economic sciences. Costs-benefits ratios and 
economic efficiency are central criteria for legiti-
mised information and knowledge. 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
The river basin management planning process 
(definition of means and ends) is driven by  infor-
mation and knowledge from multiple disciplines and 
both from experts and lays. Joint fact finding and 
social robustness are central criteria for legitimised 
information and knowledge. 
  
Legend: The research observations come closest to ideal-type A and ideal-type B rules as ex-
pressed by the ‘X’. 
 
4.3.7 Pay-off rules 
Ad defined in Section 2.2.9, pay-off rules point at the incentives and deterrents for 
action (Ostrom, 2005). In interaction with other rule types, pay-off rules affect the net 
benefits and costs that will be assigned to particular combinations of actions and out-
comes (ibid.). In this research three ideal-type IRBM pay-off rules have been con-
structed (see Table 4.9). 
The WFD fits in the neo-liberal tradition of the European institutions in which 
economic incentives and market forces prevail and in which (potential) non-economic 
distortions (such as from different environmental standards in the Member Sates) 
should be prevented.  The Directive makes this tradition more explicit for the water 
policy sub-domain by the incorporation of economic principles and instruments, e.g. 
as expressed by its Article 9 on recovery of costs for water services and assessments of 
economic benefits and disproportionate costs as key elements in the economic analy-
sis (European Communities, 2003a). These economic principles and instruments 
should be understood as additional to formal rewards and sanctions, as expressed by 
the compliance checking procedures of the European institutions.  
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The EC is in charge of compliance checking. When a Member State does not comply 
with (some of) the requirements, the Commission may initiate an infringement proce-
dure, after a mandatory round of consultation with the incriminated Member State 
(Koppen, 2005). The consultation is a first step in which the Member State is asked to 
provide additional information and/or arguments and/or to voluntarily adjust the 
alleged infraction (ibid.). It is the discretionary power of the Commission to decide 
whether or not to file suit if a Member State persists in its non-compliance (ibid.; 
Mostert, 2010). As final resort, jurisprudence by the ECJ will make clear whether 
Member States’ interpretations may hold and whether they will suffer from (financial) 
penalties. In addition, given Article 23 (European Communities, 2000: 20), ‘Member 
States shall determine penalties applicable to breaches of the national provisions 
adopted pursuant to this Directive. The penalties thus provided for shall be effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive.’ 
The EEB/WWF coalition has formulated five headline indicators to assess how 
governments are performing and to which extent the river basin management plans 
pick up the challenge of sustainable water management (Scheuer, 2009: 2): ‘(1) trans-
parent and publicly owned water management; (2) reducing wastage and using water 
well; (3) more space for living rivers; (4) healthy, safe water for people and nature; and 
(5) visionary and adaptive water policies’. Although formally the NGOs are not in 
charge of compliance checking, their benchmarks may be influential since they may 
trigger the EC to initiate legal infringement procedures. For example, the first assess-
ment of the draft river basin management plans (Scheuer, 2009) has induced 
infringement procedures on narrow and arbitrary definitions of water services by 
eleven member states (including the Netherlands). Verhulst, Van der Molen and Mak 
(2010) ply for a more intelligent infringement policy which supports best practices of 
cooperation and coordination (in the spirit of the WFD) instead of a too rigid com-
pliance checking approach (in the finest wording of the WFD). Mostert (2010) argues 
that, given its discretionary power, the EC may support alternative implementation 
strategies, as long as they lead to compliance with the European objectives.  
November 2009, infringement cases are running against 21 Member States (in-
cluding the Netherlands) on non-conformity with WFD requirements. Water services 
definitions are still matter of concern. Since the EC faces a number of complaints 
related to Article 4(7), it is conducting a survey across Member States using additional 
information sources beyond the river basin management plans. Article 4(7) allows for 
conditioned failure to achieve good groundwater status and/or good ecological status 
(of a natural surface water body) or good ecological potential (of a heavily modified 
surface water body), as the result of new modifications to the physical characteristics 
of a water body or new sustainable human development activities (European 
Communities, 2000: 11). A modification of a water system should be included and 
explained in the river basin management plan when it is still in the planning stage. 
Guidance Document No 11 (European Communities, 2003k: 13-15) presents a 
range of planning process types, from ‘plain rational-instrumental’ to ‘interactive with 
an open eye for the power of fundamental debate’.  In the interactive types, the initia-
tive for a planning process may come from public, private and/or civil stakeholders. 
These interactive types may pay-off as collaborative capital, since ‘the discussion in  
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this type of planning is structured by new viewpoints on a problem that are recognised 
by several actors. On the basis of these viewpoints, strong coalitions can be formed, 
pursued by the adjustment of ongoing activities’ (ibid.). The Guidance Document 
attaches high priority to ‘establishing effective mechanisms for public participation 
(consultation and active involvement) in planning and decision-making, right from the 
start of the IRBM process’ (ibid.: 47). The document sketches potential pay-off 
benefits of active stakeholder involvement (ibid.: 46, 47): 
 
River Basin Management Plans are likely to be more successful through achievement 
of “buy-in” to their objectives and delivery by promoting “ownership”, acceptability 
and the cooperation of relevant stakeholders; Decision making is likely to be more 
efficient through earlier identification and, where possible, resolution of conflicts;  
Solutions are likely to be more sustainable and equitable through the input of a wider 
range of knowledge and perspectives; In the longer term, relationships between 
competent authorities and stakeholders are likely to be  strengthened. 
 
Despite this rhetoric, which builds on the options for joint fact finding, self-
organisation and social learning of the Guidance Document No 8 (European 
Communities, 2003h), public officials and experts have dominated the WFD’s plan-
ning processes so far. 
 
Table 4.9 Ideal-type collective IRBM pay-off rules (European level; 1990 to 2009) 
Ideal-type rules↓ 1990 to 2000↓ 2001 to 2009↓ 
A: Rewards and sanctions from laws and regulations 
are major drivers for compliance with collective 
rules (e.g. as expressed by standards and licence 
conditions). 
 
X 
 
X 
B:  Economic incentives and market forces are ma-
jor drivers for compliance with collective rules.  
 
X 
 
X 
C: (Sub-)basin communities voluntarily invest 
resources (human, financial, expertise) as collabora-
tive capital for  compliance with collective rules. 
  
Legend: The reseacrh observations come closest to ideal-type A and B rules as expressed by 
the ‘X’. 
 
The research observations point at a stable juxtaposition of ideal-type A and B pay-off 
rules, both before and after adoption of the WFD (see Table 4.9). The WFD confirms 
the prior economic principles and makes them more explicit for the water policy sub-
domain. This research shows no clear indications for ideal-type C rules.   
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4.4 European rules in the context of policy discourses, actors and  
resources and power 
 
The primary focus of this research is on triggers and barriers for changes in collective-
choice rules for IRBM at interrelated political levels within the International Meuse 
River Basin District. As explained in Chapter 2, for each of the seven collective-choice 
rules, three ideal-types have been constructed as a benchmark for tracking changes 
over the 1990 to 2009 period. From the subsequent assessment at different political 
levels (European, multilateral, national, regional and local), challenges for a coor-
dinated implementation may become noticeable. In order to detect potential explana-
tions for continuity or change of collective-choice rules, this dimension should be 
considered in interaction with the other three dimensions of a policy arrangement (i.e. 
policy discourses, actor coalitions and oppositions and distribution of power and re-
sources; Arts, Van Tatenhove and Leroy, 2000; Liefferink, 2006; Leroy and Arts, 
2006). Since the rules dimension has been assessed yet in detail in Section 4.3, this 
section adds observations on the other three dimensions.  
 
4.4.1 Policy discourses 
 
Within the European institutions, ambiguity is an essential feature for political survival 
in a continuous search for compromises. The discourse analysis of this research shows 
that the WFD is no exception. Section 1.3 has introduced the ambiguous nature of the 
WFD’s policy discourse as expressed by the wording of its paradigms, governance and 
policy principles (see Table 1.2 for an overview). As concluded in Subsection 4.2.3, the 
Directive may be characterised as a complicated, hybrid political construct that in-
cludes potentially high ecological ambitions, as well as exemption options and inter-
pretation ambiguities. The 24 informal implementation guidance documents express 
the compromises and multi-interpretability. For example, the policy summary of the 
guidance document ‘Exemptions to the Environmental Objectives’ considers the 
WFD as a framework that gives the general orientation ‘with scope for differences in 
understanding and application’ (European Communities, 2009c: 3).  
As perhaps best illustrated by the extensive deliberations on the interpretation of 
the Directive’s core Article 4 (environmental objectives and exemption options), one 
might speak of an “interpretation freedom trap”. Both the EC and the EU Water 
Directors signal that the offered interpretation room may hinder effective WFD 
implementation and that often, ‘the reflections on these issues do not interpret the 
nature and the ambition of the WFD in a correct way. In particular, the substantial 
benefits of achieving the environmental objectives, i.e. benefits for the environment, 
the individuals, water users and the economy and society as a whole, are neglected’ 
(European Communities, 2009c: 3, 4). These European actors consider development 
of a common understanding of the level of ambition essential in order to prevent 
distortions and lack of comparability in the way the directive is implemented across 
the EU. Given the potentially too large interpretation flexibility, many of the Direc-
tive’s terms may be subject to such a high degree of abstraction and subjectivity that 
Member States may not be able to provide more than very general motivations for their 
application. This overkill of interpretation freedom may lead to accommodation and 
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prudent implementation strategies and lack of harmonised criteria for quantification, 
especially in the context of shared, international river basins. Remarkably, the EU Water 
Directors and the EC admit that common understanding for a number of key terms 
related to the application of exemptions may be a mission impossible not to strive for 
(European Communities, 2009c: 20; italics added):  
 
As mentioned earlier, the exemptions contain a number of conditions for their appli-
cation. To some extent, these conditions are qualified by terms which are not easy to 
interpret. The most important terms are “disproportionately expensi-
ve/disproportionate costs”, “technically feasible”, “significantly better environmental 
option” or “sustainable (human) development”. It will hardly be possible to agree on a 
common application of these terms. Thus, it is even more important that the methodologies 
developed by the Member States are presented in an open and transparent manner so 
that they can be discussed in the public consultation process. 
 
The observations over the 1990 to 2009 period do not show major differences in 
dominant argumentation lines on paradigms and governance and policy principles in 
the European water policy sub-domain. The WFD presents a rich palette of sustaina-
bility paradigms without making a choice and without providing explicit clues as how 
to interconnect the planet, people and profit dimensions (see Table 1.2 in Section 1.3). 
The Directive further institutionalises “river basins as the appropriate management 
units”. In general, its governance principles echo principles of good governance and 
effective water governance (such as defined by Rogers and Hall, 2003: 27-29). Sover-
eignty, subsidiarity, a level playing field (with regard to the internal European market), 
integration and active stakeholder involvement remain key principles. The WFD pro-
vides no detailed requirements for integration and active stakeholder involvement. 
Concerning the latter, calls for more openness, transparency and interactive policies 
formulation are translated into ample opportunities for information and consultation 
of non-governmental stakeholders. Although the WFD emphasises the importance of 
multilateral river basin committees, their formal roles and positions remain unaltered.  
The WFD re-emphasises the common environmental policy principles of Article 
174 of the Treaty establishing the European Community and adds specific water-
related ones, i.e. the combined approach (emission limit values and water quality stan-
dards), one out, all out, no deterioration, no-shift and integration of quantity and quality 
of surface waters and ground waters. Whenever the one out, all out principle is inter-
preted strictly, it may bring large socio-economic consequences, since for every indivi-
dual water quality parameter standards will have to be complied with. On the other 
hand, new modifications to the physical characteristics of surface and groundwater 
bodies are allowed for reasons of new sustainable human development activities, as 
expressed by Article 4(7) (European Communities, 2000: 11): 
 
154 CHAPTER 4 
 
Member States will not be in breach of this Directive when:  
- failure to achieve good groundwater status, good ecological status or, where 
relevant, good ecological potential or to prevent deterioration in the status of a 
body of a surface water or groundwater is the result of new modifications to 
the physical characteristics of a surface water body or alterations to the level of 
bodies of groundwater, or 
- failure to prevent deterioration from high status to good status of a body of 
surface water is the result of new sustainable human development activities and 
the following conditions are met: 
(a) all practicable steps are taken to mitigate the adverse impact on the status of 
the body of water; 
(b) the reasons for those modifications or alterations are specially set out and 
explained in the river basin management plan required under Article 13 and 
the objectives are reviewed every six years; 
(c) the reasons for those modifications or alterations are of overriding public in-
terest and/or the benefits to the environment and to society of achieving the 
objectives set out in paragraph 1 are outweighed by the benefits of the new 
modifications or alterations to human health, to the maintenance of human 
safety or to sustainable development and 
(d) the beneficial objectives served by these modifications or alterations of the 
water body cannot for reasons of technical feasibility or disproportionate 
cost be achieved by other means which are a significantly better environ-
mental option. 
 
Article 4(7) may be considered the WFD’s apogee of ambiguity, providing maximal 
room for interpretation differences stemming from diverging world views. It offers 
Member States a politically important escape option for too severe environmental 
requirements on a too short timeline. For example, the Member States’ implementa-
tion ambitions will be expressed by the way they will define overriding public interest, new 
sustainable human development activities, technical feasibility and disproportionate costs.  Article 
4(8) introduces the no-shift principle as an attempt to link water bodies within river 
basins in order to arrive at coherent river basin management. Again, given this Subar-
ticle refers to the preceding subarticles 3 till 7, Member States’ ambitions will largely 
depend on how the aforementioned terms in the preceding paragraphs of Article 4 
will be interpreted.  
With regard to information rules, scientific-technical and socio-economic argu-
mentation lines intermingle at the European level, as clearly expressed by the wording 
of the Single European Act (European Economic Communities, 1987: 17-18):  
 
In preparing its action relating to the environment, the Community shall take ac-
count of: 
o available scientific and technical data; 
o environmental conditions in the various regions of the Community; 
o the potential benefits and costs of action or of lack of action; 
o the economic and social development of the Community as a whole and 
the balanced development of its regions. 
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Burchell and Lightfoot (2001: 43) argue that ‘apart from trying to ensure a level-
playing field, the SEA was an attempt to address the market failures inherent in the 
single market’. As part of the dominant discourse, environmental pollution is framed 
as ‘an unwanted side effect of human economic activity’ (ibid.). Inclusion of the pre-
cautionary principle goes beyond a scientific-technical rationale since it suggests that 
preventive action should be taken even before a definite causal link has been proved 
between a human activity and any consequent harm to the environment.  
The socio-economic discourse around the WFD is expressed amongst other is-
sues by the recurrent discussions on a common definition of disproportionate costs. 
In June 2007, the EU Water Directors stress that applying the WFD’s exemptions 
should not be the rule but exceptional. Furthermore, they suggest that the effects of 
past expenditures should be analysed in more detail, since the costs of basic measures 
cannot be considered when deciding on disproportionate costs. Some Water Directors 
stress their wish to take into account ability to pay as part of a more pragmatic 
approach, especially in the first river basin management cycle. Others highlight that 
any alternative approach should not influence the decision on disproportionality. They 
underline that ability to pay is not explicitly mentioned in the WFD. All agree that in 
any case the ambition of the Directive should not been watered down. Finally, both 
the EC and the EU Water Directors decide that the use of exemptions should not be 
considered as derogations, but as an integral part of the WFD approach for a staged 
compliance. As such, the exemption options are considered a regular prioritisation 
instrument to prevent disproportionate costs (European Communities, 2009c). 
April 2009, from the draft river basin management plans the EEB/WWF coali-
tion concludes that it becomes clear that the “interpretation freedom trap” occurs. 
The coalition argues that in the draft river basin management plans, ‘although often 
no or little information is provided about 2015 objectives and the selection of  
measures, deadline extensions and lower objectives are proposed in many cases’ 
(Scheuer, 2009: 4). Also the EC concludes that the content of the majority of the draft 
river basin management plans is too general and insufficiently supported by explana-
tion of choices made (Commission of the European Communities, 2009). Others are 
more positive and count the blessings. For example, Page and Kaika (2003: 331) men-
tion seven water policy innovations as expressed by the WFD: 
 
1. Coordination of policies that previously addressed different water types sepa-
rately and coordination of water management strategies; 
2. Switching to river management based on hydrological boundaries; 
3. Introducing the ‘combined approach’ to pollution control by linking emission 
limit values to environmental quality standards; 
4. Incorporating quantitative elements into environmental planning at the EU 
level; 
5. Redefinition of ‘good water status’ and redrawing the list of priority hazardous 
substances; 
6. Introduction of the costs of environmental externalities into water pricing in 
order to encourage demand management; 
7. Increasing public participation in policy making in order to increase transpa-
rency and compliance. 
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Public officials at the Dutch Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Man-
agement, who have coordinated the first river basin management drafting process, 
claim that water systems may not be directed towards a good ecological status within 
six years (Verhulst, Van der Molen and Mak, 2010). They view the staged approach of 
the WFD (with three subsequent 6-years terms) as a realistic opportunity to enforce 
the implementation of required measures. Furthermore the river basin management 
plans are an important tool for increasing transparency and information exchange and 
may support more active involvement of and communication with diverse stake-
holders (ibid.).  
 
4.4.2 Actors 
With regard to scope rules, a coalition of EU-Water Directors at five Member States 
(Germany, France, the Netherlands, United Kingdom and Spain), supported by actors 
in the EP, manage to convince the EC of the need of a water framework directive 
instead of a sector directive on ecological quality objectives (Melis and Boudewijn, 
2002; Interviews 40 and 43, Appendix I). According to Melis and Boudewijn (2002), 
the WFD negotiation process reflects general European level coalitions, i.e. coalitions 
of southern Member States (water scarcity, water as a social right) and northern  
Member States (environmental concerns, water as a common pool resource). For her 
part, Kaika (2003) mentions the occurrence of a-typical alliances, in which France and 
Portugal are amongst the strongest advocates. The position of Spain has been am-
biguous. Although Spain is mentioned among the forerunners, according to Kaika and 
Page (2003), within the Council of Environmental Ministers Spain tried to prevent the 
WFD becoming law. From Interview 43 (Appendix I) it has become clear that Spain 
has been part of the five forerunner states, because it was the then chair of the EC. 
On the other hand, although Portugal is not mentioned as forerunner, its environ-
mental minister strongly advocated adoption of the WFD (ibid.). The position of both 
Portugal and the Netherlands as downstream riparian states may account for their 
WFD advocacy voices (Meijerink and Wiering, 2009).  
Within the CIS, sector coalitions try to influence the scope of the process and 
whenever necessary express their opposing interests. For example, two clear confron-
tational discourse coalitions occur around the interpretation of irreversible hydro-
morphological changes. At one bank of the river, there is a strong international lobby 
coalition of environmental NGOs including Birdlife International, the European 
Environmental Bureau (EEB), Greenpeace, Seas at Risk, the UK Wildlife Trusts and 
the WWF (the EEB/WWF coalition). This coalition, predominantly driven by eco-
logical interests, plies for a strict implementation, taking into account morphological 
changes for designation of heavily modified water bodies only. At the side of the river, 
a number of Member States and EURELECTRIC (i.e. a union which represents the 
electricity industry), predominantly bearing socio-economic interests in mind, advo-
cate a broader interpretation which includes hydrological changes (in some cases 
related to hydropower dams) as irreversible too. In the heat of the debate, the 
EEB/WWF coalition builds up the pressure by mentioning its withdrawal option in a 
letter to the EU Water Directors (Hontelez and Long, 2002; italics added): 
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The EEB and WWF have informed the Strategic Co-ordination Group that their 
support for ALL guidance documents depends on a solution to both of these out-
standing issues in strict accordance with the WFD. We trust that you will be able to 
resolve this situation in the appropriate manner at your meeting in Copenhagen, so 
that we are not forced to take such a decision, which would mean a complete absence of environ-
mental NGO support for the WFD CIS outputs to date. 
 
Given the importance of cross-sector arrangements for compliance with the WFD’s 
water-related environmental objectives, it is remarkable that the official text does not 
directly refer to the common objective of environmental policy integration. Although 
Preamble (16) mentions that the WFD ‘should provide a basis for a continued dia-
logue and for the development of strategies towards a further integration of policy 
areas’ (European Communities, 2000: 2) mainly the inner circle actors of the water 
policy sub-domain are actively involved in the Directive’s implementation. In their 
analysis of the efforts for environmental policy integration at the EU level, Jordan and 
Schout (2006) conclude that it is still not conceptualised as a shared challenge. 
Furthermore they point at the sharp value differences between the participating actors 
(namely the sectors), the relatively weak position of environmental actors within both 
the EC and the EP and the absence of a strong central governance network manager 
(ibid.). Detailed further, Jordan and Schout (2006: 83; original italics) argue that: 
 
[..] it is already evident that the EU as a whole is heavily reliant on a small number of 
fairly weak coordination capacities to tackle Environmental Policy Integration, 
namely mission statements, specification of outputs (i.e. management by targets and tasks) 
and some simple bureaucratic procedures (e.g. to produce environmental policy apprais-
als). Other than the Commission’s own internal reforms, the EU has made very little 
effort to put in place adequate bureaucratic procedures (rules) and horizontal coordination 
mechanisms more deeply to institutionalise Environmental Policy Integration. 
 
With regard to position rules, economic experts and water policy officials, focus on eco-
nomic tools and principles, such as the incorporation of valuation (metho-dologies) of 
environmental externalities in water services costs calculations. There are no indica-
tions for actor coalitions who advocate definition of interrelated common principles 
of ecological, social and economic resilience as starting-point for a (re-)allocation of 
uses and property rights. Environmental NGOs and socio-economic interests groups 
experience increased access in the drafting phase of the WFD (boundary rules). How-
ever, the environmental NGOs have mixed feelings, since they fear implicit co-
optation attempts by the decision-makers (e.g. Kaika, 2003). Non-governmental actors 
get actively involved in the CIS process.Their access is conditioned by the EU Water 
Directors and DG Environment and emphasis lies on information and consultation.  
The choice rules concentrate on water quality issues mainly. Issues of water quan-
tity, as related to supply and demand management and the nature of licenses systems, 
are subject to delicate politcal negotiations by the Member States. The WFD includes 
both statements about the relevancy of a more integrated legislative approach and 
prescriptions for basic measures that may be considered as choice rules of a more  
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integrated nature. As inspired by the discourse of the WFD, the European Commis-
sion advocates a firmer integrative strategy to anticipate water scarcity and droughts 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2007c). 
Concerning aggregation rules, actors in the European Parliament (EP), due to the 
introduction of the co-decision procedure, have obtained considerably more influence 
in the WFD drafting and negotiation process. The increased role of the EP has 
offered also new opportunities for lobbying by interests groups. Kaika (2003) argues 
that economic interest groups mainly lobbied at the national level, trying to influence 
the opinion of the ministers representing their country in the Council of Environ-
mental Ministers. The environmentalists (like the EEB/WWF coalition), however, 
lobbied both at the national level and at European venues. They established good 
contacts with both the Brussels bureaucracy (especially the DG Environment) and the 
EP. Environmental NGOs successfully lobbied for a much tighter implementation 
scheme, stricter standards for some dangerous substances and enlarged possibilities to 
be actively involved in the drafting process of the river basin management plans 
(ibid.).  
Concerning information rules, environmental policy at the European level often in-
volves highly technical discussions (Burchell and Ligtfoot, 2001). Due to a variety of 
actors who attempt to fit into the policy game, environmental policy making at the 
European level tends to take place within loose issue networks (Peterson and Blom-
berg, 1999). According to Greenwood (1997), technical expertise is an important entry 
card for most policy networks, as they provide useful (and cheap) information to deci-
sion-makers. The environmental policy domain is no exception (ibid.). Based on a 
literature review, Burchell and Lightfoot (2001: 59) conclude that ‘environmental 
groups have been able to identify within the EU structures a potential set of oppor-
tunities for access and influence, beyond those which they are capable of utilising at 
national levels’. Furthermore, both actors within the EC and the EP have, on occa-
sions, actively encouraged contact with the environmental movement, possibly to 
encourage a counter-lobby to combat the influence of the powerful business and agri-
cultural lobby groups active at the EU level (ibid.). The observations of this research 
point at WFD implementation guiding process at the European level which is pre-
dominantly driven by expert knowledge. Within the CIS, the EC and the EU Water 
Directors offer ample opportunities for private and civil actors to bring in relevant 
information, knowledge and expertise. However, at the end of the day it is up to the 
EU Water Directors and officials at the DG Environment to decide on the guidance 
documents. 
With regard to pay-off rules, while the EC was relieved with the compromise of the 
second reconciliation meeting, representatives of farmers’ and industrial interests 
feared severe socio-economic costs (Kaika, 2003). Environmental NGOs were disap-
pointed at a first glance, but later on acknowledged some important gains from the 
negotiations. They stressed that the added value of the WFD for improvement of 
environmental quality would largely depend on ‘the good will and seriousness of all 
players to fully use the opportunities of this Directive for enhanced water protection 
and to prevent the abuse of the legal ambiguities of the agreed text’ (Page and Kaika, 
2003: 338). The drinking water sector also had mixed feelings. On the one hand, the  
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WFD could result in lower water treatment costs while on the other hand costs could 
be presented to the sector in a disproportionate way as well. Some local governments 
feared loss of influence when a river basin management approach would be chosen 
(Gilbert, 2000).  
The EEB/WWF coalition may be characterised as a resources coalition with the EC, 
who pays them to act as critical watchdog of Member States’ implementation       
processes (Kaika and Page, 2003; Knill and Liefferink, 2007). For example, triggered 
by the coalition’s signals and interim assessments, the EC initiates 11 infringement 
cases due to significant differences of opinion with Member States about their defini-
tions of water services.  From the perspective of the EEB, the Council of Environ-
mental Ministers was defending the interests of industry and agriculture (power coali-
tion), hence preventing the production of a powerful directive, whereas the delegation 
of the EP in the reconciliation meetings ‘was carrying the banner of the environmen-
talists’ (opposing power coalition; Kaika and Page, 2003).  
 
4.4.3 Resources and Power 
Regarding scope rules, the WFD strongly echoes the need for an integrated river basin 
approach as advocated by the 1992 Helsinki Convention. However, due to the strong 
sector oriented organisation of the European institutions, which follow social, eco-
nomic and political driving forces, hydrological boundaries hardly play a role. The 
legal anchorage of the integration principle within the Single European Act (SEA) 
seems promising. The principle requires that environmental considerations be an 
integral part of all other Community policies (Koppen, 2005). In addition, Jordan and 
Lenschow (2000) argue that the Amsterdam Treaty strengthened the commitment to 
achieve sustainable development and environmental policy integration. Also it greatly 
empowered the European Parliament (EP) by extending its co-decision-making   
powers (Jordan and Fairbrass, 2005).  
Although the integration principle provides the environmental policy domain 
with a unique status (it is the only sector for which such a requirement is formulated; 
ibid.), its implementation strongly depends on the willingness and efforts by other 
DGs and the Member States. For example, with the CAP reform, integration attempts 
for policies on water, agriculture and rural development, become noticeable. At the 
same time, available funds are too limited and Member States, for political reasons, 
may underuse the opportunities while the financial and personnel position of DG 
Environment would be too weak to make a real difference (Knill and Liefferink, 2007; 
Dühr, Colomb and Nadin, 2010). Furthermore, cross-sector policy integration is hindered 
by the traditional, mainly parallel operating actor networks around the different DGs 
as developed over time (Jordan and Schout, 2006). Lenschow (2005b) argues that 
further environmental policy integration is hindered by the unwillingness of most 
other policy sectors to share responsibility for remedying environmental damage with 
the environmental sector. Given this context and notwithstanding ambitious integra-
tion wording in both the WFD and the CIS guidance documents, the European 
balance of resources and power seems to have guided the advocates towards a      
prevailing focus on internal integration issues (within the water policy sub-domain) only.  
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The European institutions are not in a legal position to interfere with domestic user 
and property rights (position rules). For example, there is no Community spatial plan-
ning policy (Dühr, Colomb and Nadin, 2010). However, Europe’s regional develop-
ment and social cohesion policies, the CAP and related funds indirectly have an im-
pact on domestic land use patterns and planning processes. Since the Treaty of Rome, 
the primary focus of Europe’s policies is on harmonious and balanced development of 
economic activities throughout the Community, addressing regional disparities across 
Member States (Brunazzo, 2010). The Treaty also laid the foundation of the protec-
tionist and interventionist CAP as supported by influential farmers’ interests groups at 
the Member States (Fouilleux, 2010). Environmental concerns and sustainable devel-
opment have progressively found their way into the agricultural policy debate since 
the 1980s. Environmental NGOs have obtained access to the CAP debate and have 
developed an increasing expertise and discursive capacity. However they rest without 
co-decision power (ibid.). With the subsequent reforms of the regional development 
and agricultural policies and related funds, the attention to environmental externalities 
gradually increases (Brunazzo, 2010; Dühr, Colomb and Nadin, 2010; Fouilleux, 
2010). However, their influence, in terms of percentages of the available European 
funds, remains rather limited (ibid.). 
Concerning boundary rules, the WFD is considered as an important test case for 
opening up the European windows for reasons of transparency, access to information 
and active involvement of stakeholders. The WFD has also been the first environ-
mental directive which has been adopted by the co-decision procedure. Overall, the 
co-decision procedure has provided the EP more (equal) power (most notably the 
actual right to veto) within the European institutions (Knill and Liefferink, 2007). The 
then EP, whose members were not directly connected to individual Member States, 
was more eager to adopt new legally binding environmental policies than the Council 
of Environmental Ministers, whose members were more primarily bounded to domes-
tic socio-economic interests (Kaika, 2003). At the same time, the WFD drafting and 
negotiation process has provided non-governmental organisations more access to the 
informal European negotiation arenas (Kaika and Page, 2003). Due to a large number 
of amendments by the EP and the sensitive political negotiations, as related to poten-
tial socio-economic consequences, with last-minute editing, the final WFD text in-
cludes several “weaving faults”, i.e. wrong cross-references and language translation 
nuances (Interviews 40 and 53, Appendix I). 
In the European environmental policy domain, economic interests are over-
represented. Generally, business interest groups clearly outweigh environmental inter-
ests, both in terms of (staff) numbers and financial means (Burchell and Lightfoot, 
2001; Mazey and Richardson, 2005). The DG Environment attempts to compensate 
for the structural inferiority of environmental associations in particular by means of 
supporting them financially (Knill and Liefferink, 2007). For example, the funds 
within the EC are the most important source of income of the EEB (Webster, 1998), 
introducing the risk of co-optation (Knill, 2003). Well-funded and experienced stake-
holder groups hold a structural advantage in the participatory mechanisms at the 
European level (Kaika, 2003). In the CIS, by means of ex ante, clear, written down 
participation rules, the EU Water Directors and the EC seriously attempt to balance  
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contributions by environmental and economic interests groups (Common Implemen-
tation Strategy, 2001, 2003a). The participation rules have been chosen by public 
actors. The emphasis is on observer status for selected stakeholder groups and co-
thinking and co-production opportunities (ibid.). Although the EEB/WWF coalition 
is generally positive about the participation options, it acknowledges its relatively 
limited influence (Scheuer and Royo-Gelabert, 2004: 64; italics added): 
 
The EEB and WWF have tried to ensure that the guidance documents are in keeping 
with the WFD’s legal objectives and requirements. However, as we have shown in 
this resource document, this has not always been the possible principally because we do 
not have the same political influence as the Member States. As a result, some of the 13 
guidance documents produced so far are sometimes biased towards the interests of a 
particular Member State or States. This has been the case, for example, with the 
WFD’s quantitative water management requirements, relevant to irrigation, hydro-
power and ‘self-services’. Additionally, we are concerned that these compromises 
could politically restrict the European Commission in pursuing Member States that 
breach the WFD. 
 
With regard to aggregation rules, environmental issues may be decided on by qualified 
majority voting (Article 100a in the SEA) or by unanimity (Article 130s in the SEA). 
Decisions made by the European Court of Justice mainly point in the direction of 
application of Article 100a (Koppen, 2005). Application of Article 100a means that 
the EP has co-decision authority and that environmental protection measures are 
closely related to the internal market policy of the Community (ibid.). Application of 
Article 130s means that the EP has only consultation options, but in the same time it 
offers Member States the option to adopt more stringent national standards (as long 
as these do not cause competitive market distortions) (ibid.).  
Weale (2005) argues that the European policy making process is densely popu-
lated with veto players (i.e. actors whose views have to be taken into account), which 
prevents any actor or group of actors to constantly direct the direction of political and 
economical integration. Standards that leader states promote are aggregated and trans-
formed and modified under the need to secure political accommodation from the 
powerful veto players (ibid.). Héritier (2002) refers to a continuously evolving “policy 
patchwork” which cannot easily be absorbed into national systems without some prior 
adjustment. Börzel (2005) mentions inter-state preferences as one of the most signifi-
cant drivers behind development of European environmental policy, preferences that 
are largely influenced by differences in economic weight. Quantitative water resources 
issues still resort under Article 130s, hence with veto right for individual Member 
States (Jordan and Fairbrass, 2005). This aggregation rules divide between water qual-
ity and quantity issues (as largely driven by influential economic interests) may account 
for the limited choice rules options for the CIS actors with regard to a more integrated 
approach.  
Concerning information rules, the main aim of the CIS is to provide informal scien-
tific-technical guidance to domestic actors when implementing the WFD. For this 
purpose, several guidance documents, related policy summaries, discussion papers and 
background documents have been produced (see Appendix VI for an overview). It is  
162 CHAPTER 4 
 
not the intention of the CIS to develop a hierarchy of importance of issues. The guid-
ance documents stress voluntary participation depending on national prioritisation of 
resources and national interests and may support capacity building and training 
(European Communities, 2003a to l, 2005a to d, 2007a to c, 2009a to g and 2011). 
Consequently, the implementation outcome will largely depend on multilateral, 
bilateral and domestic translations, as triggered by the subsidiarity principle. Under the 
wings of the EU Water Directors several workshops and activities take place on WFD 
issues with the aim of exchange of information and experiences. CIS actors try to 
influence the deliberations by a diversity of instruments, such as questionnaires, 
position papers, letters, working documents, power point presentations, workshops, 
seminars and pilot river basin projects.  
One conclusion of the pilot river basin testing project is that guidance documents 
have been used extensively and are generally seen as suitable, efficient and helpful 
tools (Common Implementation Strategy, 2004). However, short fact sheets on 
national approaches and joint seminars are preferred over additional guidance docu-
ments (ibid.). The DG Environment makes use of the virtual CIRCA office as a col-
laborative space for CIS actors and together with the European Environment Agency 
invest in the development of WISE (Water Information System for Europe). Elec-
tronic reporting sheets are developed to support compliance checking procedures. 
European Water Conferences are organised to disseminate information and exchange 
experiences and opinions among public, private and civil actors. 
The traditions of the European institutions point at compliance checking proce-
dures in combination with economic incentives like funding (pay-off rules). Notwith-
standing the importance of encouragement of active stakeholders’ involvement, both 
the EC and the EU Water Directors do not provide WFD funds for capacity building 
and training of specific stakeholder groups. The pilot river basin testing projects have 
supported exchange of experiences with regional and local stakeholders, but European 
funds in general are too limited too reach those without sufficient means and skills. 
Besides, DG Environment has no direct control over any of the major European 
funds. For stakeholders in accession countries, funds have been made available to 
make participation easier. One may argue that, given the sovereignty and subsidiarity 
principles, it is up to the Member States to provide for adequate resources as implicitly 
stated by WFD’s Article 14. One CIS background paper (Dworak et al., 2006) pays 
specific attention to the potential added value of voluntary, cooperative agreements, 
such as to tackle diffuse sources of water pollution by agriculture, in addition to 
regulatory approaches.  
Financially, Member States may benefit from the CAP reforms by making use of 
the increased opportunities for co-financing water policy objectives. Because imple-
mentation of the WFD will require some changes in agricultural practice which may 
entail social and economic hardship, the EC has introduced a new article under the 
Rural Development Regulation (Article 38) which aims to ‘compensate for costs 
incurred and income foregone resulting from disadvantages in the areas concerned 
related to the implementation of […] Directive 2000/60/EC’ (Interwies et al., 2006: 
46). Furthermore, farmers’ financial support depends on cross-compliance require-
ments (as defined by the European institutions) and Good Agricultural and 
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Environmental Codes (as partly defined by Member States). The Rural Development 
Regulation increasingly offers opportunities for financial support on agri-
environmental measures (for example buffer stripes) (ibid.). 
April 2009 at the second European Water Conference, the EEB/WWF coalition 
concludes that so far, economic tools for cost recovery for water services are poorly 
used by the Member States (Scheuer, 2009: 4). Additionally, the coalition mentions 
that the WFD implementation process is weak in ‘mobilising political resources in 
order to grasp the opportunities arising from new climate and energy policies and, for 
example, to establish water saving objectives’ (ibid.). On the positive side, the EC 
supports the CIS activities financially such as organisation of meetings and participa-
tion costs for accession and candidate countries. Member States have to pay own im-
plementation costs (administration, measures, monitoring and evaluation) and multi-
lateral coordination by river basin committees. Finally, the global financial crisis since 
2008 may provide Member States an alibi to embrace the exemption options more 
warmly or to downgrade their implementation ambitions. 
 
 
4.5 Synthesis: limited rules change for ambiguous ambitions 
 
One might argue that given the ambiguous ambitions and wording of the WFD, pow-
erful economic players will interpret common argumentation lines to protect their 
status quo, hence will counterforce triggers for changes in collective-choice rules. 
However, depending on the values and interests of actors involved, the opposite may 
also be true. Weale (2005) argues that, at the European level, the dense population of 
veto players, whose views have to be taken into account, causes both aggregation and 
transformation of standards and ambitions as proposed by others. The diffuse and 
delicate political planning and decision-making process as influenced by multiple 
stakeholders, leads to a continuously evolving policy patchwork (Héritier, 2002). This 
patchwork cannot easily be absorbed into national systems without some prior ad-
justment (ibid.). If we add inter-state preferences as one of the most significant drivers 
behind development of European environmental policy (Börzel, 2005) and the signifi-
cant difference in decision-making rules for water quantity and quality, it is not diffi-
cult to jump to the conclusion that an unambiguous, common implementation of the 
integrated river basin management paradigm is synonymous with a search for the 
Holy Grail. But, as the actors of Monty Python and the Holy Grail convincingly have 
demonstrated, such a quest may deliver unexpected settings and outcomes (Chapman 
et al., 1975).  
Table 4.10 brings together the observations of the Sections 4.3 and 4.4. The table 
sums potential explanatory factors for observed continuities and changes of collective-
choice rules in the European water policies sub-domain between 1990 and December 
2009, as derived from observations on the other three dimensions of a policy 
arrangement (policy discourses, actors and division of resources and power). The grey-
coloured cells indicate remarkable evolutions. The table shows that the WFD and its 
CIS have not triggered dramatic changes. Most obvious is the internal integration 
evolution (i.e. of issues within the water policy sub-domain), as expressed by an 
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incremental change of (part of) the substantive scope rules and choice rules. Organisational 
rules and the other rules types largely remain the same. Functional (water management 
related), multilateral river basin management coordination structures have already 
been present before adoption of the WFD. These structures have no (or little) supra-
national authority and work in addition to domestic governmental structures. The 
WFD text encourages enforcement of these existing and, where considered necessary, 
development of similar new coordination structures (e.g. multilateral river basin com-
mittees as stemming from international agreements). 
 
Table 4.10: Observed collective-choice rules and  potential explanations (European level) 
Rule-types in the 1990 to 2009 period ↓ Potential explanations ↓ 
Scope (organisational): Water policy imple-
mentation is guided by a sector network of 
experts, public officials and non-
governmental actors who take hydrological 
river basin boundary as the functional point 
of departure (ideal-type B). 
Sovereignty and Subsidiarity; Stable 
sector structures and actor networks; 
the Integrated River Basin Management 
Paradigm 
Scope (internal integration): An evolution 
towards river basin management plans which 
include parallel objectives and measures for 
both quantitative and qualitative aspects and 
for groundwater and surface water bodies 
(from ideal-type A towards B). 
The Integrated River Basin Manage-
ment paradigm; Different decision-
making rules for water quality and quan-
tity issues 
Scope (external integration): Policy docu-
ments and management plans from other 
policy domains take into account water is-
sues and reversely (ideal-type B). 
Cross-compliance procedures; Envi-
ronmental Policy Integration; the Inte-
grated River Basin Management Para-
digm; Relative weak position of DG 
Environment among other sector DGs 
Position: Conditional maintenance, alien-
ation and acquirement of water and land 
resources use and property rights. Condi-
tions include requirements to internalise 
social, economic and/or environmental 
externalities (ideal-type B). 
Sovereignty and Subsidiarity; Industrial 
and agrcultural actors; Environmental 
Policy Integration; Integrated River 
Basin Management Paradigm 
Boundary: Nongovernmental actors may 
have access to the river basin management 
planning process under conditions set by the 
public actors. Emphasis on co-think and 
consultation (ideal-type B). 
Integrated River Basin Management 
paradigm; Principles for good (water) 
governance; Financial support by DG 
Environment for alliances with NGOs 
Choice (supply and demand management): A 
cautious evolution from supply management 
only to a mixed supply and demand man-
agement approach (from ideal-type A 
towards B). 
 
 
 
Integrated River Basin Management 
paradigm; Sovereignty and Subsidiarity;  
European water quality/quantity divide 
AMBIGUOUS EUROPEAN AMBITIONS 165 
 
 
 
Rule-types in the 1990 to 2009 period ↓ Potential explanations ↓ 
Choice (nature of the licences system): A 
cautious evolution towards licences that 
integrate quantity and quality objectives 
related to development, management and 
use of water resources (from ideal-type A 
towards B). 
Sovereignty and Subsidiarity; Discursive 
statements on the need for a more inte-
grated and coherent legislative frame-
work 
 
Aggregation: A juxtaposition of asymmetric, 
top-down and symmetric, consensus based 
decision-making on water policy and man-
agement plans at different administrative 
levels within river basins (a juxtaposition of 
ideal-types B and C). 
Sovereignty and Subsidiarity; Legally 
binding European directives; Integrated 
River Basin Management paradigm 
Information: The river basin management 
planning process (definition of means and 
ends) is predominantly driven by expert 
information and knowledge from the natural 
and economic sciences. Validity, reliability, 
costs-benefits ratios and economic efficiency 
are central criteria for legitimised informa-
tion and knowledge (a juxtaposition of ideal-
types A and B).  
Dominance of public actors/experts 
from the water policy domain; Neo-
liberalism; cost-effectivenes; Precaution 
and prevention. 
 
Pay-off: Both rewards and sanctions from 
laws and regulations and economic incen-
tives and market forces are major drivers for 
compliance with collective-choice rules (jux-
taposition of ideal-types A and B). 
Legally binding European directives; 
The polluter pays principle, afforda-
bility, cost-effectiveness; Sovereignty 
and subsidiarity; Neo-liberalism; Domi-
nance of public actors/water experts 
from the water policy domain 
Legend: The grey-coloured cells indicate remarkable evolutions. 
 
Two strong barriers for change of organisational scope rules change become noticeable 
from the resources and power dimension. Firstly, given sovereignty of riparian states 
and the subsidiarity principle, one may not expect an advocacy or development of 
supranational authority for international river basin committees. Secondly, the 
European institutions strongly work along policy sector lines with actor networks that 
generally are not organised along hydrological boundaries. Additionally, despite IRBM 
rhetoric which points both at interdependencies between the qualitative and quanti-
tative state of water resources and pressures from land- and water-based human activi-
ties, sector interests in the context of regional and rural development and economic 
growth have more political weight and influence. As such, a broadening of the scope 
towards issues from outside the water policy sub-domain (with land use planning) is 
not likely to occur. Furthermore, the financial and personnel position of the DG  
Environment is relatively too weak to alter this historical European path towards a 
widening of the scope of the river basin management coordination structures beyond 
water sector issues.  
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The sharp divide between decision-making procedures for water quality issues (based 
on co-decision and qualified majority voting) and water quantity issues (based on con-
sultation and unanimity voting), probably is the most pregnant barrier for a more far-
stretching change of internal integration rules. However, one of the major impacts of the 
WFD is enforcement of the internal integration evolution. The Directive has reduced 
the number of prior water-related directives considerably and it explicitly has raised 
attention towards linkages between the management of groundwater and surface 
water bodies. Furthermore, it mentions mitigation of effects of floods and droughts 
and includes drinking water protection issues and so forth. A coalition of relatively 
water scarce Member States, that favour full sovereignty over water quantity issues, 
have prevented a change of decision-making rules on water quantity issues so far.  
With regard to external (cross-sector) integration, the WFD fits into the wider Euro-
pean context of the 1990s in which environmental policy integration arguments pro-
gressively gain more ground. For example, cross-sector integration of environmental 
issues is mentioned in the Treaty on the European Union among the major priorities 
(European Communities, 1992a). However, notwithstanding the joint attempt of DG 
Environment and DG Agriculture and Rural Development to integrate (some of) the 
WFD requirements into the (revision of) the CAP, sector policies, in combination 
with sustainable economic growth and regional development discourses remain domi-
nant and act as a barrier on further institutionalisation of environmental objectives 
into other policy domains. Overall, directorate-generals, who are circumvented by 
sector interests groups, mainly work in parallel.  
From the wider neo-liberal European context, the WFD has picked up economic 
instruments and has incorporated these into the position rules of the water policy sub-
domain (albeit implicitly, since the European institutions do not have formal authority 
to interfere with water and land user and property rights systems of the Member 
States). Economic and ecological experts have caught the opportunity of the CIS to 
try to incorporate environmental externalities into costs calculations for water services. 
Although methodological deficits so far have hindered a full success story of eco-
nomic valuation, awareness has been raised among European actors. Perhaps, this 
increased awareness may trigger future deliberations on conditions for social, eco-
nomic and ecological resilience in the context of sustainable development, manage-
ment and use of interrelated land-water resources. As a counterbalance, the paradig-
matic diversity in the official WFD text around sustainability, taking on board the full 
range of notions from conventional ecology, conventional economics and ecologically 
informed economics, may act as a barrier to early fruitfulness of such deliberations.  
The WFD has been formulated and adopted in an era in which there were calls 
and initiatives to both enlarge access to and increase transparency of the European 
planning and decision making processes (the good governance discourse). The WFD 
has been considered a test case for opening up the boundary and aggregation windows of 
the environmental policy domain. While the DG Environment enlarged access for 
interests groups to the WFD’s drafting process, the EP, under the co-decision proce-
dure, has managed to cash several amendments. In the CIS, the DG Environment and 
the EU Water Directors have offered ample opportunities for interests groups to get 
informed, bring in knowledge and expertise, to co-think and, to a more limited extent, 
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to co-produce. Although the WFD process certainly has triggered early involvement 
of multiple non-governmental stakeholders, conditions remain determined by the 
public actors. The privileges that environmental NGOs have acquired (such as finan-
cial support of the DG Environment) on the one hand may be viewed as a trigger for 
opening up the process. On the other hand these NGOs are cautious not to get co-
opted and other interests groups may feel disadvantaged. Besides, all DGs have devel-
oped their own sector actor networks of influence over time. Given these observa-
tions, full and open access to the European water policies planning and decision-
making processes (e.g. with pronounced co-decision and self-determination options), 
is not to be expected. The emphasis of active involvement remains on information 
and consultation of diverse interests groups by the public actors. 
For both indicators of choice rules (supply and demand management and the 
nature of water-related licences systems) the observations point a cautious evolution 
from ideal-type A towards ideal-type B rules. Notwithstanding the sharp divide 
between decision-making procedures for water quality and water quantity issues and 
the fact that European institutions have no formal authority to interfere with domestic 
demand and supply practices and licences systems, the careful and ambiguous, 
wording of the official WFD text might trigger awareness raising about the impor-
tance of linking both supply and demand management and quality and quantity issues. 
Advocates consider the WFD’s inclusion of notions on the importance of integrative 
efforts an important step forward, of which the rule-altering potential should not be 
underestimated. Among the advocates is the EC with its call for an integrated supply 
and demand approach for anticipation of water scarcity and droughts in which a hier-
archy of water uses is central (Commission of the European Communities, 2007c). 
The evolution from asymmetric, top-down decision-making by public actors to-
wards more mixed top-down and bottom up processes enters the environmental pol-
icy domain. The WFD is considered an important test case for this latter type of aggre-
gation rules. However, enlarged involvement opportunities for private and civil actors 
neither causes complete abundance of asymmetric practices, nor expansion of co-
decision procedures to civil and private actors. Additionally, although the EP has ac-
quired more shared decision-making power with the Council of (Environmental) 
Ministers, it still has less to say about water quantity issues. Besides, as argued before, 
sector boundaries are persistent and hard to overcome by the still relatively weak, 
albeit growing, DG Environment and its circumventing environmental NGOs.  
Finally, interests groups may try to influence decision-making by increasing lobbying 
activities, but still have no or limited co-decision and self-determination options. 
The Common Implementation Strategy (CIS) fills in prior calls for more open 
access to information and for more transparency and emphasis a combination of eco-
nomic and technical-scientific criteria for legitimised information and knowledge (in-
formation rules). Public actors and a selection of experts from private and civil interests 
groups dominate the information collection and aggregation process for the guidance 
documents. The guidance documents are informal and these do not necessarily reflect 
the formal opinions of involved stakeholder groups who are also not asked to explic-
itly express shared ownership. Implicitly, the contributors to the documents may be 
considered shared owners, but with regard to the informed and/or consulted actors, it  
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is not clear to which extent they (and the organisations they represent) support or 
oppose the documents. The official WFD text itself consolidates prior European 
principles and practices, e.g. by incorporating explicit information and consultation 
requirements in Article 14 (European Communities, 2000: 16) and reporting obliga-
tions in Article 15 (ibid.: 17). The more ambitious wording in two of the guidance 
documents, on joint fact finding, negotiated knowledge, social learning, shared owner-
ship building and open, interactive planning (European Communities, 2003h and k) 
should be considered as choice options for the sovereign Member States, rather than 
as requirements at the European political level.  
With regard to pay-off rules, traditionally, the European Commission has a strong 
focus on compliance checking procedures. Special funds are available to support ac-
tive involvement of accession countries, such as for participation in pilot river basin 
projects. In addition, the use of economic instruments is advocated. The observations 
concerning actors, resources, power and policy discourses all point at a stable domi-
nancy of ideal-type B rules during the entire 1990 to 2009 period. 
 
To sum up, the analysis of this research shows that the WFD until 2009 did not trig-
ger major changes in collective-choice rules within the European water policy sub-
domain. In general, the Directive mainly echoes policy discourses in the wider Euro-
pean institutional context in the era in which it has been drafted, negotiated and 
adopted and has incorporated dominant argumentation lines of these into the water 
policy sub-domain. Its major contribution has been cleaning up a considerbale part of 
the diversity of water-related directives and further institutionalisation of the IRBM 
paradigm at the European level. Although the WFD clearly supports internal integra-
tion tendencies, its triggers for cross-sector efforts are too weak to make a difference. 
The division of resources and power, e.g. parallel operating DGs with their own 
actors’ networks and a relatively weak position of the DG Environment among these, 
in combination with dominance of economic growth and rural development 
discourses, account for most strong barriers against a further integration of collective-
choice IRBM rules into other policy domains. 
In the drafting and negotiation stage, water officials, ecologists and economic 
experts have embraced neo-liberal discourse elements in order to incorporate the 
application of economic principles and instruments into the water policy sub-domain. 
Their efforts for economic valuation of environmental externalities of water supply 
and demand practices may be considered a first, albeit cautious step on the (long) way 
to define common interrelated principles of economic, social and economic resilience. 
Furthermore, incorporation of notions on interlinkages between both quality and 
quantity issues and supply and demand management, albeit again by means of cautious 
wording, opens the floor to opportunities for more integrated licences systems and 
water management practices. Given the lack of formal authority of European institu-
tions to interfere with domestic supply and demand approaches, user and property 
right systems and license systems, it is remarkable that some actors have managed to 
include these potentially far reaching discursive elements into the WFD. How influen-
tial these elements actually are should become visible in the multilateral and domestic  
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interpretations and implementation practices (see the subsequent empirical Chapters 5 
to 8).  
Finally, this analysis of the European level shows that potential explanations for 
observed changes and continuations of collective-choice rules are not easily drawn 
from assessments of individual dimensions of a policy arrangement alone. Policy dis-
courses, actors and the division of power and resources all deliver parts of the whole 
explanation. This observation supports the argument of the developers of both the 
Policy Arrangement Approach and the Institutional Analysis and Development 
framework to respectively consider the four dimensions and rule types as configura-
tions. In the next chapter it will become clear whether this observation also holds at 
the multilateral level of the International Meuse Commission. 
  
  
 
 
Sandra Borowski and Henk Saeijs prepared the Dutch tactics for a meeting of the Inter-
national Commission for Protection of the Scheldt River against Polution (Source: Zee-
land Directorate of the State Waters Management Agency, 2000) 
 
 
 
Cover of the first multilateral Meuse River Basin Actions Programme as drafted 
before adoption of the Water Framework Directive (Source: International Commis-
sion for Protection of the Meuse River against Pollution, 1998)
 
  
 
 
- 5 - 
Sovereignty and subsidiarity rule the multilateral 
Meuse Theatre 
 
‘The Water Framework Directive has urged all the riparian states and regions in the International 
Meuse Commission to enforce their multilateral coordination efforts. First of all, it has triggered the 
entry of new public actors. Secondly, the Directive has offered new opportunities for involvement of 
NGOs. Finally, it has widened the scope to both qualitative and quantitative water related issues.’  
Mario Cerutti (Secretary-General of the International Meuse Commission between 
2003 and 2010; Interview on January 31, 2011). 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
As concluded in the previous chapter the Water Framework Directive (WFD) echoes 
the European policy discourse on better governance (concerning issues such as inte-
gration, transparency and active involvement of stakeholders) and incorporates it into 
the water policy domain. The combination of the ambiguous ambitions and defini-
tions of the Directive and the policy sectors based configuration of resources and 
power has prevented significant collective-choice rules change at the European level. 
However, one may not underestimate the rule-altering potential of the inclusion of 
politically sensitive phrases in the WFD and its related guidance documents on supply 
and demand management, integration of water quality and quantity, cross-sector inte-
gration, economic valuation of environmental externalities and encouragement of 
active stakeholders’ involvement. The interplay among strategies of actors’ coalitions 
and oppositions, division of resources and power, current rules and the Integrated 
River Basin Management (IRBM) discourse within and across Member States, ulti-
mately determines to which extent this rule altering potential actually will trigger 
changes in collective-choice rules. As described in Chapter 3, the central research 
question is to which extent the WFD triggers rules changes at a (nested) hierarchy of 
political levels within the International Meuse River Basin District. This chapter poses 
and answers the question how the actors at the multilateral level (in this particular 
district) handle the ambiguous European ambitions and rule altering potential.  
Firstly, Section 5.2 provides a chronological overview of the evolutionary process 
of (enforcement of) the multilateral coordination from the signing of the first Meuse 
River Treaty (Annonymous, 1994) till the end of the first WFD implementation plan-
ning stage (December 2009). This brief reconstruction is important to understand the 
historical context of conflict and prudent trust building that has been the point of 
departure for the Meuse riparian states and regions. Additionally, it provides for an 
impression of the atmosphere in which the multilateral talks take place. Subsequently 
in the search for continuity and change, Section 5.3 compares observed collective-
choice rules for IRBM during the 1990 to 2009 period with the ideal-types as defined 
in Chapter 2. As a third step, Section 5.4 provides for an assessment of policy 
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discourses, actors’ coalitions and oppositions and the division of resources and power 
over time. Finally, Section 5.5 closes this chapter with a synthesis, summarising poten-
tial explanations for observed continuities and changes in collective-choice rule-types.  
 
 
5.2 Laborious enforcement of multilateral coordination 
 
5.2.1 Life before the WFD (1990 to 2000) 
The ‘Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and 
International Lakes’ (the Helsinki Convention; UN-ECE, 1992) is based on the IRBM 
paradigm. Saager (2001) argues that the Helsinki Convention has been among most 
important triggers for drafting the 1994 Charleville-Mézières ‘Treaty on Protection of 
the Meuse River against Pollution’ (Anonymous, 1994). After a long history of politi-
cal conflict and distrust, the signing of the 1994 Meuse Treaty has been considered an 
important turning-point in the multilateral water relations (Meijerink, 1999). The 1994 
Meuse Treaty mainly focuses on multilateral coordination of surface water and sedi-
ment management of the Meuse River (Anonymous, 1994). The Treaty has been 
signed by the Republic of France, the Royal Kingdom of the Netherlands and the 
three Regional Authorities of Belgium (Brussels, Wallonia and Flanders). The con-
tracting parties declared to work together in a spirit of good neighbours in order to 
maintain and improve the quality of the main river course. Four principles (in the 
European acquis communautaire) are central in the multilateral coordination efforts: pre-
caution, prevention, source oriented emission reduction and the polluter pays. Economic acceptability 
and a level playing field are mentioned as important preconditions for measures to be 
taken. The riparian states and regions aim at defining preconditions for sustainable 
development of the Meuse River and its hydro-geographic basin (ibid.).  
Emphasis of the Meuse Treaty is on information exchange concerning pollution 
sources, monitoring networks, (intentional) quality objectives and management pro-
grammes of the individual riparian states (Anonymous, 1994). The Treaty introduces 
the intention to establish a homogeneous water quality monitoring network and aims 
at coordination of the national and regional warning and alarming systems on acciden-
tal pollution. Stakeholder participation is limited to observer status for the European 
Community, Member States within the river basin who are not contracting parties and 
intergovernmental organisations or commissions with comparable interests or tasks 
(ibid.). January 1, 1995, based on the Treaty the International Commission on Protec-
tion of the Meuse River against Pollution (henceforth ICPM) has started its activities 
on an informal basis. 
April 1996: the ICPM decides to incorporate a number of border-crossing 
cooperation structures (bilateral and trilateral) within its coordination framework. 
January 1, 1997, the ICPM launches its final international Warning and Alarming Sys-
tem on accidental pollution of the Meuse River (WASM). Evaluation and improve-
ment of this system is one of the main activities of the ICPM. In 1997 the ICPM also 
publishes its first report on the water quality of the Meuse River (i.e. the quality in 
1994; ICPM, 1997). After ratification of the 1994 Meuse Treaty by all contracting 
parties (January 1, 1998) the ICPM continues on a formal basis. The ICPM launches  
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its homogeneous water quality monitoring network for the entire Meuse River. At 17 
monitoring stations in the Meuse River (from source to mouth) sub-
stances/parameters of the multilateral list are measured once every four weeks. Bio-
logical quality parameters would be added later when the harmonisation exercises had 
been finished. In 1998 the ICPM launches its first Meuse River Actions Programme 
(ICPM, 1998). The overall aim is to improve transparency on joint actions and indi-
vidual actions of the states and regions and to stimulate international coordination. 
Emphasis of the first programme is on short term actions by the contracting parties, 
both individually and in concert (1998-2003). Remarkably, the list of joint actions is 
relatively short. In October 1998 the ICPM decides on the list of relevant physical-
chemical substances for the Meuse River. Besides, the ICPM works with a list of can-
didate substances and parameters. 
March 18, 1999, the first ministerial conference of the ICPM contracting parties 
took place in Namur (Belgium). The Environmental Ministers reconfirmed the inter-
national coordination objectives in a spirit of good neighbours and welcomed first 
positive results regarding multilateral coordination for water quality amelioration such 
as theWASM, the homogeneous water quality monitoring network and the LIFE wa-
ter sediment project (ICPM, 1999). They supported the first Meuse River Actions 
Programme and asked the ICPM to come forward with an interim progress report in 
2000. The Environmental Ministers asked special attention to reduction of diffuse 
sources of pollution by means of joint actions. In 2003 the ICPM would evaluate the 
first Meuse River Actions Programme and draft a second one including intentional 
objectives by 2010. An Internet site would be launched soon to inform the general 
public. The Ministers emphasised the WFD’s importance for the activities of the 
ICPM and asked for a study of its implications. They emphasised the necessity of a 
close cooperation between the ICPM and the High Waters Working Group, given 
relations between the management of high water levels and ecological values of the 
Meuse River. Implications of potential multilateral coordination of groundwater 
systems by the ICPM would be studied. The Ministers invited Germany and Luxem-
bourg to join the ICPM. Finally, the Ministers decided to grant access to NGOs to 
attend the plenary ICPM meetings for those issues that relate to their activities (with 
an advisory role; ibid.). The Declaration of Namur (ICPM, 1999) marked the entry 
into a new era in which the multilateral coordination of the WFD implementation 
would become central.  
 
5.2.2 Implementation of the WFD (2001 to 2009) 
In first WFD implementation planning period, three sub-periods are distinguished at 
the multilateral level: 
 
o From January 2001 to December 2002: Exploring implications of the WFD to-
wards a second Meuse Treaty, 
o From January 2003 to December 2005: Drafting of the multilateral Article 5 roof 
report and laborious reorganisation attempts, 
o From January 2006 to December 2009: Preparation of the multilateral roof river 
basin management plan; procedural debates. 
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The so-called roof report is the multilaterally coordinated part of the Article 5 report. 
The report is a transboundary synthesis of the Article 5 editions of the individual 
Member States. It concerns those issues only for which multilateral coordination is 
considered necessary in addition to those issues which are to be solved trilaterally, 
bilaterally or nationally. The decision to draft a multilateral roof report is a remarkable 
milestone given that the WFD (European Communities, 2000: Article 3(4), page 8) 
does not prescribe one. The Directive mentions that ‘Member States shall ensure that 
the requirements of this Directive for the achievement of the environmental objec-
tives established under Article 4 and in particular all programmes of measures are 
coordinated for the whole of the river basin district’ (ibid.). A similar observation 
applies for the multilateral roof river basin management plans (European Communi-
ties, 2000: Article 13(2), page 16):  
 
In the case of an international river basin district falling entirely within the Commu-
nity, Member States shall ensure coordination with the aim of providing a single in-
ternational river basin management plan. Where such an international river basin 
management plan is not produced, Member States shall produce river basin man-
agement plans covering at least those parts of the international river basin district  
falling within their territory to achieve the objectives of this Directive. 
 
In retrospect: the Meuse riparian states and regions decided to draft a multilateral roof 
Article 5 report, as they viewed it as important starting point for the subsequent multi-
lateral roof river basin management plan.  
 
Exploring implications of the WFD, signing a new Treaty (2000 to 2002) 
At the end of 2000 the 8th Plenary Meeting installs a temporary working group to 
identify both the potential tasks of the ICPM in relation to the WFD implementation 
and required adaptations of the 1994 Charleville-Mézières Treaty. In 2001 Luxem-
bourg and Germany decide to become a contracting party of the ICPM, whereas the 
Belgian Federal State expresses the intention to enter. At the 9th Plenary Meeting (No-
vember 2001) the states and regions on the hand hand stress own responsibilities for 
WFD implementation and on the other the added value of multilateral coordination at 
the level of the entire river basin district under the wings of the ICPM. They ask the 
WFD Working Group to prepare a proposal on modalities for the structures of the 
ICPM in relation to international WFD coordination tasks. Environmental NGOs ask 
for more direct ways of participation, similar to the arrangements of the international 
Rhine and Danube commissions. Instead of their proposed three-level approach (see 
Subsection 5.3.3 for a further description) the ICPM decides to follow a more limited 
participatory approach.  
November 30, 2001: the Environmental Ministers of the Meuse river states and 
regions declare to adapt the ICPM structures for the new task of multilateral coordina-
tion for the WFD’s implementation (Ministerial Declaration of Liege, ICPM, 2001). A 
focal shift takes place from water quality for the Meuse River to integrated water 
management for the entire Meuse River Basin District. In November 2002 the 10th 
Plenary Meeting approves the adapted organisational ICPM structures. The previous 
transnational High Waters Working Group has been incorporated in the ICPM struc- 
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tures and the Coordination Working Group has been added. In addition coordination 
for border-crossing sub-basins (surface, ground and coastal waters) shall take place in 
“appropriate regional frameworks”. The ICPM is asked to draft a second Meuse Ac-
tions Programme which will have to take into account implications of the WFD’s 
implementation. The 1994 Treaty shall be adapted to these implications (ibid.). Multi-
lateral coordination of the WFD implementation is considered one important activity, 
parallel to implementation of the Meuse Actions Programme. The Coordination 
Working Group coordinates the activities of the three technical working groups (i.e. 
physical-chemical, ecology and high waters) but has an equal position in the ICPM 
hierarchy. All working groups draft annual working plans and may work with tempo-
rary project groups. The states and regions express the intention to open up the multi-
lateral window for participation of experts from NGOs in working groups.  
Given that the WFD and the High Waters Working Group bring in new activities 
the Dutch delegation (supported by the Flemish Region of Belgium) proposes to 
expand the secretariat with one additional executive secretary. The Walloon and 
French delegations are not convinced of the need and disagree. During the meeting a 
lack of progress on several activities from the first Meuse Actions Programme be-
comes visible. Environmental NGOs are seriously disappointed about the lack of 
actual active participation opportunities. According to them sovereignty hinders effec-
tive multilateral coordination. The WWF and Inter Environnement Wallonie (which is a 
Walloon Region based green NGO) conclude that the new Meuse Treaty only in-
cludes minimal information and consultation requirements. They characterise the 
ICPM as a forum for information exchange only instead of a platform for active de-
velopment of border-crossing water policy. As symbolic sign of protest they leave the 
meeting room. RIWA Meuse (which is an international drinking water interests’ um-
brella organisation) is deeply disappointed about the lack of a final international acci-
dental pollution model and will offer the ICPM its own proposal. The representative 
of Walloon industries plies for a level playing field by taking into account exceptional 
low river flows in dry periods.  
December 3, 2002: the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the 
Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Belgian Federal State, the Regional Authorities of 
Brussels, Wallonia and Flanders and the Royal Kingdom of the Netherlands sign the 
Ghent Meuse Treaty (Anonymous, 2002) which replaces the 1994 Charleville-
Mézières Treaty (Anonymous, 1994). With the new Treaty the riparian states and 
regions intend to establish a sustainable and integrated water management within the 
Meuse River Basin District, in particular taking into account the multiple-functionality 
of the water systems (Anonymous, 2002). Special tasks of the (renamed) International 
Meuse Commission (henceforth IMC) will be the multilateral coordination of the 
WFD requirements, drafting an international river basin district management plan, 
coordination of preventive and protective high waters measures, contribute to mitiga-
tion of effects from floods and droughts and multilateral coordination of prevention 
and combat of accidental pollution. It is remarkable that integration with other policy 
domains (spatial planning, nature management, forestry and urbanisation) is men-
tioned explicitly in relation to flood prevention and protection, but not with regard to 
the WFD requirements. The new Treaty mentions the same four cooperation 
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principles ‘as defined and commonly interpreted in European environmental law’ 
(Anonymous, 2002: Article 3(1), page 5). Coordination of issues within border-
crossing sub-basins may take place in ‘appropriate regional frameworks’ (ibid: Article 
4(5), page 7). With regard to participation procedures it is remarkable that the new 
Treaty mentions the option for observers to bring in relevant information, but not a 
reverse right of observers to receive relevant information (ibid: Article 6, page 9). 
 
The Article 5 roof report and laborious reorganisation attempts (2003 to 2005) 
In 2003 the Heads of Delegations decide to hire a consultancy firm (the Eurogroup) 
as temporary liaison officer for WFD activities (drafting the Article 5 roof report 
mainly). As a matter of principle NGOs may participate in working groups and pro-
ject groups, as long as they provide their information and expertise and as long as they 
do not use the meetings for lobbying. Criteria for participation will be detailed further 
by the then chair and the secretariat. The Belgian Federal delegation plies for more 
equilibrium in the type of participants, since to its opinion environmental NGOs 
dominate by numbers. All Heads of Delegations support the German-French pro-
posal for an international Article 5 roof report for the entire Meuse River Basin Dis-
trict (Interview 42, Appendix I). A table of contents is approved. In the second stage 
of the Meuse Actions Programme (2004 to 2009) emphasis again will lie on the Meuse 
River. Within the programme there should be balance and coherence with other IMC 
activities like the WFD coordination and high water activities. In addition to the WFD 
and water quantity issues five priority themes are mentioned: (1) warning, alarming 
and modelling of accidental pollution (lead: Netherlands); (2) homogeneous monitor-
ing network (lead: France); (3) fish (lead: Flanders); (4) manure and eutrophication 
issues (lead: Wallonia); and (5) water sediment (lead: Netherlands). 
The Heads of Delegation welcome the idea of the Dutch delegation to come up 
with proposals for quantitative objectives and process evaluation criteria for the multi-
lateral coordination. Later, actual support from the other delegations turns out to be 
limited, since such criteria have not been formulated. At the end of 2004 the Dutch 
delegation expresses worries about the timely international WFD coordination and 
apologies for the limited provision of its national data so far. The EC’s observer 
points at the necessity of a timely deliverance of the Article 5 roof report based on 
available information. The Walloon Union of Enterprises (again) refers indirectly to an 
international level playing field with regard to the WFD’s environmental objectives 
which, to the union’s opinion, should take into account periods of extreme low dis-
charge rates in the river. 
In 2004 the Heads of Delegation do not reach full agreement on the description 
of tasks and organisation of the IMC secretariat. The French and Walloon delegations 
ask for an overview of additional WFD tasks before deciding on additional human 
and financial resources. According to the Dutch, Flemish and German delegations it is 
already clear that mainly due to the WFD, there are substantial additional tasks for the 
Commission. Seven NGOs have been accepted as observers. Their representatives are 
invited for a special annual meeting with the Heads of Delegations. The Article 5 roof 
report (Part A) shall be based on 23 reporting units. The part B reports (national 
parts) will not be harmonised. Since not all delegations (including the Netherlands)  
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provided requested data in time, the secretariat has not been able yet to conduct an 
evaluation of the first stage of the Meuse Action Programme. Due to limited re-
sources, highest priority is given to WFD activities. The draft list of pertinent sub-
stances for the Meuse River Basin District is approved. Monitoring data will be col-
lected for candidate pertinent substances. November 2004 the risk analysis (to be 
included in the Article 5 report) is not available yet, as the Head of Delegation still 
would have to decide on the multilateral procedures. The Heads express their inten-
tion to exchange views with NGOs on public consultation procedures and decide on 
the participation procedures for NGOs in project group activities. Given the laborious 
procedural discussions some NGOs start to loose interest in active participation. 
At the 12th Plenary Meeting (December 2004), the Walloon delegation asks 
questions about the legitimisation of some activities by the IMC and refers to a strict 
interpretation of WFD’s Article 3. According to the Walloon Region of Belgium the 
IMC should restrict itself to the coordination of methods and procedures and should 
not collect its own data. Furthermore, the Coordination Working Group should revise 
the mandates for the working groups and project groups for the benfit of clear work 
programmes. Although the then chair points at unclear mandates for the secretariat 
(which have hindered coordination of the Article 5 roof report drafting process), the 
states and regions do not conclude any action for improvement. The Dutch delegation 
notifies differences in interpretation and application of the (European) WFD guidance 
documents. The Dutch argue that the IMC could help to obtain insight in the differ-
ent domestic approaches. The Plenary Meeting recommends the riparian states and 
regions to enforce the bilateral coordination efforts on WFD implementation issues in 
border-crossing river sub-basins. The Monitoring Project Group will receive the man-
date to establish an international WFD monitoring programme, as based on the 
national networks before the end of 2005. Opinions differ from a more limited inter-
pretation (Wallonia: chemical water quality only) to broad (Germany and the Nether-
lands: chemical and biological parameters, surface water and groundwater). The 
homogenous network will continue at least until 2006 and will be part of the multilat-
eral coordination of the national WFD monitoring networks.  
In 2005 the IMC reorganises itself for the 2006 to 2009 period in which the 
WFD activities would become more dominant. The organisation scheme includes four 
permanent working groups and a number of temporary project groups (see Figure 
5.1). Although the Coordination Working Group is drafted centrally in the scheme, it 
formally does not have a higher hierarchical position compared to the other three 
working groups. However, from the scheme it seems that both the Coordination 
Working Group and the Hydrology/High Water Working Group have a direct link 
with the Heads of Delegation (who actually take the decisions), while the other work-
ing groups only have indirect links. The former Ecology Working Group has been 
“downgraded” to a temporary project group. Since both working groups and project 
groups are active during the same period, it is not clear in practice what is the actual 
difference between “permanent” and “temporary”. The role of NGOs becomes not 
visible in the organisation scheme.  
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Figure 5.1: IMC organisation scheme 2006 to 2009 (Source: IMC, 2005a) 
 
In 2005 the IMC publishes its Article 5 roof report (IMC, 2005b). All riparian states 
refer to this report in their related national reports in order to proof the EC that mul-
tilateral coordination has taken place. There is an English translation and a brochure 
(IMC, 2005c) available. Based on the roof report the IMC selects the ‘important water 
management issues’ at the level of the entire river basin district (IMC, 2005d):  
 
o hydro-morphological alterations (including fish migration barriers, 
o water shortages (taking into account environmental, social and economic        
considerations), 
o pollution from households, agriculture and industry, 
o flood prevention and mitigation in relation to ecological restoration and natural 
erosion and sedimentation processes, 
o and water shortages in relation to sustainable water use; groundwater quality and 
quantity.  
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At the end of 2005 the delegations still did not agree on an extension of the secre-
tariat. The delegations informed each other about their national public consultation 
procedures (WFD’s Article 14). France and Wallonia had initiated extensive public 
surveys about important water management issues. The exchange of information on 
national monitoring programmes had been completed. The Flemish delegation regret-
ted the lack of a joint multilateral report with common conclusions. Finally, NGOs 
again criticised the lack of openness of the IMC such as no public access to the warn-
ing and alarming system on accidental pollution. RIWA Meuse expressed deep disap-
pointment regarding the exclusion of its water quality figures in the roof Article 5 
report. RIWA and other observers expressed their willingness to contribute actively to 
the roof river basin management plan, for example by offering monitoring data and 
expertise. 
 
The roof river basin management plan, procedural debates (2006 to 2009) 
In 2006 irritation about the lack of progress is expressed explicitly by some delega-
tions. For example, the then German Head of Delegation mentions a strong focus on 
procedural discussions which deflect attention from urgent activities. The suboptimal 
information about an accidental pollution with high cadmium concentrations in the 
Meuse River causes irritation among the downstream situated Dutch and Flemish 
riparian states. Progress on the improvement of the multilateral warning and alarming 
system is hampered by laborious debates. A joint workshop with the International 
Scheldt Commission parties on this issue has been postponed. A new project group 
will consider (dis)advantages of integration or parallelism for the homogenous and 
WFD monitoring networks. Based on a German proposal the IMC will draft a roof 
monitoring report. The IMC initiates activities on a comparison of national definitions 
on economic issues like application of the disproportionate costs argument. 
NGOs again ask for more openness, transparency and less bureaucratic participa-
tion procedures. In response the Heads of Delegations approve participation of ex-
perts from observer organisations in the working groups and project groups. The 
Heads of Delegations decide not to integrate issues from NGOs in the list of impor-
tant water management issues. Instead they may be mentioned in the working plans 
for the working groups and/or project groups. A French proposal to draft the roof 
Meuse River Basin Management Plan in a mixed top-down (by the IMC) and bottom-
up process (by the riparian states and regions) has been approved. The delegations 
agree to deaprt from the significant multilateral water management issues. The 
Groundwater Project Group has concluded that there is no groundwater body that 
requires multilateral coordination. The IMC actors decide to draft a list of water bod-
ies which do require trilateral or bilateral coordination. The Objectives and Measures 
Working Group doubts whether there could be draft texts available by mid 2007, 
since most riparian states and regions have only initiated national activities on drafting 
programmes of measures in 2006. The working group has started with an inventory of 
basic measures conform the WFD’s Annex VI (European Communities, 2000: 64). 
In 2007, driven by a Flemish-Dutch proposal, the IMC decides to include a chap-
ter on floods and droughts in the roof river basin management plan. Progress in the 
Objectives and Measures Working Group is laborious with lots of procedural 
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discussions (such as on drafting a work plan; Interview 34, Appendix I). In March the 
Heads of Delegations decide to initiate a project group on warning and alarming of 
accidental pollution (with a Dutch chair). Luxembourg and Germany decide to join 
and tributaries are included. In December the project group turns into a permanent 
working group. The IMC publishes the roof report on the WFD’s transboundary 
monitoring requirements (IMC, 2007). The Heads of Delegations discuss five major 
issues as mentioned in a Dutch discussion document. The issues mainly concern irre-
versible hydro-morphological changes and application of the Article 4’s exemptions. 
The aim of the Dutch delegation is to provide clarity on the views of the delegations 
in order to support the coordination activities in the working and project groups. The 
Dutch delegation wished to avoid different images and interpretations on the WFD’s 
environmental objectives and exemptions in the implementation within the interna-
tional river basin district (Interviews 18 and 51, Appendix I).  
The IMC chair speaks informally with representatives of NGOs. The NGOs 
consider the participation procedures as too inflexible, for example they have no ac-
cess to minutes of working group meetings. Besides, the IMC does not offer resources 
for translation of their documents. All 7 NGOs wish to continue as observers of the 
IMC. Also the Flemish MINA Council (which is an advisory platform for nature and 
environmental policy), after initial opposition from the Walloon delegation, has been 
granted the observer status. The Plenary Meeting is happy about the initiatives from 
the Walloon and Dutch delegations for integration of the Meuse Junior Symposium in 
the 3rd International Meuse Symposium under the wings of the IMC. The Plenary 
Meeting supports the initiative of the Reinwater Foundation (Stichting Reinwater; which 
is a Dutch NGO) for an IMC brochure on street litter. The IMC decides to act as the 
competent authority for multilateral coordination of the European Floods Directive. 
The French delegation is in favour of integration of the WFD and homogeneous 
monitoring networks. The Walloon PEGASE model will be used to study the impact 
of basic WFD measures on water quality improvement. There is little progress on 
coordination of groundwater issues and comparison of cost-effectiveness analyses. 
RIWA Meuse asks the IMC to consider an additional list of twelve substances as rele-
vant Meuse substances in relation to drinking water production. 
2008: the Heads of Delegation agree to change the rules of procedure. NGOs 
may attend working group meetings (except for the Coordination Working Group) for 
issues that the chairs decide upon. The NGOs notify a lack of progress and too many 
short notice cancellations of working group meetings. The chair of the drafting team 
for the roof part of the river basin management plan mentions a laborious progress. 
The (German) IMC chair expresses the need for more mutual trust and asks the pro-
vision of the draft national documents in order to accelerate multilateral coordination. 
France expresses the lack of a sound method for estimation of benefits. The Dutch 
request the other delegations to provide representatives in the working and project 
groups more mandate for manoeuvre. The Flemish delegation stresses the necessity of  
both multilateral and bilateral coordination. 
Only the Walloon delegation opposes to the ublication of monitoring results of 
the 2007 domestic WFD programmes in the international river basin management 
plan. The Walloon do not consider figures for one particular year as representative  
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and given the fact that the domestic methods have not been not coordinated multilat-
erally. The Walloon delegation is in favour of a restriction to the current homogenous 
(pre-WFD) monitoring network for the main stream (excluding tributaries). The Wal-
loon public actors view the homogeneous network as a good coordinated network 
which should be continued in the future. The Walloon delegation is not in favour of 
collecting information on water temperature and litter (important issues according to 
some NGOs), since they are not earmarked as significant domestic water management 
issues. The Dutch delegation gets irritated about the delay in the study report on water 
temperature issue which has repeatedly been promised by the Walloon delegation. 
Some delegations ply for more scientific research before adding those issues.  
The editing of the litter brochure has been delayed given priority to drafting the 
roof part of the international river basin management plan. This drafting process re-
mains laborious as well. In October data from several riparian states still lack. At the 
end of November the Plenary Meeting releases a draft version for public consultation. 
An IMC-GIS website will be designed by the Walloon actors. Finally, this somehow 
troublesome year ends with the conclusion that the work plan for the multilateral 
Floods Directive coordination activities (Article 13) is not available yet. The French 
and German delegations stress that national discussions should be finished first. 
To concluse the IMC chronology, in 2009 the Heads of Delegations decided on 
the multilateral milestone of a future integration of the homogeneous IMC network 
and the WFD monitoring programmes of the riparian states. They decied to prpare a 
report on 10 years of monitoring data from the homogeneous network. RIWA Meuse 
again offered to make use of its monitoring data which date back to 1950. The Bene-
lux Economic Union had published a revised disposition on fish migration (Benelux, 
2009). The new disposition aims for restoration of fish migration conform the WFD 
terms. Rerring to this disposition, the IMC’s Ecology Project Group strated the draft-
ing process for a Fish Master Plan. The Plenary Meeting decided on practical coordi-
nation rules (multilateral in relation to bilateral activities) for the Floods Directive’s  
requirements and the inclusion of drought issues. In November, the Plenary Meeting 
approved the roof part of the International Meuse River Basin Management Plan with 
reservations by the Walloon and German delegations. No comments had been re-
ceived in the national public consultation rounds. The Plenary Meeting approved the 
proposed 2010-2015 working plan and took notice of the adapted organisational 
structures. As of 2010 progress of the four main working groups (Accidental Pollu-
tion, WFD, Monitoring and Hydrology/High Water) would be discussed in the (re-
named) Direction Working Group (as liaison with the Heads of Delegations). There 
was only one project group left, namely on the multilateral Geographical Information 
System. 
 
This brief historical reconstruction illustrates that, despite the somehow laborious 
nature of the multilateral coordination game, the water policy discourse gradually has 
become more integrated in nature. Incrementally and despite the procedural debates, 
important milestones have been decided on which may pay-off in the future. The next 
section will continue with an analysis of observed collective-choice rules for IRBM 
during the 1990 to 2009 period. 
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5.3 The WFD and multilateral rules of IRBM 
 
This section explores to which extent the governance and policy principles, the envi-
ronmental objectives and exemption options in the official WDF text and their inter-
pretations in the Common Implementation Strategy (CIS) may have provoked 
changes in collective-choice rules for IRBM at the multilateral political level. The 
ideal-types rules (as defined in the Subsections 2.2.3 till 2.2.9) are the benchmark in-
strument for the assessment.  
 
5.3.1 Scope Rules 
 
As defined in Section 2.2.3, scope rules may concern the geographic area, the type of 
organisational structures and networks and the issues to be decided on. For the aim of 
this research a distinction is made between organisational and substantive scope rules. 
Concerning the former the focus is on the impact of hydrological boundaries on 
organisational structures, whereas for the latter the focus is on the levels of integra-
tion. For example, are “river basins as the appropriate management units” translated 
into functional agencies and to which extent may these entities operate autonomously? 
Additionally, what are collective choices for internal integration (of issues within the 
water policy domain) and external integration (of issues across policy domains)? To 
whivh extent do these choices affect the nature of river basin legislation, policy docu-
ments and management plans? 
 
Organisational scope: the impact of hydrological boundaries 
As presented in Subsection 5.2.1, before adoption of the WFD there has already been 
a multilateral river basin committee which has started the exchange of information on 
the implementation of water quality policies of the then involved riparian states. The 
committee followed the hydrological boundaries of the basin of the Meuse River but 
only focused on the main river itself. Subsection 5.2.2 has shown that the WFD has 
triggered enlargement of this committee by also including the tributaries, hence invit-
ing new riparian states to participate. The nature of the committee remains functional: 
it focuses on water management related issues only. After adoption of the WFD the 
committee has broadened its attention from exchange of information and harmonisa-
tion efforts for monitoring networks only to coordination of issues that have a signifi-
cant multilateral dimension. The committee has no supranational authority and works 
in addition to existing parliamentary institutions in the participating riparian states and 
regions (by providing no legally binding advices and recommendations). These obser-
vations point at ideal-type B collective scope rules both before and after adoption of 
the WFD (see Table 5.1a). 
 
Substantive scope: internal integration 
The scope of the ICPM as based on the Charleville-Mézières Meuse Treaty (Anony-
mous, 1994) was limited to selection of measures for compliance with the quality 
objectives for the surface water of and the aquatic ecosystems in the Meuse River. 
Tributaries have only been discussed when measures in these sub-basins would 
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contribute to objectives for the Meuse River. Sediment issues for the main river have 
been included, whereas groundwater issues excluded (as shown by the Meuse Action 
Programme (ICPM, 1998)). Due to the WFD, the scope has been enlarged to all those 
water issues that require multilateral coordination including tributaries (Anonymous, 
2002). In this respect adoption of the important water management issues (IMC, 
2005d) has been a significant step, since the riparian states have acknowledged those 
issues as to be necessarily multilaterally coordinated (Interviews 18, 42, 51 and 53, 
Appendix I). This overview includes hydro-morphological alterations of water sys-
tems, as due to electricity generation, navigation and water discharge management; 
water quality (nutrients, heavy metals, organic micro-pollutants, crop protection sub-
stances and protection of drinking water); water quantity (flood prevention and miti-
gation, water shortages and sustainable management; and groundwater issues.  
 
Table 5.1a: Ideal-type organisational scope rules for IRBM (multilateral level) 
Ideal-type rules↓ 1990 to 2000↓ 2001 to 2009↓ 
A: Water policy is implemented by organisational 
structures and actor networks which are driven by 
social, economic and political factors that do not 
follow hydrological (river) basin boundaries. These 
structures/networks may be multi-purpose or 
sectoral in nature and are under parliamentary 
control. 
  
B: Water policy is implemented by functional water 
agencies, committees and actor networks which 
follow hydrological (river basin) boundaries. These 
functional entities and actor networks are controlled 
by parliamentary institutions.  
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
C: Water policy is implemented by autonomous 
(sub) river basin authorities and/or communities 
that are organised along hydrological boundaries. 
These authorities and communities are beyond par-
liamentary control and do have their own 
polity rules. 
  
Legend: The research observations come closest to ideal-type B rules as expressed by the ‘X’. 
 
Given the political delicacy of water quantity issues at the European level and the 
laborious history of the multilateral talks, it seems remarkable that these issues are 
discussed by the IMC (Interview 42, Appendix I). Although both water quality and 
water quantity issues are adopted, emphasis is mainly on parallel approaches, as ex-
pressed by separate working groups/product groups and the separate actions pro-
grammes on high waters (WHM, 1998; IMC, 2005e) and quality issues (ICPM, 1998). 
Also, groundwater and surface water issues are discussed in separate product groups. 
Apparently, the salient integration wording in the WFD’s Preamble (European Com-
munities, 2000: Statements 19 and 25) in combination with the work of the prior High 
Waters Working Group may have triggered inclusion of water quantity issues, albeit 
mentioned in generic terms (IMC, 2005d: 2, 4; translation from Dutch added): 
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Also water shortage may be a critical bottleneck for ecological functioning of the Meuse 
River and its tributaries. [..] Specific attention will be given to solving erosion problems 
with an eye on maintenance of the natural discharge capacity of rivers. [..] The fresh water 
availability has its limits. Consequently, also water use will have to comply with the sus-
tainability principle in order to diminish the effects of droughts. Mining activities have 
disturbed local hydrological equilibria and the connections between groundwater and 
surface water resources. A new equilibrium will have to be found. [..] For part of the 
groundwater resources, there are quantitative problems. 
 
The analysis of documents and meeting reports does not show attempts to formulate 
integrated objectives and measures for quantitative and qualitative aspects of individ-
ual groundwater and surface water bodies. The observations point at an evolution 
from ideal-type A towards ideal-type B collective-choice rules on internal integration 
between 1990 and 2009 (see Table 5.1b). 
 
Table 5.1b Ideal-type internal integration rules for IRBM (multilateral level) 
Ideal-type rules↓ 1990 to 2000↓ 2001 to 2009↓ 
A: Separate legislation, policy documents and man-
agement plans for both water quality and quantity 
issues. Surface water and groundwater are dealt with 
in parallel.  
 
X 
 
 
B: Legislation, policy documents and management 
plans which include parallel objectives and measures 
for both quantitative and qualitative aspects and for 
groundwater and surface water. 
  
X 
C: Legislation, policy documents and management 
plans with integrated objectives and measures for 
related surface and groundwater bodies, including 
quantitative and qualitative aspects. 
  
Legend: The research observations come closest to ideal-type A and B rules as expressed by 
the ‘X’. 
 
Substantive scope: external integration 
Both before and after adoption of the WFD the IMC does not take on board detailed 
cross-sector linkages, although the overview of important water management issues 
includes one implicit argumentation line on their importance (IMC, 2005d: 1; transla-
tion from Dutch added): 
 
The use of freshwater from the Meuse and policies from spatial planning and other 
domains are not always tuned to the environmental objectives of the WFD, in par-
ticular concerning navigation and electricity generation. An approach need to be de-
veloped which will guide the way to at least the most cost-efficient combination in-
cluding environmental externalities. 
 
In generic terms the second Meuse Treaty (Anonymous, 2002: 1; translation from 
Dutch added) refers to the shared wish of the riparian states and regions to cooperate 
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for the aim of sustainable development. All Parties express ‘the willingness to, indi-
vidually, implement appropriate measures on integrated management of the Interna-
tional Meuse River Basin District [..] in particular with regard to the multi-
functionality of the Meuse River.’ The Treaty does not include definitions of sustainable 
development, integrated management and multiple-functionality. There have been limited dis-
cussions on the linkages between nature conservation policy (Natura 2000) and the 
WFD requirements (Interviews 18 and 42, Appendix I). The Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) and other rural development policies are not detailed further at the mul-
tilateral level. It is remarkable that the second Meuse Treaty (Anonymous, 2002: Arti-
cle 2 (c)) mentions integration with other policy domains (spatial planning, nature 
management, forestry and urbanisation) explicitly in relation to flood prevention and 
mitigation, but not with regard to the WFD requirements. In conclusion, the IMC 
does not work out specific arrangements on cross-sector policies coordination or 
integration. The multilateral documents mainly focus at water management issues. 
These observations point at ideal-type A collective rules for external integration, both 
before and after adoption of the WFD (see Table 5.1c). 
 
Table 5.1c: Ideal-type external integration rules for IRBM (multilateral level) 
Ideal-type rules↓ 1990 to 2000↓ 2001 to 2009↓ 
A: Separate policy documents and management 
plans for water policy and other policy domains 
without linkages. 
 
X 
 
 
X 
B: Policy documents and management plans for 
other policy domains take into account water 
issues and reversely. 
  
C: Cross-sector, integrative policies and manage-
ment plans. 
  
Legend: The research observations come closest to ideal-type A rules as expressed by the ‘X’. 
 
5.3.2 Position Rules 
As introduced in Subsection 2.2.4, within this research, position rules relate to the 
question as to how do collective (inter-)national river basin governance and policy 
principles affect the positions of owners and users of water and land. Or reversely, 
which conditions should apply to acquisition, continuation and termination of rights 
to own and/or use (interrelated) water and land resources, in order to comply with 
common principles of ecological, social and economic resilience? Three ideal-types of 
position rules have been distinguished (see Table 5.2). 
 
It is remarkable that both Meuse Treaties (Anonymous, 1994; 2002a) do not refer 
directly to the international principles of equitable and reasonable utilisation and the obliga-
tion not to cause significant harm, as expressed by the Helsinki Rules (International Law 
Association, 1966), the ‘Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of In-
ternational Watercourses’ (United Nations, 1997) and the ‘Berlin Rules on Water Re-
sources’ (International Law Association, 2004). As such, at a first glance, the riparian 
states and regions seem to get round the political delicate issues of water and land 
resources user rights and the related economic, social and environmental externalities. 
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The focus of the two Meuse Treaties, by referring to the (Helsinki) ‘Convention on 
the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes’ 
(UN-ECE, 1992), is predominantly on water quality issues (see also Subsection 5.3.1 
on scope rules). However, the Helsinki Convention should not be interpreted as ex-
cluding water quantity issues (Tanzi, 2000). For example, Article 2.2(c) of the Helsinki 
Convention (UN-ECE, 1992: 3, italics added) mentions that the Riparian Parties shall 
take all appropriate measures ‘To ensure that transboundary waters are used in a reason-
able and equitable way, taking into particular account their transboundary character, in 
the case of activities which cause or a likely to cause transboundary impact’. Further-
more, Article 2.2(b) aims for ecologically sound and rational management of trans-
boundary waters and conservation of water resources. Article 2.6 adds transboundary 
cooperation on the basis of equality and reciprocity (ibid.). Article 10 mentions con-
sultations by Riparian Parties on the basis of reciprocity, good faith and good-
neigbourliness, ‘at the request of any such Party’ (UN-ECE, 1992: 8). The Helsinki 
Convention does not literally include an obligation not to cause significant harm but its Arti-
cle 2.1 translates it as ‘The Parties shall take all appropriate measures to prevent, con-
trol and reduce any transboundary impact’ (ibid.: 2). Article 1.2 includes a broad defi-
nition of transboundary impact which does not limit the focus to direct water-related 
human activities (UN-ECE, 1992: 2):  
 
"Transboundary impact" means any significant adverse effect on the environment 
resulting from a change in the conditions of transboundary waters caused by a  
human activity, the physical origin of which is situated wholly or in part within an 
area under the jurisdiction of a Party, within an area under the jurisdiction of an-
other Party. Such effects on the environment include effects on human health and 
safety, flora, fauna, soil, air, water, climate, landscape and historical monuments or 
other physical structures or the interaction among these factors; they also include 
effects on the cultural heritage or socio-economic conditions resulting from 
alterations to those factors. 
 
The second Meuse Treaty (Anonymous, 2002) cautiously opens the door to inclusion 
of quantitative issues, by adopting the WFD’s ‘…contributes to mitigating the effects 
of floods and droughts…’ wording. Both Meuse Treaties echo four basic European 
environmental cooperation principles: precaution, prevention, source oriented pollution preven-
tion and the polluter pays (Anonymous, 1994; 2002a). Whereas the Treaty of Charleville-
Mézières includes notions on good-neighbourliness and prevention of distortion of economic 
competitiveness, the Treaty of Ghent remarkably does not mention these. In its Article 5 
on research and development programmes the Helsinki Convention mentions the 
‘development and application of environmentally sound technologies, production and 
consumption patterns’ and ‘environmentally sound water-construction works and 
water-regulation techniques’ (UN-ECE, 1992: 5, 6). The Meuse Treaties do not refer 
to such environmentally sound technologies (Anonymous, 1994; 2002a). 
The riparian states and regions of the International Meuse Commission (IMC) 
intentionally coordinate their water policies and management related activities on the 
basis of sovereignty. The IMC has no supranational authority and cannot formally 
interfere with domestic user and property rights’ systems. It is up to the individual,  
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sovereign riparian states to decide on these territorial issues and their multilateral 
coordination. In the Ghent Treaty the riparian states and regions express their aware-
ness of the fact ‘the Meuse River is used for divergent essential, ecological, economic 
and social functions and objectives’ (Anonymous, 2002: 3). The Helsinki Convention 
(UN-ECE, 1992) includes some generic notions on sustainability. For example, its 
Article 2.5(c) echoes the Brundtland report (WCED, 1987): ‘Water resources shall be 
managed so that the needs of the present generation are met without compromising 
the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ (UN-ECE, 1992: 3). Fur-
thermore, its Article 3.1(i) advocates sustainable water resources management ‘includ-
ing the application of the ecosystems approach’ (ibid: 4). However, within the IMC, 
up to the time of writing in 2012 there haven been no attempts to define sustainability 
or to translate this concept into (interrelated) principles of ecological, economical and 
social resilience. The Helsinki Convention recalls the ‘ECE Declaration of Policy on 
the Rational Use of Water’ (UN-ECE, 1984). This Declaration refers to integrated 
management of river basins, which includes integrated supply- and demand manage-
ment, rational use of water resources (both in a quantitative and qualitative sense) and 
remarkably, a potential far-stretching principle on cross-sector integration (ibid.: prin-
ciple 6, page 16): 
 
Priority should be accorded to the coordination of land-use planning and water man-
agement. This could be restrictions on the use of certain areas, already subject to se-
rious water shortages and or heavy environmental stress, as well as the separation of 
areas of water use from those of water abstraction. However, the general principle 
should be maintained, where possible, that the establishment of new industrial com-
plexes, power plants, intensive livestock farming, the development of new settle-
ments and the expansion of urban areas should be compatible with the availability of 
water of sufficient quality and quantity at reasonable distances. 
 
In conclusion, given international water rules and conventions and referral in the 
Meuse Treaties to the ‘Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary 
Watercourses and International Lakes’ (UN-ECE, 1992), one might expect multilateral 
discussions on the impact of land user and property rights on the state and function-
ing of the Meuse River and its tributaries. However, the strong focus on water quality 
issues, the sovereignty principle and the political priorities of the individual riparian 
states and regions have avoided such complicated discussions so far. Since common 
definition of position rules is an important aspect in the context of sustainable river 
basin management, the lack of multilateral rules and discourses points at uncon-
ditioned protection of prior property and user rights with regard to transboundary envi-
ronmental, social and economic externalities. These observations indicate ideal-type A 
position rules before and after adoption of the WFD (see Table 5.2).  
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Table 5.2: Ideal-type position rules for IRBM (multilateral level) 
Ideal-type rules↓ 1990 to 2000↓ 2001 to 2009↓ 
A: Protection of prior water and land resources use 
and property rights without preconditions on 
environmental, social and economic externalities. 
 
X 
 
X 
B: Conditional maintenance and acquirement of 
water and land resources use and property rights. 
Conditions include requirements to consider social, 
economic and/or environmental externalities. 
 
 
 
 
C: Reallocation of use and property rights, based on 
interrelated conditions of ecological, economical and 
social resilience. 
  
Legend: The research observations come closest to ideal-type A rules as expressed by the ‘X’. 
 
5.3.3 Boundary Rules 
As defined in Subsection 2.2.5, in this research boundary rules are interpreted as 
related to who has access to the river basin management planning and decision-
making process and who has not? What are conditions for entry and exit? What are 
the degrees of participation for different stakeholder categories? Three ideal-types of 
boundary rules have been distinguished (see Table 5.4). 
 
In the 2001 Plenary Meeting environmental NGOs ask for more direct ways of par-
ticipation and propose a three-level approach. As the first level, they propose to install 
an advisory forum of users and interests groups. The advisory forum may provide 
advice (by request and own initiatives) on issues of river basin management and activi-
ties of the working groups. A delegation of the forum attends the Plenary Meetings to 
elucidate the advice. Secondly, experts from NGOs will have access to working groups 
in order to cooperate on relevant issues. The third level concerns a political dialogue of 
information, education and communication in order to raise awareness and involve 
the general public. The then ICPM does not accept the first proposal on an advisory 
forum. Instead NGOs may attend the Plenary Commission Meetings as observers if 
they meet three criteria: (1) they are statutory organisations of which representatives 
have mandate to talk on behalf of the organisations; (2) they have interests in and 
expertise relevant for the tasks of the Commission; and (3) they acknowledge the 
principles, objectives and organisational rules of the Commission. The number of 
observers may be limited for reasons of efficiency, balance among interests and 
balance among regional and international NGOs. NGOs may not attend parts of the 
plenary meetings on financial and organisational aspects and are not allowed to join 
the meetings of Heads of Delegations. Instead the Heads of Delegations organise a 
special consultation meeting with the NGOs annually (the first meeting has taken 
place in 2004). Experts from NGOs may attend at project group meetings (since 
2004) and working group meetings (since 2006) if not for lobbying reasons and if not 
distributing documents of the Commission. Every four years access requests will have 
to be renewed.  
Table 5.3 shows an overview of participating NGOs (that obtained a formal ob-
server status until the end of 2009). Emphasis is on water users’ interest organisations 
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and environmental NGOs who have conditional and limited access to the multilateral 
river basin management coordination process. Due to the WFD, the IMC prudently 
has opened its window a little bit more towards non-governmental actors. The multi-
lateral roof river basin management plan mentions that the IMC does not have 
authority to implement Article 14(1) of the WFD on active involvement of interested 
parties (IMC, 2009: 28). According to the editors, the observers and experts from 
NGOs and other interests groups have contributed to the drafting process of the plan 
(ibid.). From the plan it does not become clear what have been these contributions. 
The observations point at an evolution from ideal-type A towards ideal-type B bound-
ary rules (see Table 5.4). 
 
Table 5.3: Participation of NGOs and interests groups in the IMC 
Organisation(s))↓ Rate of participation↓ 
Secretariat-General of the Benelux (Bel-
gium, Netherlands, Luxembourg) 
Plenary Meeting (observer) 
URGE = Union régionale du grand Est 
des Fédérations pour la Pêche et la Pro-
tection du milieu aquatique (France) 
Plenary Meeting (observer) 
Fédération des Associations agrées de 
Pêche et de la Protection du Milieu 
aquatique de la Meuse (FAPPMM) 
(France) 
Plenary Meeting (observer in 2000 and 
2001) 
Bond Beter Leefmilieu (Flanders) Plenary Meeting (observer) 
MINA Council (Flanders) Plenary Meeting (member of the Flemish 
delegation; observer) 
WWF (Belgium) Plenary Meeting (observer) 
UWE = Union Wallonne des Enter-
prises (Walloon Region) 
Plenary Meeting (observer); expert in the 
Pressures Project Group (2004, 2005). 
IEW = Inter-Environnement Wallonie 
(Walloon Region) 
Plenary Meeting (observer); expert in the 
Groundwater Project Group (2004, 2005). 
RIWA Meuse (All) Plenary Meeting (observer and expert 
member of the Dutch delegation); expert in 
the Pressures and Monitoring Project 
Groups (2004, 2005). 
Aluseau (Luxembourg) Plenary Meeting (observer) 
Stichting Reinwater (the Netherlands) Plenary Meeting (observer from 2002 on-
wards) 
European Anglers Alliance (All) Plenary Meeting (observer in 2000 and 
2001) 
European Union of National Associa-
tions of Water Suppliers and Waste 
Water Services (EUREAU) (All) 
Plenary Meeting (observer in 1999 and 
2001) 
 
190 CHAPTER 5 
 
Table 5.4: Ideal-type IRBM boundary rules (multilateral level) 
Ideal-type rules↓ 1990 to 2000↓ 2001 to 2009↓ 
A: Access to the river basin management planning 
process is restricted to public actors only. Other 
stakeholders are informed. 
 
X 
 
 
 
B: Non-governmental actors may have access to the 
river basin management planning process under 
conditions set by the public actors. Emphasis on 
co-thinking and consultation. 
 
 
 
X 
C: Ample opportunities for all interested stake-
holders to join the river basin management planning 
process, including co-productions, co-decisions and 
self-realisation. 
 
 
 
 
Legend: The observations in this research come closest to ideal-type A and B rules as ex-
pressed by the ‘X’. 
 
5.3.4 Choice Rules 
As introduced in Section 2.2.6, for the aim of this research two indicators for observa-
tion of choice rules change have been defined. The first indicator concerns water sup-
ply and demand rules. Three ideal-types have been identified for this indicator, ranging 
from a focus on water supply only to integrated demand and supply management in 
which a hierarchy of functions may apply, as conditioned by fresh water availability 
and protection of the ecological life support system (see Table 5.5a). The second indi-
cator expresses the nature of licenses system. Ideal-types range from parallel licences 
for quality and quantity objectives for the use, development and management of water 
resources towards integrated licences for interdependent natural resources (including 
water; see Table 5.5b).  
 
Supply and demand management 
The multilateral roof river basin management plan (IMC, 2009: 9; translation from 
Dutch added) mentions ‘water quantity management (to hold, to store, to discharge)’, 
‘water for human consumption’ and ‘living ecosystem’ among the most important 
water (related) functions in the International Meuse River Basin District. Furthermore, 
the plan (ibid.: 26) points at close interrelations between the objectives and measures 
of the WFD and Directive 2007/60/EC on the assessment and management of flood 
risks (European Union, 2007a) and the potential impact of climate change. The plan 
includes an important argumentation which implicitly points at an integrated approach 
for water quality and quantity issues (IMC, 2009: 26, translation from Dutch added): 
‘Partly due to climate change the Meuse Riparian States have the duty to elaborate and 
coordinate supra-regional waterhousekeeping measures within the International 
Meuse River Basin District in order to obtain and maintain a good water state.’ Inter-
viewees 18, 42 and 51 (Appendix I) have mentioned laborious discussions on the in-
clusion of statements on the impact of climate change. Generic notions in the plan 
(IMC, 2009: 26-27; translation from Dutch added) point at the importance of both 
supply and demand management, albeit not literally mentioning these terms and with-
out more specific objectives. ‘In order to mitigate the effects of droughts, the Riparian 
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States will notice wherever necessary to diminish surface water abstractions from the 
Meuse, while at the same time to influence water use positively by means of informa-
tion’. In addition, coordinated measures within the river basin district will have to be 
taken in times of droughts, in order to serve multifunctional use. ‘Sustainable use of 
water within the entire Meuse River Basin District asks for individual and collective 
measures in order to protect the natural environment, conserve water resources and to 
use less water in production processes’ (ibid.). 
The IMC has no formal authority to interfere with water supply and demand 
policies management approaches of the riparian states and regions. In the spirit of 
principles in (in)formal international law and triggered by the WFD wording onmitiga-
tion of effects of floods and droughts, the riparian states and regions have included 
notions and activities on water quantity issues. Although references to supply and 
demand management are implicit and in generic wording, the importance of their 
written inclusion for potential future collective action should not be underestimated 
(Interview 42, Appendix I). In conclusion, the WFD seems to have triggered a discur-
sive evolution from ideal-type A towards ideal-type B collective choice rules (see 
Table 5.5a). This evolution is in its embryonic stage: it is up to the sovereign riparian 
states and regions to decide how far the translation into quantitative, measurable 
objectives and measures should go.  
 
Table 5.5a: Ideal-type IRBM choice rules (supply and demand; multilateral level) 
Ideal-type rules↓ 1990 to 2000↓ 2001 to 2009↓ 
A: Water supply management determines availability 
of fresh water for user functions. 
X 
 
x 
 
B: Mixed supply and demand management deter-
mines fresh water availability without a hierarchy in 
user functions. 
 
 
 
X 
C: Integrated supply and demand management, as 
expressed by a hierarchy in user functions.   
  
Legend: The research observations come closest to ideal-type A and B rules as expressed by 
the ‘X’. The ‘x’ points at a reduced resemblance of the observations with ideal-type A rules 
after adoption of the WFD.  
 
Nature of the license system 
Similar to the European institutions the IMC has no formal authority to interfere with 
the licence systems of the riparian states and regions. In line with the WFD require-
ments the multilateral river basin management plan (IMC, 2009) includes assessments 
of the quantitative and qualitative state of individual groundwater bodies and the 
qualitative state of individual surface water bodies. The assessments are presented and 
discussed in parallel without drawing conclusion on their interrelations (other than in 
generic wording). From the analysis of meeting documents and reports no implicit or 
explicit argumentats on the nature of licence systems become noticeable. Whereas the 
integration text box in the European CIS guidance documents refers to the need for a 
more integrated and coherent legislative framework, there are no multilateral discur-
sive indications for integrated license systems. Although the multilateral WFD related 
documents bring together quality and quantity issues, they do not provide for 
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integrated objectives and measures. These observations point at ideal-type A choice 
rules (see Table 5.5b). 
 
Table 5.5b: Ideal-type IRBM choice rules (license system’s nature; multilateral level) 
Ideal-type rules↓ 1990 to 2000↓ 2001 to 2009↓ 
A: Separate, parallel licenses for quality and 
quantity objectives related to the use, develop-
ment and management of water resources. 
 
X 
 
X 
B: Licenses that integrate quantity and quality 
objectives related to the use, development and 
management of water resources. 
  
 
C: Integrated licenses for interrelated use, 
Development and management of natural 
resources (e.g. air, water, land). 
  
Legend: The research observations come closest to ideal-type A rules as expressed by the ‘X’. 
 
5.3.5 Aggregation Rules 
As defined in Section 2.2.7, a major collective choice challenge of Integrated River 
Basin Management (IRBM) concerns how to arrange decision-making at interrelated 
political levels within shared (inter)national river basins with the aim to reach common 
understanding and broad public support for collective choices. The aggregation rules 
may appear in different ways, as expressed by identified ideal-types (see Table 5.6). 
The aggregation question ‘who should make and who should agree with adaptations 
of prior rules and with new rules?’ shows redundancy with boundary rules. For the 
purpose of this research the question, who is involved in planning and decision-
making and to which degree (information, consultation or co-decision), is covered 
under boundary rules (see Subsection 5.3.3). The aggregation rules concentrate on the 
coherence between and the nature of decision-making at different administrative lev-
els within a river basin. 
 
The IMC formulates advices and recommendations for the states and regions. The Ple-
nary Meeting may take decisions whenever a majority of delegations is present and with 
unanimity of votes as decision-making rule (ibid.: 8; Anonymous, 1994: 6). Each delega-
tion has one vote. The absence of one or more delegations accounts for voice absten-
tion but may not hinder the unanimity rule (as long as a majority of delegations is pre-
sent) (ibid.). Observers from the European Union, intergovernmental organisations, 
NGOs and/or interested States who are not a contracting party but have an interest in 
the work of the IMC do not possess voting right (Anonymous, 2002: 9). Under the first 
Meuse Treaty, intergovernmental organisations and NGOs did not have observer rights 
(Anonymous, 1994: 7). The unanimity rule points at symmetric decision-making in the 
sense that all involved actors with a right to vote will have to agree (which may trigger a 
search for consensus). However, since observed multilateral decision-making is 
restricted to water policy related state-actors (from the water policy domain) only, it 
qualifies as asymmetric in the sense that civil and private actors are excluded (and are 
supposed to accept the top-down decisions). 
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The IMC states and regions struggle with the tension between sovereign domestic 
implementation approaches and multilateral coordination. The meeting reports  be-
make clear that on the one hand, the delegations emphasise that the planning schemes 
of the individual riparian states for drafting the (national) river basin management 
plans determine the time table for the roof multilateral Meuse River Basin manage-
ment plan. On the other hand they stress that domestic schemes should take into 
account the preconditions and requirements for international coordination. In practice 
the timetables of the riparian states and regions determine the moments of data avail-
ability, causing delays in the multilaterally agreed ones. In December 2004 the Plenary 
Meeting recommends the riparian states and regions to enforce their bilateral and 
trilateral coordination efforts on WFD implementation issues in transboundary water 
sub-basins. The IMC itself focuses mainly on the multilateral coordination of issues 
that are of concern for the entire river basin district. For example, monitoring 
programmes for specific groundwater bodies, given their relatively limited territory 
and transboundary impact, have not been coordinated multilaterally but bi- and 
trilaterally. Although points of departure differ among the riparian states and regions, 
all the groundwater programmes meet the minimal WFD requirements (IMC, 2007; 
Jansen, Schreuders and Haverkamp, 2002). 
Summarising: the generic governance principles at the multilateral scale echo the 
European ones. Due to subsidiarity and sovereignty it is up to the IMC states and regions 
how to implement the WFD within their territories. At the same time the WFD requires 
multilateral, bilateral and national coordination efforts, depending on the geographical 
and thematic scope of issues at stake (Anonymous, 2002: 2). This specific combination 
invites a juxtaposition of ideal-type A and C aggregation rules at the multilateral level 
(see Table 5.6). On the one hand, for issues without cross-border interdependencies 
parallel planning and decision-making processes of the states and regions suffice. On the 
other hand, for issues with multilateral interdependencies the states and regions search 
for common definitions and agreements. The WFD does not alter this mixture of 
aggregation rules; it explicitly stresses the importance of a common, multilateral search 
for sustainable river basin management practices. 
 
Table 5.6: Ideal-type IRBM aggregation rules (multilateral level) 
Ideal-type rules↓ 1990 to 2000↓ 2001 to 2009↓ 
A: Independent decision-making on water policy 
and management plans at different administrative 
levels within a river basin. 
 
X 
 
X 
B: Asymmetric, top-down decision-making on water 
policy and management plans at different adminis-
trative levels within a river basin: lower levels have 
to comply with the rules from the higher levels. 
  
C: Symmetric, consensus based decision making on 
water policy and management plans at different 
administrative levels: mixed top-down and bottom-
up rules. 
 
X 
 
X 
Legend: The research observations come closest to ideal-type A and C rules as expressed by 
the ‘X’. 
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5.3.6 Information Rules 
As defined in Section 2.2.8, one major collective-choice challenge of IRBM is to 
collect, aggregate and present information in such a way that river basin management 
plans are acknowledged and supported by a majority of interested public and non-
governmental stakeholders. A critical dimension of this challenge is the types of in-
formation that are considered legitimate in combination with the nature of the collec-
tion and aggregation process. The focus of this research is on this critical dimension. 
Three ideal-type information rules have been identified (see Table 5.7).  
 
Before adoption of the WFD the information rules are dominated by the riparian 
states and regions. NGOs have no access to the organisational structures of the then 
ICPM. The predominant scientific-technical and socio-economic information is col-
lected, compared and aggregated by experts and officials from the riparian states and 
regions in a process which is often laborious. As an example, the first multilateral 
report on the water quality of the Meuse River which presents “homogenous” data 
from 1994, is adopted and published in 1997 (ICPM, 1997) after an exhaustive three 
years process of drafting, translation and last minute editing. After the adoption of the 
WFD at the European level the riparian states and regions have to decide on the 
option whether or not to conduct multilateral roof reports in addition to national 
editions. Some interviewees point at a delicate growth process in which some delega-
tions gradually are convinced of the need of (more salient) multilateral coordination 
(Interviews 18, 34, 42, 51 and 53, Appendix I). Finally, the IMC partners opt for a 
multilateral roof river basin characterisation (Article 5) report (IMC, 2005b), a report 
on the WFD monitoring networks in the International Meuse River Basin District 
(IMC, 2007) and a multilateral roof river basin management plan (IMC, 2009).  
Progress in the multilateral coordination process to a large extent depends on the 
availability of national data and information as contributions by the involved actors. 
The states and regions of the IMC conclude that the Article 5 risk assessment exer-
cises have clearly demonstrated that the available data and information are not always 
compatible and do not allow for a harmonised multilateral assessment. A prudent call 
for “multilateralisation” speaks from the Article 5 roof report’s wording (IMC, 2005b: 
56): 
 
A more harmonised data management is required, not only because of the need and 
the willingness to continue the coordination, but also in view of the future reporting 
obligation of the states and regions. Furthermore, the analysis of the characteristics, 
the study of the impacts of human activity and the economic analysis of water use 
have highlighted the usefulness of instruments such as harmonised decision support 
systems (i.e. models and scenarios).  
 
The Article 5 roof report shows that there are insufficient data available for final esti-
mates of cost recovery rates of water services and baseline scenario’s. Data and 
methods are not comparable between parties and sometimes even within the territory 
of one party (IMC, 2005b). In the roof part of the international river basin manage-
ment plan, the states and regions, for reasons of limited reliability, decide not to show 
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estimated reduction percentages for nutrients (Nitrogen and Phosphorus) for the 
entire river basin district (IMC, 2009; Interviews 34, 42 and 51, Appendix I). 
From a substantive point of view it is remarkable that the IMC struggles with  
integration of the prior homogeneous water quality monitoring network and the WFD 
monitoring requirements. The meeting documents and Interview 42 (Appendix I) 
deliver three possible explanations. Firstly, the WFD requirements are predominantly 
perceived as the competency of the Member States. Secondly, different views exist on 
definition of homogeneous and reliable comparability of monitoring data. Finally, the IMC 
secretariat did not attach high priority to the issue given other urgent multilateral co-
ordination issues (which implicitly reflects low priority by some of the riparian states 
and regions). 
The information in the multilateral reports mainly is collected, compared and ag-
gregated by experts from the riparian states and regions. Experts from NGOs have 
limited access to the drafting processes. During the plenary meetings the observers 
from the NGOs mainly focus on position statements and repeatedly some show their 
dissatisfaction with the limited possibilities for active involvement. By introduction of 
a website access to information for the general public is enlarged. Inner circle actors 
need an access code to the connected virtual IMC office which contains all the 
meeting documents as of 2001. Between 1995 and 2010 the IMC has published annual 
reports and four brochures: regarding the IMC in general (1), the use of pesticides (2), 
a synthesis of the roof Article 5 report (3) and street litter (4). Some NGOs complain 
several times about the lack of openness, transparency and limited access to docu-
ments. Both the roof Article 5 report and the multilateral river basin management plan 
do not include explicit contributions from NGOs and interests groups. In this respect, 
it is remarkable that no comments are received in the formal public consultation 
round on the multilateral river basin management plan. Additionally, the meeting re-
port from the November 2009 Plenary Meeting does not include remarks or expres-
sions of support for the multilateral river basin management plan by observers from 
the NGOs.  
Despite the lack of formal consultation comments on the multilateral river basin 
management report, the disappointment of environmental NGOs and the repeated 
offer from the drinking water sector to include their monitoring data on a broader 
range of relevant substances both implicitly point at disagreement with the multilateral 
output so far. Position papers from these groups dominate the scene. Overall, expert 
information and knowledge based on scientific-technical and socio-economic legitimi-
sation criteria have dominated the multilateral coordination process during the 1990 to 
2009 period. These observations point at a juxtaposition of ideal-type A and B collec-
tive-choice information rules (see Table 5.7).  
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Table 5.7 Ideal-type IRBM information rules (multilateral level) 
Ideal-type rules↓ 1990 to 2000↓ 2001 to 2009↓ 
The river basin management planning process (defi-
nition of means and ends) is predominantly driven 
by expert information and knowledge from the 
natural sciences. Validity and reliability are central 
criteria for legitimised information and knowledge. 
 
X 
 
X 
The river basin management planning process (defi-
nition of means and ends) is predominantly driven 
by expert information and knowledge from the 
economic sciences. Costs-benefits ratios and eco-
nomic efficiency are central criteria for legitimised 
information and knowledge. 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
The river basin management planning process (defi-
nition of means and ends) is driven by information 
and knowledge from multiple disciplines and both 
from experts and lays. Joint fact finding and social 
robustness are central criteria for legitimised infor-
mation and knowledge. 
  
Legend: The research observations come closest to ideal-type A and B rules as expressed by 
the ‘X’. 
 
5.3.7 Pay-off Rules 
As defined in Section 2.2.9, pay-off rules point at the incentives and deterrents for 
action (Ostrom, 2005). In interaction with other rule types, pay-off rules affect the net 
benefits and costs that will be assigned to particular combinations of actions and out-
comes (ibid.). In the context of this research, three ideal-types of IRBM pay-off rules 
have been identified (see Table 5.8). 
 
The observations show tension between river basin management rhetoric at the 
European level (for example WFD’s Article 3) and the laborious multilateral coordina-
tion attempts by the sovereign riparian states and regions. The IMC has no suprana-
tional authority and the second Meuse Treaty (Anonymous, 2002) does not include 
rewards or sanctions. Progress depends entirely on political willingness and mutual 
trust building. However, the European Court of Justice may punish individual Mem-
ber States in cases of non-compliance with the WFD’s obligations. If multilateral co-
ordination does not succeed, the riparian states and regions may proceed individually 
and may ask the EC to mediate (Article 3 and 13, European Communities, 2000: 8 
and 16). As final resort, Article 12 applies (European Communities, 2000: 16). 
 
Where a Member State identified an issue which has an impact on the manage-
ment of its waters but cannot be resolved by that Member State, it may report 
the issue to the Commission and any other Member State concerned and may 
make recommendations for the resolution of it. The Commission shall respond 
to any report or recommendations from Member States within a period of six 
months.  
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Up to December 2009 the IMC riparian states did not make use of Article 12. Since 
the European Commission may not address WFD implementation failures directly to 
the IMC but to the individual Member States, gradually, indirect pressure for adequate 
multilateral coordination and cooperation may increase. As a counter-force, given a 
long history of conflicts and distrust it may not come as a surprise that multilateral 
coordination after the adoption of the WFD remained laborious. Interviewee 42 
(Appendix I) points at the actual delivery of multilateral roof reports as remarkable 
sign of trust-building among the riparian states and regions: ‘The sometimes contro-
versial nature of the joint drafting process proofs that trust relations have been devel-
oped sufficiently in order to continue multilateral coordination efforts after conflict.’  
Both the Meuse Treaties (Anonymous, 1994; 2002a) and the multilateral reports 
do not include explicit statements on the nature of pay-off rules. Given references to 
the polluter pays principle and the European guidance document on Water and 
Economics (European Communities, 2003a) and a search for most cost-effective 
combinations of measures, the states and the regions implicitly embrace economic 
incentives and market forces as drivers for compliance with collective rules, in addi-
tion to formal rewards and sanctions from the European and domestic levels. These 
observations point at a juxtaposition of ideal-type A and B pay-off rules before and 
after adoption of the WFD (see Table 5.8). 
 
Table 5.8 Ideal-type IRBM pay-off rules (multilateral level)  
Ideal-type rules↓ 1990 to 2000↓ 2001 to 2009↓ 
A: Rewards and sanctions from laws and regulations 
are major drivers for compliance with collective 
rules (e.g. as expressed by standards and licence 
conditions). 
 
X 
 
X 
B: Economic incentives and market forces are major 
drivers for compliance with collective rules.   
X X 
C: (Sub-) Basin communities voluntarily invest 
resources (human, financial, expertise) as 
collaborative capital for compliance with collective-
choice rules. 
  
Legend: The research observations come closest to ideal-type A and B rules as expressed by 
the ‘X’. 
 
 
5.4 Multilateral rules in the context of policy discourses, actors and re-
sources and power 
 
As explained in Chapter 2, institutionalisation of collective-choice rule-types for 
IRBM is the primary focus of this research. In the previous section observed rules at 
the multilateral level (within the International Meuse Commission) have been pre-
sented, both for the 1990 to 2000 period (before adoption of the WFD) and the 2001 
to 2009 period (the first WFD implementation planning cycle). As concluded in Chap-
ter 2, rules development over time should be best studied in relation to (changes in) 
the other three dimensions of a policy arrangement: policy discourses, actors (coalitions 
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and oppositions) and the distribution of resources and power. Observations on these 
three dimensions may deliver potential explanations for observed continuities and/or 
changes in collective rules. Since the WFD has elaborated the IRBM paradigm into a 
European set of rules and principles, one would expect rules changes to occur de-
pending on the extent to which these requirements fit into the multilateral rules, tradi-
tions and practices. In other words: how new are the IRBM discourse and its related 
rules at this political level? To which extent do these trigger changes in the distribution 
of resources and power and actors constellations? Given the European IRBM 
discourse as the research’s starting-point this section begins with the policy discourses 
dimension of the policy arrangement approach.  
 
5.4.1 Policy discourses 
Table 5.9 sums the observations on policy discourses at the multilateral level for the 
1990 to 2009 period. A distinction is made between governance and policy principles, 
as based on the analysis of the both Meuse Treaties (Anonymous, 1994; 2002a), multi-
lateral publications, meeting reports and roof reports. The scope evolves from water 
and ecological quality improvement for the Meuse River only (before publication of 
the WFD) towards integrated and sustainable river basin management (after adoption 
of the WFD). The IMC documents do not provide for further definition of this para-
digm but refer to the multiple-functionality of the Meuse. The Meuse is considered 
the fundament for essential ecological, economic and social user functions and objec-
tives. This argument is not translated into interrelated conditions for ecological, social 
and economical resilience but is a more implicit reference to the people, planet and profit 
mantra.  
The governance scope is at river basins as the appropriate coordination units for 
issues with a multilateral dimension. The IMC’s actors clearly make a distinction be-
tween issues that should be coordinated multilaterally, bilaterally or nationally. Overall, 
subsidiarity by sovereign riparian states and regions is a dominant governance princi-
ple at the multilateral scale which relates to all seven rule types. The policy scope is on 
internal integration, i.e. on inclusion of a broad array of water management issues, 
including quality and quantity, groundwater and surface water, aquatic and terrestrial 
ecology, floods and droughts. Remarkably, for the WFD’s information and participa-
tion requirements, the IMC states and regions consider the multilateral role as limited.  
Harmonisation is a multilateral keyword. The IMC’s riparian states and regions 
consider the WFD ‘a significant new impetus to water policy’. In their opinion the 
WFD ‘provides a legal basis for more extensive coordination within entire river basin 
districts across administrative and national borders’ (IMC, 2005b: 4). Additionally, 
‘although the Directive does not explicitly call for transboundary coordination under 
the Article 5 Analysis’, the IMC’s actors consider this as obvious. Therefore they 
decide to coordinate their activities on the Article 5 requirements and to establish an 
international roof report on characteristics of the Meuse River Basin District, meaning 
a review of the environmental impact of human activity and an economic analysis of 
water use (ibid.; Interview 42, Appendix I). The IMC’s riparian states and regions 
emphasise that the analysis methods for the national Article 5 reports differ and are 
not harmonised within the IMC. Therefore, comparability of the data is limited. For 
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example, there may be aggregation difficultiies due to the specific domestic method-
ologies applied for delineating groundwater bodies(IMC, 2005b).  
 
Table 5.9: Policy discourses and rules at the multilateral level (1990 to 2009 period) 
Type of rules↓ Policy discourses↓ 
Scope:  Governance principles: River basin districts as the appropriate co-
ordination units for issues with a significant multilateral dimension; 
Distinction between multilateral, bilateral and national coordination 
issues; Subsidiarity by sovereign states and regions. 
Policy principles: Internal integration; Integrated and sustainable 
river basin management based on multiple-functionality; Inclusion 
of quality and quantity aspects of both surface and groundwater. 
Position: Governance principle: Subsidiarity by sovereign states and regions. 
Policy principle: The Meuse as fundament for essential ecological, 
economic and social user functions and objectives (planet, profit 
and people). 
Boundary (entry 
or exit):  
Governance principles: Conditioned access for non-governmental 
actors with emphasis on information and consultation (observer 
status); River basin management approach; Subsidiarity by 
sovereign states and regions. 
Choice: Governance principle: Subsidiarity by sovereign states and regions. 
Policy principles: Precaution and prevention; Progressive emission 
reduction of hazardous substances/elimination of priority hazar-
dous substances; Progressive reduction of emissions of hazardous 
substances and elimination of priority hazardous substances; No 
deterioration (unless unfavourable natural conditions, or unforeseen 
or exceptional circumstances, or new modifications for reasons of 
overriding public interest); Source oriented pollution prevention. 
Aggregation: Governance principles: Subsidiarity by sovereign states and regions; 
Multilateral coordination by means of non-legally binding advice 
and recommendations; states and regions decide by unanimity of 
votes. Policy principle: Internal integration; A level playing field for 
socio-economic sectors across Europe. 
Information: Governance principles: Synthesis of expert knowledge as provided 
by sovereign states and regions; Harmonisation of monitoring ef-
forts for the aim of transboundary comparability. Policy principles: 
Validity, reliablility, cost-benefit ratios and economic efficiency are 
central criteria for legitmised information and know-ledge. 
Pay-off: Governance principle: Subsidiarity by sovereign states and regions. 
Policy principles: The polluter and user should pay; Environmental 
damage should be rectified at source, A level playing field for socio-
economic sectors across Europe; Proportionality. 
 
The European Commission stresses that the Article 5 analysis is an iterative exercise 
based on available data and information. Due to the lack of available information, the 
Article 5 roof report could not take account of the impact of the groundwater status 
on surface water ecosystems. ’If this criterion was taken into account, groundwater 
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bodies provisionally assessed as being “not at risk” may have become “at risk”’ (IMC, 
2005b: 35). Notwithstanding the shortcomings, the IMC States and Regions consider 
the roof part of the Article 5 report as an important milestone (IMC, 2005b: 55-56): 
 
A first set of important steps were made as a result of the current coordination: 
• in order to present the results of the analysis at a suitable scale and level of detail, 
the basin district was divided into working units; these may at a later stage consti-
tute a starting point for a possible identification of international sub-basins; 
• a harmonised typology for the main course of the Meuse river was adopted; 
• a harmonised methodology for identifying significant hydro-morphological pres-
sures has been adopted;  
• a list of five pollutants specific to the Meuse river was identified. 
 
This [multilateral] acquis should make future international coordination easier. Finally, it 
should be emphasised that an integrated approach has been taken to the current Action 
Programme on Flood Protection of the IMC, with a view of linking flood prevention and 
protection to other objectives and to the whole of the river basin’s ecosystem. This ap-
proach opens opportunities for using synergies between flood protection and prevention 
and the implementation of the WFD. 
The IMC predominantly focuses on a comparison of provided data and methods 
of the riparian states and regions. Opinions differ on degrees of and methods for 
harmonisation. Debates mainly take place on procedural arrangements and less on 
common definitions of the multiple interpretable WFD terms. As the IMC’s states 
and regions do not explicitly discuss the contents and multilateral implications of the 
European guidance documents, they seem to take the WFD’s ambiguous terms,  
definitions and the informal CIS interpretations for granted. 
 
5.4.2 Actors 
At the multilateral level the most remarkable change as triggered by the WFD is the 
widening of the scope and boundary rules of the IMC. Between 1992 and December 
2002, the main focus of the ICPM is on the Meuse River. Consequently, the number 
of actors is limited to the riparian states that share territories around the main river. 
Exception is inclusion of the Brussels Region of Belgium (with its territory entirely 
situated in the Scheldt River Basin) for which the Meuse River Basin is the only 
drinking water source. By appointing the (renamed) International Meuse Commission 
(IMC) as the competent multilateral WFD authority, tributaries are also embraced, 
offering Germany, Luxembourg and the Belgium Federal State the opportunity to 
enter the multilateral coordination game. Prior to the WFD, there are no formal op-
tions for NGOs to participate. Due to WFD’s Article 14, the options for NGOs to 
join activities, although limited in nature, slightly increase. NGOs repeatedly complain 
about the limited transparency of the IMC and the restricted access to information 
(information rules).  
Concerning aggregation rules, decision-making on non-legally binding advice and 
recommendations is restricted to the state actors in the IMC (with unanimity as deci-
sion-making rule). The IMC’s actors have no formal authority to discuss property and 
user rights systems (position rules), supply and demand management systems and the  
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nature of licences systems (choice rules) of the sovereign states and regions, as regarding 
their transboundary impacts. Finally, the IMC has no formal authority for establish-
ment of its own system of rewards and sanctions (pay-off rules). 
Within the multilateral coordination network a stable community of water-related 
officials and experts develops, which gradually elaborates a multilateral acquis. As such 
this community may be typified as a discourse coalition of public actors for IRBM. How-
ever under the paradigm’s surface, diverse interpretations and domestic traditions 
have to be bridged. Interviewees 34, 42 and 51 (Appendix I) have noticed changing 
coalitions and oppositions among the IMC delegations, depending on the issues and 
related world-views and domestic approaches at stake. Before adoption of the Meuse 
Treaty of Ghent (Anonymous, 2002), following native languages, actors from the 
French, Walloon and Brussels delegations at the one side and actors from the Flemish 
and Dutch delegations at the other side tended to gather whenever issues were  
circumvented by uncertainties and obscurities.  
After entry of the new actors, Germany works as important binding actor across 
the language divide, while the Flemish actors in general seem to understand the 
French language nuances better than the Dutch and Germans do (Interview 42, Ap-
pendix I). In addition the Dutch political system seems to provide for most informal 
deliberation freedom for public officials, whereas the French, Walloon, Flemish and 
German equivalents are more subject to strict political mandates (Interviews, 34 and 
42, Appendix I). Remarkable oppositions and coalitions appear around procedural 
issues which continue for some years (such as the legal seat anchorage of the commis-
sion’s secretariat, participation procedures for NGOs and mandates/tasks for the 
secretariat, working groups and project groups). Perceived obstruction from one (or 
more) delegation(s) to one issue reversely may provoke tactical obstruction (delays) to 
other issues by other delegations (see also Meijerink, 1999). 
At the non-governmental side of the river single issue organisations (such as for 
anglers, entrepreneurs, nature protection and drinking water) which have their roots in 
individual riparian states and regions dominate the multilateral scene of the IMC (see 
Table 5.3 in Subsection 5.3.3). Due to the laborious and relatively closed process by 
the public actors, only a few of these organisations continue attendance at the annual 
plenary meetings and remain active in repeating their arguments. For example, the 
Union of Walloon Enterprises repeatedly plies for a level playing field taking into 
account exceptional low flow rates of the Meuse River. The Reinwater Foundation 
asks attention for the issues of street litter and water temperature (in relation to cool-
ing water discharges in dry summer periods). Inter Environnement Wallonie plies for sus-
tainable water management in relation to spatial planning policy and for more atten-
tion to ecological restoration aspects. The representative of anglers asks for more 
attention to barriers for fish migration in both directions (upstream and downstream). 
Water-related multlilateral and multiple issues coalitions are scarce in the Interna-
tional Meuse River Basin District. RIWA Meuse is an umbrella organisation of Dutch 
and Belgian drinking water companies that periodically releases position papers on the 
importance of cross-border river basin management coordination for protection of 
drinking water sources. For example, RIWA Meuse annually asks attention to more 
dangerous substances for drinking water production and access to data from the 
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international Warning and Alarming System for the Meuse River Basin on accidental 
pollution (WASM). RIWA-Meuse does not include German and French companies. 
As compared to the neighbouring International Scheldt River Basin District (with its 
Scheldt without Borders coalition) the green NGOs do not have a significant multi-
lateral coalition. There has been one attempt, i.e. Mosa Natura (which means natural 
Meuse). As founded in 2004, this informal network brought together around sixty 
green interests groups, drinking water companies and regional governments which 
expressed the importance of a more natural Meuse River Basin (www.mosanatura.eu 
as consulted on June 2nd, 2012). The network acted like a platform for establishing 
contacts among managers, policy makers and other stakeholders for exchange of ex-
periences, learning and starting-up joint projects for education, participation, research 
and nature development. Since the network did not aim for common multilateral 
opinions or lobbying, the network did not opt for the status of a legal person and 
observer status in the IMC. Since one of the founding organisations, the Reinwater 
Foundation, went bankrupt, the network is not active anymore. 
 
5.4.3 Resources and Power 
The WFD offers opportunities to enforce multilateral coordination efforts. Article 3 
includes coordination arrangements for transboundary river basins. According to this 
article Member States sharing a river basin shall ensure both the designation of inter-
national river basin districts and multi-lateral coordination of their management activi-
ties. At the request of Member States the EC may act as facilitator. For their coordina-
tion activities Member States may use existing structures stemming from international 
agreements (European Communities, 2000: 8). Article 12 adds that issues that cannot 
be dealt with at Member State level may be reported to the EC. ‘The Commission 
shall respond to any report or recommendations from Member States within a period 
of six months.’ (ibid.: 16) Article 13 mentions that ‘Member States shall ensure [multi-
lateral] coordination with the aim of producing a single international river basin man-
agement plan’ (ibid.). The Achilles heel in the multilateral game may be sovereignty. 
Since the European Commission applies compliance checking procedures at the level 
of individual Member States, the success or failure of multilateral coordination efforts 
primordial depends on the political willingness of riparian states and mutual trust 
building among them within international river basin committees. For this reason 
Article 13 includes an escape option: ‘Where such an international river basin 
management plan is not produced, Member States shall produce river basin manage-
ment plans covering at least those parts of the international river basin district falling 
within their territory to achieve the objectives of this Directive’ (European Communi-
ties, 2000: 16). 
In the multilateral context it is remarkable that the informal, non-legally binding 
European WFD guidance documents which are meant to support the implementation 
process, are not part of the scope of deliberations within the IMC’s organisational 
structures. From the Interviews (18, 34, 42, 43, 51 and 53, Appendix I) it becomes 
clear that they are taken for granted since extensive discussions have already taken 
place at the European levels (and furthermore they should be considered as informal 
consensus papers). In the multilateral river basin management plan (IMC, 2009) the 
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guidance document on water and economics (European Communities, 2003a) is the 
only one that is referred to directly. The observer of Europe’s DG Environment 
points at an important shift in financial means from the Structure and Cohesion 
Funds, which is more attention to regional development with more room for financial 
support of water management measures for the Member States (for example linking 
the WFD and agriculture, floods and droughts). Remarkably, these financial opportu-
nities are not further explored at the multilateral table. 
 
Between 1995 and the end of 2002, based on the Charleville-Mézières Meuse Treaty 
(Anonymous, 1994), Wallonia and the Netherlands (who have equal shares of the river 
basin territory) together provide 70% of the financial costs for the secretariat and the 
joined activities of the ICPM. Under the 2002 Ghent Treaty (Anonymous, 2002) Wal-
lonia and the Netherlands remain the major contributors (30% each). With the latter 
Treaty German becomes the third formal working language of the commission (next 
to French and Dutch). The financial and human resources for the IMC secretariat, the 
working groups and joint publications are limited. Costs for simultaneous interpreta-
tions and translation of documents into the three official working languages (as per-
formed by Benelux employees) are a major component of the Commission’s annual 
budget. Although the Dutch and Flemish delegations periodically ply for structural 
enforcement of the secretariat (mainly due to additional WFD coordination tasks), the 
secretariat is not expanded (mainly due to a French-Walloon opposition). Instead, in 
2003 the IMC partners hire a Belgian consultancy firm to support the international 
WFD implementation activities. In 2009 partly triggered by the severe international 
economic recession, the Heads of Delegations decide to decrease the annual budget.  
The IMC parties do not provide resources for participation of NGOs nor for 
translation of their documents which does not help to encourage their active involve-
ment. From the analysis a strong drinking water lobby (by RIWA Meuse) and a rela-
tively weak, informal network of environmental NGOs (the Mosa Natura network) 
become visible. It is remarkable that RIWA Meuse repeatedly offers its data for inclu-
sion within the IMC documents but that the states and regions are reluctant to incor-
porate them. Cooperation with environmental NGOs starts to become more visible 
such as by means of a joint brochure on street litter (IMC, 2010). Interviewee 42 (Ap-
pendix I) mentions that apparently the different approaches from the non-
governmental actors, in combination with the power balance partly may account for 
the IMC’s attitude towards the NGOs. For example, the drinking water sector may be 
perceived as powerful (as supported by large companies), hence potential influential 
and also this sector, in the perception of some of the IMC’s public actors, too one-
sidedly stresses its own interests. The green NGOs may be perceived as less powerful 
and also are willing to contribute human resources in a search for mutual benefits 
(ibid.).  
Regarding aggregation rules physical, political and economic asymmetries be-
tween upstream and downstream riparian states may influence the multilateral coordi-
nation game. Some observations point at Germany as powerful binding actor and the 
Flemish Region of Belgium as influential due to their experiences from the Scheldt 
River Basin (Interview 42, Appendix I). For example, the Flemish Region of Belgium 
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has guided the SCALDIT project on integrated testing of guidance documents by 
multiple actors in the Scheldt River Basin (ibid.). A language divide and different 
political cultures and traditions may form part of the explanation for the lack of multi-
lateral coalitions. The website of the former Mosa Natura network clearly expresses 
this challenge (www.mosanatura.eu): 
 
A river basin like the Meuse includes many cultural differences among states and 
regions. Organisations have different visions and objectives and implement 
different types of measures. Since we live in one, shared river basin with lots of 
interdependencies it is important to learn both to understand each other and to 
collaborate.  
 
 
5.5 Synthesis: sovereignty and subsidiarity rule the multilateral world 
 
Table 5.10 brings together the observations from the Sections 5.3 and 5.4. The table 
summarises potential explanatory factors for observed continuities and changes of 
rules, as derived from the other three dimensions of a policy arrangement (policy dis-
courses, actors and division of resources and power). The grey-coloured cells indicate 
remarkable evolutions. Coming from a long history of distrust and conflicts and given 
strong emphasis on sovereignty and subsidiarity, dramatic changes in multilateral rules 
changes, as due to adoption of the WFD, were not to be expected on forehand. How-
ever from the assessment of rules (Section 5.3), it becomes clear that the IRBM dis-
course of the WFD has triggered internal integration tendencies (scope rules), a prudent 
widening of the multilateral window towards non-governmental actors (boundary rules) 
and implicit notions on the importance of both supply and demand management 
(choice rules). For the remaining rule-types, continuity of prior arrangements prevails. 
Clearly the policy discourses dimension provides a potential explanation for 
observed rules changes. On the contrary, the resources and power dimension mainly 
offers explanations for continuity of prior collective-choice rules. Under the label of 
sovereignty and subsidiarity, the riparian states and the regions emphasise the lack of 
(formal) multilateral authority and leave significant collective-choice rules (positions of 
land owners and users: position rules; the nature of licence systems; choice rules) unspo-
ken. Although the IMC states and regions express awareness of the multiple-
functionality of the Meuse (Anonymous, 2002) they do not invite actors from user 
sectors to participate. It is up to the individual states and regions themselves to organ-
ise participation of users in the domestic implementation processes. The same obser-
vation goes for the cross-sector integration potential as offered by European funds for 
regional development and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).   
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Table 5.10: Observed collective-choice rules and potential explanations (multilateral level) 
Rules-types in the 1990 to 2009 period ↓ Potential explanations ↓ 
Scope (organisational): Water policy 
implementation is coordinated by a functional 
international river basin committee without 
supranational authority (ideal-type B). 
Sovereignty and subsidiarity; IRBM 
paradigm; Entry of new state actors 
from tributaries 
Scope (internal integration): An evolution 
towards river basin management plans which 
include parallel objectives and measures for 
quantitative & qualitative aspects & for 
groundwater and surface water bodies (from 
ideal-type A towards B). 
IRBM paradigm; Incorporation of 
High Waters Working Group;  
European water quality/quantity 
divide 
Scope (external integration): Separate man-
agement plans from the water policy domain 
and other policy domains (ideal-type A). 
Dominance of public water actors/ 
experts; No discussions on use of 
European funds; Speciality principle  
Position: Protection of prior water and land 
resources use and property rights without 
preconditions on environmental, social and 
economic externalities (ideal-type A).  
Sovereignty and Subsidiarity; Strong 
focus on water quality issues 
Boundary: Prudent enlarged access for non- 
governmental actors to the river basin man-
agement planning process under conditions 
set by the public actors (from A towards B) 
IRBM paradigm; Sovereignty and 
subsidiarity; No financial support for 
participation of NGOs; Fear of 
powerful interests groups  
Choice (supply and demand management): An 
embryonic evolution from supply manage-
ment only to a mixed supply and demand 
management approach (from A towards B). 
IRBM paradigm; Sovereignty and 
subsidiarity; European water quality/ 
quantity divide 
Choice (nature of licences systems): Separate, 
parallel licences for quality and quantity objec-
tives related to development, management and 
use of water resources (ideal-type A). 
Absence of argumentation lines;  
Sovereignty and subsidiarity 
Aggregation: Independent decision-making by 
riparian states and regions and symmetric, 
consensus based decision-making (A and C). 
Absence of supranational authority/ 
sovereignty and subsidiarity;  
Upstream-downstream asymmetries 
Information: The planning process is driven 
by a mixture of a scientific-technical and a 
social-economic rationale. Validity, reliability, 
costs-benefits ratios and economic efficiency 
are central criteria for legitimised information 
and knowledge (juxtaposition of ideal-types A 
& B). 
Dominance of public actors/water 
experts from the water policy domain; 
Neo-liberal argumentation lines; Cost-
effectiveness 
 
Pay-off: Rewards and sanctions from laws and 
regulations & economic incentives and market 
forces are major drivers for compliance with 
collective rules (mix of ideal-types A and B). 
Polluter pays, affordability, cost-
effectiveness; Sovereignty and 
subsidiarity; Neo-liberalism; Domi-
nance of public water actors 
The grey-coloured cells indicate remarkable evolutions. 
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After adoption of the WFD, the substantive scope of the IMC is widened by inclusion 
of groundwater issues (quality and quantity) and floods and droughts (scope rules). 
However objectives and measures are formulated and presented in parallel. For sur-
face waters, in line with WFD’s Article 4, the focus is mainly on chemical and ecologi-
cal quality and is less on quantitative issues (although they are intrinsically related). 
Interrelations between water bodies are not worked out (IMC, 2005b; 2007; 2009) and 
there are no indications that the WFD has triggered integrated objectives and meas-
ures.  A potential barrier comes from the observation that the ambiguous European 
ambitions are taken for granted at the multilateral level. As denoted in Chapter 4, full 
and explicit inclusion of water quantity issues is a controversial issue at the European 
level (as expressed by the different decision making rules for quality and quantity is-
sues). Although the explicit notions on the importance of an integrated approach in 
the WFD’s Preamble (Statement 19, European Communities, 2000: 2), the official 
WFD text does not provide (strong) requirements on integrated quality and quantity 
objectives and measures (see Article 4, European Communities, 2000: 9-11). The CIS 
guidance documents go around this controversy and the IMC states and regions do 
not further elaborate on these documents (despite some attempts from the Dutch 
delegation to start up deliberation on common multilateral interpretations, such as of 
the Article 4 exemption terms). Viewed positively, the rule-altering potential of inclu-
sion of notions on more water-related issues may not be underestimated.  
The IRBM paradigm of the WFD has urged the IMC states and regions to invite 
additional public actors from tributary states and has triggered a cautious evolution 
towards conditioned information and consultation of non-governmental actors 
(boundary rules). The hesitating attitude may be explained by the breakable trust-
building process, different public participation traditions and perhaps fear of loose of 
control by inviting powerful interest organisations at the multilateral table. The rule-
altering potential from (and future enforcement of) widening the boundaries, among 
other factors, heavily depends on trust-building between state and non-governmental 
actors and the ways actors will deal with the political, social, economic and physical 
upstream-downstream asymmetries. With regard to aggregation rules gradually, all ripar-
ian states and regions agree that multilateral roof reports and plans have an added 
value. Although their contents predominantly may be qualified as syntheses of domes-
tic documents, some indications on development of a multilateral acquis become notice-
able, like an agreed division in sub-basins for reporting purposes. Besides, the IMC 
oyster prudently opens its shells to civil and private stakeholders, offering more co-
thinking opportunities in the IMC’s product teams. However, the decision-making 
rule remains the same, namely unanimity of votes by involved riparian states and re-
gions (Anonymous, 1994; 2002a).  
The juxtaposition of ideal-type information rules may be explained by a combina-
tion of dominance of water experts and neo-liberal argumentation lines. The influence 
of non-governmental actors and lay-knowledge is limited. With regard to the Article 
14 requirements from the WFD, the IMC states and regions stress that they are ad-
dressed at the individual Member States (again: sovereignty and subsidiarity rule the 
multilateral world). Additionally, the financial means of the IMC, as provided by the 
states and regions are relatively limited and mainly spent for translation of the  
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Commissions’ documents. There are no funds available for capacity building of and 
translation of documents from NGOs. NGOs repeatedly complain about the lack of 
access to information and the IMC’s working processes. Incidentally, initiatives from 
NGOs are accepted. In general information collection and aggregation at the multilat-
eral scale takes place in a top-down fashion by the riparian states and regions. In this 
aggregation process, there is strong emphasis on one-way information and consulta-
tion of private and civil actors.  
According to the IMC states and regions specific pay-off rules will have to be de-
fined at the domestic political level. In general, the multilateral pay-off discourses echo 
the neo-liberal principles from the European level: the polluter pays, cost recovery of water 
services, selection of the most cost-effective combinations of measures and so forth. These 
principles are considered incentives for more rational use of water resources, in addition to 
formal rewards and sanctions (at the domestic level). From the European level, there 
are no direct pay-off mechanisms with regard to multilateral coordination efforts. 
Indirectly, IMC states and segions may feel more urged to enforce their multilateral 
efforts, since individual Member States may report to the European Commission 
whenever they do no succeed in solving transboundary issues with neighbour states 
and regions.  
 
To conclude this chapter, at first glance the adoption of the WFD has not triggered 
dramatic rules changes at the multilateral level. Path dependencies and historical lega-
cies (from prevailing policies and conflicts), related to physical, political, economic and 
social asymmetries among upstream, midstream and downstream riparian states, 
dominate the multilateral coordination efforts. In this context one should remember 
the history of highly politicised Dutch-Belgian negotiations over Meuse and Scheldt 
issues (as thoroughly analysed by Meijerink (1999)). Besides language barriers, differ-
ent political and cultural traditions may account for part of the explanation (Eppink, 
1998; Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov, 2010).  However, one should not underesti-
mate the rule-altering potential from the WFD in combination with the ongoing trust-
building process. A deeper jump into the observations of this research delivers some 
remarkable, albeit embryonic and fragile evolutions.  
The IRBM paradigm, notwithstanding the ambiguous European ambitions 
around it, seems to have urged the IMC states and regions to enforce their coordina-
tion efforts. Although laborious and often procedural debates continue to dominate 
the scene, the roof Article 5 report and the roof river basin management plan proof 
that multilateral coordination actually has taken place. Publication of these reports 
does not have a solely symbolic, procedural value, since it marks the birth of a multi-
lateral acquis. The direct discursive influence from the WFD becomes visible in a 
widening of the scope of the IMC with more water related issues, e.g. groundwater, 
floods and droughts. The scope enlargement underscores that the IMC states and 
regions acknowledge the importance of internal integration. However, the IMC actors 
neither reduce the integration gap as caused by the European divide between (decision 
making procedures on) water quality and quantity issues, nor compensate for weak 
cross-sector integration arrangements (external integration). Another direct influence of 
the WFD has been the entry of three new states, with Germany as a powerful one. 
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There are some indications that Germany may act as a binding actor for the native 
Dutch and French actors whereas the Flemish may support the process positively,  
due to their expertise from the Scheldt River Basin. Additionally, opportunities to 
bring in positive experiences from the adjacent Rhine River Basin increase, as due to 
personnel alliances between the German and French delegations within the Interna-
tional Rhine Commission (IRC) and the IMC (Interviews 42 and 53; Appendix I). 
With regard to choice rules, although the IMC has no formal authority to interfere 
with domestic arrangements (sovereignty and subsidiarity), arguments in the roof 
documents point at implicit acknowledgement of the importance of both supply and 
demand management. Concerning boundary rules, the IMC has prudently opened up its 
windows for bottom-up influences, such as contributions by NGOs. The embryonic 
and fragile nature of this evolution is illustrated by both the complaints of some 
NGOs on the limited openness, transparency and access to information and the lack 
of financial support by the IMC for capacity building of NGOs. Viewed from a sunny 
side of the Meuse River, embedded in a troublesome historical context, the WFD has 
enforced multilateral harmonisation efforts, albeit still laborious and often procedural 
in nature. At the long term this joint process may pay-off as gradual sedimentation of 
a common, multilateral acquis, regarding IRBM. Perceived from a clouded side of the 
river, overemphasis on sovereignty and subsidiarity may hinder prosperous develop-
ment of the multilateral embryo into a cross-sector river basin celebrity. Whenever 
trust-building further succeeds, openness and transparency may increase as well. If 
otherwise, the IMC will remain a relatively closed Oyster which may discourage active 
participation of other policy sector, private and civil actors, hence will make collective, 
multilateral arrangements which are supported by many more troublesome. 
 
Finally, the analysis of the multilateral level arrives at the same methodological conclu-
sion as the analysis of the European level from Chapter 4. Once more it should be 
emphasised that potential explanations for observed (lack of) rules change are not 
easily drawn from assessments of individual dimensions of a policy arrangement 
alone.  Instead, actors, the division of power and resources and policy discourses all 
deliver parts of the whole explanation. In the next three empirical chapters, it will 
become clear whether this observation also holds at subsequently the domestic 
national, regional and local political levels in the Netherlands, as most downstream 
riparian state within the International Meuse Commission. 
  
  
 
 
  
 
 
In 2003 the Aqurein report triggered a political wake-op call in the Netherlands 
 regarding the implementation of the WFD (Source: Alterra, 2003) 
 
 
 
In 2004 the Dutch national authorities adopted the WFD Implementation Memorandum 
as summarised for a broad audience by this joint brochure of the TPW Ministry and the 
associations of Dutch provinces, municipalities and  
regional water management authorities.
  
  
 
 
- 6 - 
Going Dutch: the feasibility and affordability mantra 
 
‘It remains remarkable that we have said yes to a European directive for which we have to conclude 
afterwards that it will take us many years to become fully aware of its consequences. Even in a good-
marriage this might happen.’ Kees van der Staaij (in: Tweede Kamer der 
Staten-Generaal, 2004d). 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
  
As described in Chapter 3, the central research question is to which extent the WFD 
triggers rules changes at a (nested) hierarchy of political levels within the International 
Meuse River Basin District. This chapter poses and answers the question how the 
actors at the Dutch national level (in this particular district) deal with the ambiguous 
European ambitions and rule altering potential. As a decentralised unitary state (Kick-
ert, 2004; Andeweg and Irwin, 2005), the Netherlands almost by nature have opted for 
a mixed top-down and bottom-up implementation approach for the Water Frame-
work Directive (WFD). Consequently, this research presents an assessment of the 
implementation process at three administrative levels: the national level (this chapter), 
the regional level (Chapter 7) and the local level (Chapter 8). This chapter presents the 
strategic choices that have been made at the national level as guiding the regional and 
local implementation activities in all the Dutch parts of four European river basins. 
The regional level covers the Dutch part of the International Meuse River Basin 
District, whereas the local level concerns the cooperation process between municipali-
ties, the Brabantse Delta Water Management Authority (Waterschap Brabantse Delta) and 
non-governmental stakeholders. Since the author has been actively involved as WFD 
process coordinator in the Brabantse Delta territory, the assessments in the Chapters 
6, 7 and 8 will be more detailed and enriched with observations from inside out as 
compared to the two previous ones.  
Section 6.2 starts with a chronological overview of the Dutch water policy 
domain before and after adoption of the WFD. Subsection 6.2.1 describes the evolu-
tion from a focus on water quantity issues only, via inclusion of water quality issues 
(since the 1970s), towards the Integrated River Basin Management (IRBM) paradigm 
of the 1990s. Subsequently in chronological order, four WFD implementation stages 
at the Dutch national level are distinguished and described in Section 6.2.2, from a 
relatively late political WFD wake-up call (in November 2003) to drafting and adop-
tion of the river basin management plans (2008 and 2009). Section 6.3 explores the 
extent of changes in the observed collective-choice rules for IRBM (as defined in 
Chapter 2), between the period before and after introduction of the WFD. As a next 
step, Section 6.4 provides an assessment of policy discourses, actors’ coalitions and 
oppositions and the division of resources and power (in relation to observed rules). 
Finally, Section 6.5 closes this chapter with a synthesis, summarisng potential explana-
tions for observed (lack of) rule changes (including the impact of the WFD). 
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6.2 From water quantity towards integrated river basin management 
 
This section presents a brief chronology of the Dutch national water policy domain 
from the 1960s to December 2009 with emphasis on both the 1990 to 2000 and the 
2001 to 2009 period. The domestic road starts from a “battle against water” and land 
reclamation and runs via attacking water pollution towards experiments with interac-
tive policy making and integrated water systems management. In the 1990s, at the 
European level Dutch water experts and officials actively try to influence discussions 
on a different approach of water policy. Together with other Member States the 
Netherlands urge the then hesitating EC to leave the idea of another sectoral water 
policy directive for the benefit of a framework for integrated river basin management. 
After adoption of the WFD the Dutch politicians fear significant socio-economic 
consequences and struggle with the high ecological ambitions. They choose to follow 
a more pragmatic path, which is guided by the feasibility and affordability mantra. Appen-
dix VIII provides for a synthesis of the stages in the Dutch water policy domain at the 
national level before and after adoption of the WFD. 
 
6.2.1 Water policy life before the WFD (1960 to 2000) 
 
An evolution towards integrated water management 
In the Dutch water policy domain similar waves as described for the European water 
policy domain (see Subsection 4.2.1) are noticeable. Until the 1960s the traditional 
hegemonic discourse came down to the “battle against water” (Van de Ven, 2004). 
Water was considered a threat to society and policy strategies were installed to protect 
people and economic life against the water (Wiering and Crabbé, 2006). In the 1970s 
water quality issues supplement the water quantity approach, especially with the re-
sponsibilities for surface water pollution and waste water treatment (Van Leussen, 
2002). The adoption of the Surface Water Pollution Act (Wet Verontreiniging Oppervlak-
tewater; Anonymous, 1970) marks the start of the first (qualitative) wave. The (substan-
tive) integration wave starts in the early 1980’s when a special advisory committee to 
the Gelderland Province mentions the need for an integrated water management ap-
proach, due to a combination of the increasing demand for fresh water and water 
quality deterioration (Van de Nes and Romijn, 1980). With its Second National Water 
Policy Memorandum (‘Coping with Water’/’Omgaan met Water’) the Ministry of Trans-
port, Public Works and Water Management (henceforth TPW Ministry) introduces the 
water systems approach (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 1985). In this approach 
water systems are considered unities of surface water, sediment and banks (related to 
ground water resources) within a broader natural, social, administrative and political 
context (ibid.). Disco (2002) mentions an ecological turn in the Dutch discourse on 
water management in the 1980s and 1990s. This turn becomes most explicit in the 
Third National Water Policy Memorandum in which the TPW Ministry further details 
the water systems approach from an ecocentric angle (Ministerie van Verkeer en Water-
staat, 1989). This third memorandum mentions healthy, well functioning (aquatic) 
ecosystems as the fundament under human society, as providing goods and services 
for humans, plants and animals. They set conditions for the sustainable use of 
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available water resources. Furthermore, integrated water management requires balanc-
ing of interests (of natural and socio-economic subsystems) related to the functioning 
of water systems at different temporal and spatial levels (ibid.)  
In the 1980s and 1990s there are worldwide calls for new public management, includ-
ing more catalytic, community-owned, competitive, mission-driven, results-oriented, 
customer-driven, enterprising market-oriented, anticipatory and decentralised 
governments (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; read for an extensive elaboration Den-
hardt, 2004: 136-144). This new concept of government ‘has its roots in practical 
developments in public administration worldwide, in the set of ideas generally referred 
to as “reinventing government” and in a conceptual link to the public policy and 
especially the public choice perspective in public administration theory’ (Denhardt, 
2004: 136). Elements of new public management are also reflected by principles of 
effective water governance (Rogers and Hall, 2003). Within this context the integrated 
water management concept offers a new frame of reference. In the literature on public 
administration, the new frame is put forward as an alternative for existing coordina-
tion problems (Grijns and Wisserhof, 1992). Public administration experts ply for 
optimised coordination between water managers, between water managers and other 
policy domains and between policy makers, target groups and interested citizens 
(Wiering and Crabbé, 2006). Furthermore, the integrated water management concept 
has been embedded in a cross-border context by advocating river basins as the appropriate 
policy and management units (UN-ECE, 1992; Global Water Partnership, 2000) and as 
formally anchored at the European level by the WFD (European Communities, 2000). 
In the 1990s organisational integration rhetoric becomes noticeable in the Dutch 
water policy domain. Calls for more simplification, transparency, participation, 
efficient and responsive administrations and integration are, amongst other initiatives, 
echoed in numerous interactive planning experiments within the Dutch water policy 
domain. The TPW Ministry summarises the Dutch experiences in a Guidance Docu-
ment on Interactive Planning Processes (Hendriks et al., 1999). The national project 
team for preparation of the Fourth National Water Policy Memorandum initiates an 
explorative research project on future organisation of regional water management 
within the context of a more integrated approach (Van der Vlies, De Putter and 
Hötte, 1996; Interview 51, Appendix I).  In the foreword of the final report the chair 
of the guidance committee (who then is also the chair of the Association of Regional 
Water Management Authorities; Unie van Waterschappen; henceforth UvW) emphasises 
that existing administrative structures and the functional nature of the water manage-
ment authorities are not open for discussion. He concludes that ‘integrated water 
management primarily is an issue of good cooperation and coordination. Provinces, 
water management authorities and municipalities all hold crucial positions which are 
not enforceable by legislation. Finally, political willingness will determine the success 
of integrated water management.’ (Van der Vlies, De Putter and Hötte, 1996: 1) The 
report plies for more effective cross-sector integration by means of synchronisation of 
planning processes. In order to support spatial water management, municipal spatial plans 
should be updated and water system and land use functions should be tuned (ibid.)  
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Wiering and Crabbé (2006) diagnose a tight web of both substantive laws and proce-
dural, constitutional rules about the jurisdiction and competences of the water policy 
agencies. Due to this complexity authorities often rely on informal agreements about 
divisions of tasks (ibid.). Because of the hegemony of the state Liefferink (2006) 
characterises the Dutch water policy arrangement as etatist. The water sector’s limited 
cross-sector focus may be fostered by a specific epistemic community that traditio-
nally focuses on hydraulic engineering (Disco, 2002). Wiering and Crabbé (2006) con-
clude that the water agencies, with their knowledge infrastructure, have a relatively 
firm grip on their policy environment and are not willing to give up their hegemony in 
water management.  
 
The 1993 and 1995 near-floods in the Meuse and Rhine river basins and the 1998 
water distress and a number of remarkably dry summers in the 1990s,cause a political 
shift of attention to flood prevention and protection and droughts management, 
within the context of climate change. The European negotiations on the WFD take 
place in this period of decreased domestic political attention to water quality issues. 
Since the Dutch consider themselves among the European forerunners, in their per-
ception the WFD will mainly urge upstream riparian states to enlarge investments in 
water quality amelioration (Ten Heuvelhof et al., 2010; Interviews 18, 30, 39, 40, 43, 
51 and 52, Appendix I). With the Fourth National Water Policy Memorandum (Minis-
terie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 1998) the national water authorities shift to a more 
pragmatic, anthropocentric definition of the IRBM approach, emphasising safety 
against floods in the context of (restoration of) resilient water systems. In analogy with 
the WFD this fourth memorandum is presented as a more generic policy framework, 
which has been influenced by multiple stakeholders in an interactive process (Inter-
view 51, Appendix I).  
At the time of adoption of the WFD calls for change and integration cumulate in 
the decision of the Dutch Council of Ministers on ‘A Different Approach to Water, 
Water Management Policy in the 21st Century’ (Ministry of Transport, Public Works 
and Water Management, 2000). The different approach is mainly triggered by floods 
and droughts issues (and not by water quality issues). The decision document points at 
a combination of climate change, ongoing land subsidence in the lower parts of the 
Netherlands and growth of population density and socio-economic pressures (Minis-
try of Transport, Public Works and Water Management, 2000). To anticipate these 
expected changes a different approach is required, including allocation of extra land 
for water in addition to technological measures and enforcement of the linkages be-
tween water policy and spatial planning. A three-step strategy (retaining, storing and 
draining) is in the centre of the new approach (ibid.). This means that precipitation 
should be held as long as possible in the catchment area where it falls. When this is no 
longer possible, the water is temporarily stored in the water storage areas created for 
this purpose. Excess water is drained only when these options have been used to their 
full potential. Regionally-tailored efforts are needed in the context of multilaterally 
coordinated river basins. By further practical elaboration of such a multiple-level strat-
egy the objectives for prevention of dropping water-tables, salinisation and improving 
water quality must be incorporated (ibid.). This brief overview shows that at the time 
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of drafting and negotiating the WFD quantity is the major issue in the Dutch water 
policy domain which catches public and political attention, not quality. 
 
Dutch ambitions, gains and losses in the WFD drafting and negotiation stage 
Liefferink and Andersen (2005: 57) argue that in the European environmental context 
of qualitative majority voting alliance-building between countries is important, parti-
cularly for the formation of blocking minorities or in order to exert more positive 
pressure on the political process. They observe changing coalitions and oppositions of 
Member States on a case-by-case basis (ibid.). The WFD drafting and negotiation 
process may serve as an example in which the Dutch, at least in the initial stage, pro-
actively searched for a broad coalition to support their ideas for a more integrated 
framework directive. Remarkably, at the end of the 1980s the EC was inspired by the 
Dutch approach on water quality objectives setting, including basic water quality stan-
dards (basiskwaliteitsnormen) for all surface waters (Interviews 18, 39 and 40, Appendix 
I). Although this offered potential for an uploading of Dutch practices, the Dutch 
water experts and officials feared lower ambitions since the EC officials emphasised 
the basic, minimum protection level. In the then Dutch approach the basic water qual-
ity standards were considered as point of departure towards more ambitious (inten-
tional) ecological quality values (streefwaarden). Besides, the Dutch were inspired by 
societal calls for more integration, transparency and simplification of laws and regula-
tions. They became more in favour of an integrated approach in the European water 
policy domain over another sectoral directive (as proposed by the then EC; ibid.).  
The chronological process reconstruction in Subsection 4.2.2 has made clear that 
Dutch national water policy officials and experts have been very active in the early 
drafting stage of the headlines of the new integrated water framework directive. 
Especially in 1995 and 1996, the Dutch took initiatives to find coalition partners in 
support of their position papers in which the domestic approach of water quality 
standard setting had been central. The Dutch perceived themselves among the Euro-
pean forerunners for which, as a downstream state within four European River Basins 
(Rhine, Meuse, Ems and Scheldt), a transboundary river basin management approach 
would certainly pay-off at the long term (Melis and Boudewijn, 2002; Meijerink and 
Wiering, 2009; Ten Heuvelhof et al., 2010). The then French and Dutch high-ranking 
officials may be considered the founding fathers of the informal meetings of the EU 
Water Directors with the EC (Interview 43, Appendix I). According to Melis and 
Boudewijn (2002), the Netherlands considered support from the United Kingdom, 
France and Germany as very important given the large political and economic weight 
of these Member States. Implicitly, their observation is supported by Liefferink and 
Andersen (2005) who point at the generally sufficient critical mass of the French-
German cooperation on the European integration process at large and at Germany as 
by far the largest of the environmentally progressive countries in the European Union.  
After their first successful interventions the influence of the Dutch public actors 
diminishes. Other Member States (e.g. United Kingdom) soon take over the role of 
initiator. Melis and Boudewijn (2002) point at an understaffed TPW Ministry, limited 
water knowledge within the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment 
(henceforth HSE Ministry) and national compromise instructions from coordination 
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among ministries that all want to express their major points of interest. For example, 
the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality (henceforth ANF Ministry) 
from the beginning emphasised that additional (WFD) measures in the agricultural 
sector would be a mission impossible (Interviews 18 and 43, Appendix I). Ten Heu-
velhof et al. (2010: 84-86) mention three possible explanations for the waning Dutch 
influence. Firstly, low commitment at the HSE Ministry that coordinated the Dutch 
WFD negotiation strategy for the Council of European Ministers. Water issues did 
not get high priority within this ministry and the experts and officials at the TPW 
Ministry did not manage to change this. Secondly, with the growing decision-making 
influence of the European Parliament and after the release of the first draft text of the 
WFD, the European negotiation game became highly political and moved forward 
relatively rapidly. Consequently, the involved Dutch water experts and officials lost 
their substantive grip on the process. Thirdly, there are some indications from their 
interviews that the Dutch, as compared to the French and German, lack a tradition of 
early and intensive juridical involvement at the drafting stage of a European Directive 
(ibid.).  
  
One might ask what the Dutch actors did win and lose. In the early drafting stage the 
Dutch stressed the importance of subsidiarity (by advocating a flexible directive that 
provides enough room to consider specific local conditions), an (international) river 
basin management approach, integration and harmonisation of source- and effect-
oriented directives (a combined approach), identical definitions in different directives, 
less detailed and more integrated reporting requirements and development of a 
common overall Community strategy for future actions in the field of water policy 
(Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management, 1995a). According to 
the Dutch, at the European level, the source oriented (emission reduction) approach 
and the effect oriented (water quality standards) approach are to be considered as 
parallel. They cannot be related in a quantitive way (Ministry of Housing, Spatial Plan-
ning and the Environment, 1995). At the level of (sub-) river basins (multilateral) at-
tempts may be more appropriate for quantification of such relations (ibid.). 
The subsidiarity principle should guide the way to a framework directive which 
reflects ‘an even balance between constituting an effective minimum protection level 
and offering a flexible policy instrument to Member States’ (Ministry of Transport, 
Public Works and Water Management, 1995a: 8). Especially, coherence between air, 
surface water, groundwater and sediment policies should be improved (Ministry of 
Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment, 1995). The Dutch prefer intentional 
water quality objectives (ibid.) and a mixture of actions in the field of infrastructure 
and water management, including juridical arrangements, limitations to water user 
activities, emission reduction, hydrological measures and ecological restoration pro-
jects (Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management, 1995a). Diffuse 
emission sources and relations between quantity and quality of surface water and 
groundwater resources should receive more attention (ibid.).  
At the WFD negotiation stage the Dutch considered the proposed implementa-
tion term (25 years) too long (Melis and Boudewijn, 2002; Interviews 40 and 43, Ap-
pendix I). On the other hand they plied for more realistic and feasible objectives. 
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Contrary to the EP, the Dutch were proponent of inclusion of heavily modified and artifi-
cial water bodies as separate categories in the WFD (with less demanding environmental 
objectives). Given the large pressures from households, agriculture and industry, 
extensive hydrological and morphological alterations of Dutch water systems had 
taken place in the past. If the WFD would only acknowledge the state of natural water 
bodies as the central objective, dramatic investments would be required to undo the 
aforementioned large-scale alterations. Furthermore, the Dutch negotiators were 
against water transfers between river basins in times of scarcity, for practical reasons. 
The EP was proponent of such provisions in the WFD. The EP plied for full cost 
recovery for water services for several sectors. The Dutch supported the principle, but 
were against a division into sectors, since parts of the water related activities are fi-
nanced from general taxes (hence difficult to present individually). Overall, the Neth-
erlands agreed with the majority of the EP amendments. During the conciliation pro-
cedure the Dutch negotiators stuck to the draft text as agreed by the European Coun-
cil in June 2000. In that particular text, the WFD’s objectives had been formulated as 
intentional in nature (i.e. with the aim of achieving wording). On the contrary, the EP 
(supported by the EC) was in favour of the WFD as a legal obligation (i.e. in order to 
achieve wording). In the exhaustive negotiation game the EP finally gave in for the 
benefit of other gains (Kaika and Page, 2003). Although the Dutch negotiators “cele-
brated” this small “victory”, juridical experts point at the generic obligatory, legally 
binding nature of European directives (Van Rijswick, 2001; Backes, Kruyt and Van 
Rijswick, 2007, Mostert, 2010; Van Rijkswick and Havekes, 2012; see also the Stage II 
part of Subsection 6.2.2). 
In sum: at the positive side of the drafting and negotiation balance the Dutch 
gained the river basin management approach, inclusion of both quality and quantity 
issues and interactions between groundwater and surface water, the combined ap-
proach of emission reductions and water quality objectives, inclusion of the option of 
designation of heavily modified and artificial water bodies and a permanent informal 
network of EU Water Directors (which could pay off in the Common Implementa-
tion Strategy). On the other hand they did not manage to reduce the implementation 
term and issues of floods and droughts have not been fully integrated. Furthermore, 
the WFD systems both for water body classification (Annex II, European Communi-
ties, 2000: 23-30) and for ecological objective setting and monitoring (Annex V, 
European Communities, 2000:  33-63) have become rather detailed and complicated.  
Notwithstanding the major gain of a uniform European wide system, which may be 
promising for the quality of Europe’s waters, it requires adaptation of Dutch tradi-
tions and practices of monitoring and ecological goal setting. Although the WFD has 
put the issue of ecological quality of water systems high on the Dutch political agenda 
again, it may not be the Holy Grail that ecologists are searching for (Van der Wal and 
Waajen, 2010).  
To conclude this subsection, the period of formulation and adoption of the 
WFD fitted well within the evolutionary context of the Dutch water policy domain. 
From a predominant focus on water quantity management until the 1960s a gradual 
shift occurred via water quality management to integrated water systems management 
in the 1990s. However due to near floods events halfway the 1990s, water quality 
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issues have moved into the political background. Dutch water experts, ecologists and 
officials have tried to seize the European momentum for renewed attention to water 
quality issues, especially at the initial drafting stage. From the interviews and secondary 
analysis it becomes clear that these national actors, soon after the drafting start, had 
lost their substantive grip on the political process in Brussels. Furthermore, they did 
not fully manage to ex ante evaluate potential administrative and socio-economic con-
sequences of adoption of this ambitious and ambiguous Directive. The next subsec-
tion continues with the dominant argumentations and strategic choices in the first 
Dutch domestic WFD planning implementation cycle. In contrast with the high initial 
uploading ambitions of national water policy actors at the European level, the analysis 
will show a remarkable late political WFD wake-up call and subsequent struggle with 
the WFD’s core Article 4 on the environmental objectives and related exemption 
options. 
 
6.2.2 Implementation of the WFD (1998 to 2009) 
In the first Dutch national WFD implementation planning cycle four subsequent 
partly overlapping stages may be distinguished (see Table 6.1 and Appendix VIII). 
These stages serve to to structure the historical reconstruction.  
 
Table 6.1 Stages in the first national WFD implementation planning cycle 
Stage↓ Brief characterisation↓ 
I  (1998 
to 
2003): 
Low political priority until two late wake-up calls: A national WFD Implementation 
Project Team starts preparing the Article 3 and Article 24 requirements. The 
Dutch consider themselves European forerunners. Regional and local water 
managers are not actively involved. Political attention is low until parliamen-
tary questions (June 2003) and the release of the Aquarein study report  
(November 2003). 
II (2004 
and 
2005): 
Realistic ambitions, first river basins characterisations and iteration: The national Wa-
ter Policy Department introduces the pragmatic feasibility and affordability 
mantra and opts for a prudent formulation of the Dutch river basin charac-
terisation reports. An iterative process design is proposed to arrive at realistic 
environmental objectives and programmes of measures for a staged com-
pliance with the WFD requirements (until 2027). 
III 
(2006 to 
2008): 
Harmonised objectives and measures, acceptable cost-benefit ratios: Gradually, the  
regional packages of measures are harmonised by the national authorities. 
Large parliamentarian pressure downsizes the ambitions for the first genera-
tion river basin management plans to acceptable cost-benefit ratios.  
IV 
(2008, 
2009): 
Drafting river basin management plans and formal consultation: Drafting the Dutch 
water management plans at all involved political levels is synchronised with 
the terms for the WFD river basin management plans. The parallel formal 
consultation rounds on these plan figures do not deliver surprises.  
 
Stage I: Low political priority until two late wake-up calls (1998 to 2003) 
Around the time of adoption of the WFD domestic political attention to water quality 
issues is relatively low (Arcadis, 2002). The Dutch ministers present the political 
agreement on the WFD as a victory and the then Dutch water managers consider 
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themselves as European forerunners. The WFD is considered to foremost have an 
important impact on upstream and midstream riparian states. In November 1998 the 
TPW Ministry initiates the national WFD Implementation Project Team (Projectteam 
Implementatie Kaderrichtlijn Water) with representatives of the HSE and ANF Ministries, 
the UvW and the Inter-Provincial Platform (Interprovinciaal Overleg; henceforth IPO). 
The Association of Dutch Municipalities (Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten; hence-
forth VNG) is also invited but chooses not to attend the meetings. The major task of 
the project team (and related working groups) is threefold. Firstly, the project team 
prepares for a timely and correct transposition of the WFD into Dutch legislation 
(conform Article 24, at the latest 22 December 2003). Secondly, it develops proposals 
for delineation of the Dutch territories of involved international European river basins 
(conform Article 3). Thirdly, it prepares the national WFD Implementation Hand-
book, based on a synthesis (and explanation) of the guidance documents from the 
European Common Implementation Strategy (CIS). The project team also coordinates 
the Dutch contributions to the CIS and reports important implementation issues and 
controversial aspects to the director-generals of involved ministries.  
At this first stage, regional and local water managers are not very active yet in 
planning the WFD’s implementation (Arcadis, 2002). They concentrate more on the 
process for measures on safety against floods and local water distress, as part of the 
‘Start Agreement on Water Policy in the 21st Century’ (in Dutch: Startovereenkomst Wa-
terbeheer 21e Eeuw; Anonymous, 2001). This agreement mentions coherence between 
the administrative (sub) river basin delineations for both flood defence and water 
stress and the WFD requirements, by means of an integrated approach. Nonetheless, 
the UvW expresses the fear of parallel processes and management plans (Tweede 
Kamer de Staten-Generaal, 2003a). In 2002 provinces and water management authori-
ties generally express a positive attitude towards the WFD but complain about the lack 
of clarity and transparency from the national authorities on expected implementation 
implications. To turn the tide the TPW Ministry appoints national coordinators for 
initiation of regional river basin coordination structures. Although predominantly 
triggered by the WFD requirements, the (national) aim of these (regional) structures 
should also be to integrate the Water Management in the 21st Century process (WM21, 
which concerns anticipation of floods and droughts in relation to climate change). A 
(national) Internet site is launched and regional WFD information and consultation 
sessions are organised.  
The national water official and experts are surprised by the conclusions from 
three pilot WFD exploration projects (Ems, the middle part of Holland-North and 
Western-Scheldt; Hassoldt and Busch, 2002; Dommering et al., 2002). From these 
exercises it becomes clear that required information for the Article 5 reports (which 
are the river basin characterisations) and the related river basin management plans 
(Article 13) is not entirely available. Furthermore, national methods and practices do 
not match easily with the new European rules. Information is scattered among several 
organisations and its collection and aggregation may require lots of time (for example  
regarding ecological objectives, monitoring, hydro-morphological aspects and fish 
populations) (ibid.; Interview 39, Appendix I). The process gradually becomes more 
laborious. For example, the drafting process of the handbook suffers from several 
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delays caused by working group chairs who do not manage to deliver text proposals in 
time. A printed (albeit incomplete) edition is disseminated in March 2003 but does not 
play a significant role in the subsequent implementation process (Vroege, 2009; Inter-
views 39, 40 and 46, Appendix I). Furthermore, parliamentarians, NGOs and socio-
economic interest groups start to raise questions about the national ambitions with 
regard to the WFD’s environmental objectives. Worries grow about the potential 
socio-economic impact of a strict implementation.  
In general NGOs and socio-economic interest groups and the UvW express sup-
port for the proposed approach for transposition of the WFD in national legislation, 
namely strict transposition and optimal use of existing administrative and political 
structures (in order to invest maximal energy in actual implementation issues). The 
interest groups ask for more transparency on the nature of the WFD’s environmental 
objectives (are these obligations of best efforts or obligations of result?) and on the national 
ambition with regard to these objectives. In addition, they express the need for more 
clear definitions of water services which concerns the implementation of the WFD’s 
Article 9 (European Communities, 2000: 12-13). For example, to which extent may 
water services be considered as governmental task, hence be covered by generic finan-
cial state means? (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2003a: 37). The UvW, in line 
with an advice from the then State Advisory Commission on Water Legislation 
(Staatscommissie voor de Waterstaatswetgeving, 1999), plies for a bottom-up 
approach for the establishment of river basin management plans with an important 
role for the regional water management authorities (waterschappen). Besides, the associa-
tion plies for a strict implementation of monitoring requirements in order to limit 
additional administrative burden. The UvW, NGOs and other interest groups ply for a 
further integration of Dutch water legislation which may not be hindered by a too  
strict WFD transposition. 
April 2003: at a national workshop on water body typology and reference condi-
tions regional and local water managers ask for acceleration of drafting national guide-
lines and instructions. They emphasise that regional and local politicians will only 
accept national WFD ambition choices if socio-economic consequences will be made 
clear in advance. From the June 2003 report of the Permanent Commission on Trans-
port and Water Management in the Lower House of Parliament (Tweede Kamer der 
Staten-Generaal, 2003b) it becomes clear that all political parties ask numerous ques-
tions about definitions and national interpretations, organisation of the implementa-
tion process and above all the unclear Dutch ambitions with regard to the environ-
mental objectives and the related potential socio-economic consequences. Ambitions 
on an integrated approach for water quantity and quality issues and cross-sector con-
sequences should be made clear. Doubts arise about the feasibility of a timely transpo-
sition of the WFD into Dutch legislation. Remarkably, the parliamentarians ask why 
the process has remained bureaucratic for so long, since the WFD asks for a more 
political process with active involvement of socio-economic stakeholders. Notwith-
standing this first political WFD wake-up call, in the June 2003 interim progress re-
port to the European Water Directors and the EC the TPW Ministry mentions that 
there have been no major problems in the domestic WFD implementation process so 
far (Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management, 2003a). The report 
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concludes that, up to 2003, the WFD has not been not a big issue compared to flood 
protection and local flooding: ‘This had some effect on capacity building’ (ibid.: 5).  
In a memorandum with answers to the questions of the Permanent Commission 
on Transport and Water Management the State Secretary for Water Management 
announces a national WFD ambition proposal (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 
2003c: 2). The announcement precedes publication of a study report on the potential 
socio-economic impact of the WFD requirements in November 2003. This so-called 
Aquarein report (Bolt et al., 2003), as drafted by Alterra (which is a research institute) at 
the request of the rural development department within the ANF Ministry, causes a 
second, more pronounced political WFD wake-up call (Interviews 18, 26, 30, 41, 52, 
Appendix I; Ten Heuvelhof et al., 2010). According to the editors the WFD imple-
mentation requirements may generate significant negative consequences for the agri-
cultural sector in the Netherlands (Bolt et al., 2003). The main message is that not all 
the WFD objectives may be established, even not when all Dutch farmers’ land would 
be taken out of production (ibid.). In a letter to the Lower House of Parliament 
(Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2003d: 1, translation from Dutch added), the 
State Secretary for Water Management emphasises the explorative nature of the 
Aquarein report: 
 
The reader should be aware that the Alterra study, by means of different scenarios, 
provides insight in the consequences whenever objectives for nutrients would be 
strictly interpreted. The approach does not take account of the WFD option to 
differentiate. Besides the study did not extensively include other potential manage-
ment measures that may contribute to the ecological functioning of water bodies. 
The scenarios depart from (full) compliance with the WFD objectives in 2015 and do 
not include the exemption options for a staged approach until 2027. The study also 
does not anticipate the exemption option to decide on lower objectives in case of 
unfeasibility or disproportionate costs. 
 
Triggered by the alarming study report the Lower House of Parliament again asks 
more detailed information on expected socio-economic consequences. Consequently, 
approval of the national WFD Implementation Act has been postponed. The delay 
triggers a first non-compliance procedure from the European Commission against the 
Netherlands (regarding no timely transposition of Article 24 of the WFD; Tweede 
Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2003e, 2004a and c) which finally results in a condemna-
tion by the European Court of Justice (Van Rijswick, 2010). Besides, the generic 
(regional and local) positive attitude towards the WFD partly dampens and turns into 
a fear for the (perceived) obligatory nature of the environmental objectives. Since 
then, discussions mainly focus on a pragmatic and realistic implementation ambition. 
In the same period the partners of the National Political Water Platform conclude that 
the majority of municipalities are very passive and have an information backlog. 
December 2003, the National Political Water Platform decides on three central 
starting-points for pragmatic WFD implementation: (1) no more national rules than 
necessary; (2) to continue present policies and management and maintenance practices 
as much as possible; and (3) maximum decision making room in the successive 
implementation stages.  
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Stage II: Realistic ambitions, first river basins characterisations and iteration 
(2004, 2005) 
 
Intentional ambitions or strict obligations, a recurrent debate 
In the beginning of 2004 a national WFD programme leader is appointed at the Water 
Policy Department who starts with reorganising national WFD tactics and ambitions 
(Interview 18, Appendix I). The Dutch Council of Ministers decides on the headlines 
of a new (integrated) Water Act, based on three major arguments: (1) less and more 
simple regulation; (2) the European river basin management approach; and (3) better 
legal anchorage and instrumentation of contemporary integrated water management. 
April 2004 the Council approves the WFD Implementation Memorandum (Tweede 
Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2004b) which emphasises a staged, pragmatic, feasible 
and affordable implementation until the end of 2027. Prior land use and property 
rights and spatial planning policy are leading together with a European level playing 
field. An optimal mixture of source and effect oriented pollution reduction measures 
will be required to meet no deterioration as the minimum WFD requirement. July 1, 
2004, the Lower House of Parliament approves the WFD Implementation Act by 
stressing a pragmatic implementation approach (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 
2004d). The State Secretary for Water Management promises to perform a societal 
cost-benefit analysis in relation to the draft programmes of measures and river basin 
management plans. The Upper House of Parliament follows on April 5, 2005 (Eerste 
Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2005). Although the Upper House expresses worries 
about the inter-ministerial coordination and the socio-economic consequences, it ap-
proves the proposal without voting (ibid.). 
November 2004, the National Political Water Platform approves a memorandum 
with the Dutch interpretation of the juridical nature of the WFD’s environmental 
objectives (LBOW, 2004a: 1; translation from Dutch and italics added): 
 
In fact, one might speak of a direct obligation with regard to implementation of meas-
ures from the river basin management programme.  For the environmental objec-
tives, there is a staged obligation. Exceptions are the protected areas and other areas for 
which the river basin management programme mentions full compliance before the 
end of 2015. According to the Dutch competent authorities, the exemptions from 
Article 4.3 till 4.7 should also be applicable to protected areas, as long as compliance 
with other relevant European legislation is guaranteed.  
 
In contrast with earlier interpretations from the WFD negotiation stage, when the 
then Dutch state negotiators “celebrated” the intentional nature of the adopted wording, 
the State Secretary for Water Management points at a history of European intentions 
that juridically should be interpreted as obligations (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 
2004d: 18-19). Besides, given the lack of a 100% juridical guarantee, she advices to 
implement as all objectives and measures were obligations in order to avoid unwel-
come pay-off surprises afterwards (ibid.: 30). According to legal experts, the WFD 
does not include the terms obligations and intentions in its wording (Van Rijswick, 2001; 
Backes, Kruyt and Van Rijswick, 2007). They point at ambiguous phrases in the offi-
cial text. For example, the environmental ministers from the Member States overruled  
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the EC and the EP by including aim to achieve instead of in order to within the formula-
tion of Preamble’s Statement 26 (European Communities, 2000: 3). The former word-
ing should be interpreted as intentions whereas the latter points at obligations (Kruyt, 
2007: 97). However, the same statement includes minimal (obligatory) water quality 
requirements (ibid.) Backes, Kruyt and Van Rijswick (2007) and Van Rijkswick and 
Havekes (2012) argue that in general European directives concern legal obligations. 
Also the intrinsic and detailed exemption options of Article 4 point at the obligatory 
nature (ibid.). Finally, Article 2(35) (European Communities, 2000: 7; italics added), 
defines ‘environmental quality standards’ which point at obligations (Van Rijswick, 
2001; Mostert, 2010).  
The discussion on the juridical nature of the WFD requirements pops up at 
several moments up to December 2009. The 2004 national discussion triggers Euro-
pean officials and the then Commissioner of DG Environment who get the percep-
tion that the Netherlands go for a too low WFD implementation ambition (e.g. desig-
nation of as much heavily modified water bodies as possible) without appropriate 
motivation (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2004d). Meetings with the EC (both 
at official and ministerial level) take place to elucidate the Dutch approach (e.g. 
Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2004c). The ambiguity in the Dutch argumenta-
tion lines is expressed by the State Secretary for Water Management in one of her 
meetings with parliamentarians (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2007c: 9; transla-
tion from Dutch added): ‘A Member State will not be held accountable [by the EC] 
for compliance with the objectives, but for the implementation of measures that 
should guide the way to [compliance with] the objectives.’ (Read also the list of ques-
tions and answers about the 2006 December Memorandum, Tweede Kamer der 
Staten-Generaal, 2007b) 
 
The first river basins characterisation (Article 5 reports) 
The national Article 5 Reports (one for each river basin) are subject to critical screen-
ing by a national audit committee prior to reporting to the EC. The independent 
committee that is initiated by the national Water Policy Department, checks the com-
pleteness, coherence and consistency of the Dutch draft reports. Central question is 
how to maintain sufficient political room for manoeuvre with regard to formulation of 
feasible and affordable objectives and measures. The audit committee advises to 
choose a more offensive wording in the reports and to restrict the contents to facts (in 
order to prevent discussions with the EC; LBOW, 2004b). NGOs and socio-
economic interests groups in general are positive about the coherence and wording of 
the Article 5 reports. According to them, the level playing field principle should become 
visible in the multilateral roof reports to be drafted by the international river basin 
committees. Furthermore they ask for more coherence between the risks and eco-
nomic analyses, an integrated approach of water quantity and quality issues, a sound 
anti-drought approach for all protected nature areas (not for Birds and Habitats Direc-
tives areas only), a transparent designation of water bodies, more attention to cost 
recovery for water uses and societal cost-benefit analyses, a more broad consideration 
of chemical water quality (not limited to 12 parameters only) and more equal attention 
to water related recreation in all the reports.  
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The Article 5 reports make clear that for the majority of Dutch water bodies full com-
pliance with the environmental objectives by 2015 will be improbable (Tweede Kamer 
der Staten-Generaal, 2005a: 3). The Lower House of Parliament takes notice of the 
national and multilateral Article 5 Reports. The parliamentarians still have worries 
about the socio-economic consequences and ask questions about the interpretation 
and implications of the one-out, all-out principle, the principle of no-deterioration and the 
no-shift principle (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2005b; read also the letter of 
the State Secretary about legal anchorage of the WFD’s terms and definitions, Tweede 
Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2006b). March 2005, the State Secretary for Water Man-
agement sends the Article 5 reports to the EC in time. Subsequently, the national 
public actors prepare and discuss the organisational and substantive rules for the next 
stage in the first WFD implementation planning cycle which is the formulation of 
realistic environmental objectives for all the Dutch water bodies as the basis for the 
selection of cost-effective measures. The river basin characterisation reports are an 
important building block for this next stage. 
 
Implementation process design: iteration 
The Water Policy Department proposes the “funnel model” (trechtermodel) for the 
WFD process up to December 2009 (see Figure 6.1; English edition of the figure in 
Wittenhorst and Mak, 2005). This means that the process will evolve from a general 
inventory of the range of potential objectives and measures (from a maximum to a 
minimum ambition level) towards final programmes of measures (based on the feasibil-
ity and affordability criteria). The Lower House of Parliament will be informed periodi-
cally and may influence important implementation decisions by means of annual De-
cember memoranda. The model allows for iteration steps in national, regional and 
local implementation activities, in which cost-effectiveness is a central selection crite-
rion and in which societal cost-benefis analyses should be conducted (ibid.). Regional 
and local WFD pilot projects will be conducted with the aim to get a better grip on 
the range of potential objectives and measures. These projects may also help to 
choose the generic policy starting-points for the preparation of the first generation of 
river basin management programmes (which cover the 2010 to 2015 period).  
Periodically, the Water Policy Department plies for an integrated approach on 
WM21 and WFD at both the regional and local levels. In turn, the chairs of the 
regional river basin platforms ask for a more transparent inter-ministerial coor-
dination, especially with regard to the WFD ambitions. November 2005, the National 
Political Water Platform approves the pragmatic alternative approach for formulation 
of ecological objectives for heavily modified water bodies, as proposed by Dutch 
water bureaucrats at a European workshop on hydro-morphologic issues in Prague. 
At the end of 2005, the Water Policy Department and theVNG agree to initiate a 
stimulation programme on active participation of municipal experts, civil servants and 
politicians (the so-called ‘Water Ambassadors Agreement’; VNG, 2006; 2009).  
The 2005 December Memorandum (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 
2006a) reconfirms the headlines of the 2004 WFD Implementation Memorandum and 
follows the informal rules from the (draft) European guidance document on environ-
mental objectives, most notably a staged realisation of objectives prior to exploring  
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the lowering of objectives. National, regional and local water managers are expected to 
formulate draft objectives in 2006 and are allowed to follow both the theoretical WFD 
and the pragmatic approach. The memorandum provides a definition on no deteriora-
tion, meaning whenever the quality of the entire (basin of a) water body does not 
change to a lower class within one 6-year planning period. In 2006 the regional water 
authorities and municipalities should draw a picture of the urban water assignment 
including most urgent bottlenecks. Integration of WM21 and WFD measures (not 
objectives) should take place in the local and regional implementation processes. 
Provinces are the directors of the regional programmes of measures. The national 
authorities should take care of well coordinated national frameworks for the regional 
processes. The national authorities aim for a European level playing field, European 
measures for priority substances and multilateral agreements on standards and applica-
tion of the no-shift principle (Article 4(8) of the WFD; European Communities, 2000: 
11) within the international river basin committees. Environmental NGOs and socio-
economic interest groups are informed and consulted by means of one national and 
seven regional consultation platforms (ibid.).  
 
 
Figure 6.1: The Dutch WFD “funnel model” (Wittenhorst and Mak, 2005) 
  
Environmental NGOs and socio-economic interest groups subscribe the main 
starting-points, but consider the 2005 December Memorandum as too generic. The 
biggest Dutch association of entrepreneurs is very critical about the Dutch national 
ambitions (VNO-NCW, 2005). The association postulates that investments by up-
stream Member States should be a precondition for European judgements on WFD 
compliance by the Netherlands. Additionally, decisions on objectives and measures 
should be taken nationally, since the regional water authorities do not represent all 
interests in a balanced way. The no-deterioration requirement should not be anchored 
in Dutch legislation in order to avoid limits to socio-economic development projects 
(ibid.). In general, parliamentarians in the Lower House of Parliament support the 
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chosen approach in the 2005 December Memorandum (Tweede Kamer der Staten-
Generaal, 2006a). The estimated cost figures for WFD measures (as aggregated by 
national experts; about 8 billion euros till 2015) should be further reduced to become 
political acceptable. Besides, disproportional costs for the agricultural sector should be 
avoided. National interpretations of some WFD terms and definitions are to be ex-
pected on the short term (ibid.). In its advice to the draft 2005 December Memoran-
dum, the Advice Commission Water (ACW) plies for elaboration of a more integrated 
approach for water quality and quantity issues (ACW, 2005). The commission misses 
an overview of results so far from the diffuse (non-point) emission sources approach. 
Based on a scrutiny of the Article 5 reports the commission also notices an almost 
fundamental change of the domestic surface water and groundwater quality monitor-
ing methods and practices and asks for an overview of related financial and societal 
consequences (ibid.).  
 
Stage III: Harmonised objectives and measures, acceptable cost-benefit ratios  
In the third stage national, regional and local water authorities face the challenge to 
formulate the ecological objectives for all delineated surface water bodies as well as to 
identify and select cost-effective programmes of measures. Given the complicated 
mixture of national, regional and local implementation processes with multiple actors, 
the national Water Policy Department faces a major twofold steering dilemma: (1) 
How to translate the pragmatic feasibility and affordability mantra into reliable and politi-
cally acceptable cost-benefit ratios? And (2) how to harmonise processes of autono-
mous (regional and local) authorities for the sake of sufficiently comparable environ-
mental objectives and programmes of measures across the country? 
 
Downgrading implementation costs & incomplete benefits estimations (2006) 
The WFD quick scan of the Environmental Assessment Agency (Ligtvoet et al., 2006) 
shows pessimistic conclusions similar to the 2003 Aquarein report (Van der Bolt et al., 
2003). Due to considerable investments, water quality has ameliorated dramatically 
since the 1970s. However, the WFD requirements are far from fulfilled and continua-
tion of current policies only will lead to no more than stand still. Expensive additional 
measures will be necessary to comply with the environmental objectives. Protection of 
prior land use activities and minimal changes in land and water user rights may hinder 
progress. The assessment agency plies for a mixture of ecological restoration projects, 
emission reduction measures from diffuse (non-point) pollution sources and 
additional waste water treatment infrastructure. Besides, more transparency and inte-
gration of existing methods on ecological objectives setting, as related to policy files of 
different ministries, will be required (ibid.). Remarkably, the quick scan receives rather 
limited attention. At the time of publication the national Water Policy Department 
struggles more with the deadlines of the chosen “funnel model”. For example for 
political reasons, the ANF and HSE Ministries hesitate with the provision of (theo-
retical) maximum packages of measures. The ANF Ministry periodically stresses the 
limits related to laborious derogation agreements with the EC on the Nitrates Direc-
tive (‘no additional measures affordable’; Interviews 11, 12, 18, 41 and 47, Appendix 
I). Furthermore, the river basin regions differently interpret the WFD assignment and  
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required types of measures. Regional politicians ask for transparency about the generic 
national WFD measures before selecting additional specific regional measures. Finally, 
not all societal benefits of WFD investments may be easily and reliably quantified, 
given controversies and inconsistencies among available methods, e.g. intrinsic natural 
values, willingness-to-pay etceteras.  
In order to get a better grip on feasible and affordable measures, the national 
Water Policy Department asks a special project team of national and regional water 
officials and economic experts to conduct a strategic societal cost-benefit analysis for 
the Netherlands as a whole. Additionally, some river basin regions decide to conduct 
their own economic analyses, which mainly run in parallel. Conclusions from the re-
gional analyses are synthesized in the so-called (regional river basin) Summer Memo-
randa which are ingredients for the 2006 December Memorandum. A broad coalition 
of environmental NGOs and recreation and drinking water interests groups (named 
The Clean Water Coalition) conduct their own study on the benefits of investments 
for cleaner water. The coalition presents a brochure with the conclusions to the Lower 
House of Parliament (Coalitie Baten Schoon Water, 2006).  The coalition denotes that 
so far, the focus has been on the costs one-sidedly. The brochure provides ample 
examples of social, economic and ecological benefits of proposed WFD investments. 
The coalition plies for a more balanced financial discussion (ibid.).  
Representatives of economic interests groups and the ministries of TPW and 
Economic Affairs initiate a joint explorative study on the financial impact of three 
WFD ambition scenarios for Dutch entrepreneurs (Ecorys, 2007). The report 
estimates additional investments by Dutch industry between €40 and €180 millions a 
year (direct costs for emission reduction measures) and a number of indirect effects. 
Although the report briefly mentions potential benefits from the WFD, it does not 
make an attempt to quantify them. The report mainly concentrates on expected nega-
tive consequences (ibid.). These figures are incorporated in the national strategic so-
cietal cost-benefit analysis (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2006c). 
August 2006, the Water Steering Group expresses worries about the compara-
bility of the regional costs estimations for WFD measures. The members signal differ-
ent starting-points, hypotheses and prepositions. Unfortunately, the national strategic 
societal cost-benefit analysis cannot yet answer questions about the most cost-
effective measures and disproportionate costs. The Water Policy Department con-
cludes that the figures from the Meuse River Basin are much higher compared to the 
other regions. The department requests this region to exclude the least cost-effective 
and the measures that may cause disproportionate costs (‘like the other regions did as 
agreed earlier’; Interviews 20 and 48, Appendix I). The Meuse region has filled in its 
own estimation for national measures (especially for the maximum ambition scenario) 
since the national authorities did not provide them completely. The final national 
strategic societal cost-benefit analysis shows an unbalance between costs (€ 9.2 bil-
lions) and benefits (€ 6 billions) although not all benefits could have been quantified 
(Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2006c). Water system restoration projects are 
considered most cost-effective, followed by nutrient reduction efforts by means of 
both waste water treatment plants and measures in agriculture and additional chemical 
pollution reduction (ibid.). The National Political Water Platform draws the 
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conclusion that a staged WFD implementation is preferable in order to prevent 
disproportionate costs. The platform members conclude that the analysis does not provide 
insight yet in the division of the costs among socio-economic sectors. To the dis-
appointment of representatives of the industrial interest groups the national Water 
Policy Department does not opt for either quantification of disproportionality or for 
setting limits to future increases in water taxes (VNO-NCW, 2007). Both environ-
mental NGOs and members of the Water Steering Group ask for stronger national 
steering of the regional and local processes in order to ensure comparability of and to 
reduce divergency in the packages of measures and related financial figures. 
Compared with draft editions the final 2006 December Memorandum (Ministerie 
van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2006b) shows a remarkable strategic move. Instead of 
emphasising estimated additional State investments for WFD measures, the national 
authorities “cash” a potential cost reduction of €1.9 billions by implementing WFD 
and WM21 measures in an integrated way (by means of combined measures that de-
liver synergy and innovation). The national authorities will provide special funding for 
such integrated projects (ibid). First priority is given to (almost) full implementation of 
WM21 measures before the end of 2015, while for the WFD assignment a staged 
approach till 2027 is mentioned (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2006c). The 
WM21 measures should be WFD proof and wherever possible should contribute to 
WFD objectives (ibid.). Considerable additional investments will have to be made in 
order to conduct 70-80% compliance with the WFD objectives in 2027 (Ministerie 
van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2006b). Environmental NGOs and interests groups won-
der whether the EC would accept a 70-80% compliance rate (too low ambition), 
whereas some sectors (namely industry and agriculture) express worries about dispro-
portionate costs (too high ambition). 
The Advice Commission Water plies for enforced inter-ministerial coordination 
and enforced national coordination of the regional and local processes (ACW, 2007). 
Given the European obligations the commission advises to anchor the choices from 
the regional and local processes into regional river basin covenants. The commission 
denotes a delay with the no legally required municipal water plans and questions 
whether this will hinder a timely and sufficient WFD implementation at the local level. 
Furthermore, the commission doubts whether the estimated financial savings due to 
an integrated implementation of WFD and WM21 measures, will be actually feasible. 
Given different process stages (WFD planning versus WM21 implementation), oppor-
tunities may be missed. Short term financial support of the regional and local pro-
cesses would contribute to synergetic and innovative solutions (ibid.). Some members 
of the Lower House of Parliament have their doubts too about the feasibility and 
affordability of the proposed ambitions (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2007c; 
Waterforum, 2007). They ply for a balance between societal costs and benefits, a fur-
ther reduction of the implementation costs and more emphasis on WFD investments 
in upstream Member States (ibid.). Although the associations of regional water man-
agement authorities (UvW) and provinces (IPO) ply for additional national measures 
on diffuse pollution sources, so far the ministries remain reluctant to add these.  
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Harmonisation of regional measures (2007) for an ex ante evaluation (2008) 
As announced in the 2006 December Memorandum, 2007 is the year of the local and 
regional processes under the wings of the regional river basin platforms (in order to 
identify most cost-effective packages of measures; Ministerie van Verkeer en Water-
staat, 2006b; Schultz van Haegen, 2007). Soon the regional and local authorities con-
clude that more time is required for collecting and aggregating required information 
for all individual WFD water bodies. Delays are also introduced by national frame-
works, guidelines and web based applications that ‘constantly run behind schedules’ 
(Interviews 18, 20, 41; 46; 50; 52; 53, Appendix I; Ten Heuvelhof et al., 2010). 
Especially the formulation of ecological objectives for artificial and heavily modified 
water bodies requires much more time. In practice, processes of formulating objec-
tives and selecting cost-effective measures run in parallel instead of one after the other 
(as a logical order to define the “distances to targets”). To improve the comparability 
of the programmes of measures for all Dutch river basins the national Water Policy 
Department initiates a (three-staged) harmonisation exercise (DGW, 2007). The 
project plan is approved by the National Political Water Platform under the condition 
that it may no lead to disturbance of the local and regional processes (LBOW, 2007). 
It implicitly presupposes integrated local and regional processes (DGW, 2007). 
In the first half of 2007 the harmonisation exercise makes clear that more time is 
needed to collect and aggregate required data in a sufficiently comparable way. For 
example, regional and local civil servants and experts struggle with the interpretation 
and application of irreversible hydro-morphological alterations and disproportionate costs. There-
fore, the chairs of the regional river basin platforms ask for transparent national defi-
nitions of these central WFD terms. Initially, the national Water Policy Department is 
not in favour of providing for generic national definitions, in order to prevent labori-
ous juridical discussions with the European institutions. The department stresses im-
portant regional room for manoeuvre in application of these terms. However, as a 
compromise, June 2007, the Water Policy Department releases an informal argumen-
tation line on significant damage (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2007a). When-
ever supported by sound arguments, regional partners may deviate from this generic 
national interpretation (ibid.).  
The interim findings of the harmonisation exercise are presented to the National 
Political Water Platform in June 2007 (Mak, 2007). Main focus of the regional and 
local actors is on the own implementation processes in which experts from the water 
management authorities take the lead. Generally, formulation of the ecological objec-
tives runs in a comparable way. Departing point in all sub-basins is a staged com-
pliance until 2027. Criteria for the selection of measures are continuation of current 
policies, practical feasibility and public acceptance. Remarkably, expert judgement 
dominates cost-efficacy estimations (without quantification attempts). In the regional 
packages, hardly any tailor-made measures are included additional to generic, national 
policy for agriculture and other diffuse pollution sources. Decision support systems 
such as the WFD Explorer are only used by a few. The no-shift assignment (WFD’s 
Article 4.8) lacks in almost all packages. Finally, in most cases a transparent motivation 
of objectives and selected measures still lacks (ibid.). Based on the interim findings, 
the national Water Policy Department decides to provide stricter guidelines for further  
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harmonisation and formats for the provision of data (which are considered necessary 
for drafting the river basin management plans; Dierikx, 2007). The letter with the 
sharpened instructions also describes the Dutch national strategy for a staged WFD 
implementation until 2027 (Dierikx, 2007: 5; translation from Dutch added):  
 
A total package of measures will be defined for the entire implementation period up 
to 2027. From this package a selection of feasible and affordable measures will be 
selected for implementation until 2015 (as part of the first river basin management 
plans). These measures are reported to the European Commission as Dutch obliga-
tions. Whenever measures may turn out not to be feasible before 2015, they may be 
interchanged with measures from the total package of measures (and hence the for-
mer may be postponed to a later stage). The advantage of this approach is that trans-
parency is increased towards the European Commission regarding the Dutch ambi-
tions, while at the same time it becomes clear which measures are included as obliga-
tions within the river basin management plans. 
 
Given this brief assessment it may not come as a surprise that at the end of 2007 the 
State Secretary for Water Management concludes that the scope and completeness of 
regional packages of measures still show too many differences (Ministerie van Verkeer 
en Waterstaat, 2007b). Also the ecological objectives and cost-effectiveness estima-
tions are not entirely available (ibid). After consultation of an independent committee 
of economic experts the national Water Policy Department asks the Environmental 
Assessment Agency to conduct a so-called Ex Ante Evaluation of cost-effective 
measures instead of a societal cost-benefit analysis. The argument that there is a lack 
of reliable methods for quantitative estimations of all societal benefits (including eco-
logical values), is supported by environmental NGOs and socio-economic interest 
groups at both the national and the regional levels. While the national authorities still 
aim for further harmonisation of regional packages for the sake of a sound Ex Ante 
Evaluation, regional and local politicians and civil servants consider the new national 
deadlines not feasible. Some fear unnecessary additional checks of their almost 
finished work. Given the delays and methodological difficulties the State Secretary for 
Water Management decides not to publish a 2007 December Memorandum. Instead 
she releases an interim WM21/WFD progress message to the Lower House of Par-
liament (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2007b).  
After a meeting of the State Secretary for Water Management with represen-
tatives of the Lower House of Parliament (June 19, 2008) about the conclusions of the 
Ex Ante Evaluation (Ligtvoet et al., 2008), the question remains whether the EC 
would accept the Dutch approach (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2008a). By 
reading the policy letter of the Dutch Council of Ministers (Huizinga-Heringa, 2008b), 
it becomes clear that, although the proposed cost-effective packages of measures may 
deliver substantial ecological gains in the national and regional water bodies, in 2027 
full compliance with the ecological objectives may be feasible for only 40 till 60% of 
the surface water bodies. According to the Lower House of Parliament this leaves 
room for two options: either these objectives are formulated too ambitious and 
should be best lowered, or the ambitions with regard to the measures are too low 
hence additional measures should be selected (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 
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2008a). The Ex Ante Evaluation report mentions that additional water system restora-
tion investments will be far more cost-effective than further reduction of nutrient 
emissions (unless dramatic additional investments take place in the agricultural sector 
with large socio-economic consequences; Ligtvoet et al., 2008). The UvW considers 
the estimations from the Ex Ante Evaluation too negative since figures and expert 
judgement by its members are more optimistic about the positive impact of the pro-
posed packages of measures (Unie van Waterschappen, 2008b). According to the 
UvW emphasis should be put more on effective additional measures for the agricul-
tural sector (ibid.), while the Council of Ministers stresses the delicate political posi-
tion of the Netherlands and limitations due to related high socio-economic costs 
(Huizinga-Heringa, 2008b: 7; translation from Dutch added): 
 
Based on model calculations the Ex Ante Evaluation shows that only a significant 
positive effect may be expected from additional measures in the agricultural sector, 
whenever these will be implemented at large-scale. In that case the costs will increase 
dramatically. From the consultation with the European Commission about the 
Fourth Actions Programme for the Nitrates Directive it should become clear to 
which extent the Dutch derogation may hold and to which extent additional 
measures may be affordable for the agricultural sector. 
 
The State Secretary for Water Management adds that the Council of Ministers still 
aims at a full compliance for 70 till 80% of the surface water bodies in 2027, as prior 
estimated in the 2006 December Memorandum (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 
2008a: 5). She points at potential additional positive contributions from research 
measures on cost-effective measures and measures from the innovation funds (ibid.). 
The Ex Ante Evaluation shows that the harmonisation process has lead to 
further reduction of estimated investments costs (Ligtvoet et al., 2008). According to 
the evaluation, water managers have proposed the best cost-effective packages of 
measures. Together, all regional measures for the 2010 to 2027 period will lead to an 
annual increase of water related taxes of no more than 0.7% or less (ibid.). This is in 
line with the national mantra of feasible and affordable WFD implementation. In the 
course of the WFD process between the second half of 2005 and mid 2008 the total 
costs of all measures have been diminished gradually (to satisfaction of the Lower 
House of Parliament and farmers’ and industrial interest groups). This may be consid-
ered the result of the “funnel model” process in which harmonisation, feasibility, afforda-
bility and synergy have been keywords. Remarkably, the editors of the Ex Ante Evalua-
tion doubt whether the EC would consider the 0.7% tax increase as the disproportio-
nality threshold or that additional measures may be required (Ligtvoet et al., 2008; 
Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2008a). Notwithstanding the remaining ques-
tions, the Lower House of Parliament supports the generic WFD approach without 
bringing up further amendments.  
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Stage IV: Drafting river basin management plans and formal consultation  
 
Parallel processes for drafting a new generation of water plans (2008) 
2008 may be labelled as the year of parallel processes on the way towards the draft 
river basin management plans and related national, regional and local water policy and 
management plans. While the regional and national water management authorities fill 
the national databases with WFD measures for surface water bodies, the provinces do 
the same for the groundwater bodies and part of the Natura 2000 sites. At the same 
time others within these administrations are drafting the new water policy and 
management plans and conducting a strategic environmental impact assessment for 
these plans. Additionally, while ecologists formulate the final ecological objectives, 
other experts are transforming the monitoring networks (for an overview of the 
Dutch WFD monitoring efforts, see Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2007a), 
testing the final quality standards and drawing aggregated maps. Furthermore, munici-
palities prepare decisions on their lists of WFD measures. Drafting and coordinating 
all the water management plans at the multilateral, national, regional and, local levels 
at once (since the competent Dutch authorities decided to synchronise all the water 
plan figures with the WFD timetable) is a (time-demanding) profession in itself. Con-
sequently, similar to 2007, for the involved experts, (editing) civil servants and (decid-
ing) politicians 2008 becomes an intensive year.  
Spring 2008, the national Water Policy Department initiates a national editing 
team on the (draft) river basin management programmes (Interview 52, Appendix I). 
The team which includes representatives from the four river basins organises regional 
sessions to start up the drafting process (ibid.). The fundament for the river basin 
management plans has already been provided in February 2008 by the instruction 
letter from the State Secretary for Water Management (Huizinga-Heringa, 2008a). The 
letter may be considered as another attempt to harmonise the regional packages of 
measures and includes the national rules for earmarking WFD measures and for 
motivating a staged WFD implementation until 2027. All cost-effective measures 
within water bodies and other (smaller) water systems that contribute significantly to 
the environmental objectives of the WFD should be earmarked as WFD measures. 
From this pool, measures that are considered feasible and affordable for the period 
until 2015 will be selected as obligations for the first river basin management plans. 
Also measures that contribute to the water conditions of the Natura 2000 sites and 
part of the anti-desiccation measures should be included. All the measures that do not 
significantly contribute to the WFD measures (such as flood protection, local water 
stress) will not be quantified in the river basin management plans. However, they will 
be described generally, as part of the motivation for a staged implementation of WFD 
measures (ibid.). The UvW generally subscribes the chosen reporting approach but 
argues that the obligatory WFD measures to be reported should exclude those outside 
the designated WFD water bodies. ‘Measures outside the water bodies will be indi-
cated but do not resort to the jurdically obligatory WFD programme of measures’ 
(Unie van Waterschappen, 2008a: 2). 
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After approval of the conclusions of the Ex Ante Evaluation by the Lower House of 
Parliament the drafting process accelerates. The national editing team benefits both 
from the final memoranda of the regional river basin platforms which include the 
motivation for objectives and selected measures and from the harmonised national 
WFD databases. However, discussions on the legal consistency of the arguments, 
especially with regard to the exemption options of the WFD’s Article 4, remain until 
the start of the formal consultation round. Repeatedly, the national Water Policy 
Department expresses worries about the comparability of the regional argumentation 
lines, as written by the State Secretary to the regional and local partners (Huizinga-
Heringa, 2008a: 2; translation from Dutch added): 
 
Based on differences in starting positions and decentralised responsibilities in water 
management, differences in regional packages of measures certainly may be possible. 
However, I would like to point your attention that differences may become pro-
blematic whenever they enfeeble motivations for choices that we have made in the 
Netherlands. One example: One water manager excludes a measure for reasons of 
significant damage to a user function or limited effectiveness, while another water 
manager in apparently similar circumstances selects and implements the same 
measure. 
 
One critical question to be solved with regard to the drafting process is the legal an-
chorage of the WFD’s environmental objectives (Interviews 45, 52 and 53, Appendix 
I). Parallel to the drafting process the HSE and TPW Ministries elaborate a national 
generic rule for legal anchorage of the WFD’s environmental objectives. Both minis-
tries are cautious to prevent a direct restrictive linkage between the objectives and 
license requirments for water-related human development activities. In their approach, 
the argumentation behind the formulated environmental objectives and related pro-
grammes of measures within the provincial water policy plans and the related plans of 
the water management authorities are central for approval or disapproval of such 
license requests. While the draft regional and local plans have almost been finalised for 
the formal consultation round, the national Water Policy Department asks for signifi-
cant changes (Interviews, 41, 45 and 46, Appendix I). The provinces and the water 
management authorities in the Meuse River Basin oppose such dramatic alterations 
since they fly in rather too late in the process and more importantly, since, to their 
opinion, such changes would require a second formal consultation round (ibid.). Fi-
nally, in order to solve the controversy, the national Water Policy Department pro-
vides a list with generic argumentation wording that may be included in the regional 
and local plans. 
Another critical issue to be solved for the river basin management plans is the 
question whether to provide detailed information per individual water body or in a 
more aggregated fashion (Interviews 18 and 52, Appendix I). October 2008, the 
National Political Water Platform decides to include a table that provides a general 
qualitative overview of measure types per individual water body without specific 
numeric details (which should be included in the regional and/or local plans anyway). 
December 12, 2008, the Dutch Council of Ministers approves the draft river basin 
management plans and releases them for the formal consultation round (which runs 
234 CHAPTER 6 
 
between December 22, 2008 and June 22, 2009). Simultaneously, the politicians from 
the provinces and water management authorities approve their draft plans for the 
same purpose. 
 
Smooth coordination of parallel formal consultation (2009) 
February 2008, the National Political Water Platform approves the start memorandum 
on cross-scale coordination of the formal and simultaneous consultation procedures 
for the draft river basin management programmes and national, regional and local 
water management programmes (CSN, 2008). Involved administrations cooperate in a 
joint project team in order to tune answers before they are released. A special web 
based tool has been developed to support this coordinated answering process. The 
web based tool includes a postal code option to make it easier for citizens to get easy 
overview and access to relevant draft plans and related programmes of measures per 
region. The aims of the common communication about the procedures are consistent 
management of expectations towards the consulted actors, to be clear about the co-
herence and differences among the different water management programmes, gener-
ate public attention to water (quality) management issues and to stimulate citizens to 
participate. A number of information and consultation meetings have been organised 
and a consultation guidance (which is a brief introduction to all the draft programmes) 
has been available to the consulted (ibid.). 
Informal consultation rounds already took place for the 2005 and 2006 Decem-
ber Memoranda. Furthermore, a combined formal consultation round has been organ-
ised on both the time schedule for drafting the river basin management plans and the 
list of significant water management issues (as deducted from the Article 5 reports). 
Continuous informal consultation of organised interests groups has taken place by 
sessions of the WFD consultation platforms at the national, regional and local levels. 
Given these extensive consultation efforts, the range of views and ambitions has been 
well-known to the public actors at the start of the formal 2009 consultations. Most 
original reaction is a poem written by scholars. In answer to all the received views, 
only minor amendments have been made in the final river basin management pro-
grammes and related national, regional and local programmes. December 2009, the 
Dutch Council of Ministers adopts the final river basin management plans. Environ-
mental NGOs express their disappointment about a lack of ambition and mention too 
much business as usual, while the industrial and agricultural representatives generally 
are more satisfied. The national WFD programme leader in the 2004 to 2009 period 
admits that the national tactics have failed to hold the environmental NGOs on board 
sufficiently. He considers those groups as natural allies in compliance with the envi-
ronmental objectives (Interview 18, Appendix I).  
 
To round up this subsection, the fear for legally binding obligations and significant 
socio-economic consequences from the WFD’s implementation have made the Dutch 
road towards integrated river basin management somehow troublesome. Although 
national authorities have mentioned the European river basin management approach 
as one of the three major reasons for  drafting the new integrated Water Act (Anony-
mous, 2009a), the first implementation planning cycle has not paved the way to 
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integrated river basin management plans. The emphasis is on water quality and eco-
logical values of water bodies, whereas issues of floods and droughts are mainly dealt 
with in parallel processes and documents. In section 6.3, the impact of the WFD on 
national rules for (integrated) river basin management will be explored in more detail. 
 
 
6.3 The WFD and national rules of IRBM 
 
This section explores to which extent the WFD’s policy and governance principles, 
the environmental objectives and the exemption options and the related informal 
interpretations of the Common Implementation Strategy (CIS) may have provoked 
changes in collective-choice rules for IRBM (as defined in the Subsections 2.2.3 till 
2.2.9) at the national political level in the Netherlands.  
 
6.3.1 Scope rules 
As defined in Section 2.2.3, scope rules may concern the geographic area, the type of 
organisational structures and networks and the issues to be decided on. For this 
research a distinction is made between organisational and substantive scope rules. 
Concerning the former the focus is on the impact of hydrological boundaries on or-
ganisational structures, whereas for the latter the focus is on the levels of integration. 
For example, are “river basins as the appropriate management units” translated into 
functional agencies and to which extent may these entities operate autonomously? 
What are collective choices for internal integration (of issues within the water policy 
domain) and external integration (of issues across policy domains)? To what extent do 
these choices affect the nature of river basin legislation, policy documents and 
management plans? 
 
Organisational scope: the impact of hydrological boundaries 
The Netherlands have a stable decentralised unitary state tradition in which a nested 
hierarchy of general adminstrative institutions (state, provinces and municipalities) 
rules the country. Van Rijswick and Havekes (2012: 183) express the essence of the 
Dutch state model:  
 
Decentralised authorities are in principle free to regulate and administer their domes-
tic matters, but in doing so they may not act contrary to higher rules. And, when the 
higher legislative level decides to regulate a matter itself, then the rules made by the 
lower authority cease to operate. 
 
From a constitutional law perspective the principle reasons behind decentralisation are 
‘to spread power and the principle that public authority should be exercised at a level 
as close as possible to the citizens’ (Van Rijkswick and Havkes, 2012: 146). The Dutch 
unitary state model is often referred to as Thorbecke’s House, i.e. the administrative organi-
sation of the Netherlands as introduced with the Dutch 1848 Constitutional Act (as 
designed by the liberal Johan Rudolph Thorbecke (1798-1872); Neelen, Rutgers and 
Tuurenhout, 2003). Together with the general adminstrative bodies, which are under  
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parliamentary control, functional water management authorities and semi-public 
bodies (drinking-water companies), take care of an integrated water management 
approach (Van Rijswick and Havekes, 2012).  
The origin of the functional water management authorities lies in the self-
realisation of local drainage and flood defence arrangements for reclaimed peat land 
by small farmers’ communities (Van de Ven, 2004; Havekes, 2008). Due to land sub-
sidence, the communities had to protect themselves against the water by a combi-
nation of measures to secure good drainage (Van de Ven, 2004: 56-59): 
 
Each farming community carried out drainage and the construction dikes separately. 
The landowners had to maintain the hydraulic structures and the supervision of the 
maintenance was carried out by the local administration. This supervision was in fact 
a juridical matter. The village administration formulated rules concerning the re-
quirements, which had to be met. [..] Subsequently, the village administration 
checked whether the landowners maintained the hydraulic structures according to the 
rules and passed their judgement. [..] So, to this day, field drains are maintained by 
those directly involved. [..] …every farming community was responsible for draining 
their surplus water into the outside waters. It was unacceptable to let their surplus 
water flow into the drainage system of a neighbouring community. [..] Cooperation 
between the various settlements was necessary to solve certain drainage problems.  
 
Since the amount of reclaimed land and the population increased to a size which be-
came unmanageable by small groups of individuals, around the 13th Century the first 
regional water management authorities started to develop (Van de Ven, 2004; Have-
kes, 2008). As governed by the representatives of the inhabitants in an administrative 
area, these organisational structures may be considered as functional entities (for water 
management purposes) which were coordinated by local authorities. Local drainage 
areas rather than natural hydrological borders of the European rivers and inland rivers 
and brooks have been the basis for the division into administrative units (bid.).  
Given the Netherlands are the delta of four European rivers (Rhine, Meuse, 
Scheldt and Ems) in which a complex network of artificial, heavily modified and natu-
ral water systems has been developed, clear hydrological, (sub)river basin borders  may 
not easily be drawn. However, from historical analysis an evolution of merging water 
management authorities into larger units, which increasingly approach natural hydro-
logical (sub) basin boundaries, becomes visible. Since the 1950s nearly 2,650 local 
water management authorities have merged into 25 regional water management au-
thorities (Van Rijkswick and Havekes, 2008: 153).  Today, these administraive bodies 
are ‘so-called “all-inclusive” water authorities, which are responsible for all elements of 
water management within their territory’ (ibid.).  
Prior to implementation of the WFD and for reasons of flood and drought man-
agement in relation to climate change, a national division into 17 sub-basins has been 
decided on (Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management, 2000). 
These sub-basins are pragmatically tuned to territorial borders of provinces and water 
management authorities. Additionally, multilateral river treaties already provided for 
transboundary basin delineations. Given this historical context, it is not remarkable 
that the Dutch have struggled somehow on delineating the domestic WFD sub-basins.  
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The then national working-group on geographic WFD issues concludes that the WFD 
requirements may lead to some choices that are not correct from a hydrologic        
perspective (Van de Velde, 2001). Finally, the national authorities decide to take the 
river basin delineations in multilateral treaties as points of departure for the national 
division into WFD sub-basins, as expressed by the June 2002 national WFD progress 
report for the European Water Directors (Ministry of Transport, Public Works and 
Water Management, 2002: 3): 
 
In the Dutch coastal waters setting geographical boundaries between the river basin 
districts of Scheldt, Meuse, Rhine and Ems is rather artificial, as in the Dutch delta 
there is intensive intermixing of in particular Rhine and Meuse. This phenomenon of 
intermixing has given rise to heated discussions as to how particular fresh water 
basins should be integrated into individual river basin districts. Eventually, in         
deciding upon setting the borders of national river basin districts, compliance has 
been sought with the existing international agreements for the protection of the 
Rhine and Meuse, rather than accepting proposals to follow existing administrative 
borders of inland water management authorities. In each river basin district coor-
dinative committees will be formed including representatives from current com-
petent authorities (inland water management authorities, provinces and the National 
Water Management Agency (Rijkswaterstaat)). 
 
As national rule of the game, the division for Water Management in the 21st Century 
(WM21) which is optimally tuned to the administrative territories of the water      
management authorities, should be adapted to the WFD delineation of (sub-)basins 
(Anonymous, 2001). In practice, overall the WFD and WM21 divisions fit quite well 
(see Figure 6.2). Only four out of the 17 WM21 sub-basins are split into more WFD 
river basins, among them West-Brabant which is the territory of the Brabantse Delta 
Water Management Authority. Despite opposition from the North-Brabant Province 
which feared additional administrative burden from reporting to two WFD sub-
basins, the national authorities decided not to merge both divisions on the short term. 
The national authorities did not want to disturb the WM21 process which was in the 
implementation phase yet (Van de Velde et al., 2002).  
Initially, the WFD implementation process supports calls for more simple,  
transparent and integrative organisational structures. At the national level informal 
water policy coordination and working group structures on water quantity and quality 
issues gradually are integrated. At the start of the Dutch WFD implementation    
process a national working group is asked to advice on WFD implementation coordi-
nation structures with unchanged formal structures as precondition (Projectteam  
Implementatie Kaderrichtlijn Water, 2001b). Based on the advice, the national      
authorities decide on informal national-regional WFD coordination structures per 
WFD (sub-)basin with a central steering role for the TPW Ministry. Ten Heuvelhof et 
al. (2010) point at an informal double WFD pillar structure within the Dutch constitu-
tional house which has provided ample opportunities for functional redundancy (see 
also Figure 6.3 in Subsection 6.3.5). At the regional and local level, the water        
management authorities 
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Figure 6.2: Division into 17 sub-basins (the WM21 approach; grey-coloured areas) 
and the four national sub-basins for implementation of the WFD (black lines; 
Van de Velde et al., 2002) 
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have played a central role in the WFD processes for formulation of environmental 
objectives and selection of measures (see the Chapters 7 and 8 for a detailed assess-
ment of these decentral processes). Also in the drafting process of the new, integrated 
Water Act, no discussions take place on reorganisation of formal structures. Focus is 
on better internal coordination arrangements by integrating eight former water man-
agement related statutes and by minor shifts in strategic and operational tasks and 
responsibilities in order to reduce dysfunctional redundancy. 
This research concludes that the Dutch organisational landscape has not been 
significantly altered due to the first WFD implementation planning cycle. The obser-
vations point at ideal-type B organisational IRBM scope rules both in the period be-
fore and after adoption of the WFD (see Table 6.2a). During the 20th Century, the 
functional water quantity and water quality management authorities have been scaled 
up and developed into more integrated, all-in structures (Havekes, 2008; 2010). The 
water management authorities have their own policy departments, are centres of water 
(-related) knowledge and are for almost 100% self-sufficient by water-related levies, 
but for implementation of measures they are largely dependent on the rules and prin-
ciples of other policy sectors as defined and implemented by the general administra-
tive bodies.  
 
Table 6.2a: Ideal-type collective-choice IRBM scope rules (organisation; national level) 
Ideal-type rules↓ 1990 to 2000↓ 2001 to 2009↓ 
A: Water policy is implemented by organisational 
structures and actor networks which are driven by 
social, economic and political factors that do not 
follow hydrological (river) basin boundaries. These 
structures/networks may be multi-purpose or sec-
toral in nature and are under parliamentary control. 
 
 
 
 
B: Water policy is implemented by functional water 
agencies, committees and actor networks which 
follow hydrological (river basin) boundaries. These 
functional entities and actor networks are controlled 
by parliamentary institutions.  
 
X 
 
X 
C: Water policy is implemented by autonomous 
(sub) river basin authorities and/or communities 
that are organised along hydrological boundaries. 
These authorities and communities are beyond par-
liamentary control and do have their own polity 
rules. 
  
Legend: The research observations come closest to ideal-type B rules as expressed by the ‘X’. 
 
Actually, the regional water management authorities are water policy implementation 
agencies for inland water systems. Due to their expertise, skills and competences, 
these water management authorities may be considered as natural WFD sub-basin 
management structures (Havekes, 2010). Although these authorities have their own 
elected politicians, who are representatives for different water users’ categories, they 
are under supervision of the provincial and national authorities. These latter  
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authorities have to weigh water issues to the importance of issues from other policy 
domains. The national authorities have their own water management agency for water 
bodies of national strategic importance. The national-regional WFD coordination 
structures and related networks are informal and additional in nature, with no formal 
decision-making competences (Wittenhorst and Mak, 2005). They advise both the 
national, regional and local authorities and the water management authorities on WFD 
implementation issues (ibid.). 
 
Substantive scope: level of internal integration 
Before adoption of the WFD, with the Second National Water Policy Memorandum 
(Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 1985), the integrated water systems approach be-
comes among dominant paradigms in the water policy discourse. However, qualitative 
and quantitative issues largely remain covered by parallel laws and regulations: the 
Surface Water Pollution Act (Anonymous, 1970), the Water Management Act (Wet op 
de Waterhuishouding; Anonymous, 1989), the Groundwater Act (Grondwaterwet; Anony-
mous, 1981) and the Land Protection Act (Wet Bodembescherming; Anonymous, 1986a). 
The Water Management Act includes regulations for integrated water policy and man-
agement plans at the national, regional and local levels and the legal instruments for 
quantitative management of surface water (Anonymous, 1989; Van Rijswick, 2001). It 
is a framework act which means that national and provincial authorities and water 
management authorities will have to decide on additional rules that specify the generic 
aims and instruments from the act. 
The Surface Water Pollution Act includes the instruments for surface water qual-
ity management. Qualitative groundwater issues are covered by the Land Protection 
Act whereas the Groundwater Act focuses on quantitative issues. Licenses for surface 
water abstractions and discharges may also concern qualitative aspects whenever the 
Surface Water Pollution Act does not provide for adequate protection (Van Rijswick, 
2001). Furthermore, quantitative groundwater issues which are not covered by the 
Groundwater Act may be dealt with by the Water Management Act (ibid.). Nothwith-
standing the instrument of integrated water policy and water management plans, there 
are no legal requirements for integrated water quality and quantity objectives. Explicit 
linkages are rare such as groundwater standards for nitrates in relation to drinking 
water production. Generally, groundwater and surface water issues are covered by 
parallel networks of experts and officials (Interviews 44 and 48, Appendix I).  
In general the domestic water policy legislation integration discourse, which has 
its roots in the 1990s, has been supported by the WFD. The European river basin 
management approach has been mentioned by the Dutch Council of Ministers among 
the three major reasons for drafting and adopting the 2009 Water Act (Tweede Kamer 
der Staten-Generaal, 2004e). The Water Act which replaces eight former statutes in 
the area of water management including the Water Management Act, the Surface Wa-
ter Pollution Act and the Groundwater Act, aims to enforce the integrated water sys-
tem management approach (Anonymous, 2009a). The new Act brings toegther water 
quality and quantity objectives into one, more integrative water license procedure, but 
it does not further clarify and quantify the interrelations between standards for 
groundwater and surface water bodies. For dessication of terrestrial nature sites, the  
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quantitative interrelations have been legally acknowledged before adoption of the 
WFD (Van Rijswick, 2000: 23; translation from Dutch added): 
 
Dessication closely relates to qunatitative groundwater management, but, due to the 
interplay between groundwater and surface water bodies, also to quantitative surface wa-
ter management. These interrelations have been acknowledged explicitly by Article 24(2) 
of the Water Management Act (Anonymous, 1989) and by case law.  
 
Van Rijswick (2001: 64, 83 and 369) points at two weaknesses of the WFD: despite its 
Pemable’s Statement 19 on the importance of linking water quantity and quality issues, 
the WFD’s articles provide for (1) a limited elaboration of water quantity management 
and (2) weakly developed relations between quantity and quality policies. The sub-
sequent Groundwater Directive (European Union, 2006) and the Floods Directive 
(European Union, 2007) have filled in the first omission better than the second. Al-
though Statement 19 of the Preamble mentions control of quantity as an ancillary 
element in securing good water quality (European Communities, 2000: 2), the WFD 
does not include specific requirements for formulation of interlinked quantity and 
quality objectives. According to Annex VI of the WFD (European Communities: 64) 
Member States may choose from a non-exhaustive list of supplementary measures in 
order to meet the environmental objectives for surface water and groundwater bodies. 
This list includes abstraction controls and artificial recharge of aquifers. Member 
States are free to opt for quality objectives oriented quantity measures, under the 
labels of ‘other relevant measures’ and ‘negotiated environmental agreements’ (ibid.).  
 
In the Netherlands, since the 1993 and 1995 near-flood events, societal and political 
attention predominantly flows to flood prevention issues. Due to the adoption of the 
WFD, water quality and ecological restoration issues regain some political attention, 
especially after publication of the 2003 Aquarein report (Van der Bolt et al., 2003). 
However in general, water quality issues still receive low public attention as compared 
to flood management, climate change and socio-economic development. Not-
withstanding integration of informal national water quantity (WM21) and water quality 
(WFD) organisational structures and despite national internal integration rhetoric, the 
river basin management plans mainly focus on WFD issues (due to a fear for Euro-
pean obligations). The dominant focus of the Dutch river basin management plans on 
water quality and ecological restoration issues indicates a sharp contrast with the 
Dutch tradition of integrated national water policy documents since 1985. The Dutch 
river basin management plans include a synthesis of objectives and management 
measures for individual water bodies’ types without providing much clarity on the 
interdependencies between them (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2009a).  
Since the WFD explicitly includes both groundwater and surface water manage-
ment issues and their interdependencies, its implementation challenges parallel 
domestic actor networks to provide for more interactions. However, significant 
knowledge gaps and stage differences (for example the related European Ground-
water Directive is finalised only in 2006) contribute to a relative underexposure of 
interactions between surface water and groundwater bodies in the first Dutch WFD 
implementation planning cycle (Interviews 41, 44 and 46, Appendix I). Given the 
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complicated nature of these interaction issues, the WFD packages of measures mainly 
include research initiatives to tackle them. Due to the WFD, interactions among sur-
face water and groundwater actor networks are expected to increase substantially at 
the second WFD implementation planning cycle between 2010 and 2015 (ibid.). At 
the same time, due to the persistent nature of the ground water pollution issues and 
the long time span for ground water processes, quick wins are rather not to be ex-
pected (Interview 47, Appendix I).  
The observations point at an evolution from a juxtaposition of ideal-type A and 
B IRBM scope rules (internal integration) before adoption of the WFD towards 
dominance of ideal-type B rules after adoption of the WFD (see Table 6.2b). In the 
period before adoption of the WFD Dutch water legislation is divided over a diversity 
of acts, while the national water policy and management plans are more integrative 
yet. In the period after adoption of the WFD, also a legislative integration evolution 
becomes noticeable with adoption of the new Water Act (Anonymous, 2009a). Van 
Rijswick and Havekes (2012: 359) argue that ‘an expansion of the environmental ob-
jectives [WFD’s Article 4] would be advisable with a view to adequate protection of 
surface water, bacause many of the implementing instruments aim primarily at achie-
ving the environmental objectives and not so much at the general objectives contained 
in WFD’s Article 1’. They propose ‘to onclude the objective to limit water shortage by 
ensuring a “good quantitative surface water status” in [WFD’s] Article 4’ (ibid.: 361). If the 
EC and the Member States follow this advice, further internal integration tendencies 
may be expected in the future. 
 
Table 6.2b: Ideal-type collective-choice IRBM internal integration rules (national level) 
Ideal-type rules↓ 1990 to 2000↓ 2001 to 2009↓ 
A: Separate legislation, policy documents and 
management plans for both water quality and 
quantity issues. Surface water and groundwater are 
dealt with in parallel.  
 
X 
 
X 
B: Legislation, policy documents and management 
plans which include parallel objectives and 
 measures for both quantitative and qualitative 
aspects and for groundwater and surface water. 
 
X 
 
X 
C: Legislation, policy documents and management 
plans with integrated objectives and measures for 
related surface and groundwater bodies, including 
quantitative and qualitative aspects. 
  
Legend: The research observations come closest to ideal-type A and B rules as expressed by 
the ‘X’. The ‘x’ points at a reduced resemblance of the observations with ideal-type A rules 
after adoption of the WFD.  
 
Although the new 2009 Water Act clearly marks a significant internal integration step, 
actually it mainly brings together existing parallel pieces of legislation which included 
certain linkages already. For example, the instrument of integrated water policy and 
water management plans has been incorporated from the former Water Management 
Act (Anonymous, 1989). The internal integration exercise seems not to be completed. 
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For example, qualitative groundwater issues mainly remain in the Land Protection Act 
(Anonymous, 1983).  As mentioned earlier the WFD has not been the initial trigger 
for the internal integration evolution, but is among the three main arguments for 
drafting the new, more integrated Water Act. The lacuna for a more integrated 
method of standard setting (by explicitly relating quantity and quality aspects) has not 
been filled in completeluy by the WFD. Hower, its instructions for definition of and 
monitoring of compliance with its environmental objectives (Annex V; European 
Communities, 2000: 33 till 63) indirectly may include some triggers, such as inclusion 
of those hydrological and morphological characteristics which are supportive for the 
ecological state of water bodies. In the first domestic WFD river basin management 
planning cycle up to December 2009, relations between upstream, midstream and 
downstream surface water bodies and relations between surface water and groundwa-
ter bodies have not been systematically considered in the exercise of ecological objec-
tives setting. Finally, the ambiguous nature of the WFD has lead to a paradox: on the 
one hand it has supported the domestic legislative integration tendency; on the other 
hand the Dutch river basin management plans predominantly focus on water quality 
and ecology, leaving out detailed measures for floods and droughts management. 
 
Substantive scope: level of external integration 
When reading the Preamble of the WFD one may interpret high cross policy sector 
integration ambitions. For example, Statement 16 stresses that ‘Further integration of 
protection and sustainable management of water into other Community policy areas 
such as energy, transport, agriculture, fisheries, regional policy and tourism is neces-
sary. This Directive should provide a basis for a continued dialogue and for the devel-
opment of strategies towards a further integration of policy areas’ (European Com-
munities, 2000: 2). Furthermore, Statement 47 continues with ‘This Directive should 
provide mechanisms to address obstacles to progress in improving water status when 
these fall outside the scope of Community water legislation, with a view to developing 
appropriate Community strategies for overcoming them.‘ (ibid.: 5) After consultation 
of the full 72 pages of the WFD, the reader might be disappointed about the lack of 
more specified cross-sector coordination and integration arrangements. However, Van 
Rijswick (2001) and Mostert (2010) argue that the WFD may trigger cross-sector inte-
gration initiatives whenever Member States and domestic actors are willing to do so. 
In this research, the level of external integration has been explored by addressing the 
relations between water policy and respectively agriculture (the WFD and the Nitrates 
Directive, nature conservation (the WFD and the Birds- and Habitats Directives and 
spatial planning. Whereas the relations with agriculture and nature have been dis-
cussed explicitly in the Dutch WFD implementation planning process, the relations 
with spatial planning have hardly been an issue. 
In the Netherlands before adoption of the WFD, legislative arrangements have 
been introduced for coherence between national plans of related policy domains. The 
former Water Management Act included coordination requirements between policy 
plans for water, the environment, spatial planning and traffic and transport (Anony-
mous, 1989; Van Rijswick, 2001). As a generic rule, whenever a new national or-
provincial policy document is drafted it should incorporate relevant relations with and  
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requirements from other policy domains, at least at an equal ambition level as ex-
pressed by earlier policy documents. This refers to the so-called leapfrog principle 
(haasje-over-principe). Furthermore, to express shared responsibilities the national water 
policy memoranda are signed by the TPW, HSE and AFN ministries (Anonymous, 
1989). The Water Act has remained these former cross-sector coordination arrange-
ments (Anonymous, 2009a). Its Section 4.1 provides that the ministers for infrastruc-
ture, environment and agriculture co-sign the national water plan as to intertune poli-
cies for water, environment, spatial planning, nature and agriculture. Section 6.4 pro-
vides arrangements for coordination of water pollution and environmental licences 
(Articles 6.27 till 6.29; ibid.). So far, after long discussions between proponents and 
opponents, no decision has been made to fully integrate the water license system into 
the environmental one. Dominant arguments especially from the side of water manag-
ers are that such integration might sincerely weaken the coherence of the water 
management approach and the water management authorities might lose their grip on 
water pollution issues (Van Rijswick, 2001: 375-376). See also Subsection 6.3.4 (choice 
rules) for a more detailed account on the nature of the Dutch license system.  
Ostrom (2005) stresses the importance of studying informal traditions and 
practices, in addition to formal, legal arrangements. To speak more bluntly, apart from 
the leapfrog principle how do the different ministries actually work together? For exam-
ple, the specialty principle which means that ministries are not allowed to interfere with 
the specific competences of another ministry, may trigger barriers to cross-sector inte-
gration attempts, especially in the case of delicate political issues with potential large 
socio-economic impact. The chronological WFD process reconstruction of this re-
search reveals indications for such barriers, although remarkable differences occur 
depending on the ministries involved. On the one hand, the WFD planning imple-
mentation process shows more complicated and tense relations between the TPW and 
ANF Ministries. On the other hand, there are indications for more cooperative rela-
tions between the TPW and HSE Ministries. At the WFD drafting and negotiation 
stage the TPW and HSE Ministries both have been active at the European level (for 
example by launching Dutch position papers), whereas the ANF Ministry has been 
more reticent (Melis and Boudwijn, 2002; Interviews 18 and 43, Appendix I).   
Soon after adoption of the WFD the perception of a Dutch victory and high 
environmental ambitions gradually dampens by a fear of strict legally binding require-
ments and disproportionate socio-economic implementation costs. Dutch national au-
thorities and parliamentarians refer to the severe restrictive consequences from the 
transposition of the Air Quality Directive into Dutch legislation. Consequently, the 
HSE and TPW Ministries are very eager to cooperate on the juridical and legal 
arrangements around the WFD’s environmental objectives (as will be illustrated in 
Subsection 6.3.4 (choice rules). Given the strong national political emphasis on con-
tinuation of current policies with the aim of a feasible and affordable WFD implemen-
tation, no large additional spatial claims have been included in the first generation 
river basin management plans. The ANF Ministry has operated tactically both to avoid 
additional investments to the Nitrates Directive by the agricultural sector and a too 
tight coupling of the WFD and requirements of the Birds- and Habitats Directives. 
With regard to the former, the launch of the 2003 Aquarein study report (Van der Bolt 
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et al., 2003) was timed perfectly from a political point of view (Interview 18; Appendix 
I). Concerning the latter, the ANF Ministry did not provide for much additional 
human and financial resources in linking up with the regional and local WFD imple-
mentation processes. At the national level prior agreed financial resources for the 
Birds- and Habitats Directives were accepted as leading for the WFD implementation 
process. In other words, regarding the WFD, the ANF Ministry successfully has 
avoided significant additional investments for the agricultural sector and nature 
conservation. 
 
Water management and spatial planning 
Concerning spatial planning water systems do not play a major role until the 1980s 
(Van Buuren, 2009). In the 1980s, as driven by concerns about the negative impact of 
socio-economic development on the environment, the then Dutch Council of Minis-
ters asks for more attention to the balance between intensive and extensive forms of 
use of space, taking into account environmental and water aspects (Sijmons et al, 
1990). Consequently, the so-called Additional Fourth National Memorandum on Spa-
tial Planning (Vierde Nota Ruimtelijke Ordening Extra (VINEX; Ministerie van Volks-
huisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieu, 1991) includes a zoning system which 
takes the physical system boundaries as fundament, with water as the most important 
entry (Van Buuren, 2009). In the subsequent Fifth National Memorandum on Spatial 
Planning (Vijfde Nota Ruimtelijke Ordening; Ministerie van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke 
Ordening en Milieu, 2001) water is broadly accepted as one among major guiding 
principles within spatial planning (Van Buuren, 2009). This integrative evolution takes 
place in the period in which the room for water approach (as triggered by the near 1993 
and 1995 floods) gains ground in the Fourth National Water Policy Memorandum 
(Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 1998).  
To prevent further loss of space for water systems, a water assessment procedure 
(watertoets) is introduced for all decisions on locations for new spatial developments 
and alterations of existing land use destinations and practices (Ministerie van Volkshu-
isvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieu, 2003; Van Hal, 2004; Van der Vlist and van 
Dijk, 2009). In the first decennium of the 21st Century political attention shifts to 
supporting conditions for socio-economic development. Quality amelioration of water 
and nature is not considered as own objective but as a legal condition for sustainable 
development (Ministerie van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieu, 2006). 
According to the Spatial Planning Act spatial policy is written down in coherent spatial 
visions (structuurvisies) at the national, provincial and municipal levels. The visions will 
have to be translated into legally binding land and water use destinations in municipal 
zoning plans (Anonymous, 2006). 
Although not primarily triggered by the WFD, the Water Act announces an en-
forcement of the linkage between water management and spatial planning procedures. 
For national and regional water systems, the respective water plans should include 
strategic structure visions by which (headlines of) spatial requirements for water policy 
and programmes of measures are anchored. These structure visions should be guiding 
for spatial planning, hence may enforce the relations between planning of water policy 
and spatial development (Anonymous, 2009a; Van Rijswick and Havekes, 2012; Inter 
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views 45 and 50, Appendix I). The national Space Memorandum (Nota Ruimte; Minis-
terie van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieu, 2006) bundles the na-
tional policy strategies for several aspects of spatial planning (nature, economy, water 
management), which have been dealt with in separate memoranda before. It is an 
attempt of the Dutch Council of Ministers to reduce dysfunctional redundancy among 
policy domains and to increase transparency and coherence (ibid.). Although the 
memorandum may be considered a first step towards cross-sector, integrative national 
policy plans, due to the speciality principle, individual ministries still draft their own sec-
tor plans. 
The leapfrog principle should pay off especially at the level of strategic policy docu-
ments of the provinces, which may choose between close coordination arrangements 
for parallel policy sector plans and integrated environmental quality documents. As 
detailed further in Chapter 7, in the Dutch part of the Meuse River Basin both options 
are present. However, at the national level until December 2009, the choice for inte-
grated, cross-sector policy plans has not been made. These observations point at ideal-
type B IRBM scope rules for external integration (see Table 6.2c). 
 
Table 6.2c: Ideal-type collective-choice IRBM external integration rules; national level) 
Ideal-type rules↓ 1990 to 2000↓ 2001 to 2009↓ 
A: Separate policy documents and management 
plans for water policy and other policy domains 
without linkages. 
 
 
 
 
B: Policy documents and management plans for 
other policy domains take into account water issues 
and reversely. 
 
X 
 
X 
C: Cross-sector, integrative policy and management 
plans. 
  
Legend: The research observations come closest to ideal-type B rules as expressed by the ‘X’. 
 
 
6.3.2. Position rules 
As introduced in Subsection 2.2.4, within this research, position rules relate to the 
question as to how do collective (inter-)national river basin governance and policy 
principles affect the positions of owners and users of water and land. Or reversely, 
which conditions should apply to acquisition, continuation and termination of rights 
to own and/or use (interrelated) water and land resources, in order to comply with 
common principles of ecological, social and economic resilience? Three ideal-types of 
position rules have been distinguished (see Table 6.3). With regard to position rules, 
the WFD explicitly addresses relations between water and agriculture and between 
water and nature conservation. Protected areas from both the Nitrates Directive and 
the Birds- and Habitats Directives are included in the WFD’s register of protected 
areas (European Communities, 2000: 32).  
 
Water and agriculture 
As described in Subsection 6.3.1, small communities of farmers have initiated the 
Dutch water management organisation long time ago (Van de Ven, 2004; Havekes, 
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2008). Village administrations formulated the collective-choice rules for maintenance 
and management of hydraulic infrastructure and supervised their implementation 
(ibid.). This historically central role of land owners and users in water management is 
part of the explanation why the Dutch authorities prefer voluntary agreements to 
adapt land use practices over expropriation. This does not lead to the conclusion that 
land property and user rights and water user rights are unconditioned. The Dutch 
Civil Code (Burgerlijk Wetboek; Book 5, Article 1, Part 2; translation from Dutch added; 
www.wetboek-online.nl) defines that owners of a thing (like land) are free to use it 
while excluding all other persons, ‘as long as this is not in conflict with the rights of 
others and taking into account restrictions based on legal rules and unwritten law’. 
Both private law and public or administrative law may restrict absolute power and 
freedom of land owners or users (Needham, 2006). According to basic law of Dutch 
land use planning, the owner of land may not change the use of it without prior per-
mission and an application to change the use will be judged against a valid land use 
plan which specifies the uses permitted on that land. Land use planning, by restricting 
the possible uses to which land may be put, can also affect the income from the land 
to which the owner has a right. In cases where restrictions do not affect everyone 
equally damage compensation schemes may apply (ibid.). According to Article 10 of 
the Spatial Planning Act (Anonymous, 2006), land includes water. So activities on 
water too are subjected to land use regulation (Needham, 2006). The municipal, local 
land use plans are legally binding.  
Concerning diffuse sources of water pollution, agriculture is a major contributor 
(RIZA, 2002; Ligtvoet et al., 2006). Rooted in a history in which farmers for centuries 
have had a central position in water regulation and flood defence structures and given 
the contribution to Dutch economy, authorities are cautious to affect their property 
and user rights significantly. Wisserhof (2000) identifies strong corporatist policy ar-
rangements in which a coalition of the state (represented by the Ministry of Agricul-
ture), the agricultural community and the parliamentary committee on agriculture has 
been dominant from 1945 until the 1980s. Frouws (1993) argues that agriculture is the 
only sector of the Dutch economy in which corporatism has been a long-lasting policy 
arrangement. The pre- (Second World) war agricultural crisis and European protection 
and stimulation mechanisms (triggered by the ideology of agrarian particularism) may 
provide for a large part of the explanation. Since the 1980s onwards, the dominant 
corporatist arrangement gradually erodes, mainly due to external social and political 
pressures (Wisserhof, 2000). In the 1990s agricultural policy broadens towards inte-
grated rural development, providing other actors more firm access and influence 
(ibid.; Ministerie van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij, 1992; Van Tatenhove, 
1993; Frouws and Van Tatenhove, 1993). Bekke and De Vries (1994) denote a role 
change of the ANF Ministry from a sectoral client ministry to becoming a ministry of 
general administration. Wiering and Immink (2009) argue that the dominant position 
of the agricultural sector within the inland water management authorities has de-
creased gradually for the benefit of other interests.  
Notwithstanding the still relative large influence of actors from the agricultural 
sector, land and water user rights are not unconditioned. Since the 1970s public and 
political awareness on environmental quality degradation and overproduction trigger 
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environmental protection policy and measures, both at the European and domestic 
levels. Due to severe water quality problems, the Surface Water Pollution Act 
(Anonymous, 1970) is adopted. The then primary focus is on emission reduction from 
point sources of pollution (such as by means of waste water treatment infrastructure). 
Since the 1980s, in order to tackle diffuse pollution sources, several agricultural policy 
measures have been announced, as stemming from the Manure Substances Act 
(Meststoffenwet; Anonymous, 1986b) and the Land Protection Act (Anonymous, 1986a) 
(Van der Schans et al., 2001; Hulshof, 2005). Given the particular physical circum-
stances (the combination of large surface waters in connection with a relatively large 
number of related shallow groundwater systems) and the large amount of animal ma-
nure (from factory farming, intensive dairy farming and large-scale application of fer-
tilisers), the Nitrogen and Phosphorus emissions to the water systems are considerable 
(and among the highest in Europe; RIZA, 2002; MNP-RIVM, 2004a). Consequently, 
the policy assignment is substantial. For example, the Third National Water Policy 
Memorandum includes (intentional) Nitrogen and Phosphorus emission reduction 
aims for the 1985 to 1995 period of 70% and 75% respectively (Miniserie van Verkeer 
en Waterstaat, 1989). 
After adoption of the Nitrates Directive (European Communities, 1991b), a 
breath-taking cat and mouse play develops between the EC and the Netherlands. 
Given the specific physical characteristics and the high emission rates in agriculture, 
the Dutch national authorities decide to designate the entire territory as nitrates sensi-
tive area. Furthermore, the explicit linkage between the WFD and the Nitrates Direc-
tive (by means of the former’s register of protected areas), requires the Dutch to 
include agri-environmental measures into the WFD’s programme of basic measures. 
The Dutch mouse, chased by an impatient European cat, which has provided the 
mouse extra time to grow more fat by means of temporary derogations, increasingly 
gets strangled in an uneven wrestling match. While the ANF Ministry stresses that the 
WFD may not lead to supplementary measures to these of the Nitrates Directive, the 
TPW Ministry feels the pressure from provincial and water management authorities 
who continue asking for additional generic measures.  
Several reports (RIZA, 2002; Van der Bolt at al., 2003; NMP-RIVM, 2004a; 
Ligtvoet et al, 2006) make clear that additional measures in the agricultural sector may 
only pay off significantly whenever implemented at large scale. Expected socio-
economic consequences from such measures will be considerable and are labelled as 
disproportional by the national authorities. Farmers’ interests groups periodically ask for 
inclusion of considerable past expenditures, the need for differentiated water quality 
standards (related to sensitiveness of diverse water system types) and a (European) 
level playing field (LTO, 2006, 2007). The scared mouse finds a temporary way out in 
(limited) introduction of buffer-stripes (along valuable and nutrient sensitive brooks in 
the higher, sandy parts of the Netherlands), research projects on testing potential cost-
effective measures, the formulation of healthy ecosystem supportive levels of 
nutrients for different water system types, prolongation of derogation as long as pos-
sible, avoidance of legally binding uniform European standards and asking invest-
ments by upstream riparian states (with reference to the no-shift principle). 
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The conclusions of the evaluation of the Manure Substances Act (NMP-RIVM, 
2004b) clearly show that additional measures will be inescapable. Subsequently, from 
the information letter to the Lower House of Parliament on the national ambition for 
the fourth Nitrates Actions Programme (2010 to 2013 period) (Tweede Kamer der 
Staten-Generaal, 2008b), it becomes clear that measures from the third Nitrates 
Actions Programme (until December 2009) will not be sufficient to meet the water 
quality objectives. For Phosphorus a stand-still in the 2015 to 2030 period (as com-
pared to the present situation) will be the result. Without additional measures the EC 
would not accept further prolongation of the derogation. March 2009, in a second 
information letter the ANF Minister stresses that whenever innovative measures as 
tested in pilot projects may not pay-off satisfactory, a further strengthening of the 
manure application standards between 2014 and 2017 (for the fifth Nitrates Actions 
Programme) will be inescapable (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2009a). Given 
the urgency of eutrophication problems in a number of fresh surface waters the Min-
ister has decided to revise prior agreements with the agricultural sector. A more re-
gionally differentiated system of measures is necessary for improvement of surface 
and groundwater quality beyond stand-still only. The rules for good agricultural prac-
tices in general are sharpened, although for some low cost-effective measures rules 
become less severe.  
This brief historical overview illustrates that before adoption of the WFD, user 
rights for water and land are preconditioned with regard to environmental external-
ities. Since the 1970s, environmental externalities have gradually conditioned property 
and user rights of farmers. However, human development options remain central in 
Dutch policies and legislation and special financial support arrangements have been 
designed to overcome (part of the) socio-economic externalities of environmental 
measures. Van Rijswick and Havekes (2012: 318) stress that ‘Dutch water law and 
environmental law grant extensive protection to existing rights’. For example, ‘permits 
are granted on a “first come, first served” base’ (ibid.). The adoption of the WFD, 
given its ambitious environmental objectives are perceived as strict European obliga-
tions, triggers a fear of land owners and users for additional investments and loss of 
land. This fear should also be understood within the context of a downward trend of 
land use for agriculture (with less but bigger farms; Boonstra and Frouws, 2005; Milieu 
en Natuur Planbureau, 2007). Partly due to opposition from the agricultural sector, in 
2004, the Dutch Council of Ministers decides to take the then actual land use destina-
tions and spatial planning policy as starting-point for domestic WFD implementation 
(Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2004b).  
Van Rijswick (2001) observes a scattered transposition of requirements from the 
Nitrates Directive since different Ducth statutes cover parts of the arrangements: the 
Environmental Management Act, the Land Protection Act and the Surface Water 
Pollution Act. She argues that the Dutch Achilles heel lies in the incomplete transposi-
tion of European water quality objectives into sufficiently legally binding standards 
and the lack of referral to these standards in pieces of legislation from related policy 
domains (ibid.: 304, 356 and 361). Also the national Space Memorandum (Ministerie 
van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieu, 2006) witnesses a prudent 
approach in which voluntary agreements with farmers prevail (most notably with 
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regard to nature management policy). Expropriation arrangements with regard to 
environmental objectives are not opted for (ibid.). 
 
Water and nature 
Generally, Dutch politicians perceive the requirements from the Birds and Habitats 
Directives as very restrictive. A fear dominates that current prior socio-economic 
activities and future development plans in and around the Natura 2000 sites may be 
prohibited to a large extent. As such, these Directives potentially have a huge impact 
on land and water property and user rights. At the time of adoption of the WFD the 
AFN Ministry already struggles with the socio-economic impact of the Birds and 
Habitats Directives for some years. Van Rijswick (2001) argues that inclusion of the 
Natura 2000 sites in the register of protected areas is one of the most explicit WFD’s 
arrangements for cross-sector integration. The observations of this research show that 
imlementation of this arrangement is subject to a conflictual interministerial coordina-
tion game. In retrospect, in the Netherlands a laborious coordination process has 
developed between the TPW and ANF Ministries and between the national and re-
gional authorities, in which the WFD and Natura 2000 implementation processes have 
been coupled and decoupled again (Broekhans, Van der Heijden and Ten Heuvelhof, 
2010).  
As a remarkable indicator for the coordination struggle, the attempts by the 
TPW, HSE and ANF Ministries to agree on a draft memorandum about the relations 
between the WFD and Natura 2000 (Minsterie van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en 
Voedselkwaliteit et al., 2006) may serve: the memorandum has never been released, 
although some elements have been incorporated into the 2006 December Memoran-
dum (Minsterie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2006b). Remarkably, the ANF and TPW 
Ministries agree on the coordination rules spring 2007 but they release individual (in-
terpretation) letters about these rules (respectively in May and November; Van der 
Zande, 2007; Wouters, 2007). Between December 2007 and April 2008 a special ex-
pert team of the ANF Ministry visits the regional and local water managers to get an 
overview of critical bottlenecks between the Natura 2000 and WFD assignments. In 
the February 2008 meeting of the Regional Meuse Political Platform the respresenta-
tive of the ANF Minstry apologises explicitly for its ‘untimely and inadequate coordi-
nation efforts’. As of March 2008 the coordination game improves when the ANF 
Ministry iniates the Natura 2000 Bureau and invites the TPW Ministry to join. 
At the end of 2009 the TPW and ANF Ministries conclude that the actual num-
ber of Natura 2000 sites with substantive water conditions bottlenecks turns out to be 
limited (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2009a: 50, translation): 
 
In most cases the Natura objectives perfectly fit with the WFD’s water quality objec-
tives. In cases of conflicting objectives local tailor made decisions have been made in 
which one of both directives has been considered leading. Required water conditions 
have been incorporated in the formulation of desirable ground and surface water 
regimes (quantity). When specific target habitats or species within Natura 200 sites 
do require more severe water conditions (both quality and quantity) which go beyond 
the general WFD objectives, these conditions and related measures will be included 
in the Natura 2000 management plans. 
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The regional public actors mention three reasons for incomplete packages of measures 
for Natura 2000 in the first generation river basin management plans: (1) lack of 
knowledge on cost-effective measures, (2) difficulties with land acquisition (since vol-
untary agreement with land owners is a precondition) and (3) local processes for the 
Natura 2000 management plans still continue. Environmental NGOs ply for a more 
proactive attitude of the provincial authorities and regional water management 
authorities in the Meuse River Basin, since in their opinion enough instruments are 
available for full integration of the Natura 2000 requirements in the WFD’s pro-
gramme of measures (Heijnen, 2007). 
At the end of 2009, the ANF Ministry still struggles with the potential large 
socio-economic consequences of the Natura 2000 obligations. Partly stimulated by 
questions in the Lower House of Parliament and advices of special committees, the 
ministry tries to integrate and simplify legislation and make the implementation rules 
more transparent, feasible and hence, more acceptable. According to farmers’ interest 
organisations, farmers may be afraid to invest in nature protection as they fear related 
future restrictions. To cope with the external pressures the ANF Ministry invites a 
consultancy firm to study possibilities for continuation of present land and water user 
and property rights without compromising compliance with the Natura 2000 objec-
tives. According to the consultants the Birds and Habitats Directives mention no 
deadlines, hence a staged implementation is allowed in which socio-economic consi-
derations may play a role (Huys Adviesgroep, 2009). This offers room for present and 
future activities. A more balanced, programmatic approach is recommended in which 
both development of socio-economic activities and ecological objectives are elabo-
rated with relevant stakeholders. The linkage between measures and compliance with 
ecological objectives should be made clear and monitoring of both development of 
natural values and ammonia deposition should be part of the package. Activities that 
do not infringe stand-still should be allowed. However, for the long term, improve-
ments beyond stand-still may be required. The consultants propose to define current 
activities as these that are formally licensed (ibid.).  
The ANF Minister prefers the broad interpretation of the Nature Protection Act 
which also includes continuation of not licensed current activities. In its annual state 
of the art report on nature in the Netherlands (Natuurbalans 2009) the Environmental 
Assessment Agency concludes that uncertainties in the negotiation space around 
Natura 2000 objectives lead to frustrations, a negative image of nature and may hinder 
the realisation of objectives (Planbureau voor de Leefomgeving, 2009). The ecological 
objectives are too strictly formulated and offer little room for other ambitions like 
agriculture and recreation. This may cause a lack of public acceptance for Natura 2000 
measures (ibid.). 
The research observations point at ideal-type B IRBM position rules both in the 
period before and after adoption of the WFD (see Table 6.3). The report of the Ad-
vice Committee on Water Management in the 21st Century (Tielrooij et al., 2000) al-
ready made clear that, notwithstanding strong emphasis on opportunities for multiple 
land and water uses, changes in land and water user and property rights may not be 
prevented. However, given the political delicacy of and public opposition to spatial 
claims for flood prevention and mitigation (Roth, Warner and Winnubst, 2006), the 
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national authorities were not much in favour of additional spatial claims for water 
quality improvement and ecological restoration reasons (Tweede Kamer der Staten-
Generaal, 2004b). Consequently, the first Dutch WFD implementation planning cycle 
until December 2009 did not significantly alter the position of land owners and users.  
 
Table 6.3: Ideal-type collective-choice IRBM position rules (national level) 
Ideal-type rules↓ 1990 to 2000↓ 2001 to 2009↓ 
A: Protection of prior water and land resources 
use and property rights without preconditions on 
environmental, social and economic externalities. 
 
 
 
 
B: Conditional maintenance and acquirement of 
water and land resources use and property rights. 
Conditions include requirements to consider so-
cial, economic and/or environmental externalities. 
 
X 
 
X 
C: Reallocation of use and property rights, based 
on interrelated conditions of ecological, eco-
nomical and social resilience. 
  
Legend: The research observations come closest to ideal-type B rules as expressed by the ‘X’. 
  
Given environmental externalities increasingly have put pressures on agricultural en-
trepreneurs the national authorities remained cautious not to significantly restrict 
development room for agricultural entrepreneurs (Tweede Kamer der Staten-
Generaal, 2004b). On the one hand, the existing licenses system is considered appro-
priate for pollution prevention in the context of a shift to more generic rules over 
individual licences (ibid.). On the other hand, as part of the dilemma, the national 
authorities referred to potentially large socio-economic consequences from implemen-
tation of the WFD in combination with the Nitrates Directive (ibid.: 18; translation 
from Dutch added): 
 
The necessary approach fits into current policies but will lead to additional mea-
sures. It is very important that the sector itself establishes sound and sustainable 
agricultural practices. The Common Agricultural Policy, economic development 
and the innovation potential of the sector will determine the programmes of 
measures. The Dutch choice is to go for local, tailor-made solutions. The conse-
quences from implementation of the Nitrates Directive, which is partly leading 
for the WFD implementation, approximately will not be small. The intention is 
to limit these consequences as much as possible in order to safeguard room for 
economically healthy agricultural farms.  
 
6.3.3 Boundary rules 
As defined in Subsection 2.2.5, in this research, boundary rules are interpreted as re-
lated to who has access to the river basin management planning and decision-making 
process and who has not? What are conditions for entry and exit? What are the de-
grees of participation for different stakeholder categories? Three ideal-types of bound-
ary rules have been distinguished (see Table 6.4). 
GOING DUTCH: FEASIBILITY AND AFFORDABILITY 253 
 
 
 
As described in Subsection 6.3.1, since most Dutch are born in polders surrounded by 
water, organisational structures which concern water management issues are almost as 
old as the country itself (Van de Ven, 2004; Havekes, 2008). The decentralised unitary 
state also becomes noticeable from the water policy domain with a national Water 
Policy Department and a State Waters Management Agency (Rijkswaterstaat; as 
founded in 1798 by Napoleon Bonaparte) and regional water management authorities 
that are elected by the inhabitants of their territories. Who has an interest in water 
management pays for it and has a say in it (Anonymous, 1991; 2009b). Up to February 
12, 2004, coordination of the implementation of national water policy took place in 
the Integrated Water Management Committee, which was chaired by the Royal Prince 
of Orange (www.helpdeskwater.nl, consulted on March 8, 2011). Representatives 
from the Association of Regional Water Management Authorities (UvW), the Inter-
Provincial Platform (IPO), the Association of Dutch Municipalities (VNG) and direc-
tor-generals from the TPW, HSE and ANF Ministries participated in the committee, 
of which the secretariat was covered by the TPW Ministry. The committee had four 
main tasks with regard to integrated water management: (1) coordination of imple-
mentation practices; (2) discussion on policy proposals; (3) advise to the State Secre-
tary for Water Management on implementation issues (on request and by own initia-
tive); and (4) conduct of studies and research (ibid.). Most agenda issues were pre-
pared by five working groups in which also representatives from socio-economic 
interest groups, environmental NGOs and research institutes participated by 
invitation (ibid.). 
The tasks of the Integrated Water Management Committee have been taken over 
by the National Political Water Platform, chaired by the State Secretary for Water 
Management. At the same time the Advice Commission Water, chaired by the Royal 
Prince of Orange, has been installed (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2004a). 
This commission independently advises the State Secretary for Water Management on 
implementation issues of integrated water management. The State Secretary appoints 
its members, who are experts on issues of public government, spatial planning, water 
management and finances. In general they have no political functions in the water 
management domain (ibid.). Additionally, the independent Advise Committee on 
Water Policy Legislation (Commissie van Advies Waterstaatswetgeving) exists since 1892 
(www.cawsw.nl, consulted on March 8, 2011). This commission provides advice for 
the Dutch Cabinet and the Upper and Lower Houses of Parliament on the contents 
and structure of water policy legislation (ibid.). Socio-economic interest groups and 
environmental NGOs may advice the State Secretary for Water Management on the 
effectiveness and feasibility of proposed ministerial measures for integrated water 
management, by participation in the National Water Management Consultation Plat-
form (Overlegorgaan Water en Noordzee; www.helpdeskwater.nl; consulted on March 8, 
2011). This platform also serves as the national WFD Consultation Platform. 
By participation in national working groups and advisory platforms, non-
governmental stakeholders have ample opportunities to (try to) influence national 
water policy formulation and implementation strategies. The participation degree is 
conditioned by the public actors and varies for working groups and issues at stake 
(Wittenhorst and Mak, 2005). However, emphasis is on exchange of information and 
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expertise and informal consultation (in addition to formal consultation procedures). 
At the end of the day the public authorities decide. Whenever a stakeholder is dissatis-
fied, one may turn the face to members of parliament in order to lobby for specific 
interests. The WFD implementation process does not provoke changes to these 
Dutch traditions, rather offers additional opportunities for informal information and 
consultation.  
At the national level boundary rules for the WFD implementation process are 
written down in general terms in the national communication strategy (Projectteam 
Implementatie Kaderrichtlijn Water, 2001a) and subsequent working programmes 
(Wittenhorst and Mak, 2005). Information, consultation and acceptance building are 
keywords in the communication strategy (ibid.). The WFD Implementation Memo-
randum concludes that the WFD’s requirements on public participation are feasible 
(Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2004b). Formal information and consultation 
requirements with regard to Article 14 are anchored in the WFD Implementation Act 
(Implementatiewet Kaderrichtlijn Water; Anonymous, 2005). In addition, ‘societal interest 
groups are invited to participate actively in all stages of decision-making towards 2009 
(river basin management plans)’, such as by attending thematic sessions of the Na-
tional Water Management Consultation Platform (Tweede Kamer der Staten-
Generaal, 2004b: 23).  
The TPW Ministry points at continuation of Dutch traditions and practices in 
which informal information and consultation precede formal consultation rounds. Co-
productions by public actors dominate but the national working groups also allow for 
(conditioned) co-productions with private and civil actors. According to the TPW 
Ministry ‘the contributions of societal interest groups contribute to a careful and bal-
anced decision-making over the WDF assignments’ (Tweede Kamer der Sataten-
Generaal, 2004b: 23). Although public consultation of certain legislative proposals is 
not required in Dutch law, due to WFD’s Article 14, national authorities informally 
will consult environmental NGOs and socio-economic interest groups (ibid.).The 
national Water Policy Department of he TPW Ministry expects the regional and local 
authorities to organise a comparable active participation process at their levels, in 
which WFD consultation platforms (sounding-boards; klankbordgroepen) take a central 
position (DGW, 2005). 
 
The national evaluation of the WFD implementation process shows that interest 
groups and environmental NGOs have struggled with the multiplicity of parallel proc-
esses, unclear expectations and the time pressure (Ten Heuvelhof et al., 2010: 68, 69). 
Whereas the majority of respondents in the public sector is positive about the division 
of contributions among different actor groups, a majority of respondents at environ-
mental NGOs and drinking water companies considers these unbalanced and unequal 
(ibid.: 70). The interviews and written argumentation survey generally support these 
observations: especially the environmental NGOs felt too much disconnected from 
the process and asked for more coherence among and transparency of the implemen-
tation processes at different administrative levels. A majority of respondents within all 
interest group categories is negative about the extent to which one could influence the 
agenda setting of the WFD implementation process (Ten Heuvelhof et al., 2010: 56). 
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Remarkably, only 20% of the respondents from interests groups consider continua-
tion of the National Water Management Consultation Platform as necessary for the 
next implementation stage. On the contrary, the interests groups are much more posi-
tive about continuation of the regional and local WFD consultation platforms and the 
local implementation processes (ibid.). Considerable differences have been observed 
between the roles of these regional platforms. Whereas in some river basins, the pub-
lic actors mainly informed the interests groups, in other river basins, discussions about 
feasible measures took place and members were asked to advice the politicians (Sant-
bergen, 2005; Ovaa, 2007; Ten Heuvelhof et al., 2010). See also the analyses of the 
regional and local processes in respectively the Chapters 7 and 8. 
 
Table 6.4: Ideal-types collective-choice IRBM boundary rules (national level) 
Ideal-type rules↓ 1990 to 2000↓ 2001 to 2009↓ 
A: Access to the river basin management planning 
process is restricted to public actors only. Other 
stakeholders are informed. 
 
 
 
 
B: Non-governmental actors may have access to the 
river basin management planning process under 
conditions set by the public actors. Emphasis on 
co-thinking and consultation. 
 
X 
 
X 
C: Ample opportunities for all interested stake-
holders to join the river basin management planning 
process, including co-productions, co-decisions and 
self-realisation. 
 
 
 
 
Legend: The research observations come closest to ideal-type B rules as expressed by the ‘X’. 
 
The observations point at ideal-type B IRBM boundary rules in the period before and 
after adoption of the WFD (see Table 6.4). The national WFD approach fits well in 
the tradition of informal consultation and information options before formal consulta-
tion rounds.  
 
6.3.4 Choice Rules 
As introduced in Section 2.2.6, for the aim of this research two indicators for observa-
tion of choice rules change have been defined. The first indicator concerns water sup-
ply and demand rules. Three ideal-types have been identified for this indicator, ranging 
from a focus on water supply only to integrated demand and supply management in 
which a hierarchy of functions may apply, as conditioned by fresh water availability 
and protection of the ecological life support system (see Table 6.5a). The second indi-
cator expresses the nature of license systems. Ideal-types range from parallel licences 
for quality and quantity objectives for the use, development and management of water 
resources, towards integrated licences for interdependent natural resources (including 
water; see Table 6.5b).  
 
Supply- and demand management 
After the Second World War water supply management was supportive to large-scale 
food production by re-allotment and drainage of agricultural land (Wisserhof, 2000). 
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Due to a large number of land consolidation projects, a radical physical transfor-
mation of rural areas in the Netherlands took place, in order to extensively reorganise 
and modernise Dutch agriculture (Hoetjes, 1993). Farmers’ incomes were guaranteed 
by means of a detailed market and price policy, as supported by Europe’s Common 
Agricultural Policy (Bekke and De Vries, 1994). Since the 1970s ecologists and nature 
site managers notice lowering groundwater tables and ask attention for the negative, 
desiccation effects of a too one-sided water supply management (Van Gijsen, 1979; 
De Molenaar, 1980). In the Second National Water Policy Memorandum, for the first 
time the national authorities acknowledge the issue of dropping groundwater tables 
(Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 1985). The memorandum triggers additional 
research which leads to a policy objective of 25% reduction of desiccated area in 2000 
(as compared to 1985), as included in both the National Environmental Policy Memo-
randum (Ministerie van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieu, 1989) and 
the Third National Water Policy Memorandum (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 
1989).  
In an information letter to the Lower House of Parliament the State Secretary for 
Water Management explicitly mentions anti-desiccation measures regarding ground-
water management (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 1990). The national authori-
ties do not opt for a generic reservation of groundwater resources for protection and 
restoration of natural values (ibid.: 4; translation from Dutch added): ‘The policy in-
tentions with regard to nature conservation and development should be realised by 
formulation of desired groundwater situations in the provincial water policy plans and 
protection of groundwater quality by means of allocation of functions.’ The State 
Secretary announces that new rural development plans should not substantially influ-
ence the state of desiccation sensitive areas or in the absence of alternatives should 
include compensation measures (ibid.: 29). Furthermore, groundwater abstractions for 
agricultural purposes near desiccation sensitive areas should be diminished (ibid.: 30), 
proposed extensions for industrial and drinking water abstractions should be evalu-
ated on their desiccation impacts and long term alternatives for groundwater abstrac-
tions should be explored (ibid.: 31). Also notions of demand management become 
noticeable such as public awareness campaigns on the wise use of freshwater re-
sources and a distinction between high-value and low-value water uses and users as 
point of departure for a redistribution of groundwater user rights (ibid.: 30, 31).  
Van Vliet et al. (2002) summarise the main three causes for desiccation: (1) ex-
tensive drainage and discharge of fresh water for agricultural and urban development 
in combination with water supply from other areas; (2) increase of evapotranspiration 
due to an increase of crops; and (3) increase of groundwater abstractions for drinking 
water, industrial processes and agriculture. The first two causes account for 60% of 
the desiccation issues, whereas the third contributes 30%. Desiccation, acidification 
and eutrophication are the main reasons for deterioration of natural values (ibid.). The 
Third National Environmental Policy Memorandum sharpens the desiccation reduc-
tion objective to 40% in 2010 (Ministerie van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening 
en Milieu, 1997). The Fourth National Water Policy Memorandum (Ministerie van 
Verkeer en Waterstaat, 1998) calls for an integrated areal management approach in 
and around desiccated areas which combines water retention, wetlands conservation, 
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prevention of rapid discharges and reduction of groundwater abstractions. In 2000, 
only for 3% of the desiccated areas (as compared to 1985) the hydrological conditions 
have been fully restored (Van Vliet et al., 2002). The main causes are the lack of clear 
and measurable water and nature restoration objectives, unclear division of tasks and 
responsibilities, discontinuities in financial instruments and insufficient monitoring 
arrangements (ibid.).  
The Advice Committee on Water Management in the 21st Century mentions an 
underestimation of risks from water shortages (Tielrooij et al., 2000). The committee 
diagnoses that causes for too much and too little water are to be found in both tradi-
tional water management practices and the spatial development practices over the past 
50 years in combination with an ever increasing land use for agriculture, urbanisation 
and nature (ibid.: 21). Furthermore, climate change may enforce problems with floods, 
droughts and water quality (ibid.: 27). The committee concludes that (ground)water 
user functions are too much guiding and land user functions limit required room for 
more resilient water systems (Tielrooij et al., 2000). Whenever spatial planning prac-
tices will be better tuned to the physical conditions of the water systems, new oppor-
tunities for sustainable development may occur (ibid.). 
Despite the diagnosis and the recommendations of the committee and the joint 
approach of the National Water Agreement (Nationaal Bestuursakkoord Water; Anony-
mous, 2003a and 2008, revised edition), implementation of the water shortages and 
anti-dessication approach remains laborious. For example, deadlines on the elabora-
tion of the instrument for determining desirable groundwater and surface water 
regimes (GGOR = Gewenste Grondwater en Oppervlaktewater Regime) are extended several 
times. In theory this instrument could deliver a sound basis for interrelated conditions 
on ecological, social and economic resilience. In practice the fear of explicit choices 
with potentially large socio-economic impact, hinder a smooth and fast-delivering 
implementation. In this context the notions in the 2005 December Memorandum 
(Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2006a: 11; translation from Dutch added) may 
be considered as understatements: ‘The determination of the desired groundwater and 
surface water regimes is a complicated political assignment, since all user functions 
will have to be weighed. Determination will also often have spatial consequences.’ 
Triggered by the dry summer of 2003 there is a sudden increase of political atten-
tion to risks of droughts events suddenly increases. After an evaluation process, a 
remarkable change in collective-choice rules occurs. Until 2003 the instrument to set 
water distribution priorities in periods of droughts (Verdringingsreeks) does not include 
protection of the ecological life support system (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 
2004b). Based on the evaluation and requests by environmental NGOs the TPW Min-
istry decides to include protection of nature values which could be subject to irre-
versible deterioration among the three first priorities category (together with safety 
against floods and prevention of land subsidence; ibid.). This rule change is anchored 
in the new Water Act (Anonymous, 2009b). The subsequent national droughts study 
concludes that the national fresh water distribution rules are robust (Kroon, Klopstra 
and Versteeg, 2005). Additionally, although the droughts frequency may increase due 
to climate change, large-scale spatial and/or infrastructural measures are not consid-
ered cost-effective for the period until 2015 (ibid.). The national authorities also de 
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cide not to design a legal standards system for drought events, since the distribution 
prioritisation instrument will suffice for the relatively low frequency of severe 
droughts (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2006a). 
The first Dutch WFD implementation planning cycle does not have a rule alter-
ing influence on prior supply and demand management rules but it supports the inte-
gration tendencies and contributes to a sense of urgency. In the 2005 December 
Memorandum the anti-desiccation policy is presented as part of the WM21 objectives 
(Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2006a). The memorandum mentions a recon-
sideration of the anti-desiccation objectives, since the WFD and Natura 2000 
requirements should be included (ibid.). The 2006 December Memorandum adds that 
options for prevention of water shortages should be incorporated in the spatial plan-
ning stage, most notably by means of the water assessment procedure (Ministerie van 
Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2006b). The national authorities stress an integrated areal pro-
gramme approach until 2015. Whenever, measures may not be implemented voluntar-
ily, expropriation should be considered as an ultimo instrument. As a minimum re-
quirement, all Natura 2000 sites with groundwater dependent nature values should 
receive high priority (ibid.).  
 
The observations point at a juxtaposition of ideal-type B and C supply and demand 
rules both in the studied periods before and after adoption of the WFD (see Table 
6.5a).   
 
Table 6.5a: Ideal-type collective-choice IRBM supply and demand rules; national level) 
Ideal-type rules↓ 1990 to 2000↓ 2001 to 2009↓ 
A: Water supply management determines availability 
of fresh water for user functions. 
 
 
 
 
B: Mixed supply and demand management 
determines fresh water availability without a hierar-
chy in user functions. 
 
X 
 
X 
C: Integrated supply and demand management, as 
expressed by a hierarchy in user functions.   
 
X 
 
X 
 
Legend: The research observations come closest to ideal-type B and C rules as expressed by 
the ‘X’. 
 
Before adoption of the WFD an evolution took place from water supply management 
for the benefit of large scale food production to an approach in which both economic 
efficiency and social equity condition fresh water distribution to user categories. A 
shift towards less use of (high quality) deep groundwater resources and more use of 
surface water resources occurs. Gradually also notions on demand management 
appear in the subsequent national water policy memoranda. After adoption of the 
WFD, albeit not triggered by it, a remarkable rule change occurs. Ecological condi-
tions are included in the priority instrument for distribution of available fresh water 
resources in periods of prolonged droughts. Besides, the instrument for weighing land 
user functions within the context of hydrological groundwater and surface water con-
ditions receives more attention, as part of the more structural long term WM21 
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approach. Although conditions for the protection of the ecological life support system 
are not explicitly defined as water quantity standards, further elaboration of this in-
strument implicitly supports efforts on the way to more ecological resilient water 
systems management. As a counterbalance, the fear of dramatic socio-economic con-
sequences hinders a process of setting clear conditions and making difficult choices 
between user functions. Although not presented as an integrated approach, both 
supply and demand issues receive attention with regard to wise use of available fresh 
water resources.  
 
Nature of the license systems 
Although the Environmental Management Act (Wet Milieubeheer; Anonymous, 1993) 
marks an important material integration of environmental license systems, full integra-
tion with the water policy legislation does not happen. As one important explanation 
Van Rijswick (2001: 375-376) points at firm opposition from the water quality mana-
gers who argue that they need their own license system with regard to formal tasks. In 
case of integration, they fear a decreased coherence within the water management 
domain (ibid.). Since measures in one compartment (air, land, or water) could have an 
impact on other compartments, it would be wise to consider all interrelations within 
one environmental license system (Drupsteen et al., 1998, Van den Broek, 1997). Van 
Rijswick (2001: 380-381) argues that, as long as the Environmental Management Act 
maintains a rather restricted definition that excludes diffuses sources of pollution, 
integration with the Water Managment Act is not to be preferred. In that case, the 
coordination rules between both statutes should be improved. Furthermore, coordina-
tion rules between the Groundwater Act and the Environmental Management Act 
should be added (ibid.). Remarkably, it is the Environmental Management Act and not 
the Water Act (Anonymous, 2009a), which includes the arrangements for legal an-
chorage of the WFD’s environmental objectives (Ministerie van Volkshuisvesting, 
Ruimtelijke Ordening, en Milieu, 2009a, b and c).   
The Water Management Act (Anonymous, 1989) has been a first integration 
attempt within the water policy domain with an emphasis on coherence among water 
policy and management plans at different administrative levels. This statute did not 
include integration of license systems for water quality and quantity issues. Also 
groundwater issues were covered by a separate act. The new Water Act (Anonymous, 
2009a) further integrates water policy regulations (including both groundwater and 
surface water issues) and merges six former water-related license systems into a new 
integrated water one (ibid.; Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2008). Van Rijswick 
(2001: 382) argues that internal integration will not suffice to comply with the WFD 
objectives. More explicit cross-sector integration arrangements will be necessary 
(ibid.). Van Rijswick (2001) plies for explicit referral to water quality standards in legal 
instruments from other policy domains which have an impact on water quality, like 
agriculture, spatial planning, nature conservation and traffic and transport. Drupsteen 
et al. (1998) propose to include generic principles of environmental law (precaution, 
the polluter pays, stand-still, compensation and prevention at source) in all decisions 
from other policy domains that may have an impact on the environment. According 
to Van Rijswick (2001: 383-384) water quality standards should be legally anchored 
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with sufficient room for a flexible, integrated approach in which the overall good state 
of a water body is central. 
Although it is not the WFD that has triggered drafting of the new Water Act 
(Anonymous, 2009a), it has contributed to a sense of urgency for a more integrated 
approach. However, the introduction of one license system for different water-related 
activities does not necessarily mean that water quality and quantity objectives are ap-
proached in a more interrelated way. Despite the integration discourse of the WFD, 
its Article 4 mainly includes parallel objectives for groundwater and surface water 
bodies (European Communities, 2000: 9-11). Furthermore, the WFD leaves room for 
interpretation differences on the interlinkages between water bodies and protected 
areas. Regarding surface water bodies the emphasis is mainly on chemical and eco-
logical quality objectives without explicit specification of relations with quantitative 
parameters. Although the WFD may be considered the most comprehensive piece of 
water legislation in the European history so far, it does not include surface water 
quantity objectives. Whereas its groundwater objectives include quantitative aspects, 
the qualitative objectives remain limited to a few parameters. The related Ground-
water Directive (European Union, 2006) elaborates more on the linkages between 
groundwater and surface water objectives (Ministerie van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimte-
lijke Ordening, en Milieu, 2009c: 40, 41). Based on the Groundwater Directive, when-
ever chemical threshold values are surpassed at more than 20% of the monitoring 
locations within a groundwater body, the extent of the (potential) impact on the 
chemical and ecological quality of related surface water bodies and terrestrial eco-
systems and the impact on requirements for drinking water production sites should be 
explored (ibid.). Furthermore, the Member States shall ensure ‘a balance between 
abstraction and recharge of groundwater’ which will contribute to the water needs of 
dependent terrestrial ecosystems (European Communities, 2000: 5, 9). 
In the Netherlands the legal anchorage of the WFD’s environmental objectives 
has provoked arduous debates, mainly triggered by a fear of restrictions from strict 
legally binding quality standards to individual human development projects. In an 
attempt to avoid the too restrictive implementation experiences with air quality direc-
tives, the national authorities cautiously explored options for maximal flexibility and 
usage of the interpretation room within the WFD and its guidance documents (Van 
der Molen, 2009; Ministerie van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieu, 
2009b). For example, environmental objectives for heavily modified and artificial 
water bodies and related license conditions for water-related activities should be in-
corporated in the water management plans for state and inland water systems. A waste 
water discharge license request will not directly refer to the quality objectives in the 
water management plans but its approval/refusal should be weighed within the con-
text of all the measures which are planned for no deterioration and amelioration of the 
state of the entire water body (Ministerie van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening 
en Milieu, 2009c). It is the net result of all activities and measures that counts (Van der 
Molen, 2009).  
In many cases the impact of an individual discharge may not be noticeable on the 
quality of an entire water body, since the source oriented emission approach (which 
includes best available technology and the emission-imission test) remains valid for all  
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discharges (Ministerie van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieu, 2009b; 
Van der Molen, 2009). Furthermore, the story is mainly theoretical in nature since new 
license requests for substantial point sources are not to be expected in many water 
bodies (Van Roode, 2009). Whenever a citizen appeals against an individual license 
request, judges may take arguments from the state and inland water management plans 
into consideration. As a worst case scenario for the national authorities, a lack of co-
herence among these plans may provoke direct application of provisions in European 
directives (and their water quality standards), including the option of license refusal 
(Ministerie van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieu, 2009b). In order to 
avoid this worst case scenario, the plans at different administrative levels should be 
optimally coordinated and packages of measures to fulfil the obligations should be 
included with sound motivation for the use of the WFD’s exemptions (Van der 
Molen, 2009). The essence of the Dutch approach is summarised in the explanatory 
document to the decision (Ministerie van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en 
Milieu, 2009c: 7; translation from Dutch added): 
 
In this way the approach of the present decision is distinct form the original ap-
proach in the Air Quality file. In the latter, each decision on a license request had to 
be weighed directly against its impact on the environmental quality standard for  
particulate matter in the air (fijn stof). Whenever the required air quality could not be 
realised, a license could not be granted, even not in the case of proposed adequate 
measures which would lead to net compliance with the standards in the near future. 
The present decision follows the revised approach for the Air Quality Directive 
which allows for negative impacts as long as the entire package of measures leads to 
a net compliance with quality standards at the end of a planning period. 
 
In its advice the State Council is in favour of the use of (strict obligatory) standards 
(grenswaarden) since they most clearly express the obligatory nature of the WFD re-
quirements (Ministerie van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieu, 2009b; 
Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2009b). Contrary to the advice, in the Water 
Quality Standards and Monitoring Decision (Besluit Kwaliteitseisen en Monitoring Water, 
Ministerie van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening, en Milieu, 2009a) the Dutch 
Cabinet legally defines the WFD’s environmental objectives as target values (richt-
waarden). The Cabinet stresses that these target values should not be considered as 
intentions, but as obligations which may be subject to exemption options as included 
in the WFD only (ibid.). Given the WFD’s river basin management approach which 
concerns all European water resources it is remarkable that the Dutch decision only 
relates to the WFD water bodies (and not to all other, smaller water systems). In this 
respect, paradoxically, the water bodies reporting system challenges the river basin 
management approach and one might question whether a stand-still of juridical protection 
is safeguarded. In the explanatory document to the Water Quality Standards and 
Monitoring Decision (Ministerie van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Mi-
lieu, 2009c), the national authorities argue that especially the requirements from the 
emission approach, which apply to all water systems, in practice will provide an equal 
level of protection for both water bodies and other (smaller) water systems.  
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Van Rijswick and Havekes (2012: 295) argue that the WFD’s obligations do not only 
apply to designated water bodies: 
 
It is apparent form the case law of the Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the 
Council of State that measures must also be taken in waters which are not designated 
water bodies under the Directive, if the quality of those waters has a deleterious in-
fluence on a designated water body because it is connected to it. Account must also 
be taken of the cumulation of water pollution coming from various small sources.  
 
In this context it is remarkable that the (independent) National Water Inspection Ser-
vice (Inspectie Verkeer en Waterstaat) concludes that the objectives for other (smaller) 
water systems lack or are formulated inadequately in the water management plans 
(Clement, Salihovic and Van Breemen, 2010).  
To round up: the analysis shows that parallel licenses for qualitative and quanti-
tative water management issues (before adoption of the WFD) have been brought 
together into one, integrated license for water-related activities (after adoption of the 
WFD). The WFD’s discourse has supported this prior integration wish. These obser-
vations point at an evolution from ideal-type A choice rules towards ideal-type B 
choice rules (see Table 6.5b). The evolution seems not to be completed. Although the 
qualitative and quantitative issues are covered by one water license system, the sub-
stantive conditions and objectives are not fully interrelated or integrated.  
 
Table 6.5b: Ideal-type collective-choice IRBM licenses rules (national level) 
Ideal-type rules↓ 1990 to 2000↓ 2001 to 2009↓ 
A: Separate, parallel licences for quality and quantity 
objectives related to the use, development and 
management of water resources. 
 
X 
 
 
x 
B: Licences that integrate quantity and quality objec-
tives related to the use, development amd manage-
ment of water resources. 
  
X 
C: Integrated licences for interrelated use, develop-
ment and management of natural resources (e.g. air, 
water, land). 
  
Legend: The research observations come closest to ideal-type A and B rules as expressed by 
the ‘X’. The ‘x’ points at a reduced resemblance of the observations with ideal-type A rules 
after adoption of the WFD. 
 
6.3.5 Aggregation rules 
As defined in Section 2.2.7, a major collective-choice challenge of IRBM concerns the 
issue as to how arrange decision-making at interrelated political levels within shared 
river basins with the aim to reach common understanding and broad public support 
for collective choices. The aggregation rules may appear in different ways, as ex-
pressed by identified ideal-types (see Table 6.6). The aggregation question ‘who should 
make and who should agree with adaptations of prior rules and with new rules?’ 
shows redundancy with boundary rules. For this research, the question who is in-
volved in planning and decision-making and to which degree (information, consulta-
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tion or co-decision), is covered by boundary rules (see Subsection 6.3.3). The aggrega-
tion rules concentrate on the coherence between and the nature of decision-making at 
different administrative levels within a river basin. 
 
Informal national-regional WFD coordination structures 
In 2001 the national WFD Implementation Project Team concludes that only minor 
legislative changes are required, i.e. amendments to the Water Management Act 
(Anonymous, 1989) and the Environment Management Act (Anonymous, 1993). 
According to the team the strategic planning process currently in use in the Nether-
lands complies fairly well with the WFD. No specific adaptations are required      
(Projectteam Implementatie Kaderrichtlijn Water, 2001b). Right from the start of the 
domestic WFD implementation process continuity of formal organisational structures 
and aggregation rules is stressed as a precondition (Van Sprundel, 2003; LBOW, 
2003b; Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2004b; Anonymous, 2005).  Only minor 
shifts in division of tasks and responsibilities are open for discussion (ibid.). The or-
ganisational set up for the domestic WFD implementation may be summarised as 
follows (based on LBOW, 2003a; translation from Dutch added): 
 
Existing political responsibilities will not alter significantly due to the implementation 
of the WFD. The State remains the authority for policy frameworks, regional 
authorities remain responsible for implementation, monitoring, evaluation and 
reporting. Outstanding choices will have to be made within the present political   
constellation. WFD implementation choices will be prepared in an iterative process 
between regional and national authorities (bottom up and top-down), in which the 
regions are supported by national frameworks and methods. These frameworks and 
methods will be tuned to wishes and possibilities of the regional partners.  
 
The national authorities stress that the new European reporting obligations require 
transparent coordination rules due to shared responsibilities by the authorities from all 
administrative levels (LBOW, 2003c). The installation of a national water platform and 
regional river basin platforms serves the specific WFD’s coordination requirements. 
These platforms should provide for collective-choice rules that express joint respon-
sibilities. For example, all the water management plans that contribute to the (WFD) 
river basin management plans should be coherent and consistent with each other 
(ibid.). 
From 1998 to 2003 a special WFD implementation planning structure is 
established with a national project team and related working groups parallel to prior 
informal structures in the water policy domain. Gradually, the new WFD structures 
merge with these parallel structures into a more integrated organisation. The report on 
the national evaluation of the WFD implementation process in the Netherlands con-
cludes that the river basin management approach and the obligatory nature of the 
WFD’s objectives required more extensive internal and cross-sector planning and 
decision-making coordination than before (Ten Heuvelhof et al., 2010; Van der    
Heijden, Broekhans and Ten Heuvelhof, 2010). They mention the introduction of an 
informal, additional double pillar steering and coordination structure, i.e. one national 
and one regional pillar, as expressed by the image of “elevators in Thorbecke’s  
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House” (ibid.; see Figure 6.3). The decentralised unitary model with the state, 
provinces and municipalities still is the Dutch constitutional house (Kickert, 2004; 
Andeweg and Irwin, 2005). 
Within this double pillar structure, the National Political Water Platform advises 
the State Secretary of Water Management on water policy and management issues. In 
turn the State Secretary informs the platform about political decisions and provides 
assignments to the platform. The HSE and ANF Ministries participate in the national 
pillar in order to arrange cross-sectoral coordination issues. A special national WFD 
coordination bureau (Netherlands River Basins Coordination Office; CSN = Coördi-
natie Stroomgebieden Nederland), which is run by civil servants at the national Water   
Policy Department, steers and coordinates all national WFD implementation activities 
and prepares guidelines, instructions and data formats for actors in the regional pillars. 
The national Water Management Consultatation Platform (OWN = Overlegorgaan Water 
en Noordzeeaangelegenheden), i.e. a multi-stakeholder platform with representatives of 
environmental NGOs and socio-economic interests groups who advise the State  
Secretary for Water Management, takes on board the WFD implementation issues. 
National river basin coordinators (i.e. civil servants at and hired consultants by the 
national Water Policy Department) acts as liaisons between the regional WFD part-
ners and the actors from the national pillar (Interviews 18, 20, 52 and 53, Appendix I). 
 
 
 
Figure 6.3: The WFD double pillar structure (adapted figure from Van der Heijden, 
Broekhans and Ten Heuvelhof, 2010: 83; translation from Dutch added) 
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Periodically, the State Secretary for Water Management organises meetings with the 
chairs from the regional political river basin platforms (RBO’s = Regionaal Bestuurlijke 
Overleggen) in order to discuss progress of and bottlenecks in the WFD implementation 
activities (the so-called LBOR meetings). These national-regional coordination meet-
ings support the regional and local WFD implementation planning processes more 
directly and practically than the National Political Water Platform meetings do. Con-
sequently, the UvW fears a loss of influence since it only participates in the national 
platform. Therefore this association repeatedly stresses decision-making primacy of 
the national platform. The meetings of the RBO’s are prepared by civil servants at 
regional and local authorities and water management authorities who coordinate their 
activities at the meetings of the regional administrative river basin platforms (RAO’s = 
Regionaal Ambtelijke Overleggen). Some RBO’s and RAO’s are supported by a special 
project bureau, such as the case in the Meuse River Basin. Regional WFD Consulta-
tion Platforms have been initiated for informal information and consultation of 
environmental NGOs and socio-economic interest groups with working-rules similar 
to the national equivalent.  
The introduction of informal regional river basin coordination platforms is 
meant to support the national, regional and local water authorities in their joint WFD 
implementation activities. Van der Heijden, Broekhans and Ten Heuvelhof (2010: 83) 
mention the double pillar structure as an important success factor in the Dutch 
national WFD implementation tactics. First of all, the structure offered an answer to 
the mismatch between hydrological river basins and political territories. Secondly, the 
structure offered the national Water Policy Department ample opportunities to keep 
in close contact with both national and regional actors and finally, the structure of-
fered valuable iteration and reconsideration moments for all involved actors. Despite 
severe critics from many interviewed actors, on a ‘too complicated, hence not trans-
parent process with too many decision-makers’ and on ‘gradual watering down of 
ambitions’, Van der Heijden, Broekhans and Ten Heuvelhof (2010: 84) conclude that 
functional redundancy has taken place. They relate the perception of watered down 
ambitions to political under-attention of water quality issues and uncertainties about 
division of implementation responsibilities in the early years after adoption of the 
WFD, high expectations of ecologists and growing Euro-scepticism (ibid.: 84-86). 
Although some other ministries warned for the risks of allowing too much room 
for local and regional initiatives and structures (hence a risk of loosing national steer-
ing control), the TPW Ministry stuck to the mixed top-down and bottom-up approach 
in order to gain support for required measures to be implemented by regional and 
local (water management) authorities (Interview 18, Appendix I). In the final stages, 
for reasons of comparability and compliance checking, the TPW Ministry enforced 
the top-down steering. The ministry also took the lead for a mixed national-regional 
project group to coordinate the synchronous planning of all new water plans and the 
related formal consultation procedures (Interviews 52 and 53, Appendix I.).  
The WFD Implementation Act (Anonymous, 2005) appoints the TPW, HSE and 
ANF Ministers as competent national WFD authorities. The TPW Ministry takes the 
lead in the implementation planning process. The inner circle of (co-deciding) mem-
bers from the National Political Water Platform plays a central role in the national 
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WFD implementation planning and decision-making process; the other ministries 
enter this inner circle. The national platform provides for informal guidelines and 
technical instructions to regional and local authorities. Harmonisation exercises are 
supposed to correct for inappropriate regional differences, regarding European re-
porting obligations. Reversely, regional and local authorities may request national 
guidance documents and guidelines. Uncertainties about interpretations and related 
(potential) consequences have triggered laborious debates. For example, the TPW 
Ministry initially resists the regional/local calls for legally approved generic national 
interpretation lines on multi-interpretable terms, like irreversible alterations, significant 
damage and disproportionate costs. In the end, this ministry provides generic, non-legally 
binding argumentation lines on the use of the WFD’s exemption options which may 
be adapted for specific regional and local conditions. A middle (co-thinking) circle of 
environmental NGOs and socio-economic interests groups provides informal, no 
legally binding advice to the inner circle members. Some middle circle members join 
working group sessions to provide for expertise and co-productions. The outer circle 
of the general public is not explicitly involved in the national WFD implementation 
process (see also Subsection 6.3.3 on boundary rules). 
The 2009 WFD process evaluation sessions (as organised by the national Water 
Policy Department) make clear that, although regional and local politicians considered 
the WFD session and activities too technical and labour intensive, in general they 
appreciated both the offered room for regional and local initiatives and steering  
efforts from the national Water Policy Department. They support a more lean, mean 
and flexible continuation of the regional river basin platforms as of 2010 and mention 
the regional and local bottom-up processes as good examples for other policy issues, 
based on a structure follows strategy philosophy. Finally, regional and local authorities ask 
for more inter-ministerial coordination. Members of the national WFD Consultation 
Platform (OWN) on the one hand appreciate the thematic sessions and informal con-
sultation opportunities, on the other hand they doubt whether the time and resources 
demanding network of national, regional and local consultation platforms is the most 
cost-effective way of organising active participation. 
 
Synchronisation of river basin management and domestic plan figures 
Before adoption of the WFD, there has been a clear hierarchy of water management 
plans. The national water plan provided for the generic rules and principles which had 
to be implemented at the regional and local levels by provinces and water manage-
ment authorities (in cooperation with municipalities). The national, provincial and 
local water management plans were drafted and adopted after one another (“descend-
ing the ladder”). Due to the river basin management approach of the WFD, the co-
herence among the plans at different domestic levels and within the multilateral con-
text asks for special attention. Therefore, the national authorities have opted for a 
mixed top-down and bottom-up approach in which the plans have been drafted in a 
symmetric process by “ascending and descending” the ladder. In the end, all the draft 
plans were subject to a parallel consultation procedure before final adoption.  
The synchronicity of the plans (as a new element in the Dutch water policy plan-
ning traditions), the multiplicity of detailed technical issues, the obligatory nature of 
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the WFD requirements and time demanding (and sometimes laborious) cross-level 
coordination procedures together made the provisioned symmetric process somehow 
troublesome (Interviews 41, 45, 46, 50, 52 and 53). Time frames proved to be too 
short for a subsequent ascending and descending of the planning stairs (ibid.). In prac-
tice the simultaneous drafting, consultation and decision making processes at the dif-
ferent levels confused many of the involved public actors who faced difficulties in 
timely delivery and maintaining overview of all relevant interactions at and across 
administrative levels. Actually, civil servants feared to introduce alterations or new 
elements due to necessary changes it would provoke in draft plans at other administra-
tive levels. In this pressure cooking context the Dutch public actors mainly focused on 
the domestic requirements. While the national Water Policy Department took care of 
the multilateral coordination talks, many regional and local actors were not aware of 
the progress within the international river basin committees and potential linkages 
with the multilateral river basin management plans and struggled with their own bilat-
eral coordination attempts with neighbouring states). 
In a relatively late stage (soon before the start of the formal consultation round), 
the national Water Policy Department decides to carry out an independent check on 
the juridical consistency of a selection of the water plans at all administrative levels. 
From this check it becomes clear that both the draft river basin management plans 
and the water management plans from the provinces and water management authori-
ties are not fully in line with the WFD obligations (as expressed by the then draft  
Water Quality Standards and Monitoring Decision; Sterk Consulting, 2009). The use 
of the exemption option on a staged implementation has only been motivated in 
generic, qualitative way, while the WFD requires a more detailed, quantified moti-
vation (ibid.). Given arduous juridical questions, the final Water Quality Standards and 
Monitoring Decision has only been adopted in November 2009 after the formal con-
sultation round for the draft water and river basin management plans (due to the 
postponed advice from the State Council). This late adoption prevented the provincial 
and water management authorities to dramatically alter their draft plans, since signifi-
cant alterations would have required an additional formal consultation round. A com-
plicating factor in the whole planning synchronisation process has been the national 
choice not to consider legally binding water plans at the municipal level, although part 
of the WFD obligations should be filled in by the local authorities. December 2009 at 
the end of the first drafting round, the national authorities face the conclusion that not 
all the river basin regions managed to include municipal WFD measures (see also 
Chapter 7 for a more detailed analysis of involvement of municipal actors in the 
Meuse River Basin and Chapter 8 for their involvement in the local process in the 
Brabant-West Region).  
After an ex post check of all final water and river basin management plans, the 
National Water Inspection Service concludes that the actual state and the objectives 
for the WFD water bodies in general have been worked out conform the legal  
requirements (Clement, Salihovic and Van Breemen, 2010). Although the measures 
for the water bodies are described in a transparent way, their effectiveness and contri-
butions towards compliance with the WFD objectives not always become clear 
and/or are incomplete. Objectives for other (smaller) water systems are often 
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incomplete or are totally absent. The elaboration of the no-shift principle is suboptimal 
and often incomplete, hence the coherence among the programmes of measures and 
related risks for non-compliance are not entirely transparent. Finally, the owners of 
unsolved, remaining implementation issues have not been addressed (ibid.). Despite 
the critics, both national and regional authorities in general are satisfied with the first 
results of the pragmatic implementation planning approach. Overall, local authorities 
have difficulties with the aggregation level of the river basin management plans which 
does not allow for transparency about measures of individual municipalities (Inter-
views 19, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26 and 36, Appendix I). Actually, the critics are translated as 
open endings to be solved in the second implementation planning cycle (planned for 
the 2012 to 2015 period).  
 
At first glance both the introduction of informal regional river basin management 
planning and national-regional coordination structures and the synchronisation of all 
domestic water management plans (except for the municipal level) might seem indi-
cators for radical change of aggregation rules. However, despite the additional coordi-
nation options and opportunities for better cross-level linkages, prior formal relations 
and planning and decision-making rules persist. One should also not overestimate the 
rule-altering potential of the informal river basin management platforms. In the first 
river basin management planning cycle the regional and local politicians (and their 
advisers) predominantly have struggled with the highly technical nature of discussed 
issues. At best they could provide informal advices to their home boards of governors 
and parliaments. Furthermore, informal, symmetric, consensus based planning 
processes in addition to formal procedures are a natural phenomenon in the Nether-
lands. Notwithstanding enforced informal coordination and formal synchronisation of 
water management plans, no significant changes have occurred in the formal, top-
down interrelations among the involved public administrations/water management 
authorities. The process national evaluation sessions as organised by the TPW Mini-
stry and the Delft University of Technology have revealed the wish of many public 
actors to restore the subsequent drafting of national, regional and local water man-
agement plans within the new temporal boundaries as set by the WFD.  
Finally, emphasis so far has been predominantly on the domestic coordination 
process. Multilateral coordination efforts have been relatively invisible for the majority 
of regional and local public actors. This may seem remarkable given the WFD’s 
special attention to coordination mechanisms for transboundary river basins (see Arti-
cle 3, Article 11(1) and Article 13(2); European Communities, 2000: 8, 13-14 and 16). 
Van Rijswick and Havekes (2012: 128) point at the legal novelty of the river basin 
approach in the European and Dutch context: 
 
The river basin approach is new in European and national water law and a number of 
questions concerning its legal significance remain unanswered. Though its it is clear 
that account must be taken within the entire river basin of the interests of other 
states, local and regional authorities and private users of the water system, it is not 
clear how to best organise this from a legal point of view. A legal mechanism need to 
be developed to ensure that fresh water, possibilities of ontroducing pollutants and 
flood risks are all allocated fairly. At present thers is no such system. 
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These observations point at a juxtaposition of ideal-type B and C aggregation rules 
both before and after adoption of the WFD (see Table 6.6). 
 
Table 6.6: Ideal-type collective-choice IRBM aggregation rules (national level) 
Ideal-type rules↓ 1990 to 2000↓ 2001 to 2009↓ 
A: Independent decision-making on water policy 
and management plans at different administrative 
levels within a river basin. 
 
 
 
 
B: Asymmetric, top-down decision-making on water 
policy and management plans at different adminis-
trative levels within a river basin: lower levels have 
to comply with the rules from the higher levels. 
 
X 
 
X 
C: Symmetric, consensus based decision making on 
water policy and management plans at different 
administrative levels: mixed top-down and bottom-
up rules. 
 
X 
 
X 
Legend: The research observations come closest to ideal-type B and C rules as expressed by 
the ‘X’. 
 
6.3.6 Information rules 
As defined in Section 2.2.8, one major collective-choice challenge of IRBM is to col-
lect, aggregate and present information in such a way that river basin management 
plans are acknowledged and supported by a majority of interested public, private and 
civil stakeholders. A critical dimension of this challenge is the types of information 
that are considered legitimate in combination with the nature of the collection and 
aggregation process. The focus of this research is on this critical dimension. Three 
ideal-type information rules have been identified (see Table 6.7).  
 
Early interactive process calls, technocratic river basins characterisations 
As concluded in Subsection 6.3.3 (boundary rules), the Dutch water policy planning 
process (before and after adoption of the WFD) is dominated by public actors who 
set the access conditions for (experts of) non-governmental stakeholders. These 
boundary rules are echoed by the information rules. In the initial stage of the national 
WFD implementation planning process from 1998 to 2003 public actors dominate the 
process. The then national WFD Communication Working Group notifies that (Pro-
jectteam Implementatie Kaderrichtlijn Water, 2001a: 13-14; translation from Dutch 
added):   
 
Due to broad formulations in the WFD’s articles and the appendices that offer room 
for multiple interpretations, diverse directions of thoughts will develop on the poten-
tial consequences of the WFD on the water, environment, nature and spatial 
planning policy domains.  
 
In its reaction to a draft version of the WFD Communication Plan, the then national 
Water Communication Team (for all water issues, not only WFD) plies for timely, 
adequate and unambiguous communication and for early and active involvement of 
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environmental NGOs and socio-economic interests groups in order to develop shared 
ownership of the WFD assignment (Hendriksen, 2001: 1, translation from Dutch 
added): 
 
The approach should reach beyond information to co-thinking options and the 
mobilisation of creative capital. Hence, it is about interactive process planning. Make 
clear what the obligations from “Brussels” are and where there is room for domestic 
implementations and solutions. 
 
The WFD Communication Plan mentions that the tone of voice should be positive 
and stimulating (‘The WFD offers opportunities’) and there should be ample options 
for interaction and dialogue (Projectteam Implementatie Kaderrichtlijn Water, 2001a: 
9). In 2001 and 2002, the national WFD Implementation Project Team initiates a di-
versity of interactive communication events at the national and regional level. Impor-
tant target groups are water managers, provinces, municipalities, diverse socio-
economic sectors like inland navigation, professional and recreational fisheries, indus-
try, recreation, agriculture, drinking water production, minerals extraction, nature and 
environmental protection (Projectteam Implementatie Kaderrichtlijn Water, 2001a). 
Since Dutch water experts lead the European drafting group for the guidance docu-
ment on public participation, they also organise a workshop on this issue (prior to a 
written consultation round). In 2003 a general brochure is released on the WFD im-
plementation in the Netherlands (French, English and German editions; Ministry of 
Transport, Public Works and Water Management, 2003b).  
Remarkably, despite the ambitious participation rhetoric and information and 
consultation events at the early start, the national and regional authorities do not opt 
for an interactive process design in conducting the analyses and drafting the first river 
basin characterisation reports (conform WFD’s Article 5). Joint fact finding remains 
restricted to involved public actors and is predominantly driven by a technical-scientific 
rationale. From three pilot projects on the availability of required data and figures for 
these Article 5 analyses and reports, the national authorities conclude that not all in-
formation is available and that available data at different administrations and regions 
are not easy to compare (Hassoldt and Busch, 2002). Joint aggregation efforts by in-
volved water managers are needed in order to be able to present conclusions at the 
water body level (as compliance checking unit for the European Commission; ibid.). 
Interviewees 39 and 40 (Appendix I) point at a laborious process in the initial stage 
and wake-up insights from the pilot projects (‘much more work to do than estimated 
earlier’). Notwithstanding a considerable lack of information, the national authorities, 
due to time restrictions, decide not to initiate additional monitoring and research pro-
grammes for the Article 5 requirements. The Article 5 reports are based on available 
figures only.  
National product teams (including regional officials and experts) provide gui-
dance documents and technical instructions. The members of the regional river basin 
platforms are responsible for timely drafting the Article 5 reports. The national river 
basin coordinators act as a linking pin between national instructions and recommenda-
tions and regional implementation efforts. Summaries of the regionally produced Arti-
cle 5 reports will be sent to the EC by the TPW Ministry. Members of the 
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national WFD Consultation Platform (OWN) are informed and consulted by means 
of thematic sessions. Finally, the national authorities decide to aggregate the (Article 5) 
reporting information for clusters of water bodies. A limited list of 10 water quality 
parameters is included, although some interest groups ask for more parameters. At the 
stage of the Article 5 reports regional WFD Consultation Platforms with environ-
mental NGOs and socio-economic interest groups had not been established in all 
river basins. In the Scheldt River Basin controversies between public and private ac-
tors arose about facts and figures on the added economic value of agriculture and 
recreation (Santbergen, 2005; Interviews 3 till 5, Appendix I).  
 
Stable juxtaposition of technical-scientific and socio-economic rationales 
After the up-scaling process of the Article 5 reports a process of downscaling to the 
level of individual water bodies takes place in the 2005 till 2008 period. In the regional 
and local processes water experts start to define the ecological objectives for all indi-
vidual water body types, followed by identification and selection of cost-effective 
measures. Besides monitoring programmes are designed and first results are aggre-
gated and presented to provide for an actual state of the water bodies. See the Chap-
ters 7 and 8 for a more detailed account on the regional and local processes in the 
Dutch part of the International Meuse River Basin District. The degree of interaction 
with non-governmental actors differs among the seven Dutch river basin regions, 
although in all processes public actors inform and consult private and civil stake-
holders by means of WFD Consultation Platforms (Ovaa, 2007; Raadgever et al., 
2009; Ten Heuvelhof et al., 2010). The national comparison of regional processes in 
2007 shows remarkable differences among the programmes of measures in different 
regions (Haarman and Jansen, 2008). These draft programmes show a generic lack of 
transparent motivation for the selection of measures and the use of exemption op-
tions (ibid.). Based on these conclusions the national Water Policy Department de-
cides to coordinate the regional and local processes more tightly by means of top-
down instructions (Interviews 18, 52 and 53, Appendix I). Subsequently, the (WFD) 
Ex Ante Evaluation report shows that not all differences have disappeared (Ligtvoet 
et al., 2008).  
Mid 2008, the TPW Ministry decides to install a national editing team (with a few 
regional representatives) for drafting all the river basin management plans in a coor-
dinated and homogeneous way (Interview 52, Appendix I). The strong top-down 
editing approach contrasts with the more bottom-up Article 5 editing process, al-
though this latter process has also been strongly influenced by national river basin 
coordinators, national guidelines and an independent audit (for harmonisation rea-
sons). Due to the enforced national coordination in the final drafting stage, the tech-
nical and socio-economic motivations have been presented in a more harmonised 
way. Overall, the influence of non-governmental actors on definition of terms and 
concepts and the formulation of objectives and measures has been rather limited (In-
terviews 13 till 17, Appendix I; Raadgever et al., 2009). In the river basin management 
plans a technical-scientific rationale intermingles with an explicit socio-economic rationale (as 
triggered by the national WFD mantra of feasible and affordable measures; ibid.). The 
diversity of regional and local processes has not solved all the knowledge gaps and did 
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not prevent the persistence of confronting opinions among different interest groups 
(Raadgever et al., 2009), as expressed by the received opinions and the answers from 
the national authorities in the formal consultation round (Ministerie van Verkeer en 
Waterstaat, 2009b), several position papers of interest groups (Hermans, 2005; Water-
forum, 2005; LTO, 2006, 2007; VNO-NCW, 2005, 2007; Tobben, 2008) and as con-
firmed by the interviews and the written argumentation survey opf this research. 
Initially, the national WFD Internet site contains documents that have been 
approved by the national WFD Implementation Project Team only. After 2003 the 
website is extended with specific pages on the implementation processes in the four 
major Dutch river basins. Reports and other documents that have been approved by 
the national or regional and local authorities in principle are accessible for the general 
public. Directly involved actors including consultation platform members may have 
access to an Intranet part. Not all regions store their archives at the national website. 
Also regarding the national structures several meeting documents are not centrally 
stored, hence cannot easily be found afterwards other than in personal archives. 
Besides, during an interim transmission of documents from the old national WFD 
Internet site to a new one some documents have been lost. In 2008 and 2009, partly 
induced by information requests in the context of this dissertation, the national Water 
Policy Department invests in filling the gaps at the WFD website. 
At the end of 2009 the WFD website is integrated within the broader national 
Helpdesk Water website (www.helpdeskwater.nl). A number of website based databases 
contain technical data of individual water bodies (ecological objectives, monitoring 
results, programmes of measures, argumentation lines on application of Article 4’s 
exemptions and expert estimations of the 2015 state). Up to the end of 2009 only 
public actors at the water administrations have access codes for these databases. For 
example, civil servants at municipalities have to ask overviews from their own pro-
posed measures via the WFD coordinators of the regional water management authori-
ties. The national authorities translate and aggregate the information from those data-
bases into the data formats of the Water Information System of Europe (WISE). In 
2010 all WFD databases have been integrated into the so-called national WFD Portal.  
 
To conclude this subsection: the analysis shows that the active participation rhetoric 
from the first national WFD implementation stage and as advocated by Dutch water 
experts at the European level (read the guidance documents on public participation 
and the planning process; European Communities, 2003h and k), has not been trans-
lated into a corresponding process architecture for drafting the Article 5 and the river 
basin management plans. Collection and aggregation of data and figures predomi-
nantly have been subject to a rather mixed technical-scientific and socio-economic rationale. 
The large number of WFD Consultation Platforms has been mainly used for informa-
tion and consultation of private and civil stakeholders and less for making use of their 
knowledge, expertise and creative capital. Since the offered room for regional and 
local manoeuvre initially results in diverging Article 5 reports and river basin manage-
ment plans, the national authorities turn their heads to external audits, harmonisation 
exercises and they shift to a more top-down control in the final stage of the first WFD 
implementation planning cycle.  
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Given the non-obligatory nature of involvement of municipalities and despite a special 
participation stimulation arrangement, most river basin management plans lack visible 
contributions by these local authorities. At the end of the day, although the aggregated 
facts and figures from the river basin management plans are acknowledged by a ma-
jority of public actors and non-governmental l stakeholder groups, plan ownership is 
restricted to the direct involved competent water authorities, provinces and national 
ministries. Different positions about the conclusions in the river basin management 
plans such as on ambition levels and effectiveness of selected measures, persist among 
socio-economic interest groups and environmental NGOs. In this respect, the WFD 
process resembles experiences of former planning processes in the water policy do-
main with a clear divide in responsibilities between the public authorities on the one 
side and the informed and consulted environmental NGOs and socio-economic inte-
rest groups at the other. These observations point at a juxtaposition of ideal-type B 
IRBM information rules in the entire studied period from 1990 to 2009 (Table 6.7).   
 
Table 6.7 Ideal-type collective-choice IRBM information rules (national level) 
Ideal-type rules↓ 1990 to 2000↓ 2001 to 2009↓ 
The river basin management planning process (defi-
nition of means and ends) is predominantly driven 
by expert information and knowledge from the 
natural sciences. Validity and reliability are central 
criteria for legitimised information and knowledge. 
 
X 
 
X 
The river basin management planning process (defi-
nition of means and ends) is predominantly driven 
by expert information and knowledge from the 
economic sciences. Cost-benefit ratios and eco-
nomic efficiency are central criteria for legitimised 
information and knowledge. 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
The river basin management planning process (defi-
nition of means and ends) is driven by information 
and knowledge from multiple disciplines and both 
from experts and lays. Joint fact finding and social 
robustness are central criteria for legitimised infor-
mation and knowledge. 
  
Legend: The research observations come closest to ideal-type A and B rules as expressed by 
the ‘X’. 
 
6.3.7 Pay-off Rules 
As defined in Section 2.2.9, pay-off rules point at the incentives and deterrents for 
action (Ostrom, 2005).  In interaction with other rule types pay-off rules affect the net 
benefits and costs that will be assigned to particular combinations of actions and out-
comes (ibid.). In the context of this research three ideal-types of IRBM pay-off rules 
have been identified (see Table 6.8). 
 
In the case of a Member State which does not fully comply with the formal require-
ments in time the EC may start a special procedure in which the competent authorities 
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get the opportunity to fill in omissions. As a last resort the EC may initiate an in-
fringement procedure at the European Court of Justice. Such a procedure may lead to 
financial fines. In turn the competent national authorities may recover the damage 
from regional and local authorities when they are able to prove negligence (national 
WFD Implementation Act; Anonymous, 2005). The WFD’s Article 23 mentions that 
Member States shall determine penalties applicable to breaches of the national provi-
sions adopted pursuant to the WFD. ‘These penalties provided for shall be effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive’ (European Communities, 2000: 20). Until 2009 the 
Dutch national authorities did not elaborate such a penalties system. National and 
provincial authorities may overrule some decisions by the water management authori-
ties and municipal authorities, however within the Dutch institutional context this is 
not common practice.  
Notwithstanding interpretation differences between the Dutch competent 
authorities and the EC, cost recovery for water services (based on the user and pol-
luter pays principles) was the current practice already before adoption of the WFD. 
The Dutch consider themselves among the European forerunners with regard to cost 
recovery rates. Especially farmers and industrial interest groups often point at the 
importance of a European level playing field (VNO-NCW, 2005 and 2007; LTO, 2007; 
Raadgever et al., 2009). Their argument is that Dutch entrepreneurs pay more water 
related taxes than those in most other European Member States. The Dutch national 
authorities are reluctant to include flood defence costs in the definition of water ser-
vices, since flood defence is considered of generic national importance and mainly 
covered by general taxes.  
In the Dutch WFD implementation game emphasis is on continuation of prior 
land use and current water management policy first. With their pragmatic implemen-
tation approach the competent authorities do not aim for broad societal deliberations 
on trend reversals such as a transition to ecological economics. Cost-effectiveness analyses 
dominate the process. The historical process reconstruction shows a gradual decrease 
of estimated implementation costs, while the societal benefits, due to methodological 
deficiencies, remain quantitatively incomplete. All conducted economic analyses point 
out that, despite incomplete figures on benefits, the WFD implementation costs may 
outweigh the socio-economic benefits. Finally, Dutch authorities refer to disproportional 
costs when applying exemptions from Article 4. Remarkably the term “disproportion-
ate” is not commonly defined and is implicitly interpreted as what is considered politi-
cally as feasible and affordable. One might seriously question whether the average 0.7% 
annual increase of regional water taxes, from which only one third is due to additional 
WFD measures, may qualify as disproportionate (Ligtvoet et al, 2008). Another critical 
remark concerns the relatively short time span of the analyses, since societal benefits 
may increase over time.  
The Dutch national focus in the first WFD implementation planning cycle 
predominantly is on interpretation of the technical terms and requirements from the 
WFD and on reporting obligations. Edelenbos et al. (2008) compare knowledge 
production between experts and stakeholders for three Dutch water management 
cases including the WFD implementation process. From their analysis (which actually 
connects information rules to pay-off rules) they conclude a predominantly techno-
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cratic process approach which does not trigger a multiple stakeholder search for trade-
off opportunities (ibid.: 26): 
 
In the WFD there was hardly interaction between experts and stakeholders; a 
consultation platform was formed but this group had no intention to ‘fuel’ mutual 
joint knowledge production. Experts as well as stakeholders withdrew from active 
cooperation. [..] In the WFD case we see a primacy of the co-production of knowl-
edge between executives and experts, at the expense of interaction and knowledge 
search and production in cooperation with NGOs and other stakeholders. Experts 
are constantly inquiring about what executives want, who directs the process and 
who is responsible for the WFD. The knowledge from stakeholders is perceived as 
difficult to mobilise and as too simplistic to take into account. 
 
The analysis from this research arrives at a similar conclusion. Although the national 
and regional authorities stressed that broad support for the river basin management 
plans was aimed at, the process architecture was not based on a detailed ex ante analy-
sis of which environmental NGOs and socio-economic interest groups to involve 
with which specific aims at which stages in the first implementation planning cycle. 
The national WFD Implementation Memorandum (Tweede Kamer der Staten-
Generaal, 2004b) stressed that the Article 14 requirements on information and consul-
tation would be feasible, since they perfectly fit into Dutch (consultation) traditions. 
General stakeholder analyses have been made at the national, regional and local levels 
in order to inform and consult non-governmental actors, e.g. by means of thematic 
sessions, workshops and WFD Consultation Platforms. However, experts and civil 
servants have dominated the process, emphasis has been on information exchange 
and contributions from other stakeholders are hardly included in the river basin man-
agement and related water management plans (Edelenbos et al., 2008; Raadgever et al., 
2009; MB Advies, 2009). At the formal consultation round non-governmental stake-
holders repeat initial arguments with a clear divide between environmental NGOs on 
the one side and farmers’ and industrial interest groups on the other side (Ministerie 
van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2009b). 
 
In conclusion of this subsection: the focus of the WFD process, as designed by the 
national, regional and local public actors has been predominantly on an expert-driven 
identification and selection of feasible and affordable measures, as a joint assignment 
of competent water policy and management authorities. The technocratic and one-
sided nature of the process and the multiplicity of time demanding and parallel opera-
ting consultation platforms at the national, regional and local levels caused confusion 
about aggregated facts and figures.  Consequently, trade-off opportunities for (sub-) 
basin communities have not been actively explored. The chosen process approach has 
not triggered significant investments by non-governmental actors in collaborative 
capital for compliance with collective-choice rules. Notwithstanding the tremendous 
efforts and considerable investments from the national Water Policy Department in a 
mixed bottom-up and top-down process, the dominance of public actors and the 
information and consultation arrangements resemble prior traditions in the water 
policy domain. Also the neo-liberal context in which economic incentives and market forces 
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accompany formal rewards and sanctions largely remained the same. These observa-
tions point at a stable juxtaposition of ideal-type A and B pay-off rules during the 
1990 to 2009 period (see Table 6.8).  
 
Table 6.8 Ideal-type collective-choice IRBM pay-off rules (national level) 
Ideal-type rules↓ 1990 to 2000↓ 2001 to 2009↓ 
A: Rewards and sanctions from laws and regulations 
are major drivers for compliance with collective 
rules (e.g. as expressed by standards and licence 
conditions). 
 
X 
 
X 
B: Economic incentives and market forces are major 
drivers for compliance with collective rules.   
 
X 
 
X 
C: (Sub-) Basin communities voluntarily invest 
resources (human, financial, expertise) as collabora-
tive capital for compliance with collective-choice 
rules. 
  
Legend: The research observations come closest to ideal-type A and B rules, expressed by ‘X’. 
 
 
6.4 National rules in the context of policy discourses, actors and  
Resources and power 
 
In the previous section observed IRBM collective-choice rules at the national level 
have been presented, both for the 1990 to 2000 period (before adoption of the WFD) 
and the 2001 to 2009 period (the first WFD implementation planning cycle). As con-
cluded in Chapter 2, rules development should be best studied in relation to (continu-
ity and changes in) the other three dimensions of a policy arrangement: policy discourses, 
actors (coalitions and oppositions) and the distribution of resources and power. Obser-
vations on these three dimensions may deliver potential explanations for observed 
changes in rule-types or the lack thereof. Since the WFD has elaborated the IRBM 
paradigm into a uniform set of rules and principles for all European water resources, 
one might expect rules changes to occur depending on the extent to which these new 
arrangements fit into the domestic rules, traditions and practices. By other words: how 
new are the IRBM discourse and its related rules and principles? To which extent do 
these trigger changes in actor constellations and the distribution of resources and 
power? Given the new European policy discourse as a starting-point for this research 
this section begins with the policy discourses dimension of the PAA (Arts, Van 
Tatenhove and Leroy, 2000; Leroy and Arts, 2006).   
 
6.4.1 Policy Discourses 
As introduced in Subsection 2.3.2, regarding policy discourses, Wiering and Arts 
(2006) distinguish three layers: (1) world views or paradigms (which are most difficult 
to influence), (2) policy and governance principles (which are the actors’ utopias) and 
(3) operational rules and practices (daily water management routines which are rela-
tively easy to alter). As two deeply embedded paradigms, integrated water systems manage-
ment and decentralised unity dominate the scene in the Dutch water policy domain.  
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In the 1990s also the new public management discourse enters and continues after adop-
tion of the WFD. Decentralised unity is often expressed by the ‘de-central whenever 
possible, central whenever necessary’ mantra. Furthermore, as of April 2004 the 
pragmatic feasibility and affordability mantra guides the first Dutch WFD implementation 
planning cycle. Table 6.9 sums the observed governance and policy principles in the 
Dutch water policy domain (national level) in the 1990 to 2009 period. Although gov-
ernance principles are interpreted here as mainly organisational in nature and policy 
principles as mainly substantive, certain redundancy may occur.Besides, some princi-
ples may relate to multiple rule-types. 
During the studied period the integration discourse gradually gains more ground. 
In the early drafting years Dutch water experts have been among the strong advocates 
of designing a WFD in which their integrated water systems approach would be firmly 
echoed. The closely related IRBM concept challenges adminstrative boundaries (organ-
isational scope rules). The Netherlands opt for maintenance of administrative territories 
(within the context of ongoing up-scaling of regional water management authorities) 
in combination with additional informal coordination structures at the river basin and 
(sub-)basin levels. The tension between European obligations and national intentions 
hinders the internal integration ambitions, in addition to stage differences between the 
WM21 process (implementation of measures) and the WFD process (formulation of 
objectives and selection of measures). Besides, first priority goes to safety against 
flood measures. Despite wishes from the water policy actors, external, cross-sector 
incorporation of water objectives proceeds less easily. Gradually, water issues become 
more noticeable in policy documents and instruments of the spatial planning domain, 
most notably by the acknowledgement of water as one among the main guiding prin-
ciples in spatial planning and the water assessment procedure. A persistent principle 
concerns the protection of historical positions of land owners and users which makes 
a trend reversal towards more sustainable land use practices in the densely populated 
low lands of Europe troublesome.  
With regard to boundary, aggregation and information rules, despite the active participa-
tion, joint fact finding and social learning recommendations in the European guidance 
documents, the Dutch water policy domain remains largely driven by expert knowl-
edge and decisions mainly remain the privilege of public actors. Private and civil 
stakeholders have conditioned access to the river basin management planning process. 
The public actors struggle with encouragement of active stakeholder involvement, as related 
process requirements seem not to be settled within their genes. The chosen receipt by 
the TPW Ministry so far offers ample opportunities for (informal and formal) infor-
mation and consultation. Furthermore, there is increased emphasis on a European level 
playing field which reduces additional Dutch national environmental ambitions and on 
synchronisation of water policy and management plans at all administrative levels. The 
Dutch national approach should pay off in more balanced investments across Member 
States, more generic rules over individual licences and strict implementation of Euro-
pean obligations by a staged approach. In addition to formal rewards and sanctions, the pol-
luter pays and user pays principles are considered triggers in the search for more synergy 
and innovation (pay-off rules). 
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Table 6.9: Policy discourses and rules at the Dutch national level (1990 to 2009) 
Rule types↓ Policy discourses ↓ 
Scope:  Governance principles: Informal river basin management planning 
coordination; A mixed bottom-up and top-down implementation 
planning process; International river basin delineations are leading 
over domestic ones (for WFD reasons); Internal legislative integration 
(one water act, one water license system); Speciality of policy 
domains/ministries. Policy principles: Integrated management of 
water quality and water quantity issues; Taking into account relations 
between surface water and groundwater bodies;  Water as a guiding 
principle in spatial planning; Safety first; Room for the rivers. 
Position: Governance principles: Preconditioned protection of historical land 
property and user rights; Land acquisition based on voluntary agree-
ments; Maximal room for socio-economic development within the 
context of European obligations. 
Boundary 
(entry or exit):  
Governance principles: Conditioned access for non governmental 
actors (with emphasis on information and consultation); Informal 
consultation in addition to/ prior to formal consultation; It is up to 
regional authorities to decide whether drinking water companies have 
access to the river basin management platforms. 
Choice (au-
thority): 
Governance principles: Integration towards one water license system; 
Generic rules over individual licenses; Maximum room for socio-
economic development within the context of European obligations. 
Policy principles: Zoning of user functions and nature protection 
sites; A combined approach for floods, droughts and water quality; A 
combined emission-immission approach; Hierarchy of water uses in 
case of droughts; Prevention of irreversible hydro-morphological 
alterations/prevention of significant damage; No deterioration of 
water bodies. 
Aggregation: Governance principles: Multilateral cross-border coordination by 
national authorities and bilateral cross-border coordination by regional 
authorities; Competent public actors decide and private and civil 
actors are to be informed and consulted (to gain support for the river 
basin management plans); Synchronisation of river basin management 
and domestic water management plans (due to the WFD terms).  
Policy principles: A level playing field for socio-economic sectors in 
Europes; Strict divide between European obligations and national 
intentions. 
Information: Governance principles: Joint fact finding by public actors.  
Policy principles:  Scientific knowledge reduces uncertainties; Costs 
should not outweigh the benefits. 
Pay-off: Governance principles: Generic rules over individual licences; Strict 
implementation of European obligations by a staged approach; The 
invisible hand of market forces.Policy principles: Polluters and users 
pay; Cost-effectiveness; Feasible and affordable objectives and meas-
ures; Synergy and innovation; A European level playing field. 
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The analysis of the policy discoursce dimension shows an evolution from the Dutch 
perception of European forerunner in the water policy domain towards a pragmatic 
compliant of the European obligations. Bad political experiences with other directives 
(such as restrictions to building licences due to strict legally binding air quality stan-
dards) and (a perception of) more Euro-scepticism, have contributed to a less ambi-
tious implementation attitude (do no more than strictly necessary) and more emphasis on a 
level playing field. Becoming more cautious with potential restrictions from European 
environmental legislation the Dutch have opted for a more literal incorporation of the 
WFD’s terms and definitions into the domestic transposition law (Anonymous, 2005). 
Laboriuous debates have been triggered on the nature of the WFD’s requirements. 
Are they intentions or strict obligations? A comparative analysis of the WFD’s imple-
mentation process concludes that no other studied Member State (among Germany, 
France, England and Wales, Denmark and the Flemish Region of Belgium) has been 
so much troubled by this question as the Netherlands (Van Kempen and Uiten-
boogaart, 2009). Remarkably, given Dutch public actors have advocated a more inte-
grated framework directive which leaves convenient room for tailor-made domestic 
implementation practices, they clearly have struggled a lot with transposition of the 
WFD’s ambiguous ambitions and requirements (Mostert et al., 2010; Van Rijkswick, 
2010).  
 
6.4.2 Actors 
At the national level the Dutch public actors have chosen a WFD implementation 
planning approach which fits well in the Dutch tradition of informal information and 
consultation sessions in addition and prior to formal consultations. This approach 
does not alter the organisational scope rules substantially, although informal water policy 
implementation structures are subject to subsequent integration and simplification 
rounds. From the start of the WFD’s implementation planning process, Thorbecke’s 
House remains intact as a firm precondition and public actors remain in control of 
planning and decision-making and condition the boundaries for involvement of pri-
vate and civil stakeholders (boundary and aggregation rules). Although the public actors 
embrace the integrated river basin management scope of the WFD (which has been 
advocated actively by Dutch water experts and officials at the WFD’s drafting stage at 
the European level), they struggle with its technical prescriptions and the offered in-
terpretation room in relation to expected socio-economic consequences (scope and 
information rules).  
Due to their perception of critical implementation uncertainties, the HSE and 
ANF Ministries who have got access to the National Political Water Platform initially 
doubt whether the proposed process approach by the TPW Ministry, with extensive 
local bottom-up processes, is a wise choice (Interview 18, Appendix I; aggregation rules). 
They fear a loss of steering control in this complicated, multi-faceted process (ibid.). 
The TPW Ministry sticks to its conviction and initiates the informal double pillar co-
ordination structures (see Figure 6.3 in Subsection 6.3.5). Regional and local public 
actors welcome this serious attempt from the national Water Policy Department to go 
for a mixed top-down and bottom-up WFD implementation planning approach (In-
terviews, 23 till 26, 28 till 30, 34, 36, 41, 44 and 45, Appendix I). Although the boundary 
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rules more explicitly allow other ministries to participate in the water policy domain, so 
far the WFD has not triggered new rules for external, cross-sector integration (see also 
Subsection 6.3.1 on substantive scope issues).Additionally, the WFD process clearly 
has triggered a more extensive cooperation between municipalities and inland water 
management authorities than before (see Chapter 8 of the WFD process in the Bra-
bantse Delta area). 
After the second WFD wake-up call in November 2003 some Members of  
Parliament and industrial and farmers’ interests’ representatives embrace the fear of 
strict European obligations and related fines for non-compliance (pay-off rules). They 
stress the considerable prior investments in environmental measures, point at the 
dependency on upstream Member States and do not accept transposition of European 
legislation that may prevent further human development plans. The arguments are 
brought up to protect land property and user rights and water resources user rights. 
On the contrary, environmental NGOs oppose these protectionist attitudes. They 
form a coalition with representatives of drinking water and recreational interests. This 
coalition advocates the added benefits from investments in clean water resources and 
healthy ecosystems for all water and land users. Notwithstanding the wish of the na-
tional actors to obtain broad support for the river basin management plans by means 
of an extensive network of consultation platforms at the national, regional and local 
level, the classic divides between interests groups remain unsolved and are even pro-
nounced by means of sectoral position papers. This is not to discount the local cross-
interests attempts by farmers, water management and municipal authorities who tested 
innovative and synergetic solutions in practice. Also the farmers’ interest organisation 
LTO Nederland and the Association of Regional Water Management Authorities joined 
forces for an inventory of opportunities for improving water quality by agricculture 
(LTO-UvW, 2008). 
Regarding choice rules material integration of water user licences has taken place, 
supported by the WFD integration discourse. Due to opposition by the water man-
agement authorities, integration of water licences into the environmental licences 
system did not take place (Van Rijswick, 2001: 375-376). After adoption of the WFD 
the tendency of more generic national rules instead of individual licences continues. 
Controversies among different land and water resources users make elaboration of 
and clear choices by means of instruments for integrated supply and demand man-
agement laborious. Although conditions for resilient ecosystems are mentioned and 
included in some instruments (such as for the diminishment of desiccation of nature 
reserves) they are not explicitly defined and quantified (for example by means of 
minimum ecological flow requirements). 
This research and other analyses of the Dutch WFD implementation planning 
process (Edelenbos et al., 2008; Raadgever et al., 2009; Ten Heuvelhof et al., 2010) 
make clear that experts and public actors have dominated information collection and 
aggregation and decision-making for both the river basin characterisation and the river 
basin management plans (boundary and information rules). The majority of representatives 
from socio-economic interest organisations and environmental NGOs have appre-
ciated the ample information opportunities, but struggled with the complexity and 
time demanding nature of the chosen process approach (Ovaa, 2007). Furthermore, 
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they were disappointed with the limited co-thinking, co-production and co-decision 
opportunities, although some also did not want to be co-opted in the process by re-
sponsible public authorities (ibid.; Santbergen, 2005; Edelenbos et al, 2008; Interviews 
1, 2, 4 till 10,  and 13 till 17, Appendix I). In this respect, the WFD process is no 
breach with prior traditions within the Dutch water policy domain. In sum, the tech-
nocratic WFD implementation planning process has neither dissolved the classic di-
vides between public actors and private and civil actors, nor between nature and agri-
culture. Despite incidental cooperative initiatives, the WFD process so far did not pay-
off in significant investments in the design of collective arrangements by public, pri-
vate and civil actors together (pay-off rules). Initial positions by socio-economic interests 
groups and environmental NGOs have remained unaltered and emphasised by means 
of position papers and formal consultation remarks.  
 
6.4.3 Resources and Power 
In the Dutch tradition of searching for compromises, early, voluntarily and informal 
consultation is often preferred over fundamental organisational change and legally 
binding arrangements (Kickert, 2004; Andeweg and Irvin, 2005). Wisserhof (2000: 
195) points at the ‘consociated’ past, with each consociation (zuil) having its own ide-
ology. The avoidance of politicising ideological differences is central in Dutch policy-
making. Since there has always been a need for consensus regarding functional acti-
vities, not to the least because of the common threat of the sea, policy-making is 
pragmatic in nature (ibid.). Within this macro-context, many advice reports on the 
future organisation of Dutch water policy are cautious not to affect historical organ-
isational paths dramatically (organisational scope rules). For example, one advisory report 
about the future organisation of regional water management starts from the precondi-
tion that reorganisation of political and administrative structures will not be required 
for the aim of a more integrated approach (Van der Vlies, De Putter and Hötte, 1996). 
Strategic integration should best take place at the provincial level and could be im-
proved by means of a synchronous drafting and adoption of policy plans from related 
domains (such as water, environment and spatial planning; ibid.; external integration 
rules). Integrated environmental policy plans may be helpful but not necessary, as 
changes of instruments and/or organisational structures do not lead to improvement 
of the present state by definition. A culture of voluntary cooperation based on a 
common sense of shared responsibilities, a more integrated political decision-making 
approach, less time-demanding and less conditioned procedures for amendments in 
and inclusion of a so-called “wet subsection” (waterparagraaf) in local destination plans 
could contribute a lot to an integrated approach (ibid.).  
The WFD’s implementation planning process echoes the Dutch decision-making 
traditions and triggers no major shifts in formal power configurations (aggregation rules). 
The national Water Policy Department seizes the WFD momentum to ask political 
attention for inclusion of water quality issues into related policy domains. Further-
more, it opts for a mixed top-down and bottom-up process with the aim to actively 
involve local and regional authorities (who are expected to have the required knowl-
edge, experience and financial and human resources). Some civil servants at other 
ministries watch this approach with a frown and warn for a loose of steering control 
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in relation to the European obligations. The water management authorities consider 
the offered room in the WFD process as an important opportunity to prove their 
central role and position in the Dutch water management landscape. Despite efforts to 
involve other ministries more directly power configurations do not remarkably alter 
and cross-sector integration remains laborious, especially with the ANF Ministry (ex-
ternal integration rules). Similar observations come from Wiering and Crabbé (2006) who, 
in their comparative analysis of the institutional dynamics of water management in 
Flanders and the Netherlands, conclude stable resource- and actor constellation as 
well as power relations over time in the Dutch water policy domain. Based on a de-
tailed analysis, Jordan and Schout (2006: 91-94 and 166-186) argue that although the 
Dutch have been very active in advocating Environmental Policy Integration at the 
European level, they have relatively weak domestic cross-sector coordination mecha-
nisms. They point at a system of collegial policy making (in which no one has the 
authority to take a decision or to overrule others), event-driven coordination for the 
impact of European policies, informal and flexible relations, the reliance on passive 
information and an understaffed European affairs unit within the HSE Ministry 
(ibid.).  
Since 2004 periodical meetings take place between the State Secretary for Water 
Management and the chairs of the regional political river basin platforms in order to 
monitor progress of the regional and local WFD implementation processes, to com-
pare the consistency among the river basins and to discuss bottlenecks and controver-
sial issues. Initially, the UvW and the IPO were not in favour of these additional 
meetings and emphasised that decision making primacy would rest with the members 
of the National Political Water Platform (boundary and aggregation rules). As an equiva-
lent, the chairs of the regional administrative river basin platforms also meet with the 
national river basin management coordinators periodically (and more frequently). 
Despite initial opposition from the associations the additional national-regional meet-
ings proof to be high value for coordinators of the regional and local WFD implemen-
tation processes. For example, through these meetings the regional chairs and the 
national coordinators communicate instructions and interpretations more directly to 
the regional and local WFD implementers than the representatives of the associations 
in the National Political Water Platform are able to manage. This may be due to the 
more practical nature of the discussions in the national-regional meetings and the fact 
that the associations face difficulties in both organising frequent contacts with all indi-
vidual regional and local coordinators and establishing compromises among all these 
individual experiences and opinions. Ten Heuvelhof et al. (2010) mention a functional 
redundancy due to these parallel structures. The 2009 interim evaluation sessions as 
organised by the TPW Ministry and the 2010 national evaluation of the WFD process 
as organised by the Delft University of Technology and the TPW Ministry (Ten 
Heuvelhof et al., 2010) both show that for aggregation efficiency reasons, a majority 
of respectively participants and interviewees are in favour of continuation of the na-
tional-regional meeting structures. 
With regard to boundary rules the national Water Policy Department offers ample 
opportunities for non-governmental stakeholders to get informed and to be consulted 
in informal and formal consultation rounds. The department provides more 
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co-decision room for regional and local public actors but maintains the clear divide 
between public actors and private and civil actors. Besides, in order to reduce uncer-
tainties the department opts for a technical process approach, based on scientific and 
socio-economic expert knowledge (information rules; Edelenbos et al., 2008; Raadgever 
et al., 2009). Consequently, the collection and aggregation of information into river 
basin characterisation and river basin management plans is dominated by the public 
actors, water sector experts and independent research institutes (ibid.; Interviews 1, 2, 
4 till 10 and 13 till 17, Appendix I). According to Edelenbos et al. (2008) socio-
economic interest groups and environmental NGOs were seldom invited to partici-
pate in national preparation groups and working groups (except for the preparation 
group on the environment, Cluster Milieu). From the reasons these authors mention it 
becomes clear that the public authorities fear a loose of control (ibid.: 16): 
 
Reasons for this were a lack of clarity in the assignments of the groups, a lack of idea 
of who to involve, a low expectation of the surplus value of involving stakeholders, 
the short time frame for actively involving stakeholders and the juridical status and 
political character of the subject which made it, in the eyes of the responsible 
officials, difficult to involve stakeholders. 
 
Another argument often mentioned for not involving NGOs input was the too com-
plex nature of the WFD to be open for societal input (ibid.). Although some envi-
ronmental  NGOs requested financial and human resources for empowerment and 
capacity building, the national authorities decided not to grant these with referral to 
own responsibilities of all involved stakeholder categories. This process approach has 
resulted in river basin characterisation and river basin management plans which have 
been drafted and supported predominantly by public actors at the national, regional 
and local levels, whereas socio-economic interests groups and environmental NGOs 
did not express shared ownership and maintained their initial opinion differences on 
the chosen ambitions (boundary and pay-off rules). 
Mainly due to political pressure from the Lower House of Parliament and lobby-
ing by socio-economic interests groups, the “funnel model” (trechtermodel; see Figure 
6.1 in Subsection 6.2.2) has lead to a gradual, politically favourable reduction of  
implementation costs estimations (see Table 6.10). The 2006 December Memorandum 
mentioned an average 2% annual increase of water management taxes (water man-
agement authorities and municipalities together) up to 2027 for the entire national 
water assignment (WM21 + WFD), both for households and industries (Ministerie 
van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2006b). Annual costs for the industrial sector were esti-
mated €40 millions a year, i.e. 0.05% of the national production value (ibid.) Addi-
tional measures for the agricultural sector have not been presented, since these were 
considered very expensive and with low effectiveness rates. To explore potential cost-
effective measures pilot projects have been proposed (ibid.) The Ex Ante Evaluation 
report (Ligtvoet et al., 2008) showed an average 0.7% annual increase of water man-
agement authority taxes. One third is due to additional WFD measures. The main 
percentage of these taxes (75%) will be paid by households (who have not been di-
rectly involved in the WFD process so far); the rest by agriculture (1%), industry (7%) 
and other sectors (17%; ibid.). After publication of the Ex Ante Evaluation, regional 
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and local politicians have altered their proposed programmes of measures. Conse-
quently, by exclusion of some expensive measures and inclusion of less expensive 
measures by local and regional authorities,the final costs esimations were a bit lower.  
 
Table 6.10: Estimated WFD (and WM21) costs (investments + exploitation) & benefits 
 2005 December 
Memorandum: 
2006 December 
Memorandum: 
2008 Ex Ante 
Evaluation: 
WFD costs 
(€): 
3.3 to 8.2 billions (2009 
to 2015)*) 
7.3 to 9.2 billions (2009 
to 2027)**) 
2.9 billions 
(2007 to 2027) 
WM21 costs 
(€): 
9 billions for short term 
measures (2003 to 
2015) and  
16 billions for long 
term measures (2003 to 
2050) 
6.7 billions for short 
term measures (2009 to 
2015) 
4.3 billions 
(2007 to 
2027)***) 
Total costs 
(€): 
12.3 – 17.2 billions 
(2003 to 2015) 
28.3 – 33.2 billions 
(2003 to 2050) 
9.4 – 10.1 billions (2009 
to 2015) 
5.0 billions 
(2007 to 2015) 
2.1 billions 
(2016 to 
2027)****) 
WFD bene-
fits (€): 
No estimations avail-
able 
Maximal 6 billions (2009 
to 2027)  
Only qualita-
tive statements 
*) Including water system restoration projects, waste water treatment plants, measures 
taken by agriculture and industry and (polluted) water sediments. Excluding diffuse pollu-
tion sources (still to be estimated), anti-desiccation measures (included in current policies), 
sewerage systems (still to be estimated). Figures relate to a range from maximal to minimal 
synergy with WM21 measures. Investments in agriculture exclude decreased revenues due 
to production limitations. The maximum estimations concern measures that are consid-
ered feasible, hence excluding theoretical, not feasible measures. 
**) Range depending on maximal to minimal synergy with WM21 measures. Costs account 
for 70-80% compliance with ecological WFD objectives ultimo 2027. 
***) Including present and future policies (WM21 + Natura 2000 + water chain). 
****) €1.7 billions for measures in state water bodies and €5.4 billions for measures in 
inland water bodies. Costs estimations account for 40-60% full compliance with ecological 
WFD objectives for the inland water bodies and 100% for the state water bodies. Based 
on practical experience and expert judgement, water management authorities are a bit 
more optimistic about compliance rates than results from the ex ante analysis show. 
 
 
6.5 Synthesis: stable collective-choice rules, further internal integration 
 
In this final section observed collective-choice rules at the Dutch national level are linked 
to observations on the other three policy arrangement dimensions: policy discourses, 
actors (coalitions and oppositions) and distribution of resources and power (see Table 
6.11). Potential explanations for continuation of or changes in observed rules-types 
are derived from these latter observations and from literature.  
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Table 6.11: Observed collective-choice rules & potential explanations (national level) 
Rule-types in the 1990 to 2009 period ↓ Potential explanations ↓ 
Scope (organisational): Water policy is implemented by 
functional water management agencies and actors 
networks. These agencies are controlled by parliamen-
tary institutions (ideal-type B). 
Stable, public actor/expert-driven 
water policy domain;  
IRBM paradigm 
Scope (internal integration): Enforcement of the evolu-
tion towards more integrated legislation, policy docu-
ments and management plans (from ideal-type A to-
wards B). 
IRBM paradigm; New Public 
Management paradigm; Stable, 
public actor/expert-driven water 
policy domain 
Scope (external integration): Policy documents and 
management plans from other policy domains take 
into account water issues and reversely (ideal-type B). 
Speciality Principle; Leapfrog 
Principle 
Position: Conditional maintenance and acquirement of 
water and land resources use and property rights. Con-
ditions include requirements to consider social, eco-
nomic and/or environmental externalities (ideal-type 
B). 
Protection of prior user and 
property rights; Tradition of 
 voluntary agreements 
Boundary: Non governmental actors may have access 
to the river basin management planning process under 
conditions set by the public actors. Emphasis on co-
thinking and consultation (ideal-type B). 
Stable public actor/expert-driven 
water policy domain 
Choice (supply and demand management): In general a 
mixed supply and demand management approach. In 
case of prolonged droughts, the approach is more 
integrated in nature as expressed by a hierarchy in user 
functions (juxtaposition of ideal-types B and C). 
IRBM paradigm; Advocacy by 
environmental NGOs;  
Speciality Principle 
Choice (nature of the license system): An evolution 
towards licenses that integrate quantity & quality objec-
tives related to the use, development and management 
of water resources (from ideal-type A towards B). 
IRBM paradigm; New Public 
Management paradigm; Stable 
public actor/expert-driven water 
policy domain 
Aggregation: Both asymmetric, top-down decision-
making and symmetric, consensus based decision-
making examples on water policy and management 
plans at interrelated administrative levels (juxtaposition 
of ideal-types B and C). 
Decentralised unitary state;  
Tradition of informal consensus 
building; IRBM paradigm 
Information: The river basin management planning 
process is driven by a mixture of a scientific-technical 
and a social-economic rationale. Validity, reliability, 
costs-benefits ratios and economic efficiency are cen-
tral criteria for legitimised information and knowledge 
(juxtaposition of ideal-types A and B). 
Stable, public actor/expert-driven 
water policy domain; Dominant 
scientific-technical and socio-
economic rationales 
Pay-off: Both rewards and sanctions from laws and 
regulations and economic incentives and market forces 
are major drivers for compliance with collective-choice 
rules (juxtaposition of ideal-types A and B). 
Stable, public actor/expert-driven 
water policy domain; Neo-
liberalism; Polluter pays,  
affordability, cost-effectiveness 
The grey-coloured cells indicate remarkable evolutions. 
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Overall, the introduction of the governance and policy principles and the WFD’s obli-
gations mainly contributes to a consolidation of prior rules in the national water policy 
domain. The Directive supports prior integration tendencies. Except for scope rules 
(internal integration) and choice rules (nature of the license systems) no rule changes 
have been observed. The national Water Policy Department has seized the momen-
tum of institutionalising the IRBM discourse at the European level to accelerate inter-
nal integration tendencies within the context of a continued new public management 
discourse (e.g. calls for more transparency, less and more integrated, efficient rules, 
more accountable and responsive government and active involvement of stake-
holders). Institutionalisation of instruments for integrated water systems management 
and the European river basin management approach are two out of three political 
arguments for the new integrated Water Act (Anonymous, 2009a).  
With this statute, an important material legislative integration step has been 
made, even though objectives and measures for quantity and quality aspects of water 
systems have not been integrated entirely (scope and choice rules). On the one hand, sur-
face water quality standards include chemical and biological parameters without ex-
plicit referral to quantitative standards (such as minimum flow requirements). Scien-
tific uncertainties and conflicting user interests may account for the absence of such 
quantitative standards. On the other hand, in periods of prolonged droughts surface 
water abstractions may be temporarily limited or even prohibited such as for reasons 
of preventing irreversible damage to ecosystems. The more pronounced inclusion of 
groundwater issues is an important step and one of the most noticeable changes due 
to the WFD, since it enforces opportunities for translating interdependencies with the 
state and functioning of both aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems.  
Potential explanatory (f)actors for consolidation of scope (organisational and ex-
ternal integration), position, boundary, choice (supply and demand management), aggrega-
tion, information and pay-off rules have their origin in the period before adoption of the 
WFD. Summarising, the observations in this research and literature point at: the 
salient tradition of a decentralised unitary state, new public management discourse, the 
integrated water systems management approach, limited cross-sector planning prac-
tices as rooted in the specificity principle, protection of historical property and user 
rights in combination with opposition from farmers’ interest groups and some Mem-
bers of Parliament, persistent expert-driven planning traditions by public actors, a 
tradition of resistance to strict legally binding quality and quantity standards and the 
polluter pays and the user pays principles. 
One might argue whether change of aggregation rules has occurred. The more top-
down sequence of drafting and adopting water policy and management plans one after 
the other, from the national via the provincial to the local level, has been replaced by a 
mixed level approach in which the plans are drafted and adopted synchronously. Al-
though one might conclude an evolution towards more symmetric, consensus based 
decision making, the formal hierarchical relations between the water policy and man-
agement plans persist. Furthermore, given the fear of legally binding environmental 
objectives from the WFD (which asks for coherence among all water plans) it remains 
up to the national authorities to finally decide on the aggregation instructions for the 
river basin characterisation reports and the river basin management plans. 
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Actually, the additional river basin management coordination structures may be 
perceived as natural phenomenon within the Dutch tradition of extensive informal 
information and consultation prior to formal consultation and decision-making. These 
observations lead to the conclusion of a stable juxtaposition of ideal-type B and C 
aggregation rules over the entire 1990 to 2009 period (see Table 6.6 in Subsection 
6.3.5).  
 
Given the overall picture of consolidation of prior collective-choice rules, at first 
glance one might argue that the national water policy actors have succeeded quite well 
in uploading Dutch traditions and practices to the European level. At the positive side 
of the WFD drafting and negotiation balance in Brussels the Dutch water experts 
gained the river basin management approach, inclusion of both quality and quantity 
issues and interactions between groundwater and surface water bodies, the combined 
approach of emission reductions and water quality objectives, inclusion of the option 
of designation of heavily modified and artificial water bodies and a permanent infor-
mal network of EU Water Directors (in order to influence further implementation 
guidance). However, at the negative side, despite the original transparency and integra-
tion calls, the text of the Directive might have well become too thick, too confusing 
and too full of ambiguous ambitions (Mostert et al., 2010). Also, the Dutch water 
experts have lost their substantive grip during the political negotiation process in 
Brussels. For example, the WFD’s requirements for water body classification and for 
ecological objective setting and monitoring have become rather complicated (Euro-
pean Communities, 2000: 23-30 and 33-63).  Notwithstanding the major gain of a 
uniform European wide system of environmental objectives, which holds a promise 
for the overall quality of Europe’s waters, these instructions do not solve the critical 
uncertainties in the impact of restoration measures on the desired ecosystem proc-
esses, habitats and species (Van der Wal and Waajen, 2010).  
The primary and secondary analyses show a stable inner circle of civil servants 
and experts within the Dutch water policy domain. The TPW Ministry maintains its 
dominant position over time. Other ministries enter the inner circle more explicitly, 
while non-governmental stakeholders mainly are informed and consulted. No signifi-
cant changes in distribution of power and resources occur due to the WFD implemen-
tation process although regional and local partners get more opportunities to influence 
the national planning process, e.g. by means of the informal national-regional coordi-
nation structures. The umbrella organisations of provinces, regional water manage-
ment authorities and municipalities continue struggling with equitable representation 
of their grass-roots members. Informal instructions and harmonisation attempts guide 
the national implementation planning process. As will be explained in Chapter 8, one 
major gain from the WFD process certainly is the active involvement of munici-
palities. Overall, the inner water policy circle remains locked up within the “water 
sector box”, floating around in a cosmos in which political and public attention mainly 
focuses on social issues (such as the multi-cultural society, integration and migration) 
and economic issues (such as marketisation, privatisation and a level playing field).  
In general there is a relative low political attention to water quality and ecological 
issues. Dramatic changes in land property and user rights for nature restoration 
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and/or water management purposes are not generic practice in the Netherlands. 
Given a preferential context of intentional, domestic policy ambitions over strict le-
gally binding European obligations, a still influential agricultural sector and more pro-
nounced (perception of) Euro-scepticism, the launch of the feasibility and afforda-
bility mantra apparently is a logic consequence. These national political arguments and 
stable configurations of resources and power have prevented significant rule changes 
(with regard to implementation of the WFD) to occur except for further support for 
already initiated integration efforts within the water policy domain.  
 
Finally, also the analysis of the Dutch national level shows that potential explanations 
for observed (lack of) rules change are not easily drawn from assessments of individ-
ual dimensions of a policy arrangement alone. Observations on policy discourses, 
actors and the division of resources and power all deliver parts of the entire explana-
tion. This observation supports the argument from the developers of both the Policy 
Arrangement Approach and the Institutional Analysis and Development framework 
to respectively consider the four dimensions and rule types as configurations. In the 
next chapter it will become clear whether this conclusion also holds at the Dutch 
regional level. 
  
  
 
 
  
 
 
Harry van Huet (Regional WFD Meuse Project Bureau) informs 
the politicians in the Dutch part of the International Meuse River 
 Basin District about costs and benefits regarding WFD measures  
(Source: Leo Santbergen, November 20, 2008) 
 
 
Impression of the outdoor multi-stakeholder WFD conference 
 in the Dutch part of the International Scheldt River Basin District  
(Source: Leo Santbergen, September 27, 2006) 
  
  
 
 
- 7 - 
The regional Meuse Bridge between national desires 
and local ambitions 
 
‘An arduous bottleneck is the limited number of people that think integrally. Whenever a project 
serves multiple goals one has to accept that not everything may be perfect in the end. That does not 
withhold sectoral thinkers to strive for own maximal result only.’ Gerard Daandels, chair of the 
Dynamic Rural Land Steering Group (Stuurgroep Dynamisch Platteland) in the North-
Brabant Province (Provincie Noord-Brabant, 2008: 9; translation from Dutch added). 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
As presented in the previous chapter, the Dutch national authorities have sincerely 
wrestled with the ambiguous ambitions from the Water Framework Directive (WFD). 
When Members of Parliament got entangled in delicate political debates on the nature 
of the Directive’s requirements (serious intentions or strict obligations?), the national 
Water Policy Department introduced the feasibility and affordability mantra as a prag-
matic exit road to the European capital. Furthermore, as embedded in a strong tradi-
tion of a decentralised unitary state and informal consultation prior to decision-
making, the national Water Policy Department introduced regional river basin plat-
forms and national-regional coordination structures. Whereas other ministries warned 
for a loss of steering control, the department initiated a mixed top-down and bottom-
up process in order to raise broad support for the river basin management plans.  
This chapter turns the spotlights on the regional coordination process within the 
Dutch part of the International Meuse River Basin District. The regional politicians 
from this river basin have raised their voices several times during the first WFD im-
plementation planning cycle, for example to emphasise the urgency for additional 
generic (inter-)national policies. Some interviewees satirically mentioned the relatively 
high turnover rate of national river basin coordinators for this particular river basin as 
an indication for the laborious debates. Others emphasised the added value of data 
formats which have been developed and tested within this region, uploaded to the 
national level and downloaded again to all the Dutch regional river basins. At the same 
time, differences of approach among the local processes within this river basin have 
been noticed. One might question whether the regional Meuse Bridge between na-
tional desires and local ambitions is to be considered as an ugly duckling that cries a 
lot and mainly triggers controversies, or a showpiece of subsidiarity that comes up 
with multi-stakeholder partnerships for sustainable, tailor-made solutions to persistent 
environmental issues.  
Section 7.2 starts with a chronological overview of the water policy domain in the 
Dutch part of the International Meuse River Basin District before and after adoption 
of the WFD. Subsection 7.2.1 describes the headlines of the water policy domain at 
the provincial level in the 1990 to December 2000 period, as the historical context 
from which the regional WFD coordination process has been started. Since this 
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research aims to assess the impact of the WFD on collective-choice rules for IRBM at 
interrelated administrative levels within one international river basin district (and not 
to explore differences and similarities among Dutch provinces), a detailed analysis for 
one province will suffice. Although the decentralised unitary state tradition has invited 
process differences, all Dutch provinces are embedded in the same domestic context 
and they all will have to comply with the national policy objectives and implementa-
tion requirements. In subsection 7.2.1 the emphasis is on the North-Brabant Province. 
This province has been selected given the historical analysis of the local level is con-
ducted for the Brabant-West Region, which is entirely situated within its territory (see 
Chapter 8). The author is part of the actor network for water policy implementation 
within this province, which provides ample opportunities for inside out observations. 
Subsequently, in chronological order four WFD implementation stages at the 
Dutch regional level are distinguished and described in Subsection 7.2.2. Section 7.3 
explores the extent of observed changes in the collective-choice rules for IRBM (as 
defined in Chapter 2) at the regional level in the 1990 to 2009 period. These rules are 
one of the four dimensions of the Policy Arrangement Approach (PAA; Arts, Van 
Tatenhove and Leroy, 2000; Leroy and Arts, 2006). The four dimensions are to be 
understood as a configuration hence rules should be best studied in interaction with 
developments in the other three dimensions. Therefore as a next step, Section 7.4 
provides an assessment of policy discourses, actors’ coalitions and oppositions and the 
division of resources and power, in relation to the rules dimension. Finally, Section 7.5 
closes this chapter with a synthesis which describes potential explanations for conti-
nuities and changes in observed collective-choice rules, as derived from the develop-
ments in and interaction with the other three dimensions (and related theoretical con-
cepts) as introduced in Section 2.3.  
 
 
7.2 The Water Framework Directive and regional coordination 
 
7.2.1 Provincial life before the WFD (1990 to 2000) 
 
An evolution towards integrated water and integrated areal management 
In the Netherlands the 1990s show several experiments with interactive water policy 
making as stimulated by the TPW Ministry (Hendriks et al., 1999). Besides, the ten-
dency towards integrated areal processes, as started with pilot projects early 1990s by 
the HSE Ministry, further develops (Ministerie van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke 
Ordening en Milieu, 1998; Janssens and Van Tatenhove, 2000). In the same period the 
ANF Ministry introduces special Valuable Cultural Landscape areas (Waardevolle Cul-
tuur Landschappen) to promote projects that would combine activities in farming, nature 
management, landscape protection, cultural heritage and tourism (ibid.). The prior 
Dutch water systems approach starts to melt with the European river basin manage-
ment concept towards IRBM. 
At the provincial level, the domains of water management, spatial planning, na-
ture conservation and environmental policies gradually come closer in integrated areal 
processes. The North-Brabant Province and the Limburg Province both seize the 
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momentum of the rural area reconstruction assignment, which has been triggered by an 
extensive outbreak of swine fever in 1997, to stimulate integrated areal processes, 
including water policy objectives (Provincie Noord-Brabant, 2001a; Ploegmakers, 
2007; Interviews, 30, 34 and 49, Appendix I). Padt (2007: 167) argues that the  
pluralistic-liberal approach has been the dominant approach in the Netherlands during 
the mid-1990s. ‘State-led (authorative) interventions were “out” and regional interac-
tive integrated (pluralistic-liberal) approaches were “in” (ibid.). Van Tulder et al. 
(2004) mention a considerable increase in strategic stakeholders’ dialogues in the 
Netherlands since the mid-1990s, as triggered by the sustainable development dis-
course. 
An evolution towards integrated river basin management becomes noticeable in 
the first (integrated) Provincial Water Policy Plan for the 1991 to 1995 period (Provin-
cie Noord-Brabant, 1991a). Before 1991 parallel policy plans have been launched for 
groundwater and surface water issues (Provincie Noord-Brabant, 1992; Interviews 44, 
40 and 47, Appendix I). The (integrated) water policy plan is the provincial translation 
of the first national Water Management Act (Wet op de Waterhuishouding; Anonymous, 
1989) which prescribes integrated water policy plans both at the national and the pro-
vincial level. In order to balance different water uses in an equitable way the provinces 
have to apply the instrument of designation of important water systems functions, 
which shall be anchored in the provincial water policy plan (Provincie Noord-Brabant, 
1992.). Important interests that should be weighed include drinking water provision, 
agriculture, navigation, electricity provision, industry, recreation, fisheries and nature 
and landscape (Glasbergen and Van Essen, 1992).  
Based on an inventory of actual water systems uses, the North-Brabant Province 
has designated the water system functions which include the Main Ecological Struc-
ture (Ecologische Hoofdstructuur; ibid.). The first Water Policy Plan aims at development, 
well functioning and protection of inland water systems (Provincie Noord-Brabant, 
1991a). The Province emphasises that integrated policy formulation and implementa-
tion is required since it increasingly becomes clear that quantity and quality manage-
ment of both surface water and groundwater are closely interrelated (Glasbergen and 
Van Essen, 1992; Interviews 44, 40 and 47, Appendix I). However, the quality stan-
dards for groundwater and surface water are not entirely coherent. For example, 
values for groundwater are not based on ecotoxicological knowledge and for some 
parameters values for groundwater are less severe (ibid.). 
The North-Brabant Province has been divided into regions that are dominated 
by either agriculture or nature (conform the spatial planning policy; Glasbergen and 
Van Essen, 1992). For the division into regions, hydrological river basin boundaries 
are followed whenever possible. In general there are more ambitious ecological resto-
ration options in regions that are dominated by nature. The objectives for water 
quantity requirements in relation to different water uses functions are not detailed 
further, whereas for water quality, numeric standards from national policies have 
been repeated (ibid.). Emphasis of the first Water Policy Plan is on anti-desiccation 
(stand-still as policy objective), water quality improvement and ecological connectivity 
zones (Interview 30, Appendix I). Water quality standards and emission reduction 
objectives are part of a combined approach (Glasbergen en Van Essen, 1992). Special 
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focus is on emission reduction of sewage overflows. Given critical uncertainties emis-
sion reduction perspectives for agriculture and for upstream, transboundary river 
basin parts are difficult to prognosticate,. The North-Brabant Province will consider 
buffer zones around areas with high ecological values. In general the Province does 
not work with compliance terms for the provincial water policy objectives, given criti-
cal uncertainties about feasibility and impact of measures (Provincie Noord-Brabant, 
1991a; Interview 30, Appendix I).  
The former water quantity and water quality management authorities (kwantiteits- 
en kwaliteitswaterschappen) would have to translate national and provinvial water policy 
objectives into measures at the local level. These administrations showed limited inter-
est in active participation in the drafting stage of the provincial plan and became more 
active in the consultation stage (Glasbergen and Van Essen, 1992.). Collective-choice 
rules for compliance with the provincial water policy objectives are written down in 
the Provincial Water Regulation (Verordening Waterhuishouding Noord-Brabant; Provincie 
Noord-Brabant, 1991b). The nature of the rules is different for groundwaters and 
surface waters (Provincie Noord-Brabant, 1992: 2; translation from Dutch added): 
 
Since the province is the formal groundwater manager it may provide for detailed 
user rules and conditions. The situation for surface water is rather different. The 
water management authorities provide the detailed rules and conditions in their water 
management plans. The province can only provide the generic frames within which 
these authorities shall operate. 
 
For anti-desiccation reasons, the provincial water policy includes a shift from ground-
water abstractions towards surface water abstractions whenever feasible (ibid.). 
Periodically, new developments and rules changes are included in a revision of the 
regulation.  
In the 1990’s a tendency becomes noticeable to draft policy plans of related 
sectors in parallel whenever feasible. The North-Brabant province opts for interactive 
policy revision processes. For example, in 1997 the Province initiates an interactive 
process with non-governmental stakeholders on revision of its environmental policy. 
The resulting fifth Provincial Environmental Policy Plan for the 2000 to 2004 period 
shows that growing welfare, emancipation, labour participation, free time and indi-
vidualisation all lead to a volume growth of electricity use, consumption, production, 
mobility and spatial claims (Provincie Noord-Brabant, 2000a). This socio-economic 
growth surpasses the carrying capacity thresholds of natural resources and ecosystems 
(including water-related ones). The main challenge of the revised environmental policy 
is to arrive at sustainable development. More intensive coordination will be required 
among the province, regional water management authorities, municipalities and the 
state actors. There is a clear linkage with water policy by means of emission reduction 
objectives and measures (ibid.).   
May 1998, the North-Brabant Province initiates an interactive deliberation proc-
ess with multiple stakeholders about a common vision on the future spatial planning 
policy (Provincie Noord-Brabant, 2000b). Important triggers for this process are the 
national drafting process of the fifth Spatial Policy Memorandum, a revision of the 
regional spatial plan (streekplan) the dramatic reconstruction of the rural areas and a 
THE REGIONAL MEUSE BRIDGE 295 
 
 
 
revision of the provincial strategic agenda on environment, economy and space. The 
revision process for the regional spatial plan includes two tracks, i.e. space for space 
(ruimte voor ruimte) and integrated zoning of uses (zonering van gebruikersfuncties). The 
former is a special arrangement which allows municipalities to finance demolishing of 
livestock farms in reconstruction areas with the revenues from extra building plots at 
other locations. The concept expresses ‘that space being vacate in one place could be 
exploited elsewhere’ (Padt, 2007: 60). Integrated zoning means a distinction between 
development zones (with room for controlled expansion of intensive livestock farm-
ing), extensification zones (in which intensive livestock farms will be removed) and 
intermediate zones between these former two (Provincie Noord-Brabant, 2001a: 71-
74; Padt, 2007: 147). The Province does not opt for one integrated environmental 
policy plan but aims to synchronise revision of sector policies (water, environment 
and traffic and transport) whenever possible, while taking into account the leapfrog 
principle (ibid). ‘Synchronisation of sector planning procedures has the advantage of 
coordination of parallel drafting and consultation activities, which might pay off in 
opportunities for timely integration’ (Provincie Noord-Brabant, 2001a: 3). One inte-
grated policy plan would lead to a too general overview of headlines from different 
sector policies. Hence, the added value would be limited. Provincial focus is on en-
forced coordination (Interview 30, Appendix I).  
September 1998, the General Assembly of North-Brabant (Provinciale Staten) 
adopts the (second) Provincial Water Policy Plan for the 1998 to 2002 period (Provin-
cie Noord-Brabant, 1998). This plan includes five central themes which are part of an 
integrated areal approach: (1) sustainable water supply; (2) improvement of required 
water conditions for agriculture, nature and urban areas; (3) water quality amelioration; 
(4) ecological restoration of brooks; and (5) dealing with water in built-up areas (ibid.). 
A special provincial arrangement is established in December 1999 for financial sup-
port of measures by other stakeholders that contribute to the water policy objectives 
(Provincie Noord-Brabant, 2002a). The 2000 to 2010 policy vision on protection and 
restoration of natural values in the North-Brabant Province, points at the close rela-
tions between water and nature (Provincie Noord-Brabant, 2000c). The vision empha-
sises the added value of multiple land use, including new combinations of user func-
tions such as nature protection and water management. The scope within agriculture 
should be enlarged especially in and around nature areas, by including tasks in land-
scape and nature management and water management and in offering recreation facili-
ties. The vision marks an evolution from sectoral nature policy towards an integrated 
areal approach and refers to potential linkages with water policy instruments, most 
notably water as deciding principle for spatial planning, formulation of desired 
groundwater and surface water regimes, water storage and retention in brooks and 
rivers and the water systems and the river basin management approach (ibid.). 
 
Intermezzo: Revitalisation of rural areas and the WFD assignment 
Revitalisation of rural areas is a major assignment of the North-Brabant Province. It is 
an attempt to combine sector policies by means of an integrated areal process in  
interaction with several stakeholders (Provincie Noord-Brabant, 1999 and 2001a and 
b; Ploegmakers, 2007: Interviews 34, 46 and 49, Appendix I). Since the revitalisation  
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process has started before adoption of the WFD, mainly runs in parallel with the first 
WFD implementation planning cycle and includes part of the water policy objectives, 
it is considered relevant for the purpose of this research to explore the linkages be-
tween these two processes. For reason of readability the observations on the revitalisa-
tion process have not been scattered over the subsections on the WFD implementa-
tion planning stages, but are summarised in this chronological intermezzo. 
The extensive outbreak of swine fever in 1997 has triggered public outrage and 
opposition to factory farming. This veterinary crisis created a window of opportunity 
for national government to announce a drastic reconstruction of the intensive live-
stock sector in the sandy vulnerable areas in the southern and eastern part of the 
Netherlands, including large parts of the International Meuse River Basin District in 
the North-Brabant and Limburg Provinces (Padt, 2007; Ploegmakers, 2007). Given 
the delicate political negotiation process that followed at the national level, including 
both complicated linkages with the manure and ammonia policies and requirements of 
the European Nitrates Directive, it took until January 2002 before the Upper House 
of Parliament finally accepted legislation to tackle the swine fever crisis (i.e. the 
Ammonia Bill and the Reconstruction Bill; see for a sound historical assessment Padt, 
2007: 139-170). The national compromise was much in favour of the North-Brabant 
Province, since it included 250-meter pig-free zones between sensitive nature areas 
and intensive livestock farms and the promise from the ANF Minister to provide for 
financial resources for active relocation of intensive livestock farms from these 250 
meter zones (Padt, 2007).  
In order to prepare its own implementation strategy and given a sense of ur-
gency, the North-Brabant Province did not await the conclusion of the national deci-
sion-making process but established the Political Reconstruction Platform (Bestuurlijk 
Platform Reconstructie; in 1999) and lobbyed at the national level (Provincie Noord-
Brabant, 2001a; Padt, 2007). The platform with representatives of municipalities, 
farming organisations, environmental NGOs, regional water management authorities 
and advisers from the ANF and HSE Ministries has drafted the so-called Reconstruc-
tion Umbrella Plan (Koepelplan Reconstructie Concentratiegebieden), which has been adopted 
by the General Assembly of North-Brabant in June 2001 (Provincie Noord-Brabant, 
2001a). The sense of urgency must be viewed within the context of the politically 
perceived negative impact of decreasing numbers of farmers on the liveability of rural 
areas and the socio-economic structures within the province, the need for financial 
support by the state and the required acceleration of nature restoration and environ-
mental quality policies’ implementation (Provincie Noord-Brabant, 1999).  
The North-Brabant Province faces the significant challenge to reconstruct 
intensive livestock farming in seven rural areas in the eastern and middle part of the 
province (conform the national Reconstruction Bill). For example, about 2,000 live-
stock farms may have to disappear within four years, due to both the Nitrates Direc-
tive and the swine fever crisis (Provincie Noord-Brabant, 1999). In order to cover the 
entire territory in a balanced way the Province has decided to perform a similar (but 
not obligatory) process in the western part (i.e. the Brabantse Delta region) as well, 
(Provincie Noord-Brabant, 2001a and b; Interview 34, Appendix I). The assignment is 
covered by the Rural Areas Revitalisation Project, aiming at an integrated areal approach 
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which includes water-related objectives and steering committees for all areas. The 
Province prefers the phrase ‘revitalisation’ rather than ‘reconstruction’ to stress that it 
aims at a balanced and developmental approach (Provincie Noord-Brabant, 2001a and 
b; Padt, 2007).  
In the 2000 to 2004 period seven reconstruction committees (reconstructiecommis-
sies; eastern and middle parts of the province) and two areal committees (gebiedscommis-
sies; western part of the province) draft and negotiate on plans for revitalisation of the 
rural areas. The processes do not run completely smoothly, since tensions occur be-
tween farmers and environmentalists and environmentalists and some small rural mu-
nicipalities that have close linkages with farmers. At one side, the decision by the 
North-Brabant Province to prohibit the extension of stables near nature areas evokes 
strong protests among farmers (Padt, 2007). At the other side, environmentalists per-
ceive a strong emphasis on agricultural development at the expense of nature restora-
tion interests (Ploegmakers, 2007; Interview 49, Appendix I). Given the protests from 
the grass-roots supporters of the Southern Agriculture and Horticulture Organisation 
(Zuidelijke Land- en Tuinbouworganisatie; ZLTO) and the threat by the Brabant Environ-
ment Federation (Brabantse Milieufederatie; BMF) to withdraw from the process the 
North-Brabant Province initiates an informal negotiation meeting in Cork (Ireland), in 
an attempt to bridge the differences (Verboven, 2006; Ploegmakers, 2007; Interviews 
28, 34, 46 and 49, Appendix I). At first glance, the compromise of the so-called Cork 
Agreement (Anonymous, 2003b) seems to have solved the controversies sufficiently. 
However, the agreement ‘caused a schism within the BMF between realists (those who 
wanted to go on with the reconstruction process) and idealists (those who wanted to 
resign from the reconstruction process)’ (Padt: 2007: 170). The agreement could not 
prevent the (temporary) withdrawal from the process by the BMF (Ploegmakers, 
2007). Finally, in 2005 the General Assembly of North-Brabant formally approves the 
reconstruction and areal programmes and the implementation process starts.  
In 2006 agreement is reached on a national fund for investments in the rural ar-
eas (Investeringen Landelijk Gebied (ILG); Provincie Noord-Brabant, 2008). Subsequently, 
the North-Brabant Province adopts the Multi-annual Rural Areas Programme 2007 to 
2013, based on (financial) agreements with respectively the state, regional water man-
agement authorities, municipalities and interests groups and supported by European 
funds. In practice, implementation proves to be laborious. For example, Dick Sonne-
veld, chair of the meetings of the chairs of the reconstruction committees mentions 
that low hanging fruit has been picked so far (Provincie Noord-Brabant, 2008: 20; 
translation from Dutch added):  
  
Now we will have to start with the real work, e.g. to elaborate the agricultural 
development zones and hydrological restoration of the wet nature peals. The turn-
around from small quick win projects towards large integrated areal programmes 
requires significant efforts and a strong coordination by the provincial authorities. 
 
In 2009 the Province starts an implementation acceleration impulse for so-called 
priority sites (Provincie Noord-Brabant, 2008). 
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In the Reconstruction Umbrella Plan (Provincie Noord-Brabant, 2001a) high 
ambitions become visible. The plan includes obligations, intentions and additional 
(facultative) options. With regard to water policy, the umbrella plan mentions five 
themes: (1) room for the rivers (flood prevention); (2) room for inland water systems 
(inundation prevention); (3) definition and realisation of desired groundwater tables 
for agriculture, nature and urban areas; (4) quality amelioration of sediment, ground- 
and surface water; and (5) ecological restoration of brooks with high natural values. 
The objectives for these five themes are mainly labelled as obligations (ibid.). Not-
withstanding the arduous pollution problems and given the laborious implementation 
of measures so far, the obligations are very ambitious (Provincie Noord-Brabant, 
2001a: 97; translation from Dutch added): 
 
In the entire territory measures shall lead to full compliance with the groundwater 
quality objectives from the Nitrates Directive and with the Dutch and European 
(WFD) surface water standards respectively ultimately 5 years and 10 years after 
completion of the reconstruction measures. [..] Implement measures in wet nature 
pearls in order to comply with the ecological quality objectives from the WFD.  
 
From an ex ante expert point of view these obligations might have been labelled as 
mission impossible. Also the umbrella plan itself mentions large ecological problems  
(bad water quality and acidification and desiccation of nature areas), due to large-scale 
intensification of agriculture (Provincie Noord-Brabant, 2001a: 8). The overview of 
measures (ibid.: 116- 119) does not make clear how the province (and its partners) 
might comply with the ambitious objectives within the limited time frames. The de-
scriptions remain rather generic and setting objectives, emission ceilings and quality 
certificates will not suffice without additional drastic measures with spatial conse-
quences. Implicitly, the province is aware of its Achilles heel (Provincie Noord-
Brabant, 2001a: 117-118; translation from Dutch added): 
 
The main assignment is to tune the intensity of agricultural land use and the crop 
choices to the natural land and water conditions, e.g. to the sensitivity of the soil for 
leaching of substances. [..] In areas where the soil is sensitive to leaching of nitrates, 
phosphorus and chemical crop protection substances, source oriented measures will 
have the highest efficiency rates for water quality protection. [..] Spatial planning 
policy instruments have a limited impact on land uses patterns, while these strongly 
determine water and soil quality.  
 
Given these expressed relations with European requirements it is remarkable that until 
December 2009 the WFD and revitalisation planning processes mainly run in parallel 
without explicit coupling moments. Potential explanations are threefold (Interviews, 
28, 34, 46 and 49, Appendix I): (1) emphasis within the revitalisation process is on 
relocation of livestock farms; (2) stage differences with the first WFD implementation 
planning cycle; and (3) different process leaders. With regard to argument (2), the 
regional WFD process have been started up in 2003 and the objectives were for-
mulated in the 2006 to 2008 period, whereas the reconstruction plans initially had 
been scheduled for adoption in 2002. The linkage between the revitalisation process 
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and the Water Management in the 21st Century process is easier given the more 
synchronous time schedule. Argument (3) points at the ambition of the province to 
coordinate the revitalisation process, whereas the water management authorities seize 
the WFD momentum to proof their reason of existence (ibid.). 
 
7.2.2 Implementation of the WFD (2002 to 2009) 
Four subsequent (and partly overlapping) regional WFD implementation planning 
process stages have been distinguished (see Table 7.1). For each stage remarkable 
water-related policies developments in the North-Brabant Province will be sketched 
briefly (the A sections), followed by a chronological overview of the WFD implemen-
tation planning process with the other partners in the Dutch part of the Meuse River 
Basin (the B sections). 
 
Table 7.1: Stages in the Dutch WFD implementation process (regional level) 
Stage↓ Period↓ Brief characterisation↓ 
I 2001 to 2003 Starting up regional coordination structures. 
II 2004 to 2006 Setting regional ambitions: The Article 5 Report 
and the 2005 and 2006 Meuse Memoranda. 
III 2007, 2008 Harmonising regional and local implementation processes. 
IV 2008, 2009 Drafting provincial and local water plans, formal 
consultation. 
 
Stage I: Starting up regional WFD coordination structures (2001 to 2003) 
 
A - Policy developments in the North-Brabant Province 
In 2001 the North-Brabant Province evaluates the impact of its water policy and 
concludes that groundwater abstractions exceed the carrying capacity of water systems 
in several areas within the province (Provincie Noord-Brabant, 2002b).The anti-
desiccation objectives for nature areas are not easily established. Generally, the quality 
of surface water and groundwater does not comply with the standards. Additionally, 
ecological restoration of brooks and the realisation of ecological connectivity zones 
run behind schedule. The conclusions of the evaluation are one reason for a partial 
revision of the second water policy plan. Other reasons are the WFD’s implementa-
tion requirements, the (national) Water Management in the 21st Century policy and the 
(provincial) revitalisation process for the rural areas. Furthermore, water policy should 
be tuned to the new spatial developments (ibid.). The Provincial Spatial Development 
Plan for the 2002 to 2006 period aims at a more careful, balanced use of available 
space (‘Brabant in Balans’; Provincie Noord-Brabant, 2002c). In order to cope with 
increasing human pressures five principles are considered leading for spatial planning: 
(1) more attention to the physical layers as fundament under human uses (including 
water con-ditions); (2) economical use of space (adaptation of built-up areas prior to 
new extensions); (3) concentration of compact urban zones; (4) zoning of nature areas 
and agriculture in rural areas; and (5) transboundary cross-sector planning and imple-
mentation practices, both internationally and interprovincial. With regard to zoning 
(the third principle), the plan distinguishes the Green Main Structure (Groene 
300 CHAPTER 7 
 
Hoofdstructuur; areas with high ecological values of national or regional importance), 
the Agricultural Main Structure (Agrarische Hoofdstructuur) and the Urban Areas (Stede-
lijk Gebied). In addition the plan designates Regional Nature and Landscape Units 
(Regionale Natuur- en Landschapseenheden). These are defined as ‘areas of several thou-
sands hectares, consisting predominantly of woods and nature, surrounded by farm 
land and functioning as autonomous units’. An integrated areal development approach 
in which the leading principles are applied is central (ibid.).   
December 2002, the General Assembly of the North-Brabant Province adopts 
the partial revised Second Provincial Water Policy Plan which is valid until September 
2006 (‘Verder met Water’; Provincie Noord-Brabant, 2002d). Water conditions are con-
sidered one important key for realisation of agricultural and natural values in rural 
areas. Therefore the designated water-related functions are connected to the rural area 
units from the new spatial policy plan. A new function is introduced for protection 
and restoration of so-called wet nature pearls (natte natuurparels), i.e. nature areas which 
depend much on (restoration of) groundwater tables and water quality amelioration 
(ibid.). Regarding sustainable water supply the prior policy to diminish deep ground-
water abstractions stagnates due to limited rentability of alternatives for drinking water 
companies. The Province wishes to enlarge the feasibility of alternatives by providing 
financial support. A stand still for groundwater abstractions by agricultural users has 
not been met so far. Consequently the Province will sharpen the license conditions.  
For the long term the Province aims to arrive at a more sustainable redistribution 
of available fresh water resources among the different users. In order to improve 
water quality both diffuse and point sources of pollution will have to be tackled. For 
diffuse sources the number of problematic substances should be reduced in combina-
tion with reduced emissions to surface and groundwater. Waste water and (relatively 
cleaner) rainwater will be collected separately whenever feasible, especially in urban 
areas. For rural areas the Province aims to make municipalities responsible for emis-
sion reduction from households that are not connected to a sewerage system (ibid.). 
With regard to the WFD the partial revised plan mentions that national transposition 
and instructions for its implementation are not entirely available yet. Consequently, 
additional revision of the provincial water policy plan may be required in a later stage 
(Provincie Noord-Brabant, 2002d).  
April 2003, the Provincial Executive of North-Brabant (Gedeputeerde Staten) adopts 
the two sub-basin visions (one for Brabant-West and one for Brabant-East), as re-
gional elaboration of the national WM21 policy. The visions translate the integrated 
water management objectives into spatial requirements until 2050 and present a pro-
gramme of measures for the short term (i.e. until 2015; Provincie Noord-Brabant, 
2003a and b). The proposed programmes of measures are not restricted by financial 
preconditions but provide an overview of requirements in case of full compliance with 
the policy objectives. The visions are part of the negotiations with the state actors on 
final selection of a feasible and affordable package of measures. They have a non-
legally binding status. The visions’ measures have already been anchored in both the 
new spatial policy and the water policy plan as adopted in 2002 and will be further 
implemented and weighed against other spatial interests in the rural areas revitalisation 
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processes (ibid.). Although water quality aspects have been considered, adaptations 
may follow from the parallel WFD implementation planning process (Provincie 
Noord-Brabant, 2003a). Due to national initiatives, the expectation is that the WM21 
and WFD processes will be integrated (Provincie Noord-Brabant, 2003b). April 2003 
the Province also launches a communication strategy to raise awareness about water-
related issues (Adolfse, Schepers and Cornet, 2003). The Province aims for a partner-
ship approach of public actors, environmental NGOs and socio-economic interest 
groups. As part of the strategy, the WFD (like other water assignments) will be trans-
lated into tangible water management issues for citizens (ibid.). 
 
B - The regional WFD coordination process in the Meuse River Basin 
Between 1998 and mid 2002 regional and local authorities and water managers are not 
very active in the WFD implementation planning process. By participation of regional 
representatives in national working groups and attendance of national information and 
consultation meetings, a sense of urgency starts to develop on the necessity of a coor-
dinated regional approach. June 28, 2002 may be marked as the starting-point of the 
regional WFD coordination process, when the State Waters Management Agency 
(Rijkswaterstaat) and the Limburg and North-Brabant Provinces organise the first 
(WFD) Meuse River Basin meeting. Local and regional experts and officials ask many 
questions to the national authorities about which implementation assignment is to be 
expected. Generally they view the WFD as an opportunity to put water quality and 
ecological restoration issues high on the political agenda again. In the second half of 
2002 the ‘Quartermasters Meeting’ (Kwartiermakersoverleg; which is a coalition of  
regional officials) and the national Rhine-Meuse Coordination Bureau (Coördinatiebu-
reau Rijn-Maas - CRM), design a regional organisation model. After almost one year of 
laborious negotiations on rules and procedures the Regional Meuse Administrative 
Platform (Regionaal Ambtelijk Overleg Maas - RAOM) holds its first meeting, on May 15, 
2003, followed by its political equivalent (RBOM), on June 1, 2003.  
At their first meeting the regional politicians emphasise unaltered continuation of 
Dutch constitutional structures (Thorbecke’s House). They are intending to link the 
WFD and WM21 processes without integrating structures. Societal signs will have to 
be translated to the new generation water plans. The first feat of arms by he regional 
politicians is a letter to the State Secretary for Water Management in which they ask 
for transparency about the WFD’s consequences on the regional water policy assign-
ments and the political room for manoeuvre (RBOM, 2003). In the letter the regional 
politicians stress that they expect the TPW Ministry to organise timely inter-ministerial 
coordination. They consider a generic, national programme on diffuse pollution 
sources one important cornerstone for successful regional WFD implementation. The 
platform decides to initiate WFD pilot projects on exploration of opportunities for 
staged compliance with the environmental objectives (ibid.). Shortly after the start the 
regional actors loose overview over the planning and the coherence between regional 
and national WFD product teams. The process is laborious. The provinces express 
their worries on the lack of activities by the side of the water quality and quantity 
management authorities in the North-Brabant Province. Besides, they want to enlarge 
local involvement by inviting a limited number of aldermen for the platform meetings. 
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After publication of the Aquarein report in November 2003 (Van der Bolt et al., 2003) 
the positive perception of the WFD as an opportunity for water quality amelioration 
dampens into a regional fear of dramatic socio-economic consequences. 
 
Stage II: Setting regional WFD ambitions (2004 to 2006)  
  
A - Policy developments in the North-Brabant Province 
Early 2004 the North-Brabant Province decides to start a partial revision process for 
its Spatial Planning Policy Plan (Provincie Noord-Brabant, 2004). Reasons are societal 
developments, new insights, the (2003 to 2007) political agreement of the new  
Provincial Executive, the need to implement the Cork Agreement (Anonymous, 
2003b) and a number of technical deficiencies. The five main regulating principles and 
the integrated areal spatial planning approach are not open for discussion. The pro-
vincial authority wants to make a move from spatial planning towards spatial devel-
opment and towards generic rules which offer more room for political manoeuvre by 
municipalities and other partners. The partial revision will not affect plans of other 
policy domains (ibid.).  
January 2005, the new Provincial Water Regulation becomes into force (Provin-
cie Noord-Brabant, 2005a). The regulation includes the obligation for the water man-
agement authorities to deliver quantifications of the desired groundwater and surface 
water regimes (GGOR = Gewenste Grond- en Oppervlaktewater Regimes) before the end of 
2010 and including consultation of municipalities and other stakeholders. The new 
regulation provides for generic rules for smaller groundwater abstractions since the 
authorities have noticed that impermeable subsurface layers have been penetrated 
more frequently with (potential) negative impact on the quality of deeper groundwater 
layers (Provincie Noord-Brabant, 2005b). Remarkably, the new Provincial Water regu-
lation does not refer to the WFD’s requirements. 
Due to adoption of the WFD, a synchronisation of drafting terms for the Dutch 
water policy and management plans at all administrative levels takes place. Concerning 
the transition period towards the new generation of water plans and the first river 
basin management plans the Dutch WFD Implementation Act allows the prolonga-
tion of current plans (Anonymous, 2005). Since adoption of the partial revised Second 
Water Policy Plan in 2002, the national organisational rules of the game for the first 
WFD implementation planning cycle have been worked out (Provincie Noord-
Brabant, 2006). The substantive WFD implementation rules are under construction, as 
subject to a joint process of national, regional and local actors. At the same time a 
number of important water themes (mainly as part of the WM21 assignment) have 
been detailed further in the rural areas revitalisation processes: regional water reten-
tion, ecological restoration of brooks and creeks and anti-desiccation of valuable na-
ture areas. Given the progress there are no significant deficiencies which ask for a 
new, interim water policy plan (ibid.). Based on the advice of its Water Policy De-
partment, the General Assembly of North-Brabant decides to prolong the term of the 
current water policy plan until December 2009 (Interview 30, Appendix I). A new 
water policy plan will be drafted later in order to comply with the new national Water 
Act (which then is in its drafting process), the requirements from the WFD and new 
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insights from the WM21 process (ibid.). One advantage of the prolongation is that 
coordination may take place with the drafting process of the Natura 2000 sites man-
agement plans, which should include requirements for the water conditions for these 
sites (as formal linkage with the WFD river basin management plans; Provincie 
Noord-Brabant, 2006; Interviews 30 and 44, Appendix I). 
August 2006, the North-Brabant Province invites the water management autho-
rities, municipalities, socio-economic interests group and environmental NGOs for a 
kick-off meeting on the drafting process of the new water policy plan (Interview 50, 
Appendix I). Based on the conclusions of this informal and explorative consultation 
meeting, the Province drafts the Headlines Memorandum for the new water policy 
plan in relation the WFD requirements (Provincie Noord-Brabant, 2006). The 
Province views itself as director of regional areal processes like the revitalisation and 
as substantive and process coordinator for synchronisation of the new generation of 
water policy and management plans, including the European requirements. The WFD 
planning process should be closely coordinated with five other major parallel 
processes, i.e. Natura 2000, the integrated environmental policy strategy, spatial plan-
ning, revitalisation of rural areas and other provincial water policies themes (ibid.).  
The memorandum stresses the current provincial policies, objectives, measures 
and related spatial claims as point of departure for the WFD process (Provincie 
Noord-Brabant, 2006). However due to a consistency check with the obligatory nature 
of the WFD requirements, adaptations may not be precluded. The WFD may also 
lead to a more staged implementation of (parts) of the provincial intentions. Although 
compliance with the WFD for transboundary water bodies partly depends on invest-
ments of upstream neighbour states (such as the Flemish Region of Belgium), the 
Province has its own responsibility for investments in the Dutch parts of these (sub-) 
basins. In order to avoid non-compliance procedures by the EC, anti-dessication 
measures for nature areas that are not included in the Natura 2000 network will not be 
included in the (WFD) river basin management plans. In general objectives and meas-
ures of European legislation (especially with regard to protected areas) will have first 
priority, followed by water-related objectives and measures of the reconstruction and 
areal plans. In any case, synergetic measures that combine objectives for different 
themes will receive the highest provincial priority (ibid.; Interview 30, Appendix I).  
In the memorandum the priority setting for WM21 measures has not been made 
explicit. On the one hand one may argue that, to a large extent, these are part of the 
reconstruction and areal plans. On the other hand according to the National Water 
Agreement (Anonymous, 2003a and 2008), flood defence measures will have to be 
finished before the end of 2015, hence actually have the highest priority. The memo-
randum emphasises water as part of the integrated areal processes (Provincie Noord-
Brabant, 2006). At the same time it mentions that water quality issues (the major topic 
of the WFD) have been less elaborated in the reconstruction and areal plans as com-
pared to anti-desscication of nature sites and ecological restoration of brooks and 
creeks. ‘A further specification and integration of water quality issues is required 
which asks for an intensive and common process, the more since quality issues are the 
responsibility of all involved partners’ (ibid.: 24; translation from Dutch added). For 
tackling diffuse pollution sources, the Province points at the primacy of generic 
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national and European policies (‘adequate manure and chemical crop protection 
measures’). Additional regional or local measures will only be considered whenever 
cost-effective and significantly contributing to water quality amelioration. Sustainabil-
ity, cost-effectiveness and a source-oriented emission reduction approach are impor-
tant criteria for selection of measures (ibid.). For sustainability the Province refers to 
equitable positions of the people, planet and profit dimensions, without making clear 
interconnections and choices. For affordability reasons, the division of financial bur-
den among households, industry and agriculture is more important than the division 
of costs among initiators of measures (Provincie Noord-Brabant, 2006). For histo-
rically polluted sites, a staged approach until ultimo 2027 is chosen (ibid.). 
 
B - The regional WFD coordination process in the Meuse River Basin 
In 2004 the regional politicians remain reluctant to integrate the decision-making 
processes on WFD and WM21 issues within the regional river platform. According to 
the regional politicians the integration call is due to weak inter-ministerial coor-
dination. Besides, the provinces have their own WM21 implementation approaches. 
At this stage the WFD coordination process remains laborious. In order to accelerate 
an external project leader and an editor for the Article 5 report are hired and agree-
ment is reached on division of the coordination costs. April 2004, the water manage-
ment authorities in the North-Brabant Province enter the regional river basin plat-
form. Discussions are started on installation of a WFD project bureau. According to 
the regional partners progress on the Article 5 report is hindered by a lack of timely 
and transparent national guidelines and instructions. November 2004, there is an 
atmosphere of political crisis (Interviews 11 and 30, Appendix I). National-regional 
coordination is perceived as poor and there is no common WFD implementation 
ambition. Since the chair needs time to speak all members individually to discuss 
views on the future project organisation, the December meeting of the Regional 
Meuse Political Platform is postponed to March 2005 (ibid.). 
With regard to the independent national audit of the Article 5 reports the re-
gional politicians have four major concerns: (1) rules for designation of virtual water 
bodies;  (2) inter-ministerial coordination for transparency about generic manure 
policy ambitions; (3) arrangements for coordination of WFD implementation planning 
in transboundary, bilateral water bodies (as shared with respectively Germany and the 
Walloon and Flemish Regions of Belgium); and (4) rules for the designation of indus-
trial groundwater extractions for human consumption. Finally, the (national) Article 5 
report for the Meuse River Basin has been finished in time (Ministerie van Verkeer en 
Waterstaat, 2005; Interviews 11 and 30, Appendix I).  
July 4, 2005: After almost one year of laborious procedural discussionsthe re-
gional politicians decide to start with a WFD project bureau after the summer break. 
While the organisational preparations continue a study is conducted on the range of 
objectives and measures, which includes different scenarios on ambitions and compli-
ance rates. The study report presents a number of general conclusions (Arcadis, 2005). 
Current policies already include effective types of measures for compliance with the 
WFD’s environmental objectives. The WFD may influence priority setting, locations 
and realisation terms. Autonomous developments are influential and partly 
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unpredictable. For diffuse pollution sources, generic policies at the European and 
national levels are most effective but at the same time may have substantial social-
economic consequences. Impact of measures is uncertain given time lags between 
implementation and observable effects and given restricted knowledge on measure-
impact relations (ibid.). The regional politicians welcome the conclusions of the study 
report, since these may help to reduce the WFD implementation fear. In retrospect, 
the report did not play a major role in the subsequent implementation stages. Its con-
clusions confirmed prior perceptions and expert views (Interviews 11 and 30, Appen-
dix I).  
The appointed WFD Meuse project director is responsible for the timely design 
of workable project structures (RBOM, 2005a; Interview 12, Appendix I). He is also 
in charge for a tailor-made coordination and participation strategy (ibid.). The Project 
Bureau injects new energy into the regional coordination process. A long term poli-
tical agenda is drafted and the Regional Meuse WFD Consultation Platform starts 
(Klankbordgroep KRW Maas; RBOM, 2005b). A periodical meeting of the regional and 
local WFD coordinators is organised to discuss technical and practical issues (the so-
called Boxtel Deliberations (Boxtel Overleg or KRW Coördinatorenoverleg Maas), named 
after the town where the meetings took place). May 2005, the regional politicians 
decide on the communication and participation strategy. July 2005, the regional politi-
cians conclude that the two municipal RBOM members are not able (and have no 
mandate) to represent all the 114 municipalities in the Meuse River Basin (Interviews 
11, 25, 26 and 28, Appendix I). They ply for a separate process to involve them, for 
example by organising political meetings for individual sub basins. A political pilot 
project may be necessary to break through the dominant technical nature of the 
process so far. 
November 2005, the regional politicians decide to conduct a regional ‘Social Ac-
ceptable Costs Analysis’ (Maatschappelijk Aanvaardbare Kosten Analyse - MAKA) in addi-
tion to the national strategic societal cost-benefit analysis (Interview 28, Appendix I). 
In the second half of 2005, 17 local WFD pilot projects are formulated, in which two 
methods for ecological objective setting will be tested, i.e. the formal WFD approach 
and the informally agreed pragmatic approach. The national Water Policy Department 
wants to enforce the international coordination strategy. Regional politicians empha-
sise exchange of knowledge and experiences as trigger for bilateral coordination initia-
tives. December 2005, regional partners regret the exclusion of water management 
authorities in the national rules setting process on coordination between the WFD and 
Natura 2000 files (Interview 20, Appendix I). By means of the 2005 Meuse Memoran-
dum, which is the regional WFD contribution to the (national) 2005 December 
Memorandum, the regional actors show their first WFD ambition cards (RBOM, 
2005c; Interviews 11 and 12, Appendix I). The document includes several messages 
for the national authorities (see Table 7.2). 
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Table 7.2 Messages from the Meuse region to the national authorities (RBOM, 2005c) 
A – Water bodies and aggregation level 
A1 Simplify the designation of water bodies in order to reduce the number of water 
bodies and to optimise for the selection of measures. 
A2 Choose aggregated European reporting units as the level to formulate ecological 
objectives and selection of measures. This offers room for spatial differentiation 
of measures, hence opportunities for win-win solutions. 
A3 There is a need for a national strategy for inclusion of ecologically valuable and 
vulnerable areas outside Natura 2000 areas that are too small for designation as 
individual water bodies. In the Meuse region, major investments have been and 
will be made for their protection and restoration that should be made visible to 
the European Commission. 
B – Objectives and Measures 
B1 Give highest priority to generic, national policies (such as for diffuse emission 
sources, transportation and building materials) by putting these high on the agen-
das of Europe and national ministries and by settling arrangements. 
B2 Take the lead in formulation of a strategy on historic pollution such as cadmium, 
zinc, nickel and phosphorus in surface and groundwater.  
B3 There is an urgent need for generic guiding principles for selection of regional 
measures, in order to prevent regional choices to be overruled later on in the 
process. 
C – Costs and expenses 
C1  Include costs and expenses for citizens and enterprises in the selection frame-
works for measures. 
C2 Provide a clear definition of the stand still principle on the short term given its 
relation with room for regional socio-economic development.  
D – Remaining remarks 
D1 Be clear about which considerations will apply in subsequent implementation 
stages (societal costs, technical feasibility, effects for socio-economic sectors). 
D2 We ask the national Water Policy Department to coordinate information streams 
on relevant national policies for the regional partners (for example by means of a 
newsletter and a website). 
D3 Regional partners have got the impression that the national working groups are 
too much dominated by technical experts while in some cases more strategic 
choices will have to be made. 
D4 All water managers should advocate the WFD as an opportunity otherwise the 
Dutch position may be weakened in multilateral negotiations.  
 
Since chemical and ecological objectives are hardly available, the regional partners can 
not estimate compliance rates for 2015, as asked for by the national Water Policy 
Department (RBOM, 2005c). Instead, specific issues for the Meuse River Basin are 
presented and effectiveness of specific measure types is explored in a qualitative way. 
Emphasis is on the contribution of (continuation of) current policies. By estimation, 
the water management authorities together will invest €863 millions on water quality 
amelioration in the 2005 to 2009 period. By means of ecological restoration projects 
(read: hydro-morphological alterations such as re-meandering of brooks) they may  
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contribute considerably to the WFD’s ecological objectives. For chemical water 
quality improvement, these authorities have much less cost-effective options, despite 
local progress caused by additional waste water treatment infrastructure and nutrient 
and chemical free buffer stripes along water courses. For tackling diffuse emission 
sources, (inter)national measures would be required (product regulations and manure 
policies). Historical pollution (nutrients and heavy metals) from water sediments and 
groundwater bodies may hinder significant amelioration for decades. In practice, the 
actual (intentional) policy objectives at the national, regional and local levels are 
ambitious and not considered feasible within the planned terms. This is due to the low 
rate of land acquisition on a voluntary basis, historical pollution and other reasons 
(ibid.). 
Within the Meuse region a table format for presenting identified and selected 
WFD measures is developed. The national Water Policy Department applies this for-
mat as best practice in the other river basin regions. The table may be filled in for the 
range of ambition scenarios which are formulated at the national level. With the for-
mat the Meuse region starts to become a forerunner among the Dutch river basin 
regions. However due to time-consuming deliberations on interpretation differences, 
diverging political starting-points and local ambitions and differences of opinion on 
generic national policies, the Meuse partners gradually enter the peloton’s tail. Fur-
thermore, distrust between the regional water management authorities and the ANF 
Ministry enlarges on the Natura 2000/WFD coordination issues. 
The 2006 Meuse Memorandum (named as the Summer Memorandum) presents 
the regional packages of measures and a regional economic analysis as building blocks 
for the national strategic societal cost-benefit analysis (RBOM, 2006). The memoran-
dum is subject to a regional and local, informal consultation round. Although the 
memorandum is sent to all municipalities hardly one of them reacts. The aldermen in 
the Regional Meuse Political Platform mention that local authorities do not recognise 
their figures as aggregated in the memorandum (Interviews, 26 and 27, Appendix I). 
Given the low response and the limited recognition by local actors the regional actors 
decide to concentrate their efforts on the local WFD processes in 2007 and 2008. The 
80-20% rule is mentioned: 80% of the energy will flow to the local processes, 20% to 
the regional and national harmonisation and reporting exercises (RBOM, 2006; Inter-
view 28, Appendix I). The Meuse Memorandum includes a process warning for the 
national authorities (RBOM, 2006: 5; translation from Dutch added): 
 
In the planning for stage 3, within the Meuse region final products (draft river basin 
management plan in December 2008 and its final edition in December 2009) will be 
leading and not the information need of national authorities (for the 2007 December 
Memorandum). Consequently, the Meuse region will spend more time on defining 
the preferred WFD ambition scenario (beginning of 2008) as compared to the time 
schedule of the national authorities for the 2007 December Memorandum (mid 
2007). Unavoidably, this extra time will be needed for making sound choices.  
 
In the 2006 Meuse Memorandum, the regional partners emphasise the indicative 
nature of presented figures (RBOM, 2006). Packages of measures show the range of 
possible regional ambitions which are not meant to choose from at this stage. In 2007 
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and 2008 further selection of measures will take place at the level of individual water 
bodies. The memorandum includes substantial and organisational attention points for 
national authorities (see Table 7.3). The regional partners expect national authorities 
to provide for clear guidance on acceptable costs and expenses, in order to define a 
regional ambition level (as starting-point for local selection processes; RBOM, 2006). 
The regional partners mention that the lack of a maximum ambition scenario from the 
ANF Ministry hinders solution selection for regional bottlenecks. Also the HSE 
Ministry is not clear yet about its ambition on generic WFD measures (ibid.). 
 
Table 7.3: Messages from the 2006 Meuse Memorandum (RBOM, 2006) 
A – Substantial issues 
A1 Costs and expenses: The regional partners wish to discuss with the national au-
thorities about acceptable costs and expenses in relation to available national 
financial means with the national authorities. 
A2 The regional partners expect national authorities to provide insight on the 
consequences of division of costs and expenses and to provide for frameworks 
for the regional/local processes. 
A3 The regional partners expect national authorities to provide clear guiding 
principles for priority setting among potential types of measures.  
A4 National authorities should provide clearness about generic, national measures. 
Regional partners offer to discuss an optimal mix of generic and regional 
measures with national authorities. 
A5 Voluntary land acquisition hinders progress with ecological restoration projects. 
The regional partners wish to discuss with the national authorities all legal possi-
bilities for land acquisition for WFD objectives. 
A6 The regional partners expect national authorities to provide clear definitions of 
stand still, disproportionate costs, significant damage and irreversibility of 
physical alterations. 
B – Organisational issues 
B1 Regional partners ask guidance on how to tune planning procedures of national 
authorities, provinces, water management authorities and municipalities in order 
to meet required decision making synchronicity in 2008 and 2009 for the river 
basin management plan. 
B2 National and regional authorities should strive for starting-up or intensification of 
bilateral coordination meetings with Germany, Wallonia and Flanders. Addition-
ally, regional attention points should be put on the agenda of the International 
Meuse Commission and its working groups. 
 
In the memorandum the regional partners have worked out the five nationally defined 
ambition scenarios on a geographical basis, meaning that with increasing ambition 
more water bodies will comply with the WFD objectives (RBOM, 2006). Even in the 
maximum scenario full compliance is not met for priority substances and nutrients. 
According to the regional partners this is due to incomplete national, generic packages 
of measures. They argue that generic (inter-)national measures are more effective for 
these substances and substantial investments should be made by upstream riparian 
states (ibid.). A range of costs for measures by regional authorities has been presented 
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from €93 millions a year (reference scenario: current policies + autonomous develop-
ments) to €654 millions a year (maximum WFD implementation scenario; RBOM, 
2006). Estimated costs for generic measures by national authorities range from zero to 
€360 millions a year. In the maximum scenario measures are excluded that will have a 
considerable negative effect on other functions. Limited positive benefits for house-
holds and recreational use are expected. WFD measures predominantly will have 
negative effects on the agricultural sector. Positive benefits for drinking water produc-
tion and waste water treatment may only pay off on the long term. No benefits are 
noted so far for navigation and industry (ibid.). According to the regional partners, 
‘the translation of costs to expenses for target groups finally is a political question that 
will have to be answered by means of application of instruments (e.g. subsidies, li-
cences)’. (RBOM, 2006: 25; translation from Dutch added) 
 
Stage III: Harmonising regional & local implementation processes (2007, 2008) 
 
A - Policy developments in the North-Brabant Province 
In order to improve transparency and accessibility of available information and 
knowledge about the state of the inland water systems and the impact of its water 
policy, the North-Brabant Province drafts an evaluation report (Provincie Noord-
Brabant, 2009a). Although water related objectives have been incorporated well in the 
integrated areal approach, water quality issues have been underemphasised so far. Due 
to the parallel WFD implementation planning process, inclusion will take place in the 
near future (ibid.). Remarkably, the evaluation report concludes that the extent of 
desired groundwater abstractions fits into the available capacity of the inland water 
systems (Provincie Noord-Brabant, 2009a: 19). Due to provincial policy, the total 
volume of groundwater abstractions has not increased since 2004.  At the same time 
paradoxically, the anti-dessication policy still requires considerable investments (ibid.: 
23). The anti-dessication progress stagnates, mainly due to limited land acquisition 
(ibid.). To understand this paradox the total number and volumes of groundwater 
abstractions should be understood within the context of the overall balance of ab-
stractions and recharges at the level of the entire province, whereas desiccation prob-
lems occur at the local scale due to specific land and water use and management pat-
terns and processes. The policy intention to shift from groundwater abstractions to 
surface water abstractions has been abandoned due to a lack of (a sense of) urgency 
and a lack of financial stimuli for actors (Provincie Noord-Brabant, 2009a: 19).  
Overall water quality has been slightly improved in the 2004 to 2007 period 
(Provincie Noord-Brabant, 2009a: 28-37). The challenge remains to pick the “high 
hanging fruits” such as diffuse sources of pollution (ibid.) From the evaluation report 
a somehow hesitating, ambiguous provincial attitude towards the issue of diffuse pol-
lution sources becomes noticeable (Provincie Noord-Brabant, 2009a: 32-33). The 
North-Brabant Province points at the responsibility of the national authorities (‘who 
seem to take more responsibility by means of an implementation plan’) and at the 
same time provides financial arrangements for local tailor-made initiatives (such as on 
selective use of chemical crop protection substances and active management of field 
margins close to water systems). Also drinking water companies and water 
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management authorities contribute by means of (pilot) projects (ibid.). Overall, the 
province has limited formal options to tackle these issues and generic policies are 
cautious to acoid expensive, large-scale measures. Furthermore, one-shot local (pilot) 
projects may not make a significant difference (see also Chapter 8 for experiences with 
local pilot projects in the Brabant-West region). The laborious land acquisition process 
also hinders quick wins with ecological restoration projects for brooks and creeks 
(Provincie Noord-Brabant, 2009a: 41). However, in the 2004 to 2007 period, more 
restoration kilometres have entered the initiation stage. This increase may pay off on 
the mid till long term (ibid.). 
As part of the planning cycle for the new provincial water policy plan for the 
2010 to 2015 period, the North-Brabant Province asks a consultancy firm to conduct 
an inventory of the social-cultural, economic and ecological benefits of investments in 
water policy objectives. The rationale behind the study is (Van der Lei, Terpstra and 
Hoogewoning, 2007: 7; translation from Dutch added): 
 
The Province expects that when the broad societal added value of water is presented 
(in an economical, social-cultural and ecological sense) stakeholder target groups may 
show bigger willingness to invest in water. Perhaps the benefits may be identified 
sufficiently but specific target groups do not recognise or value these. Valuation of 
the benefits partly will determine support for water related policy objectives and 
measures.  
 
The Province acknowledges that the former water policy plans one-sidedly have 
emphasised ecological benefits. For the new water policy plan the aim is a more inte-
grated, balanced approach for sustainable development (Van der Lei, Terpstra and 
Hoogewoning, 2007). The inventory identifies several potential benefits from invest-
ments in water policy objectives which may sum up to millions of euros annually. Not 
all benefits are easy to identify. Limits to both available information and methods 
prevent clear and indisputable definitions. ‘This means that every stakeholder has its 
own interpretations of water-related benefits (e.g. about definitions, identification 
level, concreteness). Consequently, the introduction of water-related benefits in the 
political and societal discussions is impossible and undesirable without proper prepa-
ration.’ (ibid.: 34) As one of the closing remarks the authors pose that without a suffi-
cient degree of concreteness of objectives and measures in the new water policy plan, 
a discussion about the water-related benefits may contribute more to confusion than 
to clearness (ibid.). This statement has been illustrated by the formal consultation 
stage during which two opposing reports about the expected socio-economic benefits 
have caused so much controversy that there was only one conclusion left to the 
General Assembly of North-Brabant: The truth must be somewhere in the middle 
(Interviews, 44, 46 and 50, Appendix I).  
Due to adoption of the new (national) Spatial Planning Act in October 2006 (Wet 
Ruimtelijke Ordening; Anonymous, 2006), the North-Brabant Province starts the prepa-
ration of a provincial structure vision on spatial development (structuurvisie). In the old 
regime provinces could draft both a structure vision and a spatial policy plan (streek-
plan). A spatial policy plan was an obligatory strategic plan by which the provincial 
authorities had the option to delineate spatial functions (Hidding, 2006; Interviews 45  
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and 50, Appendix I). This plan form aimed to provide for both horizontal integration 
(spatial aspects of different policy sectors at the provincial level) and vertical integra-
tion (of spatial aspects of policies from different administrative levels). The provinces 
used a spatial policy plan as framework for testing the appropriateness and formal 
approval/disapproval of municipal zoning plans (bestemmingsplannen; ibid.).  
In the new national spatial planning regime the provinces shall conduct a struc-
ture vision on spatial development only. Such a vision is only binding for the prov-
inces themselves. The provinces do not formally approve the municipal zoning plans 
any longer. The municipal plans remain the only legally binding spatial destination 
plans for citizens (Hidding, 2006; Interviews 45 and 50, Appendix I). The provinces 
have the legal option to adopt a spatial integration plan (ruimtelijk inpassingsplan) which 
includes spatial destinations which are of high importance at the provincial level and 
which should be integrated into the municipal soning plans concerned (Anonymous, 
2006). Besides, the provinces may impose spatial requirements by means of a provin-
cial regulation (Provincie Noord-Brabant, 2011). For the period until the new struc-
ture vision will be adopted an interim structure vision has been drafted by the North-
Brabant Province (since the in 2006 partial revised Spatial Policy Plan had lost its 
validity in October 2006). In December 2008 the General Assembly of North-Brabant 
adopts the start memorandum for drafting the structural vision on spatial develop-
ment (Provincie Noord-Brabant, 2009b). The General Assembly opts for a limited 
revision of its spatial policy (ibid.). 
 
B - The regional WFD coordination process in the Meuse River Basin 
In 2007 and 2008 emphasis lies on the local WFD processes for formulation of eco-
logical objectives and selection of related measures, as guided by the WFD coordina-
tors at the water management authorities. Read Chapter 8 for a detailed analysis of 
this local process in the Brabant-West area. The 2006 Meuse Memorandum summa-
rises the political starting-points for this third stage in the WFD implementation plan-
ning process (RBOM, 2006; own synthesis from Dutch document):  
 
First of all, current regional policies are leading and the WFD measures should build 
on these no regret choices, hence proper coordination should take place. Also, there 
is a need for a more integrated approach with special attention to coherence between 
surface and groundwater. Affordability is an important criterion, translated as  
“available financial resources are leading”. Furthermore, feasibility is an important 
criterion, referring to technical aspects, dependency on other actors, cost-
effectiveness and sustainability. Costs and expenses of a staged implementation 
approach until 2027 will be presented as well as of full compliance by 2015 and will 
be related to the entire Dutch water assignment (both WFD and WM21). Provinces 
will take the lead for defining policies on industrial groundwater extractions for hu-
man consumption. The regional water management authorities take the lead in the 
local WFD planning processes. In this third stage municipalities will have to partici-
pate actively. The regional partners will take the lead in communication with and 
 participation of environmental NGOs and socio-economic interests groups, espe-
cially focusing on additional costs and expenses due to the WFD measures. Local 
tailor-made process options for active involvement of stakeholders may be chosen. 
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At all administrative levels the Dutch actors struggle with the detailed technical WFD 
requirements which are different from the domestic traditions and practices of eco-
logical objectives setting and monitoring. National guidelines arrive relatively late in 
the regional coordination process and are subject to adaptations and new insights 
along the way. In addition criteria for the selection of measures remain abstract in 
nature while there is also a critical knowledge gap about the effectiveness of measures 
with regard to individual biological quality parameters (Van der Wal and Waaijen, 
2010). Consequently, within the Dutch part of the International Meuse River Basin 
District, formulation of the ecological objectives takes place rather simultaneously 
with identification and selection of measures (to comply with these objectives). With 
regard to drafting the new water policy plans the provinces face the challenge to 
match the WFD requirements with the domestic system of water-related functions.  
In order to avoid significant dissimilarities among the local processes the prov-
inces and regional water management authorities define so-called default objectives 
for the common WFD water body types and pressures from land-based activities 
(Evers and Van Herpen, 2007). As a main line in the common regipnal approach, a 
distinction is made among water body basins in which land use is dominated by 
respectively agriculture, nature or built-up areas. The restoration ambitions in terms of 
ecological objectives are closely related to the pressures from land-use processes and 
patterns (ibid.). A quick scan of formulated WFD objectives in the North-Brabant 
Province shows that differences among the three regions (Brabant-East, Brabant-
Centre and Brabant-West) are limited (Evers and Van Herpen, 2007). In general com-
parability of the provincial water functions with the quantified WFD objectives is 
limited. Furthermore, priorly defined provincial target images for brooks did not play 
an explicit and decisive role at the delineation of WFD water bodies and types (ibid). 
Despite the pleasant and friendly atmosphere among the participants, the WFD 
coordination process in the Meuse River Basin remains laborious of nature. For 
example, although many discussion hours have been spent, no full agreement is 
reached on some basic starting-points for filling in the WFD data formats, most nota-
bly definitions of investment and maintenance costs and labelling of measure types. 
Integration of the WM21 and WFD assignments is viewed as a growth process and 
should especially take place in the local WFD processes. The WFD Meuse Project 
Bureau attempts to aggregate the data from the local processes into a regional eco-
nomic analysis. The Project Bureau suffers from a lack of economic expertise at the 
provinces and regional water management authorities and has to hire a consultancy 
firm. Due to the lack of uniform instructions and expertise, the economic figures from 
the local WFD processes show differences which need further explanation and hinder 
transparent presentation. The WFD process coordinators themselves face difficulties 
in understanding the aggregated information and cost calculations. Given this context, 
it may not come as a surprise that also the politicians and non-governmental stake-
holders have many questions about the aggregated figures such as about the relation 
with the national figures. The politicians struggle with the highly technical nature of 
the Regional Meuse Political Platform meetings (Interviews 25 and 28, Appendix I). 
The Industrial Water Association (Vereniging Industriewater) distrusts the economic fig-
ures of the national and regional authorities and triggered by their differences initiates 
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its own study on the impact of the WFD on industrial expenses. In turn, this study 
(conducted by students) annoys the WFD coordinators from the regional water man-
agement authorities since the association interprets and presents their figures without 
ex ante consultation.  
In the course of 2007 regional partners get more irritated about recurrent new 
national deadlines and lately introduced web-based data formats (that are also altered 
during their application). The WFD process coordinators and their staff increasingly 
feel that relatively too much time is invested in reporting obligations for the Lower 
House of Parliament at the expense of the local processes for identification and selec-
tion of cost-effective measures. They notice a downward evolution of ambition due to 
regional and national harmonisation exercises. Because, initially the package of meas-
ures from the Meuse region is the most complete and broadest, other regions evolve 
upwards in the harmonisation process while the Meuse package becomes smaller, to a 
level that is politically spoken more feasible and affordable. Mid 2008, the national Water 
Policy Department decides to contact individual WFD process coordinators in the 
Meuse River Basin given large differences in provided data and incomplete compli-
ance with national instructions (Interviews 20, 52 and 53, Appendix I). September 
2008, from the harmonisation process the national Water Policy Department notices 
downgrading of regional packages of measures (Interviews 18 and 53, Appendix I). 
The department considers this an undesirable evolution which may hinder full com-
pliance with WFD objectives (such as the too limited number of water bodies that are 
characterised as natural; ibid.). While most regional politicians and representatives of 
industrial and agricultural interest groups are satisfied with the harmonised ambitions 
from the pragmatic approach, some officials and representatives of environmental 
NGOs increasingly become disappointed with the perceived ‘the watering down of 
WFD ambitions’ (Interview 18, Appendix I). 
 
Although progress is slow, the WFD coordinators at the regional water management 
authorities and the municipal water ambassadors manage to involve almost all 114 
municipalities actively in the local processes. February 2008, tensions rise between the 
local aldermen and the provincial deputes in the Regional Meuse Political Platform 
(Interviews 25, 44, Appendix I). The aldermen ask for a more proactive attitude from 
the provinces in order to identify bottlenecks and to select cost-effective measures on 
urban groundwater issues. The provinces mention that it is up to the partners in the 
local WFD processes to deliver such results (ibid.). In turn, the regional water man-
agement authorities, if stung by a wasp, invite the provinces once again to contribute 
more actively to the local WFD processes, since they formally are in charge of 
groundwater issues. November 2008, the majority of local authorities have decided on 
lists of WFD measures to be included in the (draft) river basin management plans 
(Interview 26, Appendix I).  
Tensions also occur between the national and regional authorities. The national 
Water Policy Department is not in favour of the wording ‘lowest possible societal 
costs’ which may suggest that the Netherlands opt for the lowest WFD ambition pos-
sible (Interview 53, Appendix I). The regional partners are reluctant to quantify the 
estimated rate of compliance with the ecological objectives by 2015. The regional 
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decision not to alter the status of some water bodies for the first river basin manage-
ment plan, is not received with applaud from the national department (Interviews 18 
and 53, Appendix I). Given the bad image of the Netherlands in European compari-
sons (‘highest rate of heavily modified water bodies’) the department asks for more 
natural water bodies whenever possible (ibid.). As the Lower House of Parliament will 
not accept generic WFD measures for the agricultural sector that would be additional 
to the basic measures for compliance with the Nitrates Directive, in turn, the regional 
partners are reluctant to be more ambitious with additional waste water treatment 
infrastructure investments. The national Water Policy Department mentions propor-
tionality as an argument for such additional investments since countries like Germany 
have already invested more in waste water treatment infrastructure (Interviews 18 and 
51, Appendix I). Regional officials and politicians increasingly get irritated about the 
reluctant attitude of the ANF Ministry on timely and adequate coordination of the 
interlinkages between the WFD and the Birds and Habitats Directives linkages. 
Finally, bilateral, border-crossing coordination efforts with the Flemish Region of 
Belgium, both at an official and political level, remain incidental. At the end of the 
first WFD implementation planning cycle the regional partners conclude that bilateral 
coordination on objectives and measures did not take place. They expect that differ-
ences in standards will remain limited, given the fact that Flanders applies the Dutch 
working standards as well. Cooperation with Germany runs more smoothly, while 
with Wallonia hardly any coordination talks have taken place so far. The regional part-
ners expect the national Water Policy Department to invest more in coordination of 
multilateral and bilateral activities. Whereas the department mainly focuses on the 
multilateral coordination efforts by the International Meuse Commission (see Chapter 
5), the regional partners continue struggling with the ‘missing links between the multi-
lateral and bilateral activities’ (Interviews 28 and 46, Appendix I). 
The results of the local WFD processes are summarised in the 2008 Meuse 
Memorandum, which initially ought to become the central building block of the draft 
Meuse River Basin Management Plan (RBOM, 2009). However during the process, 
the national Water Policy Department extracts the data for the Ex Ante Evaluation of 
costs and benefits and the draft river basin management plan directly from the local 
processes by means of the national databases. Besides, the regional water management 
authorities gradually loose attention to the laborious regional coordination process, in 
which the WFD Meuse Project Bureau is increasingly perceived as an autonomously 
operating unit. Remarkably, the Project Bureau, in its attempt to produce a final 
edition of the Meuse Memorandum, also bases its draft final 4.0 version (in February 
2009 when the draft water plans and river basin management plans are already subject 
to the formal consultation) on the figures from the national databases (RBOM, 2009). 
The Project Bureau, a bit overruled by the parallel activities, asks whether the regional 
and local partners have based their draft water plans on the same figures in the 
national databases. Major differences among the figures of the local processes are 
concluded such as with regard to definitions of actual and additional policies, report-
ing units, which measure types to be included in the river basin management plan, 
whether or not to present prior investments in the 2000 to 2009 period, expert 
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judgement on present state and estimated 2015 state of water bodies and the extent of 
inclusion of WM21 measures. To the disappointment of the Project Bureau the 
regional and local partners decide not to invest more time in harmonisation of data. A 
proposal from the project director to publish a summary of the memorandum for the 
general public is not supported by the partners. At this final stage the local WFD co-
ordinators are too exhausted by the entire process to invest in common regional har-
monised products any longer. Instead they concentrate on finalising their own water 
plans and coordination of the formal consultation results.  
 
Stage IV: Drafting regional/local water plans, formal consultation (2008, 2009) 
 
A - Policy developments in the North-Brabant Province 
From the end of August till the beginning of October 2009 the formal consultation 
round takes place on the final draft of the Structure Vision on Spatial Development 
(Voorontwerp Structuurvisie Ruimtelijke Ordening; Provincie Noord-Brabant, 2009c; Inter-
view 45, Appendix I). The central assignment of the Province is to maintain the 
specific (small-scale) mosaic of the Brabant landscape (with alternation of built-up and 
rural areas) and to develop it in a sustainable way, in the context of (decreasing) popu-
lation growth and economic growth (Provincie Noord-Brabant, 2011: 18; Interview 
45, Appendix I). Despite considerable investments in ecological restoration measures, 
the biodiversity in and around nature areas still goes downward (ibid.: 19). The 
tendency towards less but more intensive and bigger farms continues, as due to more 
restrictive national legislation on human health and environmental quality. This chal-
lenges the aims for a vital and sustainable rural area (ibid.: 20). With the revised spatial 
policy, the North-Brabant Province aims at a balance between restrictions and stimu-
lation of developments. Actually, close reading of the final structure vision (Provincie 
Noord-Brabant, 2011) indicates that the provincial authorities wish “to have it all”, a 
growth of social-cultural, economic and ecological capital, by means of an integrated 
areal approach which is based on zoning and (whenever feasible) combinations of 
activities. The authorities aim for sustainable growth of and people and profit and 
planet as summarised implicitly in the structure vision (Provincie Noord-Brabant, 
2011: 30; translation from Dutch added): 
 
In trunk lines, the provincial spatial vision is based on a robust and resilient nature- 
and water system, with attention to flood protection, droughts and biodiversity. The 
Province aims for a multiple-functional rural area, in which agriculture, recreation 
and nature are allocated space in an interrelated fashion. Special attention is paid to 
historic cultural values and liveability of small-scale built-up centres. The urbanised 
areas should be varied and attractive, with strong cities, green connectivity zones and 
outlet areas (intensive recreation, urban agriculture). Special emphasis is on strong 
regional economic clusters, (inter)national accessibility and junctions of infra-
structure. 
 
The spatial choices and interests have been translated into four main spatial structures: 
(1) the green-blue structure (water and nature); (2) rural areas; (3) urban structure; and 
(4) infrastructure (Provincie Noord-Brabant, 2011: 41). The core of the blue-green 
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structure is the Main Ecological Structure which includes robust ecological connec-
tivity zones and brooks and creeks. The water structures are mainly based on the 
WFD requirements and the water systems with the ‘water nature’ function in the Pro-
vincial Water Plan (ibid.: 62; Provincie Noord-Brabant, 2009c; Interviews 45 and 46, 
Appendix I). The Province aims at effective and efficient realisation of desired spatial 
development by means of interactive open processes and target-oriented agreements 
with other stakeholders (Provincie Noord-Brabant, 2011: 50; Interview 50, Appendix 
I). More room for spatial development should never threaten the basic attitude of 
careful use of soil, water, nature and historic cultural values (ibid.: 51). 
At the end of 2009 the General Assembly of the North-Brabant Province 
approves the final 2010 to 2015 Water Policy Plan, which includes the WFD objec-
tives and measures (Provincie Noord-Brabant, 2009c). The formal consultation round 
has predominantly led to minor changes except for changing the heavily modified 
qualification of one brook system in Brabant-West (‘t Merkske) into a natural one. The 
change is due to opposition from the Brabant Environmental Federation that asked 
for designation of several brook systems as natural ones (ibid.). On the base of a pilot 
project status the General Assembly accepts this change for one brook system only, in 
order to explore whether the related ecological objectives actually will be feasible and 
affordable. At this stage the Province is cautious to avoid a precedent for other brook 
systems (Interviews 44 and 46, Appendix I). The new water policy plan mainly builds 
on a continuation of the current policy, opting for a staged implementation approach 
with regard to the European obligations (Provincie Noord-Brabant, 2009c).  
 
B - The regional WFD coordination process in the Meuse River Basin 
In 2008 the river basin management plans, the national water plan, the national man-
agement plan for the state waters, the provincial water plans and the water manage-
ment plans of the regional water management authorities have been drafted in a simul-
taneous process. A strategic environmental impact assessment has been conducted for 
all these plans. At the same time the TPW and HSE Ministries take the lead in design-
ing national regulation for WFD standards for surface and ground water bodies and 
other, smaller water systems (for a more detailed elaboration read Subsection 6.3.4 on 
national choice rules).  National and regional partners prepare the coordinated consul-
tation procedures in good harmony. At the end of 2008 the formal consultation 
procedures are presented to the members of the Regional Meuse WFD Consultation 
Platform. These members express the overkill of information in relation to short 
consultation periods for the more detailed domestic plan figures (6 weeks) compared 
to the new, more aggregated river basin management plan (6 months). Some represen-
tatives doubt whether a six months waiting period for coordinated answers to regional 
and local questions qualifies as good governance.  
The overview of consultation views, remarks and answers of the competent 
authorities shows not many surprises (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2009b; 
Provincie Noord-Brabant, 2009d; Van den Berg, 2009). Due to the extensive process 
with informal regional and local WFD consultation platforms, workshops and infor-
mation sessions for grass-roots supporters, most views and positions have been well 
known at the start (Interviews, 2011). Consequently there are hardly any substantial 
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changes in the final versions of the diverse water plans. Although the regional Meuse 
partners mentioned the formal consultation round as an opportunity for information 
of the general public, hardly any citizen visit the consultation meetings nor contributes 
written comments. The process has been locked up for too long among water authori-
ties and organised NGOs and interest groups to invoke the citizens’ attention.  
 
 
7.3 The WFD and regional rules of IRBM 
 
This section explores to which extent the WFD’s policy and governance principles, 
environmental objectives and exemption options may have provoked changes in col-
lective-choice rules for IRBM at the regional administrative level in the Netherlands, 
i.e. the Dutch part of the International Meuse River Basin District. For definition of 
ideal-type IRBM rules, see the Subsections 2.2.3 till 2.2.9.   
 
7.3.1 Scope rules 
As defined in Section 2.2.3, scope rules may concern the geographic area, the type of 
organisational structures and networks and the issues to be decided on. For the aim of 
this research, a distinction is made between organisational and substantive scope rules. 
Concerning the former the focus is on the impact of hydrological boundaries on or-
ganisational structures, whereas for the latter the focus is on the levels of integration. 
For example, are “river basins as the appropriate management units” translated into 
functional agencies and to which extent may these entities operate autonomously? 
Which are the collective choices for internal integration (of issues within the water 
policy domain) and external integration (of issues across policy domains)? To which 
extent do these choices affect the nature of river basin legislation, policy documents 
and management plans? 
 
Organisational scope: the impact of hydrological boundaries 
Three ideal-types of organisational IRBM scope rules are distinguished (see Table 
7.4a). As concluded in Subsection 6.3.1, the Netherlands have a tradition of functional 
water management structures which follow (man-made) hydrological boundaries and 
which implement policies as controlled by parliamentary institutions (ideal-type B 
scope rules). The regional water management authorities are the most pronounced 
example of these functional entities which implement national and regional policies at 
the local level. Given the predominant heavily modified nature of the water systems in 
the Dutch delta and the fact that different rivers intermingle there, river basin delinea-
tion involves administrative choices. For example, according to the WFD logics it 
would be preferable to consider the Meuse River as tributary of the Rhine River.  
Consequently, to consider the Meuse as part of the international Rhine River Basin 
District would be the most logic solution.  Since this purely hydrological rationale 
would not be in line with the existing International Meuse and Rhine River Basin 
Treaties, the national authorities have decided otherwise (Van der Velde et al, 2002; 
Interview 30, Appendix I). 
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Already before adoption of the WFD the North-Brabant Province has started analyses 
for territorial units which are delineated by hydrological boundaries. The province is in 
favour of a WFD delineation which fits entirely to the prior WM21 division into 17 
sub-basins, since this latter division for 100% matches with its territorial borders. 
However due to the nationally chosen WFD division, the province has territorial parts 
within the Meuse, Scheldt and Rhine basins. The initial WFD subdivision within the 
Meuse River basin for the purpose of the Article 5 report has been based on larger 
hydrological regions which included several water bodies (Ministerie van Verkeer en 
Waterstaat, 2005). In the final Meuse River Basin Management Plan these hydrological 
regions have been abandoned for a presentation based on the individual WFD water 
bodies (Ministerie Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2009a). For the Dutch implementation 
planning process the water bodies have been clustered within the territorial borders of 
the regional water management authorities (RBOM, 2009). Besides, the North-
Brabant Province also works with sub-river basin units (regionale watersysteemeenheden) 
which differ from the WFD units. Since the final WFD water bodies easily could be 
grouped into these provincial units, there has not een a major aggregation problem. 
For the first WFD implementation planning cycle the regional actors concentrate 
on the Dutch part of the International Meuse River Basin District as defined by the 
2002 multilateral Meuse Treaty (Anonymous, 2002). Groundwater bodies are identi-
fied at the level of the entire (Dutch) part of the Meuse River Basin, whenever possi-
ble fitted to the delineation typology of upstream riparian states. Unintendely, the 
WFD water bodies reporting system has created a Dutch “priority paradox”. Al-
though the aims of Article 1 of the WFD in principle apply to all European surface 
and groundwater, the distinction between water bodies and remaining, smaller water 
bodies, such as tributaries or isolated (urban) water systems, has induced a political 
perception of a prioritisation exercise. This perception is enforced by the feasibility and 
affordability mantra in combination with the WFD obligation fear. Since resources are 
limited and the river basin management plans primarily report at the level of water 
bodies, political attention is driven away from the smaller, often ecologically valuable 
and/or urban water bodies. The final Meuse Memorandum explicitly deals with this 
dilemma (RBOM, 2009: 20-21; translation from Dutch added): 
 
A preliminary definition for reporting to the EC has been applied: Measures in up-
stream water systems that are no part of a water body will only be reported when 
they effectively contribute to compliance with ecological WFD objectives of a down-
stream water body. The extent to which a measure contributes to downstream eco-
logical objectives is difficult to determine, since it is part of a larger package of meas-
ures and in the same time dependent on local conditions. This requires tailor-made 
solutions. In addition there are measures that do not contribute (directly) to objec-
tives of a water body but which to a certain extent may contribute to (perception) of 
water quality amelioration (such as dredging of isolated urban waters or water level 
management of smaller rural water systems). Especially these measures are visible to 
citizens and may contribute strongly to a positive public perception of urban waters. 
As such they are a powerful element in local public support for water management. 
Therefore, the regional partners have decided that political freedom in dealing with 
these measures is important, hence regional harmonisation did not take place.  
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The Regional Meuse Political Platform has been initiated as an additional, informal 
coordination structure in the WFD implementation planning process. It is functional, 
water oriented and aims to provide for consensus-based, non-legally binding advice to 
the provincial, municipal and regional water management authorities (horizontal inte-
gration). Furthermore, the platform tries to bridge the national desires with local am-
bitions (vertical integration). The platform is a new entity in the Dutch organisational 
water landscape. Such informal (temporary) coordination structures are a well-known 
phenomenon in the Netherlands. The regional, functional water management autho-
rities take the lead in the local WFD processes by which they wish to enforce their 
position. The observations point at ideal-type B organisational scope rules at the re-
gional level both before and after adoption of the WFD (see Table 7.4a). The WFD 
has enforced the focus on hydrological, (sub) river basin boundaries. 
Although national and regional politicians have expressed the added value of the 
Regional Meuse Political Platform and have decided on its continuation, in December 
2008 the WFD momentum passes its climax. After publication of the (draft) river 
basin management plans (as output of an extensive and exhaustive coordination proc-
ess) many involved actors suffer from a “WFD fatigue”. Besides, the recommenda-
tions of the National Delta Committee on anticipating climate change mainly focus on 
safety against floods and a sustainable fresh water provision (Deltacommissie, 2008).  
Notwithstanding earlier calls for broadening the scope of the (WFD) regional river 
basin platforms, the committee’s recommendations are worked out by a completely 
new, additional, informal organisational structure. The regional river basin platforms 
will continue in parallel, following a ‘sugar beet factory model’ (suikerfabriekmodel), with 
high activity rates only during the harvest season’ (Interview 28, Appendix I).  
 
Table 7.4a: Ideal-type collective-choice IRBM scope rules (organisation; regional level). 
Ideal-type rules↓ 1990 to 2000↓ 2001 to 2009↓ 
A: Water policy is implemented by organisational 
structures/actor networks as driven bysocial, eco-
nomic and political factors which do not follow 
hydrological (river) basin boundaries. These struc-
tures/networks may be multi-purpose or sectoral in 
nature and are under parliamentary control. 
  
B: Water policy is implemented by functional water 
agencies, committees and actor networks which 
follow hydrological (river basin) boundaries. These 
functional entities and actor networks are controlled 
by parliamentary institutions.  
 
X 
 
X 
C: Water policy is implemented by autonomous 
(sub) river basin authorities and/or communities 
that are organised along hydrological boundaries. 
These authorities and communities are beyond  
parliamentary control and do have their own polity 
rules. 
  
Legend: The research observations come closest to ideal-type B rules as expressed by the ‘X’. 
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Substantive scope: level of internal integration 
In its first (integrated) water policy plan the North-Brabant Province emphasises the 
interrelated nature of groundwater and surface water systems (Provincie Noord-
Brabant, 1991a; Glasbergen and Van Essen, 1992). Although the plan includes both 
surface water and groundwater issues, regulations run in parallel and different expert 
networks operate for surface water and groundwater issues (Interviews 44 and 45, 
Appendix I). Whereas the Province focuses more on groundwater management stra-
tegies, the regional water management authorities further detail surface water 
management regulations (ibid.). In order to combat desiccation of nature sites and 
drying up of inland surface waters, groundwater and surface water abstraction regula-
tions are developed. There are no detailed quantified objectives that express quanti-
tative requirements for ecosystem functions (Interview 46, Appendix I). Due to the 
WFD, interdependencies between surface water and groundwater bodies start to 
receive more explicit attention (Interviews 44, 48). However, the WFD focus until 
December 2009 has been predominantly on objectives and measures for individual 
surface water and groundwater bodies. Interdependencies between upstream, mid-
stream and downstream (surface) water bodies, has been dealt with in a generic, quali-
tative manner (Provincie Noord-Brabant, 2009c; Ministerie van Verkeer en Water-
staat, 2009a Interviews 46, 50, Appendix I). WFD’s Article 4 might trigger further 
elaboration of no-shift arrangements for interrelated water bodies in the second WFD 
implementation planning cycle as of 2010 (Interviews 46 and 52, Appendix I) . Similar 
conclusions may be drawn for the Limburg Province (Interview 41, Appendix I).  
 
Table 7.4b: Ideal-type collective-choice IRBM internal integration rules (regional level) 
Ideal-type rules↓ 1990 to 2000↓ 2001 to 2009↓ 
A: Separate legislation, policy documents and man-
agement plans for both water quality and quantity 
issues. Surface water and groundwater are dealt with 
in parallel.  
 
X 
 
x 
B: Legislation, policy documents and management 
plans which include parallel objectives and measures 
for both quantitative and qualitative aspects and for 
groundwater and surface water. 
 
X 
 
X 
C: Legislation, policy documents and management 
plans with integrated objectives and measures for 
related surface and groundwater bodies, including 
quantitative and qualitative aspects. 
  
Legend: The research observations come closest to ideal-type A and B rules as expressed by 
the ‘X’. The ‘x’ points at a reduced resemblance of the observations with ideal-type A rules 
after adoption of the WFD. 
 
These observations point at an evolution from a juxtaposition of ideal-type A and B 
IRBM scope rules (internal integration) before adoption of the WFD towards domi-
nance of ideal-type B rules after adoption of the WFD (see Table 7.4b). For the 
second and third WFD implementation planning cycles, provincial actors expect a 
pay-off in terms of more pronounced, interrelated objectives and measures for surface  
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water and groundwater bodies (hence, a further evolution towards ideal-type C rules; 
Interviews 44 and 46, Appendix I). 
 
Substantive scope: degree of external integration 
In the 1990s an integrated areal policies implementation approach becomes noticeable 
at the provincial level. In the Limburg and North-Brabant Provinces the outbreak of 
swine fever in 1997 triggers the reconstruction process for the rural areas. Both prov-
inces seize the momentum to enforce an integrated policies approach in which water 
related objectives are incorporated (Interviews 41 and 46, Appendix I). Regarding the 
nature of sector policies plans there is a remarkable difference between the Limburg 
and North-Brabant Provinces. Whereas the former opts for an integrated environ-
mental policy plan, the latter works with parallel sector policies plans following the 
leapfrog principle. In practice the Limburg Province works with sector policies plans as 
well: an umbrella plan includes a generic overview of policies objectives and principles 
which are worked out in subsequent, more detailed sector policies plans with not 
completely synchronous terms. These sector plans also follow the leapfrog principle 
(ibid.).  
In the North-Brabant Province, despite integration of water-related objectives in 
the rural areas reconstruction process, the WFD, WM21 and the reconstruction proc-
esses mainly run in parallel. Due to differences in implementation stages, the WFD 
objectives and measures have been less integrated in the reconstruction plans as com-
pared to the WM21 ones. Despite the formal linkage between the Birds and Habitats 
Directives and the WFD (by means of the WFD register of protected areas), these 
two implementation processes also mainly have run in parallel. The first WFD imple-
mentation planning cycle has not triggered an opening up of the water policy box and 
(further) integration of its objectives into other policy sectors.  
The observations predominantly point at ideal-type B external integration rules at 
the regional level both before and after adoption of the WFD (see Table 7.4c). 
Although the Limburg Province works with an integrated environmental policy plan, 
it brings together policies from different sectors without actually translating these into 
integrated objectives and measures (Interviews, 2011). 
 
Table 7.4c: Ideal-type collective-choice external integration rules of IRBM (regional level)  
Ideal-type rules↓ 1990 to 2000↓ 2001 to 2009↓ 
A: Separate policy documents and management 
plans for water policy and other policy domains 
without linkages. 
 
 
 
 
B: Policy documents and management plans for 
other policy domains take into account water 
issues and reversely. 
 
X 
 
X 
C: Cross-sector, integrative policies and manage-
ment plans. 
 (X) 
Legend: The research observations come closest to ideal-type B rules as expressed by the ‘X’. 
The ‘(X)’ expresses that, although the Limburg Province has opted for an integrated environ-
mental policy plan, far more detailed sector policy plans still dominate the scene. The inte-
grated plan has the nature of a generic umbrella framework. 
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7.3.2 Position rules 
As introduced in Subsection 2.2.4, within this research position rules relate to the 
question as to how do collective (inter-)national river basin governance and policy 
principles affect the positions of owners and users of water and land. Or reversely, 
which conditions should apply to acquisition, continuation and termination of rights 
to own and/or use (interrelated) water and land resources, in order to comply with 
common principles of ecological, social and economic resilience? Three ideal-types of 
position rules have been distinguished (see Table 7.5). Regarding position rules the 
WFD explicitly addresses relations between water and agriculture and between water 
and nature conservation. Protected areas due to both the Nitrates Directive and the 
Birds- and Habitats Directives are included in the WFD’s register of protected areas 
(European Communities, 2000: 32).  
 
Notwithstanding the North-Brabant Province stresses a balanced development of the 
people, planet and profit dimensions of sustainability, it struggles with their translation 
into conditions for ecological, economical and social resilience. Although property and 
user rights are preconditioned with regard to environmental, social and economic 
externalities, the provincial authorities are cautious not to affect historic rights too 
dramatically. Concerning water policy objectives reallocation of prior rights is limited 
and subject to sensitive political debates. The expropriation instrument is considered a 
final resort whenever voluntary measures and land acquisition do not pay off suf-
ficiently (Provincie Noord-Brabant, 2006; Interviews 45 and 46, Appendix I). 
Although the shock event of the 1997 swine fever outbreak triggers unavoidable 
reallocation proposals, actual policies remain restricted to certain zones within rural 
areas. Furthermore, the reallocation process runs slowly in practice. The instrument to 
quantify desired groundwater and surface water tables includes the promise of formu-
lation of interrelated conditions of ecological, economical and social resilience. In 
practice, different interpretations appear as rooted in conflicting interests (such as the 
classic divide between nature and agriculture) which guide the way to pragmatic com-
promises (Interview 46, Appendix I). The subsequent delays in implementation terms 
of the instrument may speak for themselves and point at the laborious nature of this 
multi-stakeholder negotiation process.  
 
Table 7.5: Ideal-type collective-choice IRBM position rules (regional level) 
Ideal-type rules↓ 1990 to 2000↓ 2001 to 2009↓ 
A: Protection of prior water and land resources use 
and property rights without preconditions on  
environmental, social and economic externalities. 
 
 
 
 
B: Conditional maintenance and acquirement of 
water and land resources use and property rights. 
Conditions include requirements to consider social, 
economic and/or environmental externalities. 
 
X 
 
X 
C: Reallocation of use and property rights, based on 
interrelated conditions of ecological, economical and 
social resilience. 
  
Legend: The research observations come closest to ideal-type B rules as expressed by the ‘X’. 
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The WFD implementation planning process mainly builds on prior water policy 
choices. Given the tensions between different interests and the dominant political 
protection of historical property and user rights it may not come as a surprise that the 
provincial authorities embrace the national WFD implementation rule not to trigger 
significant additional land use alterations. However, maintenance and acquirement is 
conditioned by requirements to consider social, economic and environmental external-
ities. These observations point at ideal-type B position rules before and after adoption 
of the WFD (see Table 7.5). 
 
7.3.3 Boundary rules 
As defined in Subsection 2.2.5, in this research boundary rules are interpreted as the 
question who have access to the river basin management planning and decision-
making process and who have not? What are conditions for entry and exit? What are 
the degrees of participation for different stakeholder categories? Three ideal-types of 
boundary rules have been distinguished (see Table 7.6). 
 
Before adoption of the WFD the regional water policy planning process is dominated 
by the provinces. In North-Brabant the Provincial Executive organises periodical 
informal information exchange meetings with representatives from environmental 
NGOs and socio-economic interest groups. In the rural areas reconstruction process 
the Province initiates areal committees (gebiedscomissies) including public and non-
governmental actors. Although the emphasis within these committees is on com-
pliance with provincial policies objectives, the other stakeholders extensively co-think, 
co-produce and bring in their objectives and interests (Interview 49, Appendix I). 
These multi-stakeholder platforms offer ample opportunities for negotiated agree-
ments, including water-related objectives and measures, but at the end of the day it is 
up to the General Assembly of North-Brabant to formally approve and adopt the 
reconstruction and areal programmes (ibid.). Also in the provincial Natura 2000  
implementation planning process, multi-stakeholder platforms offer access to both 
governmental and non-governmental actors.  
Similar to the national level public actors dominate the regional WFD river basin 
planning and decision-making process. Non-governmental actors have no direct 
access to the Regional Meuse Political and Administrative Platforms but are informed 
and consulted informally in the Regional Meuse WFD Consultation Platform (Klank-
bordgroep KRW Maas). This sounding-board is a new multi-stakeholder platform which 
initially has been chaired by the North-Brabant Province, but which changed to an 
independent chair later on in the process. The independent chair attends the Regional 
Meuse Political Platform meetings and may bring in raised voices from the sounding-
board members. In addition the WFD Meuse Project Bureau organises special infor-
mal WFD information and consultation sessions for grass-roots supporters of envi-
ronmental NGOs and socio-economic interest groups that participate in the sound-
ing-board. The “citizen” is not involved in the first WFD implementation planning 
cycle. At the regional level, entry and access rules for the WFD process are written 
down implicitly in the 2005 Installation Decision on the WFD Meuse Project Orga-
nisation (RBOM, 2005a). Although all relevant ministries in principle have access to  
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the regional platform meetings, the national Water Policy Department of the TPW 
Ministry is guides the WFD activities, mostly joined by the AFN Ministry. The HSE 
Ministry mainly reserves its human resources for the national structures.  
Gradually, following the WFD processes in the other Dutch river basins a re-
markable evolution occurs from ex post information of sounding-board members to 
ex ante information and consultation (ex ante = prior to decision-making in the Re-
gional Meuse Political Platform). According to the members of the Meuse sounding-
board the platform has been established for two main reasons: (1) to advise the 
authorities on decisions to be made and (2) to inform the interest groups regarding the 
progress of the WFD implementation process (Koppers and Ovaa, 2007: 34; Inter-
views 13 till 17, Appendix I). In practice, the members perceive a broader range of 
functions of the sounding-board, e.g. platform for exchange of stakeholder positions, 
input of sector knowledge, information of grass-roots supporters and bringing in 
societal signals (Koppers and Ovaa, 2007: 36; Interviews 13 till 17, Appendix I). The 
respondents are more satisfied with the actual information function in comparison 
with the advisory function (Koppers and Ovaa, 2007: 36, 37). In a 2009 evaluation 
session the sounding-board members express their satisfaction with the information 
function of the platform. Some members ply for a future co-production function.  
The entry rules for representatives of drinking water companies or their interest 
organisations differ among the Dutch river basins. In the initial stage the Association 
of Dutch Drinking Water Companies (Vereniging van Waterbedrijven in Nederland; 
VEWIN), as supported by the HSE Ministry, is allowed access to the project team 
that edits the national WFD Implementation Handbook. In the Scheldt basin the 
Evides drinking water company is member of the Regional Scheldt Platform (both at 
the political and official level). On the contrary, in the Regional Meuse Political Plat-
form drinking water companies are refused access, instead may attend the Regional 
Meuse WFD Consultation Platform. In the Scheldt basin, like in some other Dutch 
basins, the drinking water company was already member of a former political plat-
form. In the Meuse basin there was no pre-existing platform and the drinking water 
companies are considered as a social interest group (not as a public actor).  
 
Table 7.6: Ideal-type collective-choice IRBM boundary rules (regional level) 
Ideal-type rules↓ 1990 to 2000↓ 2001 to 2009↓ 
A: Access to the river basin management planning 
process is restricted to public actors only. Other 
stakeholders are informed. 
 
 
 
 
B: Non-governmental actors may have access to the 
river basin management planning process under 
conditions set by the public actors. Emphasis on  
co-think and consultation. 
 
X 
 
X 
C: Ample opportunities for all interested stake-
holders to join the river basin management planning 
process, including co-productions, co-decisions and 
self-realisation. 
 
X 
 
X 
Legend: The research observations come closest to ideal-type B and C rules as expressed by 
the ‘X’. 
THE REGIONAL MEUSE BRIDGE 325 
 
 
 
The observations point at a juxtaposition of ideal-type B and C boundary rules in the 
water policy domain at the regional level before and after adoption of the WFD (see 
Table 7.6). The WFD implementation planning process is a clear exponent of ideal-
type B. The rural areas revitalisation and the site-specific Natura 2000 processes point 
at higher degrees of active participation of non-governmental stakeholders by offering 
more opportunities for co-production and joint fact finding under conditions as de-
fined by the public actors. Consequently, these processes may be typified as a mixture 
of ideal-types B and C boundary rules. In the regional WFD implementation planning 
process the emphasis is on ex post information and consultation: most documents are 
prepared by the governmental actors and presented to the other stakeholders 
afterwards.  
  
7.3.4 Choice rules 
As introduced in Section 2.2.6, for the aim of this research two indicators for identifi-
cation of choice rules change have been defined. The first indicator concerns water 
supply and demand rules. Three ideal-types have been identified for this indicator, 
ranging from a focus on water supply only to integrated demand and supply manage-
ment in which a hierarchy of functions may apply, as conditioned by fresh water avail-
ability and protection of the ecological life support system (see Table 7.7a). The 
second indicator expresses the nature of license system. Ideal-types range from sepa-
rate, parallel licenses for quality and quantity objectives for the use, development and 
management of water resources, towards integrated licenses for interdependent 
natural resources (including water; see Table 7.7b).  
 
Supply and demand management 
In general the provincial spatial development and water management policies aim at a 
balanced fresh water supply for different land use catgeories. Although arguments on 
economic efficiency, social equity and ecosystem protection all play a role in precondi-
tion setting for the abstraction, use and discharge (after usage) of fresh water, moni-
toring figures still show a significant anti-desiccation assigenmnet for valuabe nature 
sites. Under average hydrological conditions there is no clear hierarchy between these 
arguments. Implicit choices are made by means of zoning of land and designation of 
water user functions. For example, in agriculture dominated areas, the options for 
anti-desiccation measures are more limited. For economic efficiency and social 
reasons, high quality deep groundwater resources are reserved for drinking water pro-
duction. In periods of prolonged droughts the national priority instrument for the 
distribution of available fresh water applies which includes a hierarchy of user fun-
ctions. Functions for protection of human life and prevention of irreversible deterio-
ration of natural values are among the first category priorities.  
The provincial water policy objectives are mainly expressed in generic water bal-
ance terms such as an intention to shift from groundwater to surface water abstrac-
tions. Groundwater abstractions are subject to a license and tax system. Although 
larger amounts of abstractions from both surface water and groudwater resources are 
subject to legislation, a large number of small abstractions add to the critical desicca-
tion issue. In the Dutch legislative system there are no standards for water supply  
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service levels. As an unwritten rule, user categories are used to a strong governmental 
apparatus that provides for fresh water suppply whenever needed. Despite the policy 
discourse on water as a guiding principle for spatial development, influential land user 
categories dominate the scene. The slow, conflictuous process for definition of the 
desired groundwater and surface water tables for several (sub-)basins (with the classic 
dive between farmers and environmentalists), is a clear indicator for the provincial 
struggle to make significant political choices. 
In addition to supply management also demand management receives consider-
able attention. Demand management measures include public awareness campaigns  
by drinking water companies and development of water saving technology by agricul-
ture and industry. In the regional WFD implementation planning process demand and 
supply management issues do not receive much attention. The main focus is on 
diffuse sources of water pollution, ecological restoration of brooks and creeks and 
water-dependent terrestrial nature sites. With regard to the supply and demand indica-
tor, the WFD does not influence the regional water policy development significantly. 
These observations point at a juxtaposition of ideal-type B and C IRBM choice rules 
(see Table 7.7.a). 
 
Table 7.7a: Ideal-type choice rules for IRBM (supply and demand rules; regional level) 
Ideal-type rules↓ 1990 to 2000↓ 2001 to 2009↓ 
A: Water supply management determines 
availability of fresh water for user functions. 
 
 
 
 
B: Mixed supply and demand management 
determines fresh water availability without a 
hierarchy in user functions. 
 
X 
 
X 
C: Integrated supply and demand management, as 
expressed by a hierarchy in user functions.   
X X 
 
Legend: The research observations come closest to ideal-type B and C rules as expressed by 
the ‘X’. 
 
Nature of the license system 
Before adoption of the WFD, in North-Brabant the Provincial Water Regulation in-
cludes license rules for both groundwater and surface water abstractions (Provincie 
Noord-Brabant, 1992). The former were elaborated more in detail by the Province, 
whereas the latter were the concern of the water quantity and water quality manage-
ment authorities (ibid.). Emissions of point sources of pollution were regulated by 
means of the national Surface Water Pollution Act (Anonymus, 1970). Regulations for 
diffuse sources of pollution were more diffuse in nature and partly covered by the 
Surface Water Pollution Act and the Manure Substances Act (Anonymous, 1986b). As 
described in Subsection 6.3.4, the river basin management approach from the WFD 
has been among the main three reasons for establishing an integrated water policy act 
at the national level which includes one coordination system that brings together all 
water related licenses. For the sake of deregulation and simplification the general 
philosophy of the Water Act (Anonymous, 2009b) is to arrange as much as water-
related activities as possible by generic, national rules. For some specific activities a 
license remains obligatory. Six licences for water-related activities have been replaced  
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by one integrated one, which is supposed to reduce administrative burden for compa-
nies and citizens. Municipalities will serve as the central water license application of-
fices for companies and citizens and will take care of coordination with procedures for 
other environmental licenses (ibid.).  
The new Dutch license system includes groundwater and surface water issues 
which as a result of the integration exercise are expected to be considered more co-
herently (Interviews 44 and 45, Appendix I; Van Rijkswick and Havekes, 2012). As 
argued in Chapter 6, bringing together activities within one license system does not 
necessarily mean that interdependencies between quality and quantity and between 
groundwater and surface water are translated into interrelated and quantified objec-
tives and measures. At the time of writing in 2012 it is too early to fully analyse the 
impact of the integration exercise in which case law may play an important clarifying 
role (Van Rijswick and Havekes, 2012). Since the division of legal tasks between 
provinces and regional water management authorities largely remains unaltered (with 
exception of part of the operational groundwater tasks), one interesting question is 
how far the actual impact of the legislative integration between groundwater and 
surface water related activities will stretch. The research observations point at an 
evolution from dominance of ideal-type A IRBM choice rules before the WFD’s 
adoption towards ideal-type B IRBM choice rules afterwards (see Table 7.7b). 
 
Table 7.7b: Ideal-type IRBM choice rules (nature of the license system; regional level) 
Ideal-type rules↓ 1990 to 2000↓ 2001 to 2009↓ 
A: Separate, parallel licences for quality and quantity 
objectives related to the use, development and  
management and use of water resources. 
 
X 
 
 
x 
B: Licenses that integrate quantity and quality objec-
tives related to use, development and management 
of water resources. 
  
X 
C: Integrated licenses for the interrelated use, devel-
opment and management of natural resources (e.g. 
air, water, land). 
  
Legend: The research observations come closest to ideal-type A and B rules as expressed by 
the ‘X’. The ‘x’ points at a reduced resemblance of the observations with ideal-type A rules 
after adoption of the WFD. 
 
7.3.5 Aggregation Rules 
As defined in Section 2.2.7, a major collective-choice challenge of IRBM concerns the 
issue as to how arrange decision-making at interrelated political levels within shared 
(inter-) national river basins with the aim to reach common understanding and broad 
public support for collective choices. The aggregation rules may appear in different 
ways, as expressed by identified ideal-types (see Table 7.8). The aggregation question, 
‘who should make and who should agree with adaptations of prior rules and with new 
rules?’ shows redundancy with boundary rules. For this research, the question who is 
involved in planning and decision-making and to which degree (information, consulta-
tion or co-decision), is covered by boundary rules (see Subsection 7.3.3).  
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The aggregation rules concentrate on the coherence between and the nature of 
decision-making at different administrative levels within a river basin. 
 
In the decentralised unitary state tradition of the Netherlands provinces play the role 
of regional coordinators and integrators of national sectoral policies. They translate 
national instructions and guidelines within the context of specific regional and local 
physical, social, economical and political conditions. Actually, top-down instructions 
intermingle with regional and local bottom-up practices. National instructions should 
be considered within the context of extensive, informal, consensus-based drafting and 
negotiation processes in the corridors of the formal democratic decision-making  
venues. At the provincial level, water experts from the province and the regional water 
management authorities dominate the water policy implementation scene. Environ-
mental NGOs and socio-economic interests groups try to influence decision-making 
on the implementation rules by lobbying or participating within the general assemblies 
of both the province and the regional water management authorities, by informal and 
formal consultations and by setting-up local projects in co-production with the 
authorities. Furthermore, the North-Brabant Province offers ample opportunities for 
co-productions and negotiated agreements in its areal processes (such as the rural 
areas revitalisation approach and the Natura 2000 processes). Within the room offered 
by provincial instructions and guidelines the regional water management autorities 
develop their own tailor-made operational rules and practices. Aggregation procedures 
within the Dutch water policy domain circle around policy ambitions and objectives 
which are predominantly intentional in nature.  
As expressed in Chapter 6, the Dutch actors struggle with the obligatory nature 
of the WFD requirements. The national Water Policy Department emphasises the 
importance of local tailor-made initiatives for compliance with the Directive’s objec-
tives. The domestic implementation planning approach reaffirms the coordination role 
of the provincial authorities in bridging national wishes and local practices. Given the 
large number of actors within the Dutch part of the river basin and different cultures 
and practices among the involved provinces and regional water management authori-
ties, a functional project bureau is considered a valuable, supportive process coordina-
tion structure. The WFD Meuse Project Bureau plays a central role in translating the 
national instructions and guidelines on the one hand and harmonising the results from 
the local areal processes on the other hand (Interviews 11, 12 and 18, Appendix I). 
Figure 7.1 provides an overview of the regional WFD implementation planning 
coordination structure (translation from Dutch figure in RBOM, 2005a).  
The politicians in the Regional Meuse Political Platform (RBO Meuse; project 
unit A) provide the assignments for the WFD Meuse Project Bureau (project unit B), 
which should organise its own working-force (in cooperation with the participating 
governmental administrations). Representatives of national ministries, provinces, state 
and inland water management authorities and two (out of 114) municipalities tune 
their WFD implementation planning activities within the new platform. The platform 
has an informal status since it provides non-legally binding advices on harmonisation 
of the interdependent WFD processes at the national, regional and local levels 
(RBOM, 2005a). Regional and local authorities may relatively autonomously translate 
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the national WFD implementation guidelines and instructions, as long as deviations 
are supported by legitimate arguments. As being informal in nature, decisions from 
the National Political Water Platform generally are accepted as best possible consen-
sus. The WFD coordination process is considered as a project, in which the RBO 
chair acts as principal and the director of the Project Bureau as contractor (RBOM, 
2005a; Interview 12, Appendix I). The chair and the Management Group (project unit 
C) jointly decide on the financial and human resources for the Project Bureau. The 
Project Bureau shall provide the products as requested by the RBO and the Manage-
ment Group and shall prepare political decision making. Participating administrations 
may detach employees at the Project Bureau who should work at regional Meuse 
interests, hence not represent the interests from the parent organisations. The Project 
Bureau may install permanent and temporary thematic working groups and shall 
coordinate the WFD activities in the local processes (which are steered by the regional 
water management authorities; ibid.).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1: WFD coordination structure in the Meuse River Basin (2005 to 2009) 
 
The official equivalent of the political platform (RAO Meuse; project unit D) has two 
central tasks (RBOM, 2005a; Interview 12, Appendix I). The first one is to advice the 
project director on documents for the political meetings. In the end, the project direc-
tor who also runs the secretariat and chairs the official platform meetings is account-
able to the politicians. Secondly, the RAO members shall organise the required human 
and financial resources and political decision making within their home organisations. 
Preferably, the RAO members are managers. The Regional Meuse WFD Consultation 
Platform (project unit E) includes representatives from environmental NGOs and 
socio-economic interest groups. The consultation platform may advise the RBO 
members on products and attention points both on request and own initiative. The 
project director selects relevant documents for discussion with the platform members 
(ibid.). 
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The final Meuse Memorandum (RBOM, 2009: 2) clearly summarises the regional 
WFD aggregation rules (translation from Dutch added): 
 
1. Results from the local WFD processes are summarised in (draft) Meuse 
Memoranda and discussed in the Regional Meuse River Basin Platform.  
2. The platform members take care of coherence and regional consistency and 
provide advises to the individual authorities.  
3. Individual authorities may incorporate the regional advises into the local      
implementation processes.  
4. The results from the local implementation processes will be incorporated in 
own water management plans.  
5. The WFD parts from the regional and local water management plans will be 
provided to the national authorities for inclusion in the (draft) river basin  
management plan. 
6. The Regional Meuse Political Platform will provide the final Meuse Memoran-
dum as background document to national, regional and local authorities. 
 
Remarkably, the memorandum does not mention the role of the Regional Meuse 
WFD Consultation Platform within this aggregation process (ibid.).  
 
Table 7.8: Ideal-type collective-choice aggregation rules of IRBM (regional level) 
Ideal-type rules↓ 1990 to 2000↓ 2001 to 2009↓ 
A: Independent decision-making on water policy 
and management plans at different administrative 
levels within a river basin. 
 
 
 
 
B: Asymmetric, top-down decision-making on water 
policy and management plans at different admini-
strative levels within a river basin: lower levels have 
to comply with the rules from the higher levels. 
 
X 
 
X 
C: Symmetric, consensus based decision making on 
water policy and management plans at different 
administrative levels: mixed top-down and bottom-
up rules. 
 
X 
 
X 
Legend: The research observations come closest to ideal-type B and C rules as expressed by 
the ‘X’. 
 
The observations of this research point at a juxtaposition of ideal-types B and C both 
before and after adoption of the WFD (see Table 7.8). Given European obligations, 
top-down instructions should prevent non-compliance fines from the EC. At the 
same time the national Water Policy Department emphasises the importance of 
enough room for regional and local tailor made implementation proposals in order to 
generate support for the river basin management plans. The regional river basin coor-
dination structures are pronounced exponents of a mixed top-down and bottom-up 
approach. Its informal nature fits well in the Dutch traditions, whereas the extensive-
ness of the working-structures is remarkable. Although non-governmental actors are 
allowed to raise advisory voices, emphasis within the Meuse River Basin is on their 
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ex post information and consultation. Gradually, as partially influenced by experiences 
from other river basins (such as the Scheldt), the non-governmental actors are con-
sulted earlier, i.e. before adoption of documents by the governmental authorities. 
 
7.3.6 Information rules 
As defined in Section 2.2.8, one major collective-choice challenge of IRBM is to col-
lect, aggregate and present information in such a way that river basin management 
plans are acknowledged and supported by a majority of interested public and non-
governmental stakeholders. A critical dimension of this challenge is the types of 
information that are considered legitimate in combination with the nature of the col-
lection and aggregation process. The focus of this research is on this critical 
dimension. Three ideal-type information rules have been identified (see Table 6.7).  
 
As concluded in Subsection 7.3.3 (boundary rules), at the regional level before adoption 
of the WFD the water policy planning process is dominated by the provinces. In 
North-Brabant the Provincial Executive organises periodical informal information 
exchange meetings with representatives from environmental NGOs and socio-
economic interest groups. Emphasis is on extensive informal consultation and nego-
tiation prior to formal consultation and decision-making. Negotiated agreements 
dominate the scene with the rural areas revitalisation process as one striking example. 
In general common agreement is reached on information as aggregated in policy and 
management documents and the chosen objectives and measures reflect political 
compromises. However, differences of interpretation may persist such as expressed by 
representatives of agricultural interest organisations and environmental NGOs after 
the Cork agreement (Ploegmakers, 2007; Interviews 28 and 49, Appendix I ).  
In the regional WFD implementation planning process in the Meuse River Basin, 
predominantly, water experts and policy officials have collected, interpreted and ag-
gregated technical-scientific and socio-economic information for the Article 5 and subsequent 
river basin management plan. At the stage of drafting the Article 5 report the Regional 
Meuse WFD Consultation Platform did not exist. Joint fact finding took place among 
the state and regional water management authorities and the provinces. The munici-
palities have not been involved actively at this stage (Ministerie van Verkeer en Water-
staat, 2005; Interviws 11 and 30; Appendix I). In the adjacent Scheldt River Basin the 
WFD Consultation Platform has been involved in the Article 5 drafting stage. In this 
basin representatives of the recreation and agricultural sector differed of opinion with 
officials at the State Waters Management Agency regarding included socio-economic 
figures (Santbergen, 2005; Interviews 3 till 5, Appendix I). Furthermore, the inter-
viewees 1 till 10 (Appendix I) explicitly stated that the Article 5 report is the respon-
sibility of the governmental and water management authorities. The Article 5 reports 
in the four Dutch river basins have not been subject to a formal consultation 
procedure. Based on the reports four significant water management issues have been 
identified at the national level and not per individual river basin (Ministerie van 
Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2006d). The significant water management issues have been 
subject to a formal consultation procedure which triggered six reactions only 
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(Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2007c). The reactions were generic and did not 
specifically concern issues in the International Meuse River Basin District (ibid.). 
In the stages of formulating objectives and measures and drafting the Meuse 
River Basin Management plan environmental NGOs and socio-economic interests 
groups are informed and consulted informally at meetings of the WFD Consultation 
Platform. Many questions relate to cost-effectiveness and societal costs and benefits of invest-
ments. Despite national guidelines and harmonisation efforts regional and national 
economic analyses mainly run in parallel. The state actors collect and aggregate re-
gional information to perform national analyses. At the same time the WFD Meuse 
Project Bureau conducts its own analyses with the same figures. Remarkably, the 
figures of the national and regional analyses are difficult to compare, partly due to 
different ways of aggregation and presentation. Consequently, environmnetal NGOs 
and agricultural and industrial interest groups in the Meuse region express a lack of 
transparency and coherence between the national and regional analyses and debates 
develop about interpretation of the apparently different economic figures. The lack of 
common definitions of multi-interpretable terms like disproportionate costs adds to the 
confusion.  
Some interests groups initiate contra (sector) analyses. As a striking example, the 
Industrial Water Association (Vereniging Industrie Water) asks a student to inventory the 
potential impact of the WFD on investment costs by industry, based on waste water 
treatment costs figures of the regional water management authorities. The conclusions 
are not discussed with these authorities prior to lobbying by the association within the 
political networks in The Hague. The water authorities do not fully support the con-
clusions. Remarkably, not all regional water management authorities could provide for 
financial experts to participate in the regional project group on economic issues. Con-
sequently, a consultancy firm has been hired to fill this gap but memoranda by the 
working-group often did not receive much attention at meetings of the WFD coor-
dinators and the official and political platform meetings, mainly due to their highly 
technical nature.  
Within both the Article 5 report and the Meuse River Basin Management Plan, 
contributions by municipalities are hardly noticeable, although the latter includes more 
indications. There are no explicit contributions from NGOs or socio-economic 
interest groups which make the state and provincial authorities and the state and 
regional water management authorities the predominant owners of the plans. Both 
documents express a mixture of a technical-scientific and a socio-economic rationale.  Techni-
cal measures, cost-efficacy analyses and feasibility and affordability arguments have domi-
nated the first WFD implementation planning cycle. The formal consultation round 
shows that opinions on the chosen ambitions (the objectives and measures) in the 
Meuse River Basin Management Plan differ considerably among the interests groups. 
For example a classic divide between agriculture and nature becomes noticeable. With 
regard to the new Water Plan of the North-Brabant Province two opposing advise 
reports on the socio-economic costs and benefits of the WFD investments have been 
conducted. These reports illustrate the controversial issue of economic valuation of 
water-related costs and benefits.  
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The observations from this research point at a juxtaposition of ideal-type A and B 
IRBM information rules both before and after adoption of the WFD (see Table 7.9).  
 
Table 7.9 Ideal-type collective-choice information rules of IRBM (regional level) 
Ideal-type rules↓ 1990 to 2000↓ 2001 to 2009↓ 
The river basin management planning process (defi-
nition of means and ends) is predominantly driven 
by expert information and knowledge from the 
natural sciences. Validity and reliability are central 
criteria for legitimised information and knowledge. 
 
X 
 
X 
The river basin management planning process (defi-
nition of means and ends) is predominantly driven 
by expert information and knowledge from the 
economic sciences. Costs-benefits ratios and eco-
nomic efficiency are central criteria for legitimised 
information and knowledge. 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
The river basin management planning process (defi-
nition of means and ends) is driven by information 
and knowledge from multiple disciplines and both 
from experts and lays. Joint fact finding and social 
robustness are central criteria for legitimised infor-
mation and knowledge. 
  
Legend: The research observations come closest to ideal-type A and B rules as expressed by 
the ‘X’. 
 
7.3.7 Pay-off rules 
As defined in Section 2.2.9, pay-off rules point at the incentives and deterrents for 
action (Ostrom, 2005).  In interaction with other rule types pay-off rules affect the net 
benefits and costs that will be assigned to particular combinations of actions and out-
comes (ibid.). In the context of this research, three ideal-types of IRBM pay-off rules 
have been identified (see Table 7.10). 
 
Before and after adoption of the WFD a juxtaposition of ideal-type A and B IRBM 
pay-off rules dominates the regional water policy domain. Legal regulations which 
include water user license systems are supported by economic incentives, such as provin-
cial subsidies for the implementation of measures and financial contributions to inter-
est groups (for generic capacity building of critical counter voices). The polluter pays and 
the user pays principles have been translated into water tax systems for groundwater 
and surface water protection, waste water collection and treatment and drinking water 
production. Provinces formally may overrule contradictory practices of the regional 
water management authorities and municipalities, although within the Dutch institu-
tional context this is not common practice (Van Rijswick and Havekes, 2012; Inter-
views 45 and 46, Appendix I). One might argue whether negotiated agreements from 
the integrated areal processes in the North-Brabant Province point at ideal-type C 
pay-off rules. Based on the observations this research concludes that the integrated 
areal processes are mainly oriented at the objectives from provincial policies. Although 
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multiple stakeholders have direct access to areal committees, it is up to the General 
Assembly of the Province to finally approve the proposed programmes of measures. 
There are no strong indications for decentralised communitarian initiatives or local 
self-organisation in which public and non-governmental actors voluntarily invest 
resources in a search for collective arrangements.  
The regional WFD coordination process builds on these provincial traditions. 
The competent authorities orchestrate the planning and decision-making process. 
Non-governmental stakeholders are mainly invited as audience without being subsi-
dised for taking their seats. At the end of the play they applaud politely and take their 
opinions home. Some may feel relieved either because the governmental players did 
not live up to the initially high WFD ambitions, or since the consequences are milder 
than feared for. The majority is glad not to have become co-opted. At the end of the 
first WFD implementation planning cycle, a large part of measures from prior water 
policy is labelled as WFD proof contributions and as such perceived as more firmly 
anchored (indicating a shift from national intentions to European obligations). 
Despite requests from interests groups, no additional funds are raised for capacity 
building of stakeholders for active participation. Joint fact finding is a game for the 
governmental officials and water experts mainly. Although initially, provincial depu-
tees chair and attend the consultation platform meetings, their enthusiasm leaves by 
horse. Despite incidental attempts by some interests groups to join forces in order to 
trigger a joint search for trade-off opportunities (e.g. the initiative by the Limburg 
Environment Federation (Limburgse Milieu Federatie; LMF) and the Limburg Agricul-
ture and Horticulture Organisation (Limburgse Land- en Tuinbouw Organisatie; LLTO) to 
discuss feasible WFD measures in the agricultural sector at grass-roots level) collabo-
rative capital does not flourish at the WFD sessions. The competent authorities 
remain within their comfort zones of technical and economical assessments and 
information and consultation rituals. In their struggle with the technical WFD 
requirements, less energy remains for encouragement of active stakeholders’ involve-
ment.  
 
Table 7.10 Ideal-type collective-choice pay-off rules of IRBM (regional level) 
Ideal-type rules↓ 1990 to 2000↓ 2001 to 2009↓ 
A: Rewards and sanctions from laws and regulations 
are major drivers for compliance with collective 
rules (e.g. as expressed by standards and license 
conditions). 
 
X 
 
X 
B: Economic incentives and market forces are major 
drivers for compliance with collective rules.   
 
X 
 
X 
C: (Sub-) Basin communities voluntarily invest  
resources (human, financial, expertise) as collabora-
tive capital for compliance with collective-choice 
rules. 
  
Legend: The research observations come closest to ideal-type A and B rules as expressed by 
the ‘X’. 
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7.4 Regional rules in the context of policy discourses, actors and        
resources and power 
 
In the previous section observed  collective-choice IRBM rules types at the regional 
level have been presented both for the 1990 to 2000 period (before adoption of the 
WFD) and the 2001 to 2009 period (the first WFD implementation planning cycle). 
As argued in Chapter 2, rules development over time should be best studied in rela-
tion to (changes in) the other three dimensions of a policy arrangement: policy discourses, 
actors (coalitions and oppositions) and the distribution of resources and power. Observa-
tions from these three dimensions may deliver potential explanations for observed 
(changes in) rules types or the lack thereof. Since the WFD has elaborated the IRBM 
paradigm into a uniform set of rules and principles for all European water resources, 
one may expect rules changes to occur depending on the extent to which the new 
rules fit into the domestic rules, traditions and practices. In other words, how new are 
the (integrated) river basin management discourse and its related rules and principles? 
To which extent do these trigger changes in actor constellations and the distribution 
of resources and power? Given the new European policy discourse as a starting-point 
for this research this section begins with the policy discourse dimension of the policy 
arrangement approach.   
 
7.4.1 Policy discourses 
As explained in Subsection 2.3.2 regarding policy discourses, Wiering and Arts (2006) 
distinguish three layers: (1) world views or paradigms (which are most difficult to in-
fluence), (2) policy and governance principles (which are the actors’ utopias) and (3) 
operational rules and practices (e.g. daily water management routines which are rela-
tively easy to alter). In the 1990 to 2009 period at the regional level three paradigms 
become noticeable with regard to the water policy domain. First of all, the decentra-
lised unitary state pops up again, in which the provinces are the translators and inte-
grators of national sector policies into regional policies and regulations. Secondly, in 
order to implement these policies and regulations, an integrated areal management 
approach is advocated. Thirdly, more specific for the water policy domain, the provin-
cial authorities embrace the integrated water systems management approach. Table 
7.11 summarises the observed governance and policy principles in the Dutch regional 
water policy domain in the 1990 to 2009 period. Although governance principles are 
interpreted here as mainly organisational in nature and policy principles as substantive, 
certain redundancy may occur. Furthermore, some principles may relate to multiple 
rules types. To a considerable extent these principles resemble the ones at the national 
level.  
At the regional level the public actors struggle with the democratic legitimacy of 
the activities in the Regional Meuse Political Platform and the roles and positions of 
the individual authorities in the regional coordination of diverse local WFD imple-
mentation planning processes. Specific discussions concern the tasks and competences 
of the Meuse WFD Project Bureau and its independent director. A special Installation 
Decision (Instellingbesluit) has been signed which has provided the project director a 
central position in bridging local practices and national instructions (RBOM, 2005a).  
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Table 7.11: Policy discourses and rules (Dutch regional level; 1990 to 2009 period) 
Type of rule↓ Policy discourses↓ 
Scope:  Governance principles: Informal river basin management planning coor-
dination; Strategic multilateral and bilateral coordination by national 
authorities and bilateral implementation by provinces and inland water 
management authorities; Parallel regional WM21, WFD and Natura 
20000 implementation processes; Integration of measures in the local 
WFD processes. 
Policy principles: Integrated management of water quality and quantity 
issues; Taking into account relations between surface water and ground-
water bodies; Water as a guiding principle in spatial planning. 
Position: Governance principles: Preconditioned protection of historical land 
property and user rights; Land acquisition based on voluntary agree-
ments; Blue-green services contracts with farmers. Policy principles: 
Zoning of user functions and nature protection sites. 
Boundary 
(entry or exit):  
Governance principles: Conditioned access for non-governmental actors 
(with emphasis on information and consultation); Informal consultation 
in addition to, prior to formal consultation; Drinking water companies 
are considered as private actors. 
Choice 
(authority): 
Governance principles: Generic rules over individual licenses; People, 
Planet and Profit; Generic national policies required for diffuse emission 
sources of pollution. Policy principles: Zoning of user functions; Staged 
reallocation of groundwater abstractions (for drinking water production); 
Setting limits to abstractions from/discharges to groundwater & surface 
water bodies combined with water saving pilot projects; Combined 
emission-immission approach; Hierarchy of water uses in case of 
droughts; Prevention of irreversible hydro-morphological altera-
tions/prevention of significant damage; No deterioration (water bodies). 
Aggregation: Governance principles: Mixed local implementation planning and re-
gional coordination; National authorities should provide for generic 
diffuse emission sources policies; The national Water Policy Department 
should take care of inter-ministerial integration of water policies objec-
tives; Competent public actors decide, non-governmental actors are to 
be informed and consulted (to gain support for the river basin manage-
ment plans); Synchronisation of water policies and management plans 
(due to the WFD). Policy principles: A level playing field for socio-
economic sectors across Europe; A strict divide between European 
obligations and regional/local intentions. 
Information: Governance principles: Joint fact finding by public actors; Regional 
water management authorities should integrate all the WFD (and WM21) 
measures at the local level (including groundwater and water-related 
Natura 2000 issues). Policy principles: Scientific knowledge reduces 
uncertainties; Costs should not outweigh the benefits. 
Pay-off: Governance principles: Generic rules over individual licenses; Strict 
implementation of European obligations by a staged approach; Joint 
implementation by co-financing of measures. Policy principles: Polluters 
and users pay; Cost-effectiveness; Feasible and affordable objectives and 
measures; Synergy and innovation; A level playing field for socio-
economic sectors across Europe. 
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Tensions have been noticeable between the WFD coordinators of the regional water 
management authorities and the project director (and his staff), since the former con-
sidered their own politicians as primary clients, whereas the director stressed their 
reporting obligations to him (as mentioned in the Installation Decision).  
The national WFD deadlines are perceived as tight and time spans for organising 
consultation of the elected parliaments/councils and the governing boards of the par-
ticipating administrations often are limited. Another issue that bothers the politicians 
is the regional and local room for manoeuvre within the context of national WFD 
implementation instructions and guidelines. The regional actors share the national 
dilemma of how to comply with the WFD obligations without formally altering organ-
isational structures and without losing too much room for socio-economic develop-
ment. Although the regional actors embrace the national feasibility and affordability man-
tra, controversies persist around the balance between national, generic measures and 
additional, regional and local investments. The provincial authorities (especially from 
Limburg) periodically stress the necessity of additional, generic policies to combat 
diffuse emission sources of pollution. The decentralised unitary state tradition appar-
ently has made a full harmonisation process somehow troublesome, for example with 
regard to technical starting-points for coherent reporting purposes. The regional water 
management authorities seized the WFD momentum for image building by perform-
ing as local WFD process coordinators. However, they failed (the one more than the 
other) in organising adequate integration of parallel running water assignments, as 
asked for by the provinces. Relatively much time has been spent on selection of types 
of measures to be labelled as part of the WFD assignment or not.   
Representatives of industry and agriculture often share arguments and positions 
and repeatedly ask for feasible and affordable objectives and measures. On the 
opposite side they often found the nature and environment NGOs and managers of 
specific nature conservation sites, who periodically express disappointment with the 
gradually eroding ambitions. Sector position papers dominate the process over cross-
sector coalition building. At the meetings of the Regional Meuse WFD Consultation 
Platform, representatives of industry and agriculture often group on the one side, 
whereas environmental NGOs and nature site managers gather on the other side. Also 
drinking water companies often sit next to each other and express shared argumenta-
tion lines.  
Overall, the WFD implementation planning discourse has not triggered dramatic 
changes in neither prior organisational structures nor planning and decision making 
traditions at the regional level. In this respect the first planning cycle delivers to the 
domestic starting-point not to alter Thorbecke’s House. The WFD’s paradigms, gover-
nance and policy principles have supported the Dutch integration and river basin 
management tendencies as of the 1990s. As a major gain, due to the regional river 
basin coordination process, cooperation efforts between regional water management 
authorities, between provinces and between provinces and regional water management 
authorities have been enforced. Furthermore, inclusion of municipalities has triggered 
local political attention to urban water management issues (see Chapter 8 for a further 
elaboration of the active involvement of municipalities).  
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7.4.2 Actors 
During the entire WFD implementation planning process tensions between the 
regional and the national partners are noticeable (scope and aggregation rules). The 
national Water Policy Department struggles with inter-ministerial coordination and 
the mismatch of regional wishes and national political ambitions. Some regional part-
ners do not take for granted political reasons for restricted ambitions with additional 
generic national policies on diffuse water pollution sources. The tensions may be part 
of traditional rituals in the Dutch decentralised unitary system by which the authorities 
continuously search for compromises. Despite these tensions, both the regional and 
national partners positively value the new WFD regional coordination structures for 
coalition building amnong public actors and do wish to continue with them in the 
second WFD implementation planning cycle as of 2010. The regional WFD imple-
mentation planning structures trigger extensive contacts and information exchange 
among officials and politicians of national, regional and local governmental admini-
strations and regional water management authorities. Other areal processes, such as 
WM21, Natura 2000 and rural areas reconstruction continue in parallel and cross-
actor network linkages are limited.  
Regarding position rules, provincial authorities and farmers interests’ organisations 
find each other in the cautiousness not to trigger dramatic, additional spatial claims for 
WFD-related objectives and measures. Given the consequences of the rural areas 
reconstruction process on the position of land owners additional WFD claims are not 
broadly supported by the agricultural sector. The North-Brabant Province prudently 
opens the discussion on land expropriation as ultimate instrument for cases where one 
single land owner may hinder compliance with nature protection policies. However, 
the emphasis remains on voluntary land acquisition and environmental management 
contracts with farmers (for so-called blue-green services). Environmental NGOs and 
some officials at regional water management authorities view obligatory land acquisi-
tion as necessary to (fully) comply with the WFD requirements. Concerning supply 
and demand management (choice rules) provincial authorities and drinking water com-
panies agree on conditioned and staged reallocation of deep groundwater abstractions 
in order to combat desiccation of nature sites. As best practice for protection of 
groundwater extraction areas (for drinking water production), the Clean Water Ap-
proach has been advocated as cost-effective WFD measure. This approach includes a 
broad coalition of the North-Brabant Province, six municipalities, Brabant Water (i.e. a 
drinking water company), ZLTO (i.e. one major farmer interests’ organisation) and a 
number of individual farmers (named as the Duinboeren) who jointly take preventive 
and protective measures. 
With regard to boundary and aggregation rules, there is a remarkable sharp distinc-
tion between public actors (who have access to the river basin management platform) 
and other stakeholders (who may attend information and consultations meetings). 
Provincial authorities, regional water management authorities and some municipalities 
join forces in the informal WFD river basin coordination structures. Finally, it is up to 
these public actors to decide on objectives, measures and disproportionality. Municipal 
actors struggle with representation on behalf of the 114 municipalities within the 
Meuse River Basin. Although regional divisions of the State Waters Management 
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Agency (Rijkswaterstaat) participate at the regional coordination structures, they mainly 
concentrate on their internal and national harmonisation processes. Since also the 
regional water management authorities have their main focus on the local areal 
processes, limited time is left on discussing no-shift principle issues regarding these 
regional and state managed water bodies. Intensive coordination takes place in the 
WFD implementation planning process between the Limburg Province, the regional 
water management authorities and municipalities. In the North-Brabant Province, 
initially, this coordination is less intensive and harmonious. For example, late in the 
first WFD implementation planning cycle (in 2008) laborious discussions arise on 
ground water management issues among municipal and provincial actors and the re-
gional water management authorities.  
The chosen WFD process coordination approach in the Meuse River Basin (with 
emphasis on information and consultation of non-governmental stakeholders) has 
triggered polarised debates (pay-off rules). Traditional differences of opinion between 
both environmental NGOs and socio-economic interest groups remain dominant, 
despite incidental cross-sector initiatives. Although the conclusions from the afore-
mentioned joint project by the LMF and the LLTO on identification of feasible and 
affordable measures sounded promising (since both grass-roots supporters arrived at 
common agreement on preferable WFD measures), these did not trigger subsequent 
initiatives within the North-Brabant Province and at the level of the entire Dutch 
territory of the Meuse River Basin. Position papers from sector organisations (agricul-
ture, nature, industry and drinking water) kept dominating the scene, while the public 
actors concentrated on their mixed technical-scientific and socio-economic informa-
tion gathering and interpretation process (information rules). Within the North-Brabant 
Province, distrust between the environmental NGOs and the farmers’ interest organi-
sations, as developed within the rural areas revitalisation process, may have contrib-
uted to a limited coalition-building attitude in the WFD process.  
 
7.4.3 Resources and power 
Around 2005 the North-Brabant Province views itself as natural director of the 
regional WFD process but mentions that ‘the water management authorities refuse to 
accept to be directed’ (Bos and De Smit, 2005b: page 7 in appendix 4; aggregation rules). 
The province stresses the opportunity for the regional water management authorities 
to act as leaders of the local WFD processes given they are the primary technical water 
experts. The Province emphasises the shared assignment of the state and regional 
water management authorities and provinces and advises the water authorities to join 
forces with the province (in order to negotiate with the state and municipalities). 
Remarkably, in a 2005 interview a representative of the Inter-Provincial Platform 
(IPO), argues that ‘although provinces mention that they want to direct the regional 
processes they walk away from the consequences in terms of human and financial 
resources’ (Bos and De Smit: page 4 in appendix 4).  These citations must be inter-
preted in the context of the starting-up stage of the regional WFD coordination 
process in the Meuse River Basin at which the regional water management authorities 
were not very active with the WFD assignment. At the stage of the local, areal WFD 
processes in 2007 and 2008 the reverse occurs when the regional water management  
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authorities criticise the North-Brabant Province for a lack of human resources. The 
then provincial authority concentrates its human resources at the parallel rural areas 
revitalisation and the local Natura 2000 processes (scope rules). In the Limburg Province 
the WFD coordination process with the regional water management authorities runs 
more smoothly. 
With regard to position rules in both provinces historic land property rights are 
respected as much as possible (Interviews 30 and 41, Appendix I). Emphasis is on 
land acquisition on a voluntary basis with expropriation as the final resort for a limited 
number of cases. Europe’s water policy obligations trigger the explicit demarcation of 
spatial claims hence point the finger at classic tensions between environmentalists and 
farmers, as triggered by limited progress with voluntary land acquisition. The largest 
farmers’ interest organisation (ZLTO) shows a cooperative attitude but, for obvious 
reasons, prefers voluntary environmental contracts with farmers over land acquisition. 
Smaller cattle breeding interests groups frequently raise voices at the Regional Meuse 
WFD Consultation Platform meetings, opposing or at least challenging common con-
clusions by quoting controversial websites and citations (which were denied by cited 
researchers and experts when confronted with these quotes by the author). These 
representatives do not receive much support from other platform members, provoke 
controversies with the WFD Meuse Project Bureau and mostly take an isolated stance. 
As stimulated by the national water ambassadors’ arrangement, the WFD process 
triggers a significant mobilisation of municipal actors. Municipalities that house one 
ambassador are more active than many others without (boundary rules). National au-
thorities have granted €25 millions for WFD synergy projects in the Meuse basin 
which include cooperation efforts of regional water management authorities and mu-
nicipalities and WFD and WM21 integration measures (scope rules). Laborious discus-
sions have been provoked by the Hollandse Delta Water Management Authority since 
it asked a larger part of the synergy cake as compared to its financial share to the pro-
ject bureau working costs. This discussion caused irritation among the officials at 
other regional water management authorities whereas their politicians decided to 
maintain peace and approved the additional claim (at the expense of lower shares; pay-
off rules). 
Regarding water supply and demand (choice rules) the international drinking water 
interests umbrella organisation (RIWA Maas) acts as a persistent ambassador. Often 
its representatives are supported by individual drinking water companies both from 
the Limburg and North-Brabant Provinces. Due to dissatisfaction on the way that 
drinking water issues are dealt with in the regional and local WFD processes, the 
drinking water sector in the Meuse River Basin organises its own workshops and lob-
bying activities. The conclusions and recommendations are offered to involved au-
thorities. By repetition the drinking water companies ask for more attention to inter-
actions between groundwater and surface water bodies and offer expertise and text 
proposals to the water management authorities (scope rules).  
As described in the previous Chapter, the Dutch WFD “funnel model”, mainly 
due to political pressure by the Lower House of Parliament and lobbying by interests 
groups leads to a gradual, political favourable reduction of implementation cost esti-
mations (information rules). Not surprisingly, since national figures are based on regional 
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inventories, also cost figures for proposed WFD measures in the Meuse region gradu-
ally decrease. Table 7.12 presents the regional figures on costs and benefits in the 
subsequent Meuse memoranda. Due to the estimated investments on the entire water 
assignment in the 2007 to 2027 period, annual costs for all authorities together will 
increase to about €142 million (which means an average 0.9% annual increase of water 
management related expenses). This average is lower than the historical 2000 to 2006 
trend, although differences may occur between subbasins in the Meuse region.  
 
Table 7.12: Estimated costs and benefits for WFD measures in the Meuse region  
 2005 Meuse 
Memorandum 
2006 Meuse Memoran-
dum 
2009 Meuse 
Memorandum (4.0 
edition) 
WFD costs 
(€): 
863 millions (2005 
to 2009) by regional 
water management 
authorities only. 
Range from 93 to 654 
millions a year (mainly by 
regional water manage-
ment authorities between 
2002 and 2015). 
Range from 0 to 360 
millions a year for  
national, generic measures 
(incomplete package; 2002 
to 2015). 
Range from 1 to 100 
millions a year (Rijkswater-
staat) (2007 to 2015). 
1.3 billions for the 
2007 to 2027 period; 
including measures 
of regional water 
management 
authorities and 
municipalities *). 
WM21 costs 
(€): 
Not identified. Not identified. 0.3 billions (2007 to 
2027; measures of 
regioal water 
 management au-
thorities and  
municipalities). 
Total costs 
(€): 
Not identified. Not identified. 2.5 billions (2007 to 
2027)**) 
Benefits (€): Not identified. 24 to 119 millions a year 
for households; -0.3 to -
9.5 for agriculture; other 
functions/uses: qualitative 
estimations. 
Only qualitatively 
since quantification 
is not considered 
feasible (lack of 
reliable methods). 
*) €0.9 billions of measures for quality amelioration of regional water bodies are included in the 
draft Meuse River Basin management plan; €0.4 billions of regional measures are excluded due 
to uncertainties of financial resources and/or technical feasibility. €0.5 billions (out of 0.9) will 
be invested before the end of 2015; the remaining €0.4 billions will be invested before the end 
of 2027. **) April 2008 (3.1 edition), total investment costs were estimated to be €3.4 billions, 
so a further reduction has taken place since then. There are differences in the figures on WM21 
measures. Not all regional water management authorities have included the entire WM21 as-
signment. Also costs for the (water-related) Natura 2000 assignments are incomplete. €0.9 
billions relate to measures from Rijkswaterstaat; groundwater measures by provinces account for 
€30 millions; remaining €1.6 billions are for measures by regional water management authori-
ties and municipalities (including €0.4 billions additional to current  policies due to the WFD). 
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In their final memorandum, the regional authorities conclude that a sufficient reliable 
translation of expected annual investment costs to their distribution among different 
target groups like households and industries has not been possible (RBOM, 2009; 
information and pay-off rules). For both insiders and outsiders the different economic 
figures were difficult to compare. Causes are the differences in applied unities and cost 
figures for measure types, implicit notions on cost-effectiveness and political choices, 
the very technically written financial memoranda and the aggregation differences be-
tween regional and national economic analyses (see also Subsection 6.4.3).  
 
 
7.5 Synthesis: regional coordination, ugly duckling or showpiece? 
 
In this final section observed collective-choice rules at the Dutch regional level are 
linked to observations from the other three policy arrangement dimensions: policy 
discourses (Subsection 7.4.1), actors (coalitions and oppositions; Subsection 7.4.2) and 
distribution of resources and power (Subsection 7.4.3). Potential explanations for con-
tinuation of or changes in observed rules-types are derived from observations on 
these three dimensions and from literature. Table 7.13 brings together the observa-
tions from the analyses of all four dimensions. The grey-coloured cells indicate 
remarkable evolutions. 
Regarding organisational scope rules the Netherlands show a strong tradition of a de-
centralised unitary state in which provinces coordinate the translation of national wa-
ter policy within the context of specific regional conditions and in which functional 
water management authorities maintain a central position in implementation. The 
IRBM discourse from the 1990s has been firmly incorporated within the WFD and 
supports a further merging of the water management authorities into bigger organisa-
tions. The WFD also triggers the initiation of river basin management planning struc-
tures at the regional level, which are functional and informal in nature and should be 
understood as additional to generic, parliamentary institutions. These new platforms 
fit well in the Dutch tradition of informal deliberations and consultations prior to 
formal consultation and decision-making procedures.  
During the 1990 to 2009 period an internal integration evolution becomes no-
ticeable which may be explained from a combination of the Dutch water systems ap-
proach, the WFD’s integrated river basin management discourse and the new public 
management discourse (substantive scope rules). The WFD triggers more explicit atten-
tion to groundwater issues and (quantitative) interactions between groundwater and 
respectively surface water bodies and terrestrial ecosystems. Although both quality and 
quantity issues are increasingly incorporated into water legislation, policy documents 
and management plans, they are elaborated for individual groundwater and surface 
water bodies mainly. Furthermore, surface water quantity thresholds implicitly relate 
to water user functions and basic ecological requirements. Fully integrated objectives 
and measures for related surface and groundwater bodies are a bridge too far. Their 
formulation is hindered by a combination of knowledge gaps and tensions between 
land user sectors, most notably nature site managers and farmers, which hinder fast 
progress with quantifying desirable ground- and surface water tables.  
THE REGIONAL MEUSE BRIDGE 343 
 
 
 
Table 7.13: Observed collective-choice rules and potential explanations (regional level) 
Rules-types in the 1990 - 2009 period ↓ Potential explanations ↓ 
Scope (organisational): Water policy is implemented by 
functional water management agencies and actors 
networks. These agencies are controlled by 
parliamentary institutions (ideal-type B). 
Stable, public actor/expert-driven 
water policy domain; Integrated 
River Basin Management 
paradigm 
Scope (internal integration): Enforcement of the evolu-
tion towards more integrated legislation, policy docu-
ments and management plans (from ideal-type A  
towards B). 
Integrated River Basin Manage-
ment paradigm; New Public Man-
agement paradigm; Tensions 
between land user sectors 
Scope (external integration): Policy documents and 
management plans from other policy domains take 
into account water issues and reversely (ideal-type B). 
Speciality Principle;  
Leapfrog Principle 
Position: Conditional maintenance and acquirement of 
water and land resources use and property rights. 
Conditions include requirements to consider social, 
economic and/or environmental externalities (ideal-
type B). 
Political influence of farmers’ 
interest organisations; Tradition 
of voluntary agreements; Multiple 
interpretations of sustainable 
development  
Boundary: Non-governmental actors may have access 
to the river basin management planning process under 
conditions set by the public actors. Emphasis on 
co-thinking and consultation (ideal-type B). 
Stable public actor/expert-driven 
water policy domain; Provinces 
are eager to proof their reason of 
existence 
Choice (supply and demand management): In general a 
mixed supply and demand management approach. In 
case of prolonged droughts, the approach is more 
integrated in nature as expressed by a hierarchy in user 
functions (juxtaposition of ideal-types B and C). 
Integrated River Basin Manage-
ment paradigm; Advocacy by 
environmental NGOs 
Choice (nature of the license system): An evolution 
towards licenses that integrate quantity and quality 
objectives related to development, management and 
use of water resources (from ideal-type A towards B). 
Integrated River Basin Manage-
ment paradigm; New Public  
Management paradigm; Stable 
public actor/expert-driven water 
policy domain 
Aggregation: Both asymmetric, top-down decision-
making and symmetric, consensus based decision-
making examples on water policy and management 
plans at interrelated administrative levels (mix of ideal-
types B/C). 
A decentralised unitary state; 
Subsidiarity; Integrated River 
Basin Management paradigm; 
Tradition of informal consensus 
building 
Information: The river basin management planning 
process is driven by a mixture of a scientific-technical 
and social-economic rationale. Validity, reliability, cost-
benefit ratios and economic efficiency are central crite-
ria for legitimised information/knowledge (juxtaposi-
tion of ideal-types A and B). 
Stable, public actor/expert-driven 
water policy domain; 
Neo-liberalism 
Pay-off: Both rewards and sanctions from laws and 
regulations and economic incentives and market forces 
are major drivers for compliance with collective-choice 
rules (juxtaposition of ideal-types A and B). 
Stable, public actor/expert-driven 
water policy domain; Neo-
liberalism; Polluter pays, afforda-
bility, cost-effectiveness  
The grey-coloured cells indicate remarkable evolutions. 
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The WFD implementation planning process does not trigger changes in prior cross-
sector integration rules. The leapfrog principle remains dominant at the provincial 
level. Plans of other policy domains have to take into account water-related objectives 
and reversely. A stable configuration of power and resources with the specification 
principle as one fundament may account for the lack of rules changes. Besides, the 
WFD text itself does not include either strong legally binding cross-sector 
arrangements or strong informal triggers. 
The WFD does not trigger a dramatic reallocation of land user and property 
rights and water resources user rights at the regional river basin level. Prior Dutch 
rules for maintenance and acquirement of property and user rights persist without 
significant alterations. The strong political influence of farmers’ interest organisations; 
multiple interpretations of sustainable human development and activities and the pref-
erence of provincial authorities for voluntary agreements over land expropriation may 
account for protection of the status quo. Persistent Dutch water policy planning tradi-
tions with a strong position of both experts and public actors and including informal 
information and consultation of non-governmental actors may explain for the ob-
served stability of boundary and aggregation rules at the regional level. In the regional 
WFD coordination process, a new platform has been initiated for informal informa-
tion and consultation of non-state actors (including drinking water companies). The 
juxtaposition of asymmetric, top-down and symmetric, consensus based decision-
making on water-related issues is reconfirmed by the chosen WFD implementation 
planning approach, with a mixture of top-down and bottom-up rules. 
A juxtaposition of parallel and more integrated supply and demand management 
rules is noticeable in the Dutch regional water policy landscape (choice rules). Argu-
ments of economic efficiency, social equity and ecosystem protection all implicitly 
influence water distribution decisions without transparent interconnections. Protec-
tion of natural values has been included among the hierarchy of water demanding 
functions in case of prolonged droughts. The WFD does not affect these choice rules 
directly, but due to its attention to interactions between surface water and ground-
water bodies and to both quality and quantity issues, the Directive includes the poten-
tial for future changes. Albeit not caused by the WFD directly, the license systems on 
water-related activities have evolved into a more integrated nature in the 1990 to 2009 
period. This change of choice rules may be explained by the continued IRBM and new 
public management discourses. Further integration into the environmental licences 
system did not take place, partly due to opposition of the regional water management 
authorities (see also Section 6.5).  
Concerning information rules, generally the predominant technical and socio-
economic figures as collected and aggregated in water policy documents and manage-
ment plans is acknowledged by the directly involved public actors. Due to extensive 
information and consultation procedures, a majority of non-governmental stakeholder 
groups generally also accepts expert facts and figures. Significant differences of opin-
ions mostly concern the related political ambitions (too low or too high) and conclu-
sions on objectives, measures and socio-economic consequences. The informal and 
formal information and consultation procedures for the WFD river basin manage-
ment plans and related water policy and management documents at the regional level 
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have shown that the WFD has not triggered a process of joint fact finding and joint 
river basin management planning by public and non-governmental stakeholders.  
The analysis of this research shows a stable mixture of a technical-scientific and a 
socio-economic rationale. Technical measures, cost-efficacy analyses and feasibility 
and affordability argumentation lines have dominated the first WFD implementation 
planning cycle at the regional level. The WFD implementation planning approach 
builds on the tradition of expert-driven water policy making in which information 
collection and aggregation and decision-making is dominated by public actors. Pay-off 
rules in the water policy domain are dominated by a mixture of economic incentives 
and market forces, formal rewards and sanctions and negotiated informal agreements. 
The boundary, aggregation and information rules (and underlying explanations from histori-
cal, stable resources and power configurations) may account for a limited joint search 
of public, private and civil stakeholders for collaborative capital. 
 
In synthesis: the observations from the regional level resemble these for the national 
level. Within the Dutch water policy domain, a context of stable actor and power con-
figurations, as developed in the past, and the IRBM and new public management dis-
courses may explain for limited change of (ideal-type) collective-choice IRBM rules. 
The WFD has not triggered significant rules changes but has been implemented in a 
way that both confirms and supports water policy planning traditions and prior initi-
ated tendencies of integration and river basin management. Finally, also the analysis of 
the Dutch regional level shows that potential explanations for observed (lack of) rules 
change are not easily drawn from assessments of individual dimensions of a policy 
arrangement alone. Observations from actors, the division of resources and power 
and policy discourses all deliver parts of the entire explanation. This observation sup-
ports the argument from the developers of both the Policy Arrangement Approach 
(PAA) and the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework to respec-
tively consider the four dimensions and rule types as configurations. In the next chap-
ter, it will become clear whether this conclusion also holds at the Dutch local level. 
This chapter started with the question whether the regional WFD coordination 
structure (for the Dutch part of the International Meuse River Basin District) has to 
be considered as an ugly duckling that cries a lot and mainly triggers controversies or a 
showpiece of subsidiarity. The answer lies somewhere in the middle. On the one hand 
the regional politicians periodically weened like Calimero who felt disadvantaged by 
the angry outside world full of national interests. On the other hand the regional ac-
tors changed colours into David, who conquered Goliath with unbeatable regional 
proposals (which the national authorities have applied in other regions). The new 
informal river basin management network has increased coordination efforts among 
regional and local public actors but the process remained locked up in the water policy 
domain. Active involvement of non-governmental actors has been limited in the pre-
dominant technocratic implementation planning process. The regional public actors 
also struggled with an adequate harmonisation of local processes as guided by the 
regional water management authorities. Chapter 8 will continue with an analysis of 
rules changes in the Dutch water policy domain at the local level, the Brabant-West 
Region which is the territory of the Brabantse Delta Water Management Authority. 
  
 
 
  
 
- 8 - 
Parallel local processes and voluntary agreements 
in Brabant-West 
 
‘A major dilemma in local cooperation processes is to transcend core competences and cost-efficiency 
arguments of individual organisations for the benefit of collective sustainable solutions. In a prolonged 
period of a global financial crisis this is an arduous but inspiring challenge.’ Quote from an inter-
view with Joseph Vos, Chair of the Daily Board and General Assembly of the Bra-
bantse Delta Water Management Authority (July 14, 2009). 
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
As presented in the previous chapter, the provincial authorities in the Dutch territory 
of the International Meuse River Basin District have tried to match national desires 
and local ambitions in the regional WFD implementation planning coordination 
process. The WFD has offered these provinces a new platform for enforcement of 
informal contacts with both national and local public actors. However, due to stable 
actor constellations and power configurations in the water policy domain as developed 
over time, the WFD has not triggered dramatic changes in collective-choice rules at 
the regional level. Although the Directive’s integration discourse has supported the 
observed incremental changes in part of the regional scope and choice rules (see Table 
7.13 in Section 7.5), it did not trigger them. The internal integration evolution in the 
Netherlands has its roots in the mid 1980s when the integrated water systems ap-
proach has been introduced. 
Given recurrent parliamentarian debates on a potential simplification of Dutch 
institutions which include doubts on the added value of provinces and regional water 
management authorities, both authorities could gain a lot from a proactive role in the 
WFD’s implementation planning process. Whereas the provinces chaired the regional 
coordination process, the regional water management authorities seized the WFD 
momentum for underlining their reason of existence. They explicitly wished to take 
the lead in local WFD implementation planning processes. The previous chapter has 
shown mixed feelings about the connective capacities of the provincial authorities. 
This chapter turns the spotlights on the local WFD process in relation to other local, 
areal water-related processes within Brabant-West, i.e. the territory of the Brabantse 
Delta Water Management Authority (Waterschap Brabantse Delta). It will explore to 
which extent the national desire for the bottom-up development of tailor-made, inte-
grative, synergetic and innovative water management solutions has been satisfied at 
the local level. This chapter also includes observations on the impact of the WFD on 
bilateral cross-border cooperation efforts by the water management authority and 
actors in the Flemish Region of Belgium.  
Section 8.2 starts with a brief historical overview of the water policy domain at 
the local level in the Dutch part of the International Meuse River Basin District before 
and after adoption of the WFD. Subsection 8.2.1 describes the headlines of the water 
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policy domain in the Brabant-West area in the 1990 to December 2000 period, as the 
historical context in which the local WFD implementation planning process has been 
started. This subsection sketches the historical path from water quantity via water 
quality towards all-in water management. Subsequently, in chronological order, four 
WFD implementation planning stages at the Dutch local level are distinguished and 
described in Subsection 8.2.2. The impact of the WFD on transboundary Flemish-
Dutch coordination structures is presented in Subsection 8.2.3. 
Section 8.3 explores the extent of changes in the identified ideal-type collective-
choice rule-types regarding IRBM (as defined in Chapter 2). The observed rule-types 
are compared for the period in which the WFD has been drafted, negotiated and 
adopted (1990 to December 2000) and the period in which the first WFD implemen-
tation planning cycle took place (from 2001 to December 2009). These rules are one 
among the four dimensions of the Policy Arrangement Approach (PAA; Arts, Van 
Tatenhove and Leroy, 2000; Leroy and Arts, 2006). The four dimensions are to be 
understood as a configuration hence rules should be best studied in interaction with 
developments in the other three dimensions. Therefore as a next step, Section 8.4 
provides an assessment of respectively policy discourses, actors (coalitions and opposi-
tions) and the division of resources and power, all three in relation to the rules dimension. 
Finally, Section 8.5 closes this chapter with a synthesis, which summarises the poten-
tial explanations for continuities and changes in observed collective-choice rules, as 
derived from the developments in and interaction with the other three dimensions 
(and related theoretical concepts as introduced in Section 2.3).  
 
 
8.2 The WFD and local policy implementation planning 
 
8.2.1 Local life before the WFD (1990 to 2000) 
 
A road from water quantity…  
Before plunging into the 1990s the historical context of water management in the 
Brabant-West area is sketched briefly. Brabant-West is situated in the transition zone 
of the Meuse and Scheldt River Basins (the so-called South-Western Delta). It in-
cludes higher sandy parts in the south (at the border with the Flemish Region of Bel-
gium) and lower clay dominated parts in the north (read Subsection 3.3.2 for a geo-
graphical introduction). In the Middle Ages large parts of the region have been cov-
ered with peat layers (both under dominant influence of salt or fresh water; Leenders, 
1989). Flemish entrepreneurs started exploitation of the peat layers in the 13th Cen-
tury, which ran for several ages until profitable reclamation was not possible any 
longer (ibid.). The large-scale peat reclamation and subsequent salt mining have in-
vited land subsidence and inland movement of the North Sea (Van den Noort, 2009). 
Consequently, in the 15th Century the lower parts were under permanent tidal influ-
ence and the built-up area of the Zevenbergen Town turned into an island surrounded 
by the sea (ibid.).  
Since 1877 national storm water reports have been drafted. These reports show 
that the North-Brabant Province has suffered from almost every flood event since  
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then (Van de Ven, 2001). For example, in 1953 about 45,000 hectares of land have 
been inundated, more than half of which concerned the lower clay areas in Brabant-
West (ibid.). Dykes construction works became necessary to reclaim and protect the 
fertile clay soils and built-up areas which offered opportunities for agriculture (Van 
den Noort, 2009). In turn, agricultural development required drainage and discharge 
works, inviting controversies among adjacent areas, administrations and user functions 
(such as navigation, agriculture and urban life). Together with investments for agricul-
ture and navigation, coordinated water quantity management developed (ibid.).  
Several plans for drainage and navigation channels have been drawn for the 
Brabant-West area (Van den Noort, 2009). Mostly for disproportionate cost reasons the 
majority of these plans did not leave the drawing tables. For example, due to sedimen-
tation problems the Breda City periodically had to concentrate on maintenance works 
for the Mark and Dintel Rivers, instead of dreaming about a water connection with 
Holland in the north (ibid.). Although bends in the river had been cut of in order to 
increase stream velocity and to limit sedimentation, the measure evoked additional 
measures given the sedimentation issue repeated itself more downstream (Van Bree, 
1969). By the land reclamation activities the mouths of the inland rivers moved west-
wards and the accessibility of more inland, eastward harbours (like at Breda) decreased 
(Van den Noort, 2009). The limited discharge capacity of the upstream parts of the 
Mark and Aa of Weerijs Rivers also contributed to the sedimentation problems in the 
midstream and downstream parts (Van Bree, 1969).  
Water quantity management requirements for navigation and agriculture differed 
(Van den Noort, 2009). For a natural drainage of water from the polders water levels 
in the rivers should be as low as possible. Due to sedimentation, the river beds rose 
until even water levels during the lowest tides became too high. On the contrary, for 
navigation higher water levels are preferable. Persistent sedimentation triggered the 
need for artificial drainage in the lower clay polders by means of pumps, for example 
driven by windmills. Finally a more sustainable solution was chosen by building navi-
gation and discharge locks in the mouths of the Vliet and Dintel Rivers (respectively 
in 1823 and 1828). By means of the locks a stable water level could be maintained 
which was (more or less) acceptable for both navigation and agriculture in the lower 
parts of the Brabant-West area. The locks did not help to solve the accessibility prob-
lems of the higher inland parts and in periods of high river discharges, the locks had a 
negative impact on the discharge capacity as well. Additionally, due to sand banks in 
the upstream river parts, local water inundations also occurred in built-up areas north 
to Breda.  
The Mark Canal (1815) in the eastern part brought a solution for navigation from 
and to the Breda harbour. Besides, it offered an alternative route for supply and dis-
charge of fresh water to and from Brabant-West, respectively in periods of droughts 
and high river discharges or for dilution of pollution. In the 1950s the Mark River has 
been broadened and deepened substantially in order to discharge more water when 
necessary (Witter, Van Stokkom and Hendriksen, 2006; Van den Noort, 2009). Addi-
tionally, three storage basins have been created downstream Breda. Finally, the Mark-
Vliet Canal (1983) brought some relieve for water quantity management in the areas 
around the Roosendaal and Steenbergen Cities (ibid.). 
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Figure 8.1: The Mark River before the significant hydraulic reconstruction works of the 
1950s (Source: archive of the Brabantse Delta Water Management Authority) 
 
via water quality… 
From the start of the 20th Century water pollution issues have been discussed inciden-
tally. Since the 1940s they became subject of more serious political debates. Pollution 
of water systems had been forbidden by provincial rule since 1943 but the intrinsic 
escape options were used frequently (Van den Noort, 2009). Before the 1953 flood 
disaster one management option dominated the scene: transportation of polluted wa-
ter elsewhere (prefereably downstream) for dilution and making use of biological deg-
radation processes within the water systems (ibid.). Van den Noort (2009: 119) 
sketches the then mentality and perceived dilemma of socio-economic development in 
a touching way (translation from Dutch added): 
 
As long as the water quality suffices, poets get inspired. But, whenever the quality 
deteriorates rapidly, complainers will grow in numbers and municipal politicians will get 
trapped in a split. Every municipality that dignifies itself will opt for a part of the profit 
cake that has been baked by industrialisation. With the inextricably related water pollu-
tion, many local politicians do not know how to deal with it, particularly when problems 
are caused by their own activities. 
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In the 1960s and 1970s cost-effective options for dealing with municipal and industrial 
waste water were studied. Transportation of waste water to the Western-Scheldt is 
among the central solutions chosen. Gradually more attention has been paid to waste 
water treatment infrastructure in combination with transportation elsewhere. A fear 
for financial claims and juridical procedures triggered waste water treatment initiatives 
by some municipalities (Van den Noort, 2009). Controversies between water quality 
management authorities and municipalities about investment costs and protection of 
industrial interests hindered fast decisions on waste water treatment infrastructure. 
For example, water quality management often was tuned to the wishes and interests of 
sugar beet factories and farmers did not want to pay for the pollution caused by urban 
areas and industries (ibid.). The adoption of the national Surface Water Pollution Act 
(Anonymous, 1970) within the context of international anti water pollution conven-
tions has been an important turning-point. Discharges of untreated waste water were 
not longer accepted by the national authorities and became subject to a license and 
taxation system (to cover treatment infrastructure costs; ibid.).  
During centuries the creation of new water management authorities mostly was 
related to financing opportunities for new infrastructural works, since these entities 
received the legal opportunity to raise water-related taxes (Van den Noort, 2009). The 
extensive use of water and land resources for diverse purposes with different quantity 
and quality demands triggered the need for a more coordinated and integrated water manage-
ment approach (Havekes, 2008). Actually, one might say an internal integration tendency 
has been started already as of the beginning of the 20th Century, at least in an organisa-
tional sense. Gradually so-called polders and water quantity management authorities 
merged into larger administrative units (Havekes, 2008). For water quality manage-
ment a limited number of water authorities were present (Van den Noort, 2009). 
Besides, municipalities performed waste water collection and treatment tasks. In the 
1960s the North-Brabant Province launched its idea for the creation of one inland 
water management authority for Brabant-West both for water quantity and quality 
issues. In the period 1970 to 1977 this idea partly became reality with the gradual 
establishment of the (predominantly water quality oriented) Brabant-West Water 
Management Authority (Hoogheemraadschap van West-Brabant; ibid.).  
A major challenge of the new water management authority was the building and 
operation of waste water treatment infrastructure which involved laborious negotia-
tions and/or juridical procedures with some municipalities (Van den Noort, 2009). 
These negotiations concerned the question where does the municipal task in water 
management end and the responsibility of the regional water management authority 
start. It took ten years to reach an agreement with all municipalities within the territory 
of the regional water management authority. Since 1983 the waste water from the 
majority of municipalities is transported to the waste water treatment plant of Bath (in 
the Zeeland Province; ibid.). After treatment the water is discharged into the Western-
Scheldt, in order to unburden the Lake Volkerak-Zoom (which is sensitive to nutri-
ents loads that may cause toxic algae blooms). The new water management authority 
strongly focused on water quality; whereas the water quantity management authorities 
survived (Interview 34, Appendix I).  
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towards all-in water management 
Around 1990, despite a significant merging process since the start from the 20th Cen-
tury, there was still a patchwork of administrations involved in water quality and quan-
tity management in the Brabant-West area. The Brabant-West Water Management 
Authority coordinated water quality management issues whereas nine smaller water 
management authorities and five cities (Waalwijk, Breda, Moerdijk, Oosterhout and 
Bergen op Zoom) took care of water quantity management (Van den Noort, 2009). 
Three out of these nine quantity management authorities crossed the borders between 
the Zeeland and North-Brabant Provinces. Under pressure from the provincial 
authority, which aimed at a more integrated water management organisation, in 1995, 
an important next step in the merging process took place: the nine water quantity 
authorities merged into four (Schelde-kwartier, Land van Nassau, Mark en Weerijs and 
Dongestroom; ibid.; Interview 34, Appendix I). Subsequently, it would take until the 
beginning of 2004 before these four water quantity authorities merged with the Bra-
bant-West Water Management Authority into one integrated, all-in water management 
authority (i.e. the Brabantse Delta Water Management Authority; Postma and 
Laracker, 2005; Interview 34, Appendix I).  
 
8.2.2 Implementation of the WFD (2001 to 2009) 
In the Brabant-West area, four subsequent (and partly overlapping) local WFD im-
plementation planning stages have been distinguished (see Table 8.1). 
 
Table 8.1: Stages in the Dutch WFD implementation process (local level) 
Stage↓ Period↓ Brief characterisation↓ 
I 2000 to 2004 Minor WFD activities. Merging of four water quantity 
 management authorities and one water quality management 
authority into the Brabantse Delta Water Management 
Authority. 
II 2005, 2006 Implementing no regret measures while exploring WFD 
ambitions and consequences by means of pilot projects. 
III 2007, 2008 Definition of objectives and selection of measures, 
proposals for synergy and innovation projects. 
IV 2008, 2009 Drafting and formal consultation of the new Water 
Management Plan for the 2010 to 2015 period. 
 
Stage I: Minor WFD activities, merging of five water management authorities  
Between 2000 and 2004 the water management authorities in the North-Brabant 
Province have not been very active with WFD implementation issues. The second 
Brabant-West Integrated Water Management Plan (for the period 2000 to 2004;  
Waterschap De Dongestroom/Hoogheemraadschap van West-Brabant, 2000) builds 
on the principles from the Fourth National Water Policy Memorandum (Ministerie 
van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 1998) and the Second Water Policy Plan of the North-
Brabant Province (Provincie Noord-Brabant, 1998). Remarkably, the plan only 
includes one small paragraph on the WFD which states that its consequences for the 
water management authorities are not clear yet. Furthermore it mentions that pro-
bably current administrative structures and plan figures will remain intact. The second  
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plan does not refer to the WFD environmental objectives (Article 4) or terms for 
compliance with objectives, instead mentions both a mid term (2018) and a long term 
perspective (2040). Compared to the first plan (which covered period the 1993 to 
1999), the second plan emphasises the importance of an integrated areal approach in 
which water is linked with other policy domains (most notably nature conservation, 
environmental protection and spatial planning). Water is mentioned as one among 
guiding principles for spatial planning. The river basin management approach is men-
tioned indirectly by the water systems approach (ibid.) The second plan applies the 5 
central themes of the North-Brabant Province: (1) establishing a sustainable fresh 
water provision; (2) amelioration of the quantitative conditions for different func-
tions/uses; (3) water quality amelioration; (4) arrangement/restoration of water sys-
tems in rural areas; and (5) urban water management (Provincie Noord-Brabant, 
1998). 
In the 2000 to 2003 period the Brabant-West Water Management Authority pre-
pares the merging with the four water quantity management authorities within its terri-
tory. The new, all-in Brabantse Delta Water Management Authority starts its activities 
on January 1, 2004 (Postma and Laracker, 2005; Interview 34, Appendix I). All-in 
refers to organisational integration of water quality and water quantity management 
issues with emphasis on surface waters. By then strategic and operational groundwater 
management issues are mainly covered by the North-Brabant Province. Within one 
century, the patchwork of more than 200 water management authorities has been 
replaced by one inland water management authority (Van den Noort, 2009). After the 
first elections for the Brabantse Delta General Assembly in November 2004, the 
2005-2008 Political Programme is presented in 2005 (Postma and Laracker, 2005). 
The programme explicitly pays attention to WFD implementation issues.  
 
Stage II: No regret measures while exploring WFD ambitions & consequences 
 
Strategic reflections by the regional water management authorities 
Early 2005, the three major inland water management authorities in the North-
Brabant Province (Aa and Maas, De Dommel and Brabantse Delta) initiate a joint project 
to explore both potential minimum and maximum consequences of the WFD’s im-
plementation and possible strategies to participate in the implementation planning 
processes at different political levels. Starting-point is the Article 5 river basin charac-
terisation report. Estimations of effectiveness and costs of measures are based 
onavailable data and expert knowledge. Emphasis lies on measures of the inland water 
management authorities themselves (Bos, 2005 and Bos and De Smit, 2005). A generic 
conclusion is that ecological restoration projects of water systems are amongst the 
most cost-effective measures (Bos, 2005). Emission reduction investments in general are 
less cost-effective, notwithstanding local and specific exceptions. As a first indication, 
additional investments costs for WFD measures per inland water management author-
ity in the 2005 to 2015 period might range from €40 millions (minimum package of 
measures) to €652 millions (maximum package of measures). These costs do not in-
clude additional human resources for implementation of measures which are esti-
mated from 2 (minimum) to 10 (maximum) persons per involved authority (ibid.). 
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The Brabantse Delta and the Aa and Maas Water Management Authority distinguish 
water systems with high ecological potential (25% of the territory), water systems with 
medium ecological potential (25% of the territory) and water systems with low eco-
logical potential (50% of the area). In the minimum scenario WFD objectives are met 
for all water systems with high ecological potential and for 10% of each of the other 
two categories (in total: WFD compliance for 1/3 of the territory). In the maximum 
scenario, full WFD compliance is established for 75% of the territory (Bos, 2005a). 
Experts at the Brabantse Delta Water Management Authority mention stand still as an 
absolute minimum WFD requirement. Given that at that moment hardly any quality objec-
tive has been met, these experts expect that the WFD’s Article 4’s exemption options 
will have to be applied as a generic rule if the politicans choose no further deteriora-
tion as their ambition only (ibid.). For priority and other chemical substances addi-
tional measures will be required, since generic national policies are insufficient. Ac-
cording to the experts also for protected areas additional measures will be necessary, 
since derogation is not allowed for these areas. The Dommel Water Management 
Authority has elaborated four emission reduction scenario’s and concludes that even 
by means of a maximum package of local and national measures not all the WFD’s 
objectives may be fully met (especially not for heavy metals and nutrients; Bos, 2005a). 
In the same period the Association of Regional Water Management Authorities (UvW) 
mentions that 80% of the WFD measures will have to be come from generic, national 
policies and only 20% from local measures in and around water systems (ibid.). 
The consultancy firm that guides the strategic exploration observes an unclear 
coordination of the WFD process by the national Water Policy Department, 
provinces and the UvW so far. Consequently, officials and experts at the three water 
management authorities are uncertain about their roles and positions and show a de-
fensive attitude (Bos and De Smit, 2005). The consultants argue that if the water man-
agement authorities manage to become more proactive, by identifying cost-effective 
measures in combination with agenda-setting, co-thinking with the province and 
national authorities on workable guidelines and instructions and alliances building 
(with local authorities and other stakeholders), then uncertainty may alter into a spirit 
of cooperation and enthusiasm. Officials at the Dommel Water Management Author-
ity ply for strategy development on transboundary cooperation with Belgium in com-
bination with announcing transboundary issues at the European Commission. More 
direct contacts with Belgian colleagues are considered desirable (Bos and De Smit, 
2005). Furthermore, in their opionion the water management authority should take 
the lead in the local WFD implementation process (ibid.).  
Whereas the Dommel Water Management Authority stresses an integrated 
implementation of the WFD with other assignments (such as rural areas revitalisa-
tion), experts and managers at the Brabantse Delta Water Management Authority 
emphasise the importance ‘to set clear priorities among the Water Management in the 
21st Century (WM21), WFD and rural areas revitalisation assignments’ (Bos and De 
Smit, 2005: annex 3, page 9). They consider coalition building with regional and local 
partners very important and stress that local and regional politicians should be in-
volved more in the WFD implementation planning choices. At present the authority 
has an unpleasant feeling as ‘player in an in-transparent, complex process which is  
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characterised by lots of input without proper knowledge, many co-talkers and co-
deciders, lots of paperwork and no action’ (ibid.: 10). This water management autho-
rity asks the question whether the process perhaps has too much the character of a 
bottom-up process. The Aa and Maas Water Management Authority opts for a proac-
tive attitude as opportunity to enforce its position as the water authority in coopera-
tion with national authorities, provinces and municipalities (Bos and De Smit, 2005). 
In the synthesis workshop of the strategic exploration project, managers and ex-
perts of the three regional water management authorities conclude a three-step strat-
egy (Bos and De Smit, 2005, annex 5, page 3; translation from Dutch added): 
 
The regional water management authorities have three major roles in the WFD im-
plementation process: 
1. Agenda formulator: to present water management within the right societal con-
text, announce important issues for the director’s agenda by means of vision 
building based on areal and water system knowledge; 
2. Pro-active implementer of physical projects (ecological restoration, waste water 
treatment) and licenses provider; 
3. Alliance builder at the local level. 
The overall direction of the WFD process concerns societal costs and benefits con-
siderations hence belongs to the generic democracy (state, provinces) and not to 
the functional democracy (regional water management authorities). 
 
No regret measures and pilot projects 
The results of the strategic exploration have been discussed with the political chairs of 
the regional water management authorities. The choice for a proactive attitude in the 
WFD process is noticeable in the 2005-2008 Political Programme of the Brabantse 
Delta General Assembly (Postma and Laracker, 2005). In his preface to this pro-
gramme the chair mentions ‘The European Commission will severely check whether 
we will comply with the anchored WFD results in time’ (ibid.: 5). The programme 
mentions an obligation to comply with the objectives, as compared to the intentional 
nature of domestic objectives. European penalties may result from non-compliance. 
Within this context, the programme announces additional investments to be required in 
the forthcoming years. Although the majority of the WFD objectives still have to be 
formulated, the General Assembly decides to anticipate these new requirements by 
selection and implementation of no regret measures which undoubtedly will be necessary 
for compliance. The intention is to spread additional investments till 2015 well-
balanced in order to avid disproportionate water tax rises. Measures with uncertain costs-
effectiveness rates will not be implemented yet. The programme mentions interdependen-
cies with other partners, among them the Flemish authorities, hence the importance 
of alliance building, coordination and cooperation (Postma and Laracker, 2005).  
In 2005, the Brabantse Delta Water Management Authority also launches its first 
Emission Management Programme which has the character of a “living document” 
(Waterschap Brabantse Delta, 2005). The programme is tuned to the time schedule of 
the WFD implementation planning process and may serve as important building block 
for the new water management plan. The programme includes measures to reduce 
both point and diffuse pollution emission sources. The water management authority 
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initiates two local water quality amelioration pilot projects (which are named after the 
involved water systems Chaamse Beken and Rietkreek) with the aim to test implementa-
tion of potential cost-effective measures (together with stakeholders; Van den Berg 
and Van Lamoen, 2008). In 2006 these projects are labelled as WFD pilot projects. 
The General Assembly decides that the 2000 to 2004 water management plans from 
the former water management authorities will be valid until the new water manage-
ment plan regarding the 2010 to 2015 period (conform the WFD’s requirements) will 
be adopted. 
 
Lessons from the Roosendaal Pilot WFD Implementation project 
In the second half of 2005 the Brabantse Delta Water Management Authority, the 
Roosendaal Municipality and the North-Brabant Province initiate the project ‘WFD 
consequences in urban areas – pilot Roosendaal’. Initially, a pilot project was planned 
with the Oosterhout Municipality. This project did not make it due to a lack of finan-
cial resources by the side of the municipality. The Roosendaal Municipality who ap-
pointed a new ambitious alderman on water management issues was eager to fill the 
gap. Within the first stage of the pilot project all steps of the first implementation 
planning cycle till the end of 2009 have been analysed for one urban area within half a 
year (Vroege et al., 2005a). The conclusions have been discussed with regional and 
local politicians at a workshop in November 2005. Lessons learned and views of the 
politicians have been summarised in a brochure (Vroege et al., 2005b). The second 
stage of the project included three interactive sessions about experiences and views on 
stakeholder participation at the local level (Leeuwis and Vroege, 2006). Lessons and 
conclusions of the pilot project have been presented at a series of information ses-
sions for municipal experts and politicians in the first half of 2006. 
The pilot project has shown that, although compliance with all WFD objectives 
before the end of 2015 may lead to a considerable rise of investments costs (for ex-
ample due to the one out, all out principle), measures of current urban policies already 
may contribute a lot. In practice, the WFD does not introduce a complete new water 
assignment rather is considered as a new, European label to prior (integrated) water 
management practices (Vroege et al., 2005b). The participants conclude that the WFD 
will require more coordination and cooperation between different policy departments within local 
authorities such as for sewerage management, spatial planning and environment. Local 
authorities may need to incorporate (and/or hire) more local expertise in the organisa-
tion. The pilot project has shown major implementation dilemmas (Interviews 25 and 
26, Appendix I). For example, on the one hand, in theory definition of environmental 
objectives for heavily modified water bodies provides political room for manoeuvre. 
On the other hand, in practice the technical specifications require expert knowledge 
which is very difficult to understand and reproduce by local officials and politicians. 
Hence, the approach should be simplified in order to actively involve them (ibid.).  
Another dilemma is the discrepancy between water bodies as the aggregation 
units for European reporting purposes and smaller urban water systems which are the 
visible and legitimisation units for local politicians (ibid.). Local authorities may need 
more detailed (and expensive) monitoring and research data to defend increase of 
investments costs and related expenses rates (Backx, 2005). Finally, in decisions on a 
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staged implementation of WFD measures until 2021 or 2027, the disproportionate costs 
argument plays an important role. Local politicians have an important say in defining 
acceptable socio-economic costs, benefits and expenses rates (Vroeg et al., 2005b). 
Participants in the second stage of the pilot project concluded that the nature of the 
WFD assignment in principle perfectly fits into the aims of and conditions for social 
learning approaches. However, this requires adaptations of the present implementa-
tion process approach in which governmental authorities and technical issues domi-
nate the scene (Leeuwis and Vroege, 2006). 
 
A first generic exploration of objectives and measures 
In 2006 a generic exploration of bottlenecks and potential measures takes place at the 
level of 6 sub-basins within the Brabantse Delta territory. The exploration is guided by 
the Brabant-West WFD Project Team in which 6 major municipalities, the North-
Brabant Province and the WFD Scheldt and Meuse Project Bureaus participate and 
which is chaired by the WFD coordinator at the Brabantse Delta Water Management 
Authority. In practice, this exploration marks the start of the local areal process with 
all 21 municipalities, environmental NGOs, private terrain managers and owners, 
drinking water companies and socio-economic interest groups. At this stage, since not 
all environmental objectives have been formulated, selection and identification of 
measures at the level of individual water bodies may not take place. By means of  
expert judgement and interactive workshops in six subbasins, the national range of 
five WFD ambition scenarios, as translated for local application by the WFD Meuse 
Project Bureau, are discussed. First indications of minimum and maximum additional 
WFD investments costs per sub-basin are obtained (as part of the strategic national 
and regional societal costs benefits analyses).  
Figures, conclusions and recommendations of the local areal process are summa-
rised in the final report (with the status of official working-document; Bertens, Sant-
bergen and Stark, 2006). Although the report brings together basic information of the 
Brabantse Delta territory, including a first attempt to compare cost-effectiveness of meas-
ures, involved stakeholders struggle with the general and abstract character of the 
process so far. Officials from municipalities cannot easily translate these first facts and 
figures into local WFD assignments (Interviews 23, 26 and 36, Appendix I). Other 
stakeholders ask for more direct participation at the level of individual water systems 
in their neighbourhood (Leeuwis and Vroege, 2006). Drinking water companies ask 
for better integration of groundwater issues and special attention to interactions be-
tween groundwater and surface water bodies. In retrospect, the generic exploration at 
this stage seems to have served more the regional and national aggregation objectives 
of public officials than local needs, expectations and a joint search for tailor-made 
solutions.  
As part of the local areal process structures, the Brabantse Delta Water Manage-
ment Authority decides to install the Brabant-West WFD Consultation Platform (in 
Dutch: Klankbordgroep KRW Brabant-West) with representatives of environmental 
NGOs and socio-economic interest groups. Notwithstanding a proposal of the WFD 
coordinator, the political chair and his communication strategy adviser are not in fa-
vour of ex ante written down rules of the game. Both stress the informal nature of the 
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platform  which mainly serves as medium for information exchange about progress of 
the implementation process. In general, the meetings are well visited. Besides bringin g 
in expert remarks, the participants frequently ask questions about the mandate of the 
platform, linkages with other local, regional and national WFD consultation platforms 
and ply for more input by the provincial authorities (especially concerning ground-
water issues). Substantial, organisational and political attention-points in the explorative re-
port (Bertens, Santbergen and Stark, 2006) have been discussed with the platform 
members. According to the WFD Meuse project director the process within the terri-
tory of the Brabantse Delta Water Management Authority is the most interactive one. 
However, a number of platform members have the feeling that their stakes and local 
knowledge do not play a big role in the process. They ply for more direct participation 
methods instead of ex post information and consultation only (Bertens, Santbergen and 
Stark, 2006).  
The exploration report concludes that roles and positions of different stake-
holders in the WFD processes at all political levels are insufficiently clear (Bertens, 
Santbergen and Stark, 2006). Deadlines and expectations should be communicated 
earlier. Consultation platform members are not able yet to translate the potential 
WFD’s consequences to their grass-roots supporters. An open and target groups 
 oriented communication strategy will be required to involve individual citizens and 
enlarge final public support for the programmes of measures. Ecological objectives 
should be coordinated for upstream and downstream sub-basins. Reconsideration 
should take place on role and position of the transboundary basin committees be-
tween the Netherlands and the Flemish Region of Belgium. There is a need for clear 
criteria for identification and selection of measures per individual water bodies. The 
WFD assignment should be integrated with other policy assignments in a smart way. 
For example, restoration measures, as part of present rural areas revitalisation proc-
esses, could be extended with water quality improvement investments. Integration 
with the WM21 assignment should take place in the subsequent stage (ibid.).  
At the end of 2006, the North-Brabant Province presents its memorandum on 
the main starting points for preparation of the new provincial water policy plan which 
includes including a decision support framework for the WFD’s implementation 
(Provincie Noord-Brabant, 2006). Although the province asks the regional water man-
agement authorities to apply these “rules of the game” for the local WFD processes, 
the Brabantse Delta Daily Board considers the memorandum too general and 
approves the process proposal from its own WFD coordinator (which is not in con-
tradiction with the memorandum; March 2007). The Daily Board worries about the 
lack of sufficient human and financial resources by the side of the province and again 
plies for higher priority for the WFD assignment (which is denied by the province). 
 
Stage III: Definition of objectives, selection of measures and synergy projects 
After an interim progress evaluation, the Brabantse Delta Water Management Author-
ity decides to concentrate on three parallel tracks:.(1) the formulation of ecological 
objectives for the heavily modified and artificial water bodies; (2) identification and 
selection of measures per individual water body; and (3) the design of the WFD moni-
toring programme. In track 1, the WFD Project Team does not succeed in solving the 
PARALLEL PROCESSES IN BRABANT-WEST 359 
 
 
 
dilemma of simplifying the technical process steps. Notwithstanding a joint attempt of 
the WFD Meuse Project Bureau and ecological experts at the regional water manage-
ment authorities to present examples of ecological objectives for a broad audience 
(Barten, Voorn and Visser, 2007), the formulation predominantly remains a process of 
these ecologists. Harmonisation exercises by the province do not deliver major altera-
tions. Since the process is too technical for regional and local politicians and also diffi-
cult to understand for many officials and non-governmental actors, there is low pres-
sure from the side of the politicians to make the draft objectives an explicit part of the 
decision-making process. In March 2007, for example, the Brabantse Delta Daily 
Board approves the subsequent steps and starting-points for defining the objectives. 
The secretary-general concludes: ‘Since we trust your technical expertise, we approve 
the approach. We do not need to judge the outcome per individual water body later in 
the process.’ (Quote taken from a joint meeting of the Management Team and the 
Daily Board of the Brabantse Delta Water Management Authority at Breda, on March 
6, 2007) At the 2005 political workshop on the Roosendaal pilot the municipal water 
ambassador stressed that ‘the present method on determining the ecological objectives 
(MEP and GEP) is too complicated for local politicians as a tool for making clear 
choices between different measure options’ (Backx, 2005). Implicitly, in their percep-
tion the politicians have already influenced the ambitions by preliminary delineation of 
as many heavily modified and artificial water bodies as possible. At this stage, political focus is 
more concentrated on identification and selection of cost-effective packages of meas-
ures (and the room for political manoeuvre these offer).  
In track 2, the WFD Project Team proposes an extensive process approach in 
which each individual municipality, as supported by the two municipal water ambas-
sadors, is asked to deliver both an overview of past investments between 2000 and the 
end of 2006) and to propose packages of measures for the 2007 to 2009 and the 2010 
to 2015 periods. In the Brabant-West area two municipalities house a water ambassa-
dor. Pierre Backx (Roosendaal Municipality) has been the water ambassador for the 
Meuse part of the territory, whereas René van de Sande (Bergen op Zoom Municipal-
ity) has been the water ambassador for the Scheldt part of the terrirory. A consultancy 
firm is hired to design supportive formats for compliance with regional and national 
aggregation requirements. Together with the regional water management authority 
criteria for selection of WFD measures are defined and a special WFD checklist for 
municipalities is drafted (Santbergen, Backx and Van den Berg, 2008). The checklist 
and a proposal for coordinated ambitions is discussed and approved in a meeting with 
aldermen of all 21 municipalities. Although the fear for European obligations persists at 
the background, the feasibility and affordability mantra helps to focus on familiar measure 
types. At the end of the selection process (November 2008), almost all municipalities 
have taken daily board and/or council decisions on the WFD ambition. The approved 
lists of measures show limited local ambitions, hence will not alter the state of the 
urban waters significantly until the end of 2015. During the same period, the 
Brabantse Delta Water Management Authority preselects its own measures and asks 
the North-Brabant Province and the State Waters Management Agency (Rijkswater-
staat) to do the same. The WFD coordinator periodically emphasises own responsibili-
ties and competences of these partners who, in his perception, fail to deliver in time 
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(e.g. on groundwater, Natura 2000 and no-shift principle issues). Support comes from 
municipalities and some consultation platform members who ask for more active 
participation of these officials. Reversely, the Province expects the regional water 
management authority to include their issues more pronounced in the local WFD 
areal process (Interviews 44 and 46, Appendix I).  
The proposed measures are discussed for clusters of water bodies in a series of 
interactive workshops with a broad range of stakeholders. For communication pur-
poses, the consultancy firm drafts WFD facts sheets that cover objectives, monitoring 
results and proposed measures per individual water body (Vroege and Hoijtink, 2007). 
Although the regional water management authority intends to cover the whole range 
of measure types in section B of WFD’s Annex VI (i.e. supplementary measures to 
present policies and other European guidelines; European Communities, 2000: 64-65), 
finally the emphasis is on physical water system restoration projects. September 2007, 
the regional water management authority releases the second draft version of the re-
port that proposes a preferred scenario of WFD measures for the Brabantse Delta 
territory, as synthesis of the interactive process with involved interested stakeholders 
(Santbergen, 2007a) The tables with proposed measures per individual water body 
include names of involved stakeholder groups. The title of the report, ‘Together 
Strong for Healthy Water’ (Samen Sterk voor Gezond Water), becomes the slogan for the 
WFD assignment in this part of the Meuse basin. At the same time the WFD Project 
Team launches a brief brochure on the WFD assignment, including stakeholder views 
 (Waterschap Brabantse Delta et al., 2007).  
Although the draft report and brochure generally are well received, the preferred 
scenario is far from complete. Most municipalities still have to deliver their WFD 
measure lists, drinking water companies ask for more attention to drinking water is-
sues and inclusion of interaction between surface water and groundwater bodies. At 
request of the WFD coordinator, the drinking water companies provide an additional 
document on drinking water issues (Verheijden and Van Griensven, 2007; Rijk, 2007). 
The North-Brabant Province adds a special document on groundwater issues and 
relations with surface water bodies (Buijze, 2008). Environmental NGOs ask for in-
clusion of Natura 2000 issues, which are linked with the WFD assignment by means 
of the water conditions and the WFD register of protected areas. December 2007, 
based on the report and additional documents, the Brabantse Delta General Assembly 
approves the preferred scenario with regard to its own measures and asks the WFD 
coordinator to elaborate it in a final programme of measures for a staged WFD imple-
mentation until the end of 2027 (Santbergen, 2007b). 
 
In 2008, the overview of WFD measures in the West-Brabant region becomes clear. 
Municipalities deliver their final lists and the WFD coordinator starts filling the final 
national databases (which are the basis for the Scheldt and Meuse River Basin man-
agement plans). The draft report (with the preferred scenario) has never been finished, 
although an attempt was made to split the report in 6 sub-basin reports. Due to an 
overkill of deadlines and activities, the coordinators for the WFD and the new water 
management plan decided to draft final WFD facts sheets per individual water body 
only. Furthermore, the regional water management authority and some municipalities  
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have drafted proposals on WFD synergy projects rather successfully, since about €7.2 
million of national subsidy is gained with them. 
In track 3 the design of the WFD monitoring programme has been delivered by 
an almost autonomously operating project group of experts at the water management 
authorities, as chaired by the North-Brabant Province and operating under the um-
brella of the WFD Meuse Project Bureau. At the end of 2008, when the draft regional 
and local water management plans are prepared for consultation, national WFD 
quality objectives and monitoring rules (and their regional and local translation) are 
still not final. In general there are two stages within this track. First, under the lead of 
the director-general of the Brabantse Delta Water Management Authority, the national 
project group on monitoring and reporting provides guidelines on a minimised, cost-
effective WFD monitoring programme. Inspired by the national feasibility and afforda-
bility mantra, all water management authorities would have to cluster water bodies for 
monitoring purposes, provoking critics by experts about under-representation and 
unreliability. In the second stage, as proposed by both WFD coordinators and water 
management plan editors, for reasons of representability the national WFD monitor-
ing guidelines are altered in order to provide room for inclusion of more monitoring 
sites. In the International Meuse River Basin District the regional water management 
authorities finally decide to select at least one monitring location within every individ-
ual water body (for example as elaborated for the Brabantse Delta territory by 
Oosthoek, 2009).  
 
IV: Drafting and formal consultation of the new Water Management Plan 
In 2008, parallel to the finalisation of WFD activities, the water management authority 
starts to draft its 2010-2015 Water Management Plan. The plan includes all water 
management issues. The figures for all the water bodies are aggregated in special WFD 
appendix (Van Den Berg and Postma, 2009). As the General Assembly has decided in 
December 2007, the plan includes two scenarios: one basic to fulfil minimum Euro-
pean (WFD) obligations and one maximum scenario for full compliance with both the 
European obligations and additional, intentional domestic water policy objectives. 
Both scenarios aim at a staged compliance with all objectives before the end of ultimo 
2027. Required land will only be acquired by voluntary agreements with land owners. Cur-
rent land use functions (and approved alterations) are leading. The minimum scenario 
is based on historic implementation rates for physical measures, the feasibility criterion. 
The maximum scenario is based on both the feasibility and the affordability criterion, 
thus excluding measures which are politically considered as unrealistic. 
In November 2008, prior to the start of the formal consultation round on the 
draft water plan, elections take place for a new General Assembly which means that 
the new assembly will have to approve the final plan after incorporation of the 
received consultation remarks. Before formal consultation, a consultancy firm con-
ducts a juridical check, to analyse whether the plan complies with all the requirements 
in the new national water legislation, WFD requirements and the strategic environ-
mental impact procedures. The consultancy firm’s overall conclusion is positive but 
recommends to make the WFD assignment more consistent with regard to required 
references to the provincial water plan (such as motivation for exemptions), 
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a quantification of measures per individual water body and further clarification of 
monitoring requirements (Sterk Consulting, 2009). Concerning the WFD assignment a 
remarkable question is posed, which points the finger at a sensitive domestic discus-
sion (Sterk Consulting, 2009; translation from Dutch and italics added): 
 
The plan mentions an obligation to implement the WFD measures in time. However, 
it is important to mention that there is also an obligation for timely compliance with 
the WFD objectives. Does the regional water management authority comply with these 
objectives by implementation of the obligatory measures? 
 
This question has not been answered in the final plan given critical uncertainties on 
the precise impact of different measure types on ecological target groups (e.g. Van der 
Wal and Waajen, 2010).  
In the 2009 formal consultation round, prior viewpoints and remarks from inter-
ested stakeholders are reconfirmed. Although the formal consultation triggers a large 
number of editorial improvements, it does not lead to major changes in objectives and 
measures. One exception is the proposal by the regional water management authority 
to change the status of the Merkske water body from heavily modified to natural, induced 
by the viewpoint of environmental NGOs and accepted by the North-Brabant 
Province on a pilot project basis (in order to avoid any precedent for similar brook 
systems). Although the new 2009 General Assembly of the Brabantse Delta Water 
Management Authority decides to reduce investments costs and expenses dramati-
cally, it does not opt for lowering the 2015 ambitions of the minimum and maximum 
scenarios in the water management plan.  
Table 8.2 shows the percentages of the 2010 to 2015 assignment (in terms of 
measures) that may be me accomplished by the water management authority between 
2009 and the end of 2013 (based on figures in Postma and Laracker, 2009). The 
assignment should be understood in terms of planned measures of the first WFD 
package in the staged approach until 2027.The table makes clear that it is doubtful 
whether the 2010 to 2015 WFD ambitions may be fully met before the end of 2015. 
The General Assembly stresses the need for synergy, integration and innovation in order to 
reduce the total assignment investments and to implement measures more cost-effectively 
and coherently (Postma and Laracker, 2009).  
 
In retrospect, the local WFD implementation planning process in the Brabant-West 
area has boosted cooperation efforts between the regional water management 
authority and the municipalities. These public actors did not opt for opening up their 
windows towards more active participation of non-governmental stakeholders. 
Furthermore the process predominantly focussed on the Ducth part of the assignment 
for the transboundary inland water bodies which are shared with the Flemish Region 
of Belgium. Until December 2009, the WFD’s policy and governance principles did 
not trigger strong coordination mechnisms with the upstream neighbours. As will be 
explained in the next subsection, the momentum for transboundary coordination 
committees with the Flemish partners seems to have passed away after adoption of 
the WFD.  
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Table 8.2: Expected 2015 targets accomplishment between 2009 and 2013 (in %) 
Measure type↓ % of 2015 WFD  
assignment↓ 
% of total 2015  
water assignment↓ 
Water storage rural areas: not applicable ? 
Hydrological restoration of water-
related nature sites (“wet nature 
pearls”):  
170-180% 40-50% 
Ecological restoration of brooks 
and creeks: 
55-65% 40-50% 
Habitats for fish species: 25-35% 25-35% 
Ecological connectivity zones: 100-110% 100% 
Removal of fish migration 
barriers: 
130-140% 85-95% 
The WFD assignment (in terms of planned measures) is considered as minimum scenario, at 
least to comply with European obligations. The total water assignment is more ambitious, 
including also additional local intentions.  
 
8.2.3 A rise and fall of transboundary Flemish-Dutch coordination 
 
Before the Water Framework Directive 
In the years before adoption of the WFD rising Flemish-Dutch coordination and 
cooperation initiatives are promising. September 1990, Flemish and Dutch water 
management authorities sign a political agreement in order to reduce nutrients inflow  
(phosphates in particular) from upstream brooks to the (Dutch) Lake Volkerak-Zoom 
(Stroomgebiedcomité Mark, 1997). In 1997 the agreed measures (mainly waste water 
treatment infrastructure) have been completed. However, due to continued diffuse 
pollution emission sources from agriculture, water quality has only slightly improved 
(ibid.). November 17, 1993, the Belgian-Dutch Committee on the Transboundary 
Unnavigable Watercourses and the Benelux Groundwater Working Group take the 
decision to install bilateral, transboundary river basin committees at the local level. 
Major objective of the new platforms is better coordination of water management 
planning and implementation activities within the basins of transboundary water-
courses. As one of these five committees, in 1994 the Transboundary Mark Basin 
Committee (TMBC; Stroomgebiedcomité Mark) has been initiated. The platform (which is 
a network of experts and officials, mainly of water management authorities and drink-
ing water companies) meets twice a year and does not have a political equivalent 
(Jansen, Schreuders and Haverkamp, 2002). The bilateral Dutch-Flemish Integrated 
Water Management Platform (Nederlands Vlaams Integraal Waterbeheer Overleg; NVIWO) 
which is an informal gathering of high-ranking water officials at the national political 
level (once a year) acts as umbrella platform for all the bilateral basin committees of 
the Flemish Region of Belgium and the Netherlands (ibid.).  
Supported by a European subsidy, in 1994 and 1995 Flemish and Dutch water 
management authorities conduct an joint inventory of pollution sources in the (trans-
boundary) Mark-Vliet River Basin (Stroomgebiedcomité Mark, 1997). In addition 
attempts are made for a transboundary groundwater monitoring programme in the 
Merkske Brook Basin. Ecological and hydrological studies take place in preparation of 
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future restoration measures. Both Flemish and Dutch authorities buy land in the 
brook valley. Important milestone is the adoption of the 1997 Transboundary Man-
agement Vision on the Mark Basin (Stroomgebiedcomité Mark, 1997), including rec-
ommendations that have been translated into policies and management plans at both 
sides of the frontier. The TMBC concludes that the transboundary vision is a first step 
and should be revised every four years. The first vision mainly focuses on an inven-
tory of bottlenecks and process recommendations to arrive at future shared solutions. 
In 1997 a working group of the Belgian-Dutch Committee on the Transboundary 
Unnavigable Watercourses explores relations between regional transboundary water-
courses and the Meuse and Scheldt Treaties and studies desirable coordination struc-
tures. Finally, the Benelux Economic Union initiates a special committee on drafting a 
transboundary restoration and management plan for the transboundary Kalmthoutse 
Heide-De Zoom nature reserve (ibid.). Although the TMBC has provided overviews 
of individual projects at both sides of the frontier, attempts to establish additional 
transboundary water system restoration plans (such as for the Mark River and the 
Merkske Brook) have failed so far. More successful has been a joint European project 
to improve fish migration (between 1997 and 2000; Jansen, Schreuders and Haver-
kamp, 2002). As part of this project, a number of fish ladders in both the Aa of 
Weerijs and the Boven Mark Rivers have been realised (ibid.). 
The second Mark Basin Water System Report (1996-2000), drafted under the 
wings of the TMBC, refers to the WFD requirements. Its introduction mentions that 
the report includes ‘recommendations in order to arrive at coordinated, transboundary 
monitoring, reporting and, whenever possible also evaluation according to the WFD 
requirements’ (Jansen, Schreuders and Haverkamp, 2002: 5; translation from Dutch 
added). The report concludes that the present ground water monitoring programmes 
will be almost sufficient for WFD compliance. Water quantity parameters in relation 
to ecological quality of surface waters should deserve more attention such as stream 
velocities. Also some biological parameters such as diatoms, fish and phytoplankton 
are not sufficiently covered yet. The WFD offers opportunities to bridge differences 
between Flemish and Dutch water quality standards: ‘Harmonisation of water quality 
standards, for example within the context of WFD implementation for the [trans-
boundary Mark] river basin, could stimulate common problem acknowledgement and 
policy formulation’ (ibid.: 60). 
 
After adoption of the Water Framework Directive 
The rise of the transboundary Flemish-Dutch cooperation efforts in the 1990 to 2000 
period kept promises for a further institutionalisation of the European river basin 
management approach, as aimed for in the WFD. Remarkably, the observations of 
this research show an opposite evolution. From a 2002 inquiry it becomes clear that 
the Dutch provinces and regional water management authorities at the frontiers with 
other countries consider the WFD as an opportunity to enforce transboundary coop-
eration (Arcadis, 2002: 25-26; translation from Dutch added): 
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Especially consultations with Belgium do need an impulse, given different political 
relations. In Belgium, many water policy responsibilities belong to the Flemish 
Regional Authority, while in the Netherlands many tasks are decentralised to the 
provinces. The WFD offers opportunities to break down barriers, if good 
agreements are reached at the transboundary river basin level.  
 
In 2004 the Dutch national Water Policy Department initiates a quick scan on WFD 
implementation efforts by Flanders and the Netherlands in the Meuse River Basin 
District (Arcadis, 2004). The Flemish Environment Agency (Vlaamse Milieu Maat-
schappij) is consulted by means of a joint workshop. One major conclusion is that, due 
to differences in water body typology, assessment of irreversible hydro-morphological 
alterations and chemical and ecological quality standards, coordination problems may 
grow (ibid.).  
Both the Flemish and Dutch water authorities decide to mainly focus on domes-
tic issues within the first WFD implementation planning cycle, in order to get familiar 
with the technical implications of the directive. Although the Dutch regional and local 
partners ask attention for transboundary coordination activities more frequently, do-
mestic strategic and tactical sessions hardly take place. The Flemish Environment 
Agency periodically emphasises too limited financial and human resources for 
frequent bilateral coordination talks with individual Dutch actors. Remarkably, living 
in a downstream position from France and the Brussels and Walloon Regions, the 
Flemish authorities are in a similar position as transboundary coordination demander. 
Although in the opinion of the Dutch water management authorities, the bilateral, 
transboundary river basin committees could play a pragmatic role in WFD coordina-
tion and harmonisation efforts for individual water bodies, the Flemish and Dutch 
national water policy authorities decide otherwise. Actually, the lack of a clear political 
mandate and insufficient financial and human resources hinders effective continuation 
of the coordination activities by the Transboundary Mark Basin Committee. Besides, 
the fact that Dutch and Flemish authorities do not provide the committee with WFD 
implementation planning tasks weakens its position. Despite successful initiatives 
between 1994 and 2000, the TMBC increasingly becomes a toothless tiger. Although 
the Committee agreed to publish a water system state of the art report once every five 
years, no such reports have been drafted after the second edition (for the 1996 to 
2000 period). In 2010, unilaterally (without ex ante consultation of Dutch regional and 
local authorities), the Flemish Integrated Water Policy Coordination Committee 
(Commissie Integraal Waterbeleid) proposes to explore possibilities for termination of the 
bilateral, transboundary committees, as part of a new strategy for cost-efficient bilateral 
coordination talks (CIW, 2010). 
 
At an irregular basis bilateral WFD information exchange meetings take place at the 
level of the Meuse River Basin. For example, at a 2006 meeting (in Breda) with Flem-
ish and Dutch actors, the WFD coordinator at the Brabantse Delta Water Manage-
ment Authority presents emission figures for the transboundary water courses (as 
aggregated by a Dutch consultancy firm). The Flemish partners do not consider those 
figures representative and ply for a common exercise. At the same meeting they 
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express not to have the human and financial resources available for conducting such 
transboundary inventories. According to the Flemish Environment Agency and the 
Dutch national Water Policy Department, as of 2010 (in the second WFD implemen-
tation planning cycle), there should be more opportunities for enforced bilateral coor-
dination efforts. The Flemish attitude provokes irritation at some of the Dutch 
regional participants. Reversely, the sudden presentation of a transboundary basin 
map by the WFD Meuse Project Bureau (which is based on Dutch figures only, since 
the Flemish authorities did not deliver data) causes frowned eyebrows of some 
Flemish colleagues.  
Parallel to the dissatisfactory WFD coordination talks, the Brabantse Delta Water 
Management Authority seeks alliance with the Water Policy Department from the 
Antwerp Province. The start of the Flemish Mark and Weerijs Water Management 
Authority (February 2007), as coordinated by this province, should offer new oppor-
tunities for pragmatic, local, transboundary coordination and cooperation efforts 
(Santbergen and Soens, 2010). First important milestone, after an arduous drafting and 
negotiation process with multiple Flemish stakeholders (including the Flemish Envi-
ronment Agency), is the signing of a bilateral cooperation agreement on the manage-
ment and maintenance of border-forming and border-crossing water courses (Water-
schap Brabantse Delta et al., 2010). At the regional level, political cooperation also 
gradually develops by the Flemish invitation of Dutch politicians in their Meuse River 
Basin Committee (Bekkenbestuur Maas). In return, first Dutch invitations follow in 
2009. After publication of the draft (Dutch) Meuse River Basin Management Plan 
(December 2008), the national Water Policy Department concludes that the number 
of urgent multilateral coordination issues is limited (Interviews 5, 52 and 53, Appendix 
I). The department’s focus on the main Meuse River itself does not help to increase 
attention for the bilateral efforts by the regional and local authorities. On the other 
hand, despite repeating calls from the side of the national Water Policy Department, 
the provinces and regional water management authorities do not manage to deliver a 
sound overview of high priority issues to be solved with the Flemish counterparts 
(Interview 51, Appendix I.). 
 
To conclude the chronology of this subsection: during the first WFD implementation 
planning period both the Flemish and Dutch water management authorities mainly  
focused on their domestic requirements. The momentum of the Transboundary Mark 
River Basin Committee has dampened, especially when this committee did not receive 
any formal mandate with regard to the WFD’s implementation. For the Brabantse 
Delta Water Management Authority informal contacts with Flemish actors at the local 
level, coalition building with the Antwerp Province and participation in European 
projects for regional development and transboundary cooperation has payed off in a 
more pragmatic and alternative way. Whether the second WFD implementation plan-
ning period as of 2010 will trigger a rise of bilateral coordination structures and/or 
actor networks again is difficult to predict. In this respect, the reciprocal opening up 
of water management structures for actors of the neighbouring riparian states is a 
promising sign. 
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8.3 The WFD and local rules on IRBM 
 
This section explores to which extent the WFD’s policy and governance principles, 
environmental objectives and exemption options may have provoked changes in col-
lective-choice rules for integrated river basin management at the local administrative 
level in the Netherlands, i.e. the Brabant-West part of the International Meuse River 
Basin District. For definition of ideal-type IRBM rules, see the Subsections 2.2.3 till 
2.2.9.   
 
8.3.1 Scope rules 
As defined in Section 2.2.3, scope rules may concern the geographic area, the nature 
of organisational structures and networks and the issues to be decided on. For the aim 
of this research, a distinction is made between organisational and substantive scope 
rules. Concerning the former, the focus is on the impact of hydrological boundaries 
on organisational structures, whereas for the latter the focus is on the levels of integra-
tion. For example, are “river basins as the appropriate management units” translated 
into functional agencies and to which extent may these entities operate autonomously? 
What are collective choices for internal integration (of issues within the water policy 
domain) and external integration (of issues across policy domains)? To what extent do 
these choices affect the nature of river basin legislation, policy documents and 
management plans? 
 
Organisational scope: the impact of hydrological boundaries 
Three ideal-types of organisational IRBM scope rules are distinguished (see Table 
8.3a). As concluded in Subsection 6.3.1, the Netherlands have a tradition of functional 
water management authorities which follow hydrological boundaries and which have 
their own elected general assemblies (ideal-type B). In the 1990s several smaller water 
quantity authorities in the Brabant-West area merge into four larger ones. January 1, 
2004, the Brabantse Delta Water Management Authority starts its activities, after 
completion of the merging process from the four water quantity authorities with the 
Brabant-West Water Management Authority (Postma and Laracker, 2005; Van den 
Noort, 2009). The local WFD implementation planning process triggers additional, 
informal network structures which run in parallel with existing structures from other 
areal processes. The Brabantse Delta Water Management Authority seizes the mo-
mentum of the WFD to present itself as the inland water management authority in 
Brabant-West. The authority appoints a WFD process coordinator who initiates the 
Brabant-West WFD Implementation Project Team (including municipal water experts 
and officials) and the Brabant-West WFD Consultation Platform (including represen-
tatives of environmental NGOs and socio-economic interests groups). Periodical 
WFD information and consultation sessions are organised with officials and aldermen 
of involved municipalities. After release of the draft water management plan of the 
water management authority and the draft municipal lists of WFD measures, the 
energy gradually flows out of the WFD process structures. The observations point at 
ideal-type B organisational scope rules at the local level, both before and after 
368 CHAPTER 8 
 
adoption of the WFD (see Table 8.3a). The WFD has enforced the focus on hydro-
logical, (sub) river basin boundaries. 
 
Table 8.3a: Ideal-type collective-choice IRBM scope rules (organisation; local level) 
Ideal-type rules↓ 1990 to 2000↓ 2001 to 2009↓ 
A: Water policy is implemented by organisational 
structures and actor networks which are driven by 
social, economic and political factors that do not 
follow hydrological (river) basin boundaries. These 
structures/networks may be multi-purpose or sec-
toral in nature and are under parliamentary control. 
  
B: Water policy is implemented by functional water 
agencies, committees and actor networks which 
follow hydrological (river basin) boundaries. These 
functional entities and actor networks are controlled 
by parliamentary institutions.  
 
X 
 
X 
C: Water policy is implemented by autonomous 
(sub) river basin authorities and/or communities 
that are organised along hydrological boundaries. 
These authorities and communities are beyond 
parliamentary control and do have their own polity 
rules. 
  
Legend: the research observations come closest to ideal-type B rules before and after adoption 
of the WFD, as expressed by the ‘X’.  
 
Substantive scope: degree of internal integration 
In 1995 a start has been made with integrated water management planning in Brabant-
West (Waterschap De Dongestroom and Hoogheemraadschap van West-Brabant, 
2000). The then four water quantity management authorities adopted the first genera-
tion integrated water management plans for the 1995 to 1999 period, in coproduction 
with the Brabant-West Water Management Authority. In the second generation inte-
grated water management plans for the 2000 to 2004 period, the integration approach 
has been elaborated further with special emphasis on both water systems and water 
chains (ibid.). The water chain refers to the process from abstraction and production 
of drinking water to waste water treatment and discharge of effluent towards water 
systems. The integrated water systems approach aims at restoring the balance between re-
quirements for land use and conditions for healthy functioning water systems. ‘Sus-
tainable water systems are the fundament for spatial quality of an area, an approach 
which has been incorporated into the Fourth National Water Policy Memorandum 
and the Second Provincial Water Policy Plan.’ (Waterschap De Dongestroom, 2000: 1; 
translation from Dutch added).  
The regional water management authorities focus on four major issues: (1) to 
foster water management based on specific local, natural conditions; (2) clean surface 
and groundwater for healthy and resilient ecosystems; (3) safety against floods; and (4) 
attention to landscape features (ibid.). A distinction is made between requirements for 
agriculture, nature areas and built-up areas. Although the term ‘integrated’ refers to the 
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coherence between water quantity and quality issues and their relations with other 
environmental factors and functions (Waterschap De Dongestroom and Hoogheem-
raadschap van West-Brabant, 2000: 3), in the 2000 to 2004 water management plans 
water quantity and water quality issues are mainly formulated and dealt with as parallel 
key themes. Furthermore, whereas the plans of the water quantity management au-
thorities mainly focus on quantitative issues, the plan of the Brabant-West Water 
Management Authority mainly deals with quality issues (including waste water treat-
ment). 
In generic terms the water management plans mention that restoration of more 
natural retention and discharge patterns will benefit survival of flora and fauna 
(Waterschap De Dongestroom and Hoogheemraadschap van West-Brabant, 2000). 
Interdependencies between individual water systems are not translated into integrated, 
quantified objectives, but covered qualitatively by the implicit notion of the no-shift 
principle: ‘The term “sustainability” (in a generic sense) means that one should pre-
vent a shift of (environmental) problems towards other environmental compartments 
(water, soil and air), towards other areas, or towards the future.’ (ibid.: 22) Given the 
overall aim of sustainable, healthy and resilient water systems, it is remarkable that the 
quantified management objectives in the 2000 to 2000 plans are not explicitly related 
to interdependent surface water and groundwater bodies, but primarily both to water 
quality and quantity requirements for different land and water resources uses (water 
for agriculture, water for built-up areas, water for nature (including fish) and water for 
swimming). The focus of regional and local water management strongly remains on 
balancing different user functions and is embedded in the provincial policy for a 
gradual evolution towards sustainable water use. As expressed yet in the previous 
chapter, the North-Brabant Province aims at a growth of both people and profit, 
while at the same time the planet should be recovered in a sustainable way. 
With the organisational integration of the five regional water authorities into one, 
all-in, inland water management authority, the tendency of bringing together water 
quality and quantity issues consolidates. The context of the National Water Agreement 
(Anonymous, 2003) triggers continued and enforced attention towards an integrated 
water systems approach and the maintenance of a distinction into water chain and 
water systems management. The WFD brings in the need for a river basin manage-
ment approach and more explicit attention to quantified water quality and ecosystem 
restoration objectives (Postma and Laracker, 2005). However the parallelism in coping 
with quality and quantity issues survives and the division of tasks between the 
province and the Brabantse Delta Water Management Authority on groundwater is-
sues may account for a limited focus on relating groundwater and surface water 
management issues by the latter. In the first local WFD implementation planning 
process until 2009, groundwater issues have hardly been covered, to dissatisfaction of 
drinking water companies. Interaction issues of groundwater and surface water issues 
have received little attention so far (Santbergen 2007a and b). 
The observations of this research point at a juxtaposition of ideal-type A and B 
scope rules in the period before adoption of the WFD. The WFD supports the 
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internal integration tendency, although at the local level, emphasis remains on surface 
water issues. Overall, there is an incremental evolution towards dominance of ideal-
type B scope rules in the 2001 to 2009 period (see Table 8.3b).  
 
Table 8.3b: Ideal-type collective-choice IRBM internal integration rules (local level) 
Ideal-type rules↓ 1990 to 2000↓ 2001 to 2009↓ 
A: Separate legislation, policy documents and man-
agement plans for both water quality and quantity 
issues. Surface water and groundwater are dealt with 
in parallel.  
 
X 
 
X 
B: Legislation, policy documents and management 
plans which includes objectives and measures for 
both quantitative and qualitative aspects and for 
groundwater and surface water. 
 
X 
 
X 
C: Legislation, policy documents and management 
plans with integrated objectives and measures for 
related surface and groundwater bodies. 
  
Legend: The research observations come closest to ideal-type A and B rules as expressed by 
the ‘X’. The ‘x’ points at a reduced resemblance of the observations with ideal-type A rules 
after adoption of the WFD. 
 
Substantive scope: degree of external integration 
In the 1990s the water systems approach gradually gets embedded in a more inte-
grated areal approach. In line with national and provincial water policy tendencies, the 
second generation integrated water management plans show more attention to coher-
ence with spatial planning and objectives for nature protection and environmental 
quality (Waterschap De Dongestroom and Hoogheemraadschap van West-Brabant, 
2000). The 2000 to 2004 water management plans include a vision on sustainable wa-
ter systems (ibid.: 22, translation from Dutch added): 
 
Water increasingly is considered as one ordering principle within spatial planning. 
Water management and spatial planning should walk hand in hand in order to arrive 
at sustainable water systems that may optimally fulfil the wishes and requirements 
from user functions and land uses, as accepted by generic democratic governmental 
administrations.   
 
The degree to which the regional water management authority may proceed with its 
assignment considerably depends on the rate of success for integration of water-
related objectives into the assignments of other policy domains. The first General 
Assembly of the Brabantse Delta Water Management Authority points at a reciprocal 
relationship with governmental and other stakeholders (Postma and Laracker, 2005). 
Whereas the water authority delivers a substantial contribution to the rural areas revi-
talisation plans by means of its action programme for implementation of the National 
Water Agreement, other partners contribute to the water-related objectives by their 
investments in the rural areas revitalisation measures (ibid.). Notwithstanding its ex-
plicit focus on integrated areal projects and partnerships, the regional water management 
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authority struggles with the spatial claims for its water-related assignments. Within a 
territory which is dominated by agricultural land uses (circa 63%, Bertens, Santbergen 
and Stark, 2006) the translation of water-related objectives into quantified and local-
ised spatial claims remains a political sensitive issue. Given the predominant voluntary 
nature of land acquisition, progress takes much time and depends on cooperation with 
individual entrepreneurs hence the final results often are critically uncertain (Postma 
and Laracker, 2005). 
In the Dutch context, the functional water management authorities have limited 
options to impose their spatial claims. Although the water assessment procedure for 
spatial plans and human activities (watertoets) has been legally anchored by the Spatial 
Planning Act (Anonymous, 2006), the advice by the regional water management 
authority is not legally binding. Water-related objectives may not optimally survive 
within the broad array of considerations by state, provincial and municipal actors. The 
laborious implementation of the instrument to define desired groundwater and surface 
water tables may serve as another example of the relatively weak position of a regional 
water management authority. The original 2002 deadline for definition of these tables 
has not been fully met at the end of 2009. The periodically heated debates in the gen-
eral assembly between representatives of environmental NGOs and farmers illustrate 
the different definitions, perceptions and interests related to the hydrological instru-
ment.  
On a voluntary basis, the five regional water management autorities in Brabant-
West have drafted a spatial vision with regard to the sustainable water management 
objectives in the 2000 to 2004 Integrated Water Management Plan (Arcadis, 2000). 
This informal vision presents the spatial consequences of implementation of princi-
ples for sustainable water management. The vision for the 2030 to 2050 period in-
cludes water opportunities maps (waterkansenkaarten) which the regional water man-
agement authorities will bring in the revision processes of the provincial spatial policy 
plan and in the rural areas revitalisation processes. The vision and the maps are the 
departure point for the regional water management authorities in testing of the 
(potential) impact of spatial developments, e.g. by means of the water assessment 
procedure. The water management authorities acknowledge that final spatial devel-
opment choices will be made by municipal and provincial authorities; the choices of 
these latter may not be consistent with the water opportunities maps entirely (ibid.). 
 
Within the Brabant-West region, the calls for an integrated areal approach has trig-
gered a bloom of parallel processes with diverse objectives, focuses, deadlines and 
stages which not all by definition contribute to synergetic integration of assignments 
from different policy domains. However, the leapfrog principle is central in the Dutch 
cross-sectoral policy planning procedures (as explained in Subsection 6.3.1). As con-
cluded in Chapter 7, the WFD assignment has not been integrated into the rural areas 
revitalisation process. Furthermore, even at the Brabantse Delta Water Management 
Authority, the WFD implementation planning process has run mainly in parallel with 
other water-related processes. For example, a proposal from the WFD coordinator to 
incorporate the WFD assignment within the process architecture of the integrated 
sub-basin analyses (integrale gebiedsanalyses) which are studies on cost-effective measure 
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combinations for all water-related objectives, was turned down by the management 
team. The managers considered the new European requirements, especially related 
technical procedures and assessment schemes, too complicated for integration in the 
domestic analyses that where already partly lagging behind schedule. Besides, the 
WFD’s numeric objectives were still not available at the beginning of 2006. Explicit 
integration also not took place with the processes for flood and droughts issues. Due 
to stage differences and distinct formal responsibilities, also integration of the local 
Natura 2000 and WFD processes did not take place.  
Despite the strong desire of the national Water Policy Department to integrate 
both processes, the column in the national WFD database that expresses the percent-
age of synergy between WM21 and WFD measures has been abandoned. Not all the 
regional water management authorities filled in this column and the differences be-
tween figures for certain measure types were too diverse as well for an easy harmoni-
sation process. On the contrary, there is an explicit linkage between the rural areas 
revitalisation process and the WM21 process. The regional water management 
authorities in the North-Brabant Province have agreed on a common approach for 
defining water retention programmes (Team Waterberging Brabantse Delta, 2005). 
Reserved areas for future water retention may be incorporated into the second genera-
tion rural areas revitalisation plans as definitive water retention areas. A stakeholders 
consultation process is part of the process, since both ecological objectives and socio-
economic interests are to be taken into account in the decision making process (ibid.). 
These observations on the local level point at ideal-type B IRBM scope rules (see 
Table 8.3c). 
 
Table 8.3c: Ideal-type collective-choice IRBM external integration rules (local level) 
Ideal-type rules↓ 1990 to 2000↓ 2001 to 2009↓ 
A: Separate policy documents and management 
plans for water policy and other policy domains 
without linkages. 
 
 
 
 
B: Policy documents and management plans for 
other policy domains take into account water issues 
and reversely. 
 
X 
 
X 
C: Cross-sector, integrative policies and manage-
ment plans. 
  
Legend: The research observations come closest to ideal-type B rules as expressed by the ‘X’.  
  
8.3.2 Position rules 
As introduced in Subsection 2.2.4, within this research, position rules relate to the 
question as to how do collective (inter-)national river basin governance and policy 
principles affect the positions of owners and users of water and land. Or reversely, 
which conditions should apply to acquisition, continuation and termination of rights 
to own and/or use (interrelated) water and land resources, in order to comply with 
common principles of ecological, social and economic resilience? Three ideal-types of 
position rules have been distinguished (see Table 8.4). With regard to position rules, 
the WFD explicitly addresses relations between water and agriculture and between 
water and nature conservation. Protected areas from both the Nitrates Directive and 
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the Birds- and Habitats Directives are included in the WFD’s register of protected 
areas (European Communities, 2000: 32).  
In the Dutch history of water management, requirements that enable desired 
land uses dominate over limitations for protection of natural processes and ecosystem 
conditions. In theory, the integrated water systems approach aims at a trend reversal: a 
substantial move towards protection of natural processes and ecosystem conditions as 
fundament for sustainable human development (Saeijs, 2006). In practice, at the local 
level, water management authorities and municipalities try to solve the negative con-
sequences from land and water use activities in a coherent and integrated way. They 
do not aim to substantially alter the historic rights of land owners and users. The 
second integrated water management plans of the regional water management authori-
ties in Brabant-West struggle with the provincial dilemma of sustainable restoration of 
natural values, while at the same time offering sufficient room for economic growth, 
housing, working and recreation (Waterschap De Dongestroom and Hoogheemraad-
schap van West-Brabant, 2000). The water management plans subtly point at a fragile 
relationship with land owners and users (ibid.: 5; translation from Dutch added): ‘The 
development of sustainable water systems and sustainable water management may not 
happen without the support of and cooperation with land owners and users.’  
Like all Dutch regional water management authorities, the Brabantse Delta Water 
Management Authority distinguishes between water chain and water systems 
management. The water chain part relates to collection, transportation and treatment 
of urban and industrial waste water, whereas the water systems part covers fresh water 
flows to and from inland water systems, ecological restoration and flood prevention 
and mitigation issues. The tax system reflects the distinction in tasks for water chain 
and water systems management by relating these to water users’ categories. Until 2008, 
different water users’ categories paid taxes and were represented in the elected 
General Assembly, according to the long-standing principle one that has an interest 
pays and has a voice in management decisions. The 45 seats of the assembly were 
divided among land owners, companies and inhabitants. After a change of national 
law, since 2009 also political parties and water-related interests’ parties may join the 
elections (Anonymous, 2009a; Rijswick and Havekes, 2012). A limited number of nine 
seats (out of 30) have been reserved for land owners, companies and nature site man-
agers (Postma and Laracker, 2009). The tax system has been changed into a mixture of 
solidarity and interests payments (Lievens Communicatie, 2009). In the water management 
history of Brabant-West the establishment of regional water management authorities 
in most cases related to the geographical level of the issues at stake and the organi-
sation of required financial resources (Van den Noort, 2009). In general farmers in 
Brabant-West organise themselves well and manage to dominate the decision-making 
process within the General Assembly, whereas environmental NGOs by far are in the 
minority.  
In its elaboration of the WFD obligations the Brabantse Delta Water Manage-
ment Authority continues the position rules tradition. Although the authority does not 
exclude the expropriation option, it stresses that land acquisition often should happen 
on the basis of voluntary agreements with land owners and users (Postma and Laracker, 
2005). Its programme of measures for the first generation WFD river basin manage-
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ment plans is based on prior land acquisition rates, in order to limit non-compliance 
risks (Santbergen, 2008; Postma and Van den Berg, 2009). The authority views  
voluntary management contracts with farmers for so-called blue-green services as an 
additional option to comply with WFD objectives (ibid.). In general the first WFD 
implementation planning cycle has not altered the formal position of land owners and 
users. Preconditions, e.g. as laid down in license systems, continue and may be slightly 
revised due to changes in water quality and emission standards. Informally, the WFD 
has triggered renewed discussions on the extent of expropriation conditions, albeit 
prudently and without a significant change of rules. These observations point at ideal-
type B IRBM position rules at the local level, both before and after adoption of the 
WFD (see Table 8.4). 
 
Table 8.4: Ideal-type collective-choice IRBM position rules (local level) 
Ideal-type rules↓ 1990 to 2000↓ 2001 to 2009↓ 
A: Protection of prior water and land resources use 
and property rights without preconditions on 
environmental, social and economic externalities. 
 
 
 
 
B: Conditional maintenance and acquirement of 
water and land resources use and property rights. 
Conditions include requirements to consider social, 
economic and/or environmental externalities. 
 
X 
 
X 
C: Reallocation of use and property rights, based on 
interrelated conditions of ecological, economical and 
social resilience. 
  
Legend: The research observations come closest to ideal-type B rules as expressed by the ‘X’.  
 
8.3.3 Boundary rules 
As defined in Subsection 2.2.5, in this research boundary rules are interpreted as re-
lated to who have access to the river basin management planning and decision-making 
process and who have not? What are conditions for entry and exit? What are the de-
grees of participation for different stakeholder categories? Three ideal-types of bound-
ary rules have been distinguished (see Table 8.5). 
 
In the Dutch water policy planning tradition informal consultation often takes place 
prior to formal procedures. For example, in drafting the second integrated water man-
agement plans the regional water management authorities have consulted municipali-
ties, the province and other groups of interests by means of both multi-stakeholder 
platforms and bilateral meetings (Waterschap De Dongestroom and Hoogheemraad-
schap van West-Brabant, 2000). Additionally, during an 8 weeks period, anyone was 
allowed to raise voices. In case of final disagreement one could appeal at the Court of 
Justice against adoption of the plan (ibid.). Remarkably the second integrated water 
management plans do not refer to received remarks and objections and the ways they 
are dealt with. The plans of the regional water management authorities are subject to 
formal approval by the Executive Board of the North-Brabant Province. 
Within the International Meuse River Basin District the regional water manage-
ment authorities, supported by municipal water ambassadors, take the lead in local 
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areal processes on defining ecological objectives and identifying and selecting cost-
effective WFD measures. These relatively autonomous local WFD planning processes 
differ in terms of degree of integration with other policy domains and active involve-
ment of environmental NGOs and socio-economic interest groups (with information 
sessions, consultation platforms and/or interactive workshops). In the Brabant-West 
area, there is poor integration with other local processes, such as WM21, Natura 2000 
and rural area revitalisation. In the Limburg Province, the officials mention a close 
cooperation between provinces and regional water management authorities in the 
local WFD processes.  
For the 2005 to 2008 period the then new Brabantse Delta Water Management 
Authority explicitly provides people (customers, voters and partners) a central position 
in its mission (Postma and Laracker, 2005: 15, 17; translation from Dutch added):  
 
The water management authority chooses to leave behind the old-fashioned image of 
a technically oriented, autistic organisation. Contemporary society desires a customer-
oriented attitude and transparent, well balancing of interests. The inland water man-
agement authority opts for dialogues, alliances building and partnerships with Euro-
pean, national, provincial and local stakeholders. [..] Since available land is limited, 
water management measures almost always “touch” other interests. Consequently, at 
present, it is hardly impossible to implement those measures without cooperation 
from citizens, local authorities and other parties. 
 
Given this mission statement, the ambition of the regional water management autho-
rity for an interactive and participative WFD approach fits well. The degree of partici-
pation is a mixture of information, consultation and co-thinking. Although the areal process in 
Brabant-West is mentioned in the WFD Meuse documents as the most participative 
one, at the end of the first implementation planning cycle they are the water authority 
and the municipalities who decide on the WFD objectives and measures. In retro-
spect, this local WFD process has been less interactive and participatory as initially 
perceived by or hoped for by some actors.  
As concluded in Chapter 6, the Dutch national Water Policy Department con-
siders the Dutch information and consultation traditions fully in line with the WFD’s  
requirements of  Article 14. At the local level, the Brabantse Delta Water Management 
Authority initiates the Brabant-West WFD Consultation Platform with drinking water 
companies, environmental NGOs, estate owners and other interest groups (for agri-
culture, industry, navigation and (water) recreation). The dike-reef of the regional 
water management authority chairs the consultation platform meetings. There are no 
written down rules of the game. A process evaluation shows that in general the plat-
form participants have appreciated the information as provided by the water authority. 
Although the platform meetings have provided for a valuable overview of viewpoints 
and interests, the discussed information has been predominantly provided by the  
public actors. In the opinion of the participants, the process could have been more 
interactive in order to trigger creativity.  
The Brabant Environmental Federation (BMF) criticises the lack of financial re-
sources from the side of the governments for capacity building of interests groups. 
Almost all participants mention a lack of human and financial resources for participa-
376 CHAPTER 8 
 
ting at the large number of consultation platforms in the Brabant-West Region. For 
example, the WFD platform runs in parallel with the over 20 consultation platforms 
for every sub-basin in which an integrated assessment study is conducted. Also, for 
the WM21 assignment, separate consultation rounds take place. Finally, the regional 
water management authority periodically organises bilateral relation management talks 
with non-governmental stakeholder categories. Additionally, the North-Brabant 
Province organises areal advisory committees for individual Natura 2000 sites and 
chairs the Rural Areas Revitalisation Committees in which both governmental and 
non-governmental stakeholders participate.  
These observations point at a continuation of Dutch traditions in the period after 
adoption of WFD. A strong divide remains between the governments and regional 
water management authorities who take decisions and non-governmental stakeholders 
who are informed and consulted. In the water management planning processes at the 
local level, ideal-type B IRBM boundary rules are dominant (Table 8.5).  
 
Table 8.5: Ideal-type collective-choice IRBM boundary rules (local level) 
Ideal-type rules↓ 1990 to 2000↓ 2001 to 2009↓ 
A: Access to the river basin management planning 
process is restricted to public actors only. Other 
stakeholders are informed. 
 
 
 
 
B: Non-governmental actors may have access to the 
river basin management planning process under 
conditions set by the public actors. Emphasis on co-
thinking and consultation. 
 
X 
 
X 
C: Ample opportunities for all interested 
stakeholders to join the river basin management 
planning process, including co-productions, 
co-decisions and self-realisation. 
 
 
 
 
Legend: The research observations come closest to ideal-type B rules as expressed by the ‘X’.  
 
 
8.3.4 Choice rules 
As introduced in Section 2.2.6, for the aim of this research, two indicators for identifi-
cation of choice rules change have been defined. The first indicator concerns water 
supply and demand rules. Three ideal-types have been identified for this indicator, 
ranging from a focus on water supply only to integrated demand and supply manage-
ment in which a hierarchy of functions may apply, as conditioned by fresh water avail-
ability and protection of the ecological life support system (see Table 8.6a). The 
second indicator expresses the nature of the license system. Ideal-types range from 
separate, parallel licenses for quality and quantity objectives for the development, 
management and use of water resources, towards integrated licenses for interdepend-
ent natural resources (including water; see Table 8.6b).  
 
Supply and demand management 
In the Brabant-West area, the Brabantse Delta Water Management Authority pays 
attention to both supply and demand management, even though the linkages are 
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rather implicit and there are more instruments available for supply management 
(www.brabantsedelta.nl as consulted on June, 20, 2011). In supply management, ar-
guments on economic efficiency, social equity and ecosystem protection all play a role. 
Under average hydrological conditions, there is no explicit written down 
hierarchy between these arguments. Implicit choices are made by means of zoning of 
land and water user functions, such as in areas which are dominated by agricultural 
land use options for anti-desiccation measures are considered more limited. In the 
history of Brabant-West, provincial policies have stimulated the development of large-
scale agricultural production, for example as triggered by the creation of the fresh 
water Volkerak-Zoom Lake. Land use within the majority of water systems basins is 
dominated by agriculture. However, the total volume of groundwater to be abstracted 
annually by farmers in the North-Brabant Province is restricted to 40,000 m3 (Inter-
views 44 and 48, Interviews). 
Regarding fresh water demand the region is not self-sufficient. Figure 8.2 shows a 
scheme of the water system in the Brabant-West area, including the present external 
water inlet options (Douben, 2010). The grey-coloured dots mark the fresh water inlet 
and/or outlet points. In the higher sandy parts in the south, the three inlet points 
indicate the (natural) inflow from the upstream parts in the Flemish region of Bel-
gium. The grey-coloured dot in the eastern part indicates the inlet point at Oosterhout, 
which may also be used as an outlet in case of calamities (most notably when large 
discharge quantities occur, e.g. after periods of heavy and prolonged rainfall).  
 
 
Figure 8.2: scheme of the water systems connections in West-Brabant  
(Source: Douben, 2010) 
 
The two inlet points at the western part (Dintelsas and Benedensas) may function both as 
inlets for water from the Volkerak-Zoom Lake (in dry periods) and as outlets to the 
lake (in Autumn and Winter, normally the wet seasons). Annually, whenever water 
volumes from the upstream brook systems (Mark, Aa of Weerijs and Molenbeek) are 
insufficient, fresh water is imported from the downstream Volkerak-Zoom Lake 
(Douben, 2010). In cases of blooms of toxic blue-green algae, the inlet from the lake 
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stops and fresh water supplies comes from the alternative inlet at Oosterhout (at the 
eastern side of the territory; ibid.).  
The Brabant-West area is sensitive for fresh water shortages and for its water 
demand, significantly depends on external resources. From March until September, 
the average need for external fresh water ranges between 0.7 and 6.2 m3/s (Witteveen 
+ Bos, 2010). The maximum demand for external water (based on a dry year with a 
proba-bility chance of once every 10 years) is 8.7 m3 per second (ibid.). The demand 
relates to agriculture, navigation and water quality/ecology requirements. In the clay 
parts in the north of the region, water level decisions include conditions and restric-
tions for water users. The water systems management and uses regulation of the Brabantse 
Delta Water 
Management Authority includes generic and specific rules for fresh surface water ab-
stractions from and discharges to the inland water systems (Waterschap Brabantse 
Delta, 2009). According to Article 4.8, one needs a license for abstractions from or 
discharges to a surface water system of 100 m3 per second or more. Within protected 
areas, any discharges and abstractions are not allowed without a license (Article 4.10). 
For amounts between 50 and 100 m3 per second, one shall announce the regional 
water management authority (Article 4.11; ibid.). Rules for groundwater abstractions 
and infiltrations are covered by both the North-Brabant Province (deep groundwater 
layers) and the Brabantse Delta Water Management Authority (shallow groundwater 
layers). A license is required for shallow groundwater abstractions of more than 10 m3 
per second (Waterschap Brabantse Delta, 2009; Article 4.15). For specific cases (re-
lated to temporary activities with limited amounts) an announcement duty applies 
(Article 4.17 and 4.18; ibid.).  
Notwithstanding the presence of quantitative limits for abstractions from and 
discharges to surface water and groundwater bodies, there is no explicit overall vision 
on an integrated demand and supply management approach. Human activities as well 
as ecosystem functions are served without explicit definition of conditions for their 
sustainable interrelations. Partly due to both critical uncertainties in available know-
ledge on these interdependencies and controversies among user interests, the desired 
groundwater and surface water tables have still not been defined for all the sub-basins 
in the territory of the Brabantse Delta Water Management Authority. For practical 
reasons, there is also no overview available of the (large) number of actors who ab-
stract or discharge of smaller amounts of surface water (less than 50 m3 per second) 
and groundwater (less than 10 m3 per second). Consequently, their impact on the state 
and functioning of the aquatic and related terrestrial ecosystems is not well known. In 
periods of prolonged droughts the national priority instrument for the distribution of 
available fresh water is applied which includes a hierarchy of user functions. Functions 
for protection of human life and prevention of irreversible deterioration of natural 
processes are among first priorities. In cases of extreme droughts, too much water 
and/or severe water quality conditions, the regional water management authority may 
limit or prohibit water abstractions and/or discharges/infiltrations (Waterschap Bra-
bantse Delta, 2009; Article 4.22). 
With regard to the WFD, the water systems management and uses regulation in-
cludes an empty Section 2 which is reserved for future rules with regard to ecological 
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quality requirements (Waterschap Brabantse Delta, 2009). The explanation to this 
section does not provide clues for the nature and extent of potential future rules 
(ibid.). The authority struggled with specification of this section. Although detailed 
national water quality standards have been provided (Ministerie van Volkshuisvesting, 
Ruimtelijke Ordening, en Milieu (2009a), this national regulation leaves open critical 
questions for smaller water systems which have not been delineated as WFD water 
bodies. Another reason for not written down preferences or rules may be the struc-
tural need for water supply from extraterritorial sources. An explicit quantification of 
requirements for ecosystem protection (if ever fully scientifically manageable) might 
not be feasible when knowing that water demand exceeds available sources. And al-
though water saving investments certainly may contribute, they won’t be able to fully 
fill the gap. This observation does not discount the joint efforts by the regional water 
management authority (and its predecessors), drinking water companies and the agri-
cultural sector for demand-side management since the early 1990s. In the local WFD 
implementation planning process up tol 2009, demand and supply management issues 
did not receive much attention. The main focus has been on waste water treatment, 
emission reduction from diffuse water pollution sources and ecological restoration of 
brooks and creeks (including fish migration) and water-dependent terrestrial nature 
sites.  
 
In summary: under average hydrological circumstances, a mixture of economic 
efficiency, social equity and ecosystem protection arguments condition the choice 
rules. The interrelations between these conditions are not explicitly made clear. For 
periods of prolonged droughts, a hierarchy of user functions applies, based on the 
limited availability of fresh water and emphasising prevention of irreversible changes 
to natural processes. With regard to the supply and demand indicator, until December 
2009, the WFD did not influence the local water management practices substantially. 
These observations point at a juxtaposition of (elements from) ideal-type B and C 
IRBM choice rules (see Table 8.6a). 
 
Table 8.6a: Ideal-type collective-choice IRBM supply and demand rules (local level) 
Ideal-type rules↓ 1990 to 2000↓ 2001 to 2009↓ 
A: Water supply management determines availability 
of fresh water for user functions. 
 
 
 
 
B: Mixed supply and demand management deter-
mines fresh water availability without a hierarchy in 
user functions. 
 
X 
 
X 
C: Integrated supply and demand management, as 
expressed by a hierarchy in user functions.   
X X 
Legend: The research observations come closest to ideal-type B and C rules as expressed by 
the ‘X’.  
 
 
380 CHAPTER 8 
 
Nature of the license system 
Before adoption of the WFD the Provincial Water Regulation of North-Brabant in-
cluded license rules for both groundwater and surface water abstractions (Provincie 
Noord-Brabant, 1992). The former were elaborated more in detail by the Province, 
whereas the latter were the concern of the regional water quantity authorities (ibid.). 
Emissions of point sources of pollution were regulated by means of the national Sur-
face Water Pollution Act (Anonymous, 1970). Regulations for diffuse sources of pol-
lution were more diffuse in nature, as partly covered by the Surface Water Pollution 
Act and the Manure Act (Anonymous, 1986b). As described in Chapter 6, the WFD’s 
river basin management approach has been amomg the main three reasons for 
establishing an integrated water policy act at the national level, including one coordi-
nation system that brings together licenses for water related activities. The general 
philosophy of the Water Act (Anonymous, 2009b) is to arrange as much as water-
related activities as possible by generic, national rules. However, for some specific 
activities a license remains obligatory (ibid.). The water management and uses regula-
tion of the Brabantse Delta Water Management Authority refers to the national Water 
Act (Waterschap Brabantse Delta, 2009). The licenses system for water related activi-
ties in Brabant-West includes water quality and water quantity and relates to the man-
agement and use of both surface water and ground water sources. The water license 
system has not been integrated into the environmental licenses system. Part of the 
groundwater licences remains under the responsibility of the North-Brabant Province. 
The observations of this research point at an evolution from dominance of ideal-
type A IRBM choice rules before adoption of the WFD towards dominance of ideal-
type B rules after adoption (see Table 8.6b). The WFD has been one of the three main 
reasons for a more integrated water licenses system in the Netherlands. 
 
Table 8.6b: Ideal-type collective-choice IRBM licences rules (local level) 
Ideal-type rules↓ 1990 to 2000↓ 2001 to 2009↓ 
A: Separate, parallel licenses for quality and quantity 
objectives related to the use, development and 
management of water resources. 
 
X 
 
 
X 
B: Licences that integrate quantity and quality objec-
tives related to the use, development and manage-
ment of water resources. 
  
X 
C: Integrated licenses for interrelated use, develop-
ment and,management of natural resources (e.g. air, 
water, land). 
  
Legend: The research observations come closest to ideal-type A and B rules as expressed by 
the ‘X’. The ‘x’ points at a reduced resemblance of the observations with ideal-type A rules 
after adoption of the WFD. 
 
8.3.5 Aggregation Rules 
As defined in Section 2.2.7, a major collective-choice challenge of IRBM concerns the 
issue as to how arrange decision-making at interrelated political levels within shared 
(inter)national river basins with the aim to reach common understanding and broad 
public support for collective choices. The aggregation rules may appear in different 
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 ways, as expressed by identified ideal-types (see Table 8.7). The aggregation question 
‘who should make and who should agree with adaptations of prior rules and with new 
rules?’ shows redundancy with boundary rules. For the purpose of this research the 
question who is involved in planning and decision-making and to which degree (such 
as information, consultation and co-decision) is covered by boundary rules (see Sub-
section 8.3.3). The aggregation rules concentrate on the coherence between and the 
nature of decision-making at different administrative levels within a river basin. 
 
Within the International Meuse River Basin District there is a clear aggregation border 
between the Limburg and North-Brabant Provinces. Before adoption of the WFD the 
regional water management authorities within each province coordinate their activities 
with the province. Coordination between both provinces does not take place at a 
regular basis. The WFD implementation planning process triggers interprovincial 
coordination although own planning traditions and practices remain dominant (Inter-
views 41, 44, 46, Appendix I). Despite incidental information exchange meetings with 
the Flemish authorities, no transboundary coordination of the WFD assignment takes 
place. The decision-making processes at the multilateral and the local level take place 
rather independently. This may be explained by the differences in focus level (the 
entire international Meuse River and inland water systems respectively) and the level 
of abstractness of issues at stake. European guidance documents have not been dis-
cussed at the local level. Their impact flows mainly indirectly through the translation 
into national instructions and guidance documents.   
In the decentralised unitary state tradition of the Netherlands, it is up to the func-
tional regional water management authorities and the municipalities to translate na-
tional and provincial water policies into local management practices. Given the diver-
sity of water user categories and significant tensions between water demands for agri-
culture and nature protection within Brabant-West, the General Assembly of the 
Brabantse Delta Water Management Authority continuously has to strive for com-
promises. Consensus oriented, coalition seeking behaviour dominates in this area which is 
well-known for its history of implicit, not written down rules and large number of 
covenants (Interviews 28, 30 and 34, Appendix I). Within the General 
Assembly, representatives of environmental NGOs and nature site managers are the 
minority, whereas farmers’ interests are far more dominant and join the governing 
coalition. See also Subsection 8.4.3 on distribution of resources and power.  
Notwithstanding a series of interactive workshops, the local WFD implementa-
tion planning process has been dominated by experts at municipalities and the water 
management authority. Non-governmental actors have been mainly informed and 
consulted by meetings of the Brabant-West WFD Consultation Platform. The creation 
of a special multi-stakeholder platform for the WFD perfectly fits in the local tradition 
of informal information and consultation practices. In addition to the the platform 
meetings and workshops, grass-roots information sessions have been organised for 
agricultural interest groups and environmental NGOs. Local WFD pilot projects have 
been initiated in the search for synergetic and innovative WFD measures (especially 
with farmers and municipal actors).  
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Due to a focus on larger water systems for delineation of WFD water bodies, smaller 
water systems (including isolated urban ones) have been excluded. This distinction has 
triggered a difference in priority setting which is not intended by the WFD and may 
have hindered active involvement of some municipal actors. Another barrier may have 
been the national decision not to prescribe a legally binding municipal plan figure for 
anchorage of the WFD requirements. However, generally municipal actors have 
valued the offered room for manoeuvre positive. Within Brabant-West, the fear of 
European obligations in combination with the benchmarking approach by the regional 
water management authority and the municipal water ambassadors have played a more 
dominant role than the lack of a uniform plan figure. Overall, the local WFD imple-
mentation planning process has boosted cooperation efforts between the regional 
water management authority and municipalities, for example as expressed by one of 
the municipal water ambassadors (Interview 26, Appendix I; translation from Dutch 
added): 
 
The strongest benefit from the WFD implementation planning process has been the 
creation of a network for exchange of experiences among municipal water colleagues. 
Furthermore, the relationship between the regional water management authority and 
municipalities has been improved due to increased acknowledgement of a common 
interest for water quality amelioration. Compared to other areal processes, the WFD 
has been much more focused on deliberations among relevant (and equivalent) part-
ners and less on technical aspects only. 
 
The research observations point at a juxtaposition of ideal-types B and C both before 
and after adoption of the WFD (see Table 8.7). Given European obligations, top-
down instructions should prevent non-compliance fines from the EC. At the same 
time, the national Water Policy Department emphasises the importance of enough 
room for regional and local tailor made implementation proposals, in order to gener-
ate support for the river basin management plans. The regional water management 
authorities are pronounced exponents of a mixed top-down and bottom-up approach. 
Although the authorities will have to comply with national water rules, it is up to their 
general assemblies to decide on local implemenation measures. One might argue 
whether ideal-type A rules also apply with regard to the linkages between the multilat-
eral and the local level. Since local actors participate at the multilateral level (e.g. in 
working-groups of the International Meuse River Commission), the argument here is 
that decision-making does not take place independently. It is rather the differences in 
focus and level that may cause a perception of independent processes. Remarkably, 
the Second Integrated Water Management Plan for Brabant-West refers to European, 
national and provincial policies as guiding, whereas the International Meuse River 
Commission has not been mentioned (Waterschap De Dongestroom and Hoogheem-
raadschap West-Brabant, 2000). 
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Table 8.7: Ideal-type collective-choice IRBM aggregation rules (local level) 
Ideal-type rules↓ 1990 to 2000↓ 2001 to 2009↓ 
A: Independent decision-making on water policy 
and management plans at different administrative 
levels within a river basin. 
 
 
 
 
B: Asymmetric, top-down decision-making on water 
policy and management plans at different adminis-
trative levels within a river basin: lower levels have 
to comply with the rules from the higher levels. 
 
X 
 
X 
C: Symmetric, consensus based decision making on 
water policy and management plans at different 
administrative levels: mixed top-down and bottom-
up rules. 
 
X 
 
X 
Legend: The research observations come closest to ideal-type B and C rules as expressed by 
the ‘X’. 
 
8.3.6 Information rules 
As defined in Section 2.2.8, one major collective-choice challenge of IRBM is to col-
lect, aggregate and present information in such a way that river basin management 
plans are acknowledged and supported by a majority of interested public and non-
governmental stakeholders. A critical dimension of this challenge is the types of in-
formation that are considered legitimate in combination with the nature of the collec-
tion and aggregation process. The focus of this research is on this critical dimension. 
Three ideal-type information rules have been identified (see Table 8.8).  
 
In general before the WFD’s adoption the water quantity and water quality manage-
ment authorities in Brabant-West collect and aggregate information into their own 
water management plans. Since 1995, these authorities coordinate their activities to 
draft an integrated water management plan. By means of bilateral talks and multi-
stakeholder platform meetings the authorities informally consult municipalities, the 
province and non-governmental interests groups, conform provincial rules (Water-
schap De Dongestroom and Hoogheemraadschap West-Brabant, 2000). After the 
drafting stage the integrated water management plan is subject to a formal consulta-
tion procedure (ibid.). In general, differences of opinion do not concern the aggre-
gated facts and figures but rather the chosen ambitions in terms of objectives and 
measures. Emphasis is on technical-scientific and socio-economic arguments. 
In the WFD implementation planning process the complexity of the information 
aggregation challenge increases since the local choices are explicitly subject to regional 
coordination and national harmonisation. In Brabant-West, the areal WFD coordina-
tor at the Brabantse Delta Water Management Authority, inspired by the European 
guidance documents, proposed to broaden the new water management plan to a 
shared sub-basin plan of water authorities, municipalities and whenever possible 
which includes contributions from environmental NGOs and socio-economic inter-
ests groups. Both within and outside the regional water management authority there 
has been insufficient support for this proposal. The final 2010-2015 Water Manage-
ment Plan (Van Den Berg and Postma, 2009) only includes aggregated information  
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related to the formal obligations of the regional water management authority istself. 
The plan is mainly available as Internet application which makes cross-references with 
other websites possible and enlarges public access of information which may also be 
updated anytime (ibid.). The formal consultation procedure makes clear that the  
aggregated facts and figures as aggregated by the regional water management authority 
generally are acknowledged by the other stakeholders. Differences of opinion mainly 
occur about the chosen objectives and implementation rates of measures (Van Den 
Berg, 2009).  Emphasis within the plan is on technical-scientific and socio-economic 
arguments.  
In summary, the observations of this research point at a juxtaposition of ideal-
type A and B rules before and after adoption of the WFD (see Table 8.8). In general, 
information as aggregated in the water management documents is supported by a 
majority of stakeholder categories. Differences of opinion mostly refer to stances on 
conclusions about formulated objectives, selected measures and related socio-
economic consequences.  
 
Table 8.8 Ideal-type collective-choice IRBM information rules at (local level) 
Ideal-type rules↓ 1990 to 2000↓ 2001 to 2009↓ 
The river basin management planning process (defi-
nition of means and ends) is predominantly driven 
by expert information and knowledge from the 
natural sciences. Validity and reliability are central 
criteria for legitimised information and knowledge. 
 
X 
 
X 
The river basin management planning process (defi-
nition of means and ends) is predominantly driven 
by expert information and knowledge from the 
economic sciences. Costs-benefits ratios and eco-
nomic efficiency are central criteria for legitimised 
information and knowledge. 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
The river basin management planning process (defi-
nition of means and ends) is driven by information 
and knowledge from multiple disciplines and both 
from experts and lays. Joint fact finding and social 
robustness are central criteria for legitimised infor-
mation and knowledge. 
  
Legend: The research observations come closest to ideal-type A and B rules as expressed by 
the ‘X’. 
 
8.3.7 Pay-off rules 
As defined in Section 2.2.9, pay-off rules point at the incentives and deterrents for 
action (Ostrom, 2005). In interaction with other rule types pay-off rules affect the net 
benefits and costs that will be assigned to particular combinations of actions and out-
comes (ibid.). In the context of this research, three ideal-types IRBM pay-off rules 
have been identified (see Table 8.9). 
In addition to legislative rewards and sanctions the polluter pays and the user pays are cen-
tral principles in the local water management domain. In general one pays for drinking 
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water consumption and waste water treatment by means of user prices and taxes. Cost 
recovery for water-related services is not 100%, since for example farmers do not fully 
pay for individual surface water and shallow ground water abstractions (indirectly, by 
means of the water system management tax, they pay part of these costs). To a certain 
extent water abstractions and discharges are subject to a license system. The first 
WFD implementation planning cycle does not alter the pay-off rules significantly. The 
leading principles remain the same and the chosen process architecture resembles 
Dutch planning traditions with a clear divide between governmental authorities (who 
decide) and other actors (who are to be informed and consulted).  
The chosen WFD process approach in Brabant-West does not trigger an active 
multiple stakeholder search for trade-off opportunities by (sub-) basin communities. 
Inspired by the feasibility and affordability mantra the governmental actors rethink their 
ambitions, opt for a staged implementation and label prior objectives and measures as 
WFD proof. Notwithstanding some promising results of local pilot projects to test 
new techniques with farmers (Waterschap Brabantse Delta, 2007), the positive spirit 
easily dampens without a follow-up and without continuous financial support of the 
governments. In general different interests groups seem to stick to the well-known 
heaven of raising opinions for defending own interests. The WFD process so far does 
not trigger their willingness to invest in collaborative capital for collective arrange-
ments that may benefit all (at the expense of initial investments by all).  
The observations of this research point at a juxtaposition of ideal-type A and B 
IRBM pay-off rules both before and after adoption of the WFD (see Table 8.9).   
 
Table 8.9 Ideal-type collective-choice IRBM pay-off rules (local level) 
Ideal-type rules↓ 1990 to 2000↓ 2001 to 2009↓ 
A: Rewards and sanctions from laws and regulations 
are major drivers for compliance with collective 
rules (e.g. as expressed by standards and license 
conditions). 
 
X 
 
X 
B: Economic incentives and market forces are major 
drivers for compliance with collective rules.   
 
X 
 
X 
C: (Sub-) basin communities voluntarily invest 
resources (human, financial, expertise) as collabora-
tive capital for compliance with collective-choice 
rules. 
  
Legend: The research observations come closest to ideal-type A and B rules as expressed by 
the ‘X’.  
 
 
8.4 Local rules in the context of policy discourses, actors and resources 
and power 
 
In the previous section, observed IRBM rules types at the local level (within the Bra-
bant-West part of the international Meuse River Basin District) have been presented, 
both for the period 1990 to 2000 (before adoption of the WFD) and the period 2001 
to 2009 period (the first WFD implementation planning cycle). As described in  
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Chapter 2, rules development over time should be best studied in relation to (changes 
in) the other three dimensions of a policy arrangement: policy discourses, actors (coalitions 
and oppositions) and the distribution of resources and power. Observations on these 
three dimensions may deliver potential explanations for observed (changes in) rules 
types. Since the WFD has elaborated the IRBM paradigm into a uniform set of rules 
and principles for all European water resources, one may expect rules changes to  
occur depending on the extent to which the new rules fit into the domestic rules,  
traditions and practices. In other words: how new are the IRBM discourse and its 
related rules? To which extent do these trigger changes in the distribution of resources 
and power and actors constellations? Given the new European policy discourse as a 
starting-point for this research, this section begins with the policy discourses 
dimension of the policy arrangement approach.   
 
8.4.1 Policy discourses 
As explained in Subsection 2.3.2, with regard to policy discourses, Wiering and Arts 
(2006) distinguish three layers: (1) world views or paradigms (which are most difficult 
to influence), (2) policy and governance principles (which are the actors’ utopias) and 
(3) operational rules and practices (e.g. daily water management routines which are 
relatively easy to alter). Table 8.10 summarises the observed governance and policy 
principles in the Dutch local water policy domain in the period 1990 to 2009. Al-
though governance principles are interpreted here as mainly organisational in nature 
and policy principles as substantive, certain redundancy may occur. Furthermore, 
some principles may relate to multiple rules types. To a considerable extent the local 
paradigms and principles resemble the ones at the national and regional level (see the 
Subsections 6.4.1 and 7.4.1 respectively). 
Although the WFD institutionalises IRBM at the European level, the paradigm is 
not new in the Dutch water policy domain. The WFD enters the Dutch water policy 
domain in an era in which the integrated water systems approach already grained both sub-
stantive and organisational ground (scope rules). Yet in the second half of the 1980s, the 
integrated water systems approach appears in the Dutch water policy landscape, fol-
lowed by interactive policy making and incorporation of water issues into local areal proc-
esses in the 1990s. As concluded in Chapter 6, the IRBM approach from the WFD is 
among the three main reasons for a national integrated water act. In the 1990s the 
merging process in Brabant-West continues, with four water quantity management 
and a water quality management authority as the outcome. The integrated water sys-
tems approach triggers a cooperation process among the five authorities for drafting 
one integrated water management plan for the entire territory. In 2004, a new regional 
water management authority opens its door, after merging of the five water authorities 
(Postma and Laracker, 2005). The newborn administration takes both water quantity 
and water quality issues on board. In general, the WFD has provided supporters of an 
integrated water management approach with an additional argument. 
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Table 8.10: Policy discourses and rules at the Dutch local level (periode 1990 tol 2009) 
Type of rule↓ Policy discourses↓ 
Scope:  Governance principles: Informal river basin management planning 
coordination; Mixed local implementation planning and regional 
coordination; Parallel local WM21, WFD and Natura 20000 imple-
mentation processes; Pragmatic coalition building with upstream 
Flemish actors. Policy principles: Integrated management of water 
quality and quantity issues; Taking into account relations between 
surface water and groundwater bodies; Water as a guiding principle in 
spatial planning. 
Position: Governance principles: Protection of historical land property and 
user rights; Land acquisition based on voluntary agreements; Blue-
green services contracts with farmers Policy principles: Zoning of 
user functions and nature protection sites;. 
Boundary (en-
try or exit):  
Governance principles: Conditioned access for non governmental 
actors (with emphasis on information and consultation); Informal 
consultation of interest groups in addition to, prior to formal consul-
tation; Drinking water companies are considered private actors. 
Choice (au-
thority): 
Governance principles: Maximal room for socio-economic develop-
ment within the context of European obligations; Generic rules over 
individual licenses; Those who have an interest pay and have a say in 
supply and demand management. Policy principles: Zoning of user 
functions; Combined emission-immission approach; Hierarchy of 
water uses in case of droughts; Prevention of irreversible hydro-
morphological alterations/prevention of significant damage; No 
deterioration at the level of water bodies. 
Aggregation: Governance principles: A mixed bottom-up and top-down WFD 
implementation process; National authorities should provide for 
generic diffuse emission sources policies; Interest groups have a say 
in local WFD implementation decisions by their representatives in 
the General Assembly of the regional water management authority; 
Informal consultation of interest groups prior to formal consultation; 
Synchronisation of water policy/management plans (due to the 
WFD). Policy principles: A level playing field for socio-economic 
sectors across Europe; A strict divide between European obligations 
& regional/local intentions; Tailor-made local WFD implementation. 
Information: Governance principles: Joint fact finding by public actors. Policy 
principles: Scientific knowledge reduces uncertainties; Costs should 
not outweigh the benefits. 
Pay-off: Governance principles: Generic rules over individual licences; Strict 
implementation of European obligations by a staged approach; Joint 
implementation by co-financing of measures. 
Policy principles: Polluters and users pay; Cost-effectiveness; Feasible 
and affordable objectives and measures; Synergetic and innovative 
packages of measures; A level playing field for socio-economic sec-
tors across Europe 
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At the turn into the 21st Century, the five water management authorities did not ex-
pect major changes due to the implementation of the WFD (Waterschap De Dongest-
room and Hoogheemraadschap van West-Brabant, 2000). They expected that, al-
though the consequences for the regional water management authorities were not 
entirely clear, the current organisational structures and planning system would survive 
(ibid.). November 2003, when the national actors are actively involved in a delicate  
political debate on the potentially severe socio-economic consequences of the new 
directive, the regional water management authorities in Brabant-West are busy with 
their merging process. In 2005 the then regional water management authorities in the 
North-Brabant Province have their own WFD wake-up call together when they con-
sider its financial and strategic consequences (Bos, 2005; Bos and De Smit, 2005). 
Although the feasibility and affordability arguments from the national level are incorpo-
rated in the local strategic considerations, the regional water management authorities 
opt for exploring an ambitious implementation approach. They consider the WFD as 
supportive argument for enforced implementation of domestic packages of measures 
for compliance with the provincial water policy objectives.  
The General Assembly of the Brabantse Delta Water Management Authority 
acknowledges that the WFD assignment will bring along significant additional invest-
ment costs (with a range from €65 to €450 millions; Postma and Laracker, 2005). In 
order to anticipate the European obligation terms, the assembly decides to start im-
plementing no regret measures while actively participating in the WFD implementation 
planning process (ibid.). At the same time, at local WFD information sessions in 
Brabant-West, it becomes clear that the majority of municipalities fear the socio-
economic consequences of the new European obligations. With the results of the local 
WFD pilot project the officials and politicians at the Roosendaal Municipality become 
aware of the significant financial consequences (Vroege et al., 2005a and 2005b). They 
stress the need to optimally make use of the offered room for manoeuvre in setting 
the ecological objectives for heavily modified water bodies (ibid.). In the local WFD 
areal process that follows, the feasibility and affordability mantra increasingly gains 
ground. The initial high ambitions of the new regional water management authority 
gradually dampen into a maximally staged WFD implementation until 2027.  
 
The observed policy and governance principles at the local level mainly resemble these 
at the regional level (see Table 8.10 as compared to Table 7.11 in Subsection 7.4.1). 
The WFD discourse does not affect the organisational scope of the Netherlands as a 
decentralised unitary state in which the importance of local tailor-made solutions is 
emphasised (scope rules). The Dutch water systems approach may be considered both a 
predecessor and an exponent of the European river basin management approach. 
Cross-sector integration is aimed by incorporation of the water management objectives 
into local areal processes, such as the rural areas revitalisation approach. The new 
regional water management authority in Brabant-West starts with high ambitions and 
views the WFD as an opportunity to position the administration as the local water 
management coordinator and integrator. However, in Brabant-West, agriculture re-
mains a dominant and influential factor. The local WFD process does not significantly 
alter historical land use and property rights (position rules). Voluntary agreements on 
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land acquisition remain leading with management contracts for blue-green services by 
farmers as best alternative.  
Zoning of land use types and water-related functions in which restoration of eco-
system values is weighed against human development activities is a central choice in 
local supply and demand management (choice rules). The WFD does not substantially 
alter this choice but adds more explicit incorporation of protection of fish species, for 
example by removal of migration barriers. At the local level the evolution towards one 
integrated license system for water-related activities is expressed, amongst others, by 
the one counter philosophy. According to this philosophy, a citizen may apply for one 
license for all water-related activities at the municipal administration (i.e. the front 
office) which takes care of a timely response by all involved authorities (i.e. the back 
office). Furthermore generic rules over individual licenses aim at a reduction of un-
necessary administrative burden. Although the advantage is that all aspects are 
brought together in one license, it does not automatically mean that this license is 
more integrated in nature (Interview 45, Appendix I). The WFD’s policy discourse 
supports the prior integration tendencies at the local level.  
Although the new Brabantse Delta Water Management Authority expresses the 
wish to open up its window to society, local boundary and aggregation rules remain unal-
tered by the WFD. The Dutch tradition of informal information and consultation 
prior to formal consultation rounds survives. Despite experiments with interactive 
policies making in the 1990s and calls for more interactive planning and decision-
making processes in the European guidance documents, the local areal WFD process 
does not trigger such an evolution. Although the Brabant-West WFD Project Team 
aims for interactive workshops and incorporation of measures taken by multiple 
actors (Santbergen, 2007a), local politicians decide to stick to formal requirements in 
the new generation water management plans (Van Den Berg and Postma, 2009). 
Given this focus on formal requirements, it may not come as a surprise that the in-
formation procedures are dominated by public actors.  
At the local level the Brabantse Delta Water Management Authority is considered 
the central water systems information aggregator. Joint fact finding mainly takes place 
between this water authority and the municipal actors and with a strong focus on 
technical and socio-economic arguments (information rules). The participants of the 
WFD pilot project with the Roosendaal Municipality conclude that the distinction 
between WFD water bodies and smaller, urban water systems might hinder active 
involvement of municipal actors (Vroege, 2005a and 2005b; Interviews 25 and 26, 
Appendix I). Furthermore, the new WFD’s goal setting and monitoring requirements 
require additional information collection and aggregation. Several knowledge gaps will 
have to be bridged for identification cost-effective measures (ibid.). 
Although the first General Assembly of the Brabantse Delta Water Management 
Authority initially considers the WFD as opportunity for enforced implementation of 
provincial water policy objectives, gradually the fear of non-compliance fines tempers 
the expectations and ambitions. The national feasibility and affordability mantra offers a 
convenient escape towards a staged implementation approach. Consequently, pay-off 
rules remain focused on a strict interpretation of the European obligations in order to 
prevent the local tax payers from disproportionate costs. Cost-effectiveness, synergy and 
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innovation arguments start to dominate the local WFD implementation process, which 
continue largely running in parallel with other local areal processes. The complicated 
technical nature of the WFD requirements in combination with the uncertainties of 
the directive’s consequences has hindered a more integrated approach with these 
other areal processes. Similar to the observations from the national and provincial 
levels, at the local level, representatives of industry and agriculture often share argu-
ments and repeatedly ask for feasible and affordable objectives and measures. On the 
opposite side they often found the environmental NGOs and managers of nature 
areas who periodically express disappointment with gradual eroding ambitions. Sector 
position papers have dominated the process over arguments that express cross-sector 
coalition building attempts.  
 
8.4.2 Actors 
In general the WFD does not influence actor constellations in Brabant-West dramati-
cally. Classic interests’ divides remain unsolved and sector position papers dominate 
the implementation planning discourse. Within the General Assembly of the Bra-
bantse Delta Water Management Authority, agricultural stakeholders join forces to 
prevent land expropriation for compliance with WFD objectives (position rules). On the 
opposite side they meet environmental NGOs who consider low land acquisition rates 
as major obstacle for a timely and adequate compliance. Remarkably, they share the 
view that, for a level playing field, also municipalities should invest more, for example in 
solving critical sewage spillovers to valuable water systems. Both the Brabantse Delta 
Water Management Authority and the State Waters Management Agency concentrate 
their scope on issues within own territories (scope rules). Although drinking water com-
panies (Evides and Brabant Water) and the North-Brabant Province ask for more atten-
tion to interactions between surface water and groundwater bodies, the main focus 
within the local WFD process remains on surface water issues.  
With regard to boundary and aggregation rules, the sharp distinction between (plan-
ning and decision-making) public actors and other stakeholders (who are to be in-
formed and consulted) is noticeable in the entire 1990 to 2009 period. The local WFD 
implementation planning process provides a cooperation boost between the Brabantse 
Delta Water Management Authority and the municipalities in its territory. A coalition 
of the WFD coordinator at the authority and officials at six major municipalities 
(Woensdrecht, Bergen op Zoom, Roosendaal, Etten-Leur, Breda and Oosterhout), 
including two municipal water ambassadors, guide the way towards joint political con-
ferences and decisions on harmonised lists of WFD measures for the 2010 to 2015 
period. The coalition criticises the limited visibility of the North-Brabant Province in 
the areal WFD process. In turn, the province expects the coalition to include munici-
pal groundwater and Natura 2000 issues as well in the programme of measures.  
Between 1995 and 2000, the Transboundary Mark Basin Committee (TMBC) 
serves the Dutch regional water management authorities well in their pragmatic coali-
tion seeking behaviour with the upstream Flemish actors. Remarkably, the adoption of 
the WFD does not trigger an enforcement of the committee’s activitities. Actors in 
both riparian states struggle with the complicated technical nature of the directive and 
preliminarily focus on domestic coordination issues. The momentum of the trans 
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boundary committee seems to have faded away. On the other hand, the establishment 
of the Flemish Mark and Weerijs Water Management Authority (Waterschap Mark en 
Weerijs) has triggered cooperation attempts by the Antwerp Province and the Bra-
bantse Delta Water Management Authority.  
The local WFD implementation planning process does not have a significant in-
fluence on supply and demand management (choice rules). In a parallel process, the 
Brabantse Delta Water Management Authority, the North-Brabant Province and 
municipalities join forces to reduce administrative burden of water-related licenses (as 
part of the evolution towards an integrated water license system). In the Brabant-West 
WFD Consultation Platform environmental NGOs not only get involved in polarised 
choice debates with farmers organisations but also face opposition from recreational 
fishermen. The latter consider the WFD as a threat to their preferred composition of 
fish stocks and to accessibility of river banks.  
Over the entire 1990 to 2009 period the water management authorities have a 
central position in collection and aggregation of technical and socio-economic figures 
on the state and functioning of the inland water systems (information rules). In the areal 
WFD process municipalities join the forces but suffer from sufficient financial and 
human resources to maintain data on urban sewage systems up to date (Santbergen, 
2010). Despite initial attempts for joint fact finding with multiple stakeholders such as 
by means of workshops and written stakeholders contributions, the final WFD fact 
sheets and the 2010 to 2015 Brabantse Delta Water Management Plan only include 
information from the public actors. With regard to pay-off rules the WFD does not alter 
the dominant preference of the local actors of informal cooperation agreements on a 
voluntary basis over legally binding rewards and sanctions. In general, the WFD sup-
ports the polluter and user pays principles of the Dutch water-related tax system, in 
addition to rewards and sanctions from laws and regulations. 
 
8.4.3 Resources and power 
In the period 1990 to 2000 while the North-Brabant Province turns its scope towards 
integrated areal processes, the regional water management authorities in Brabant-West 
concentrate their resources on integrated water resources management activities (scope 
rules). While the WFD is drafted and adopted at the European level the regional water 
management authorities succeed well in integrating water-related policy objectives and 
measures in the rural areas revitalisation process. In the first three years after adoption 
of the WFD, the water authorities focus on their merging process. Remarkably, 
whereas the North-Brabant Province in 2005 blames the regional water management 
authorities to be too inactive in the WFD implementation planning process, it decides 
to concentrate its own human resources at the rural areas revitalisation and the local 
Natura 2000 processes. In 2005 the first General Assembly of the Brabantse Delta 
Water Management Authority picks up the WFD challenge and, after strategic ses-
sions with the other two major water management authorities in the province, formu-
lates an ambitious and anticipatory WFD implementation strategy. Around 2007, the 
regional water management authority who considers the WFD as an opportunity to 
prove its reason of existence blames the province to be invisible in the local areal 
WFD process.  
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Subsequently, the elections for the second General Assembly coincide with the global 
financial crisis. A political shift of focus takes place: from strong emphasis on anticipa-
tion and cooperation with municipalities (2005 to 2008) to both affordability and dis-
proportionate costs as arguments for a staged implementation and a strong focus on 
own formal responsibilities (since 2009). The new General Assembly decides to stop 
the preparation and implementation of 16 projects in order to avoid disproportionate 
tax increases (Postma and Laracker, 2009). With regard to position rules, the new Gen-
eral Assembly acknowledges the risk of a low land acquisition rate (Postma and 
Laracker, 2009: 29; translation from Dutch added): 
 
Land acquisition may take a long time, hence may cause delays in project implemen-
tation. The regional water management authority tries to accelerate this process. Fur-
thermore, the authority will look for alternatives for acquisition, such as by means of 
combinations with new estates, lease constructions and contracts with landowners 
for blue-green services management. 
 
Analysis of the boundary rules shows an enforcement of cooperation and coordination 
by governmental authorities in the local WFD implementation process. Stimulated by 
the national municipal water ambassadors’ agreement, the WFD process triggers a 
considerable mobilisation of municipal experts and officials, although municipalities 
that house one ambassador are more active than many others without. National au-
thorities have provided €7.2 millions for WFD synergy projects in Brabant-West, in-
cluding cooperation between regional water management authorities and municipali-
ties and including WFD and WM21 integration measures. The Brabantse Delta Water 
Management Authority turns down a request from the Brabant Environmental Fed-
eration for financial support for capacity building in the local WFD process.The 
drinking water companies persistently ask for more attention to interactions between 
groundwater and surface water bodies and offer expertise and text proposals to the 
regional water management authority. Parallel to the WFD process, the drinking water 
companies invest in partnerships with the regional and local governmental authorities, 
the regional water management authority and non-governmental stakeholders, in or-
der to collectively protect drinking water abstraction and production sites. The re-
gional water management authority invests in WFD pilot projects with farmers and 
municipalities to test measured that might deliver both environmental and economic 
gains (Van den Berg and Van Lamoen, 2008).  
Evolutions in choice rules at the national and provincial levels (supply and demand 
management, nature of the license system) also become noticeable at the local level. 
The first WFD implementation planning cycle does not trigger significant changes in 
the distribution of resources and power. Although interactions between surface and 
ground water systems are acknowledged as an important attention issue, emphasis 
within the local process remains at surface water bodies. As part of the Dutch inte-
grated water management evolution, the provincial and municipal authorities and the 
regional water management authority jointly invest in simplifying license procedures 
for water-related activities. The WFD is not the trigger for these investments, but an 
additional argument for support. 
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Within the first implementation planning cycle, the WFD does not trigger significant 
investments in transboundary coordination efforts with actors from the Flemish Re-
gion of Belgium (aggregation rules). Both Dutch and Flemish actors predominantly focus 
on their domestic coordination processes. Furthermore, for the Dutch local actors, 
linkages with the coordination process of the International Meuse Commission are 
not very visible (Interview 28, Appendix I). The Brabantse Delta Water Management 
Authority participates in one of the multilateral working-groups but due to the ab-
stractness of the multilateral process decides to stop its active participation (Interview 
34, Appendix I). Guidance documents of the European Common Implementation 
Strategy (CIS) are not directly incorporated in the local WFD implementation process 
but rather indirectly via national instructions and guidance documents. The ecological 
objectives for heavily modified water bodies have been formulated by the ecologists of 
the regional water management authority and approved by the provincial authority as 
part of its water policy plan. Although initially the provincial and local politicians em-
phasised the room for manoeuvre in defining these objectives, the technical prescrip-
tions were too complicated for active involvement of the politicians. Moreover, ecolo-
gists seized the moment to enforce their position and to incorporate their wishes into 
the aggregation process.  
The local information collection and aggregation process is dominated by the 
public actors and by technical and scoop-economic arguments (information rules). On 
the one hand non-governmental actors express their wish to get more actively in-
volved, while on the other hand they do not want to get formally co-opted. The local 
WFD implementation planning process especially pays off in closer cooperation by 
the regional water management authority and the majority of municipalities in  
Brabant-West. Similar to the national and regional political levels, technical-scientific 
and socio-economic arguments dominate the local water policy domain before and 
after adoption of the WFD. Overall, the WFD process does not provoke significant 
changes in pay-off rules. Formal rewards and sanctions in combination with the pollut-
ers and users pay principles remain the dominant pay-off rules.   
 
 
8.5 Synthesis: Parallel processes and voluntary agreements 
 
In this final section observed collective-choice rules at the Dutch local level are linked 
to observations on the other three policy arrangement dimensions: policy discourses (see 
Subsection 8.4.1), actors (see Subsection 8.4.2) and distribution of resources and power (see 
Subsection 8.4.3). Table 8.11 brings together the observations on all four dimensions. 
The grey-coloured cells indicate remarkable evolutions. The observations on the 
Dutch domestic levels are largely similar.  
The WFD supports the prior started Dutch evolution of internal integration 
(scope rules) and changes in the choice rules (nature of the license system). At the local 
level, the internal integration evolution is hindered by stage differences of parallel areal 
processes and a persistent fear of the obligatory nature of the WFD’s environmental 
objectives. Furthermore, there is a remarkable tradition of unwritten, informal rules, as 
expressed by a strong preference for voluntary agreements.  
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Table 8.11 Observed collective-choice rule-types & potential explanations (local level) 
Rules-types in the 1990 to 2009 period ↓ Potential explanations ↓ 
Scope (organisational): Water policy is imple-
mented by functional water management agencies 
and actors networks which are controlled by 
parliamentary institutions (ideal-type B). 
Functional water management 
authorities; Stable, public ac-
tor/expert-driven water policy 
domain; Integrated River Basin 
Management paradigm 
Scope (internal integration): Enforcement of the 
evolution towards more integrated legislation, 
policy documents and management plans (from 
ideal-type A towards B). 
Integrated River Basin Manage-
ment paradigm; New Public 
 Management paradigm; Tensions 
between land user sectors 
Scope (external integration): Policy documents 
and management plans from other policy domains 
take into account water issues and reversely (ideal-
type B). 
Lack of spatial planning compe-
tences of the regional water man-
agement authorities; Functional 
water management authorities 
Position: Conditional maintenance and acquire-
ment of water and land resources use and prop-
erty rights. Conditions include requirements to 
consider social, economic and/or environmental 
externalities (ideal-type B). 
Dominance of agricultural inter-
ests in the regional water man-
agement authorities;  
Tradition of voluntary agreements 
Boundary: Non-governmental actors may have 
access to the river basin management planning 
process under conditions set by the public actors. 
Emphasis on co-thinking and consultation (ideal-
type B). 
Stable public actor/expert-driven 
water policy domain; Water man-
agement authorities are eager to 
proof their reason of existence. 
Choice (supply and demand management): In 
general a mixed supply and demand management 
approach. In case of prolonged droughts, the 
approach is more integrated in nature as expressed 
by a hierarchy in user functions (juxtaposition of 
ideal-types B and C). 
Dominance of agricultural inter-
ests in the water management 
authority; Integrated River Basin 
Management paradigm; Advocacy 
by environmental NGOs 
Choice (nature of the license system): An evolu-
tion towards a license system that integrates quan-
tity and quality objectives related to the use, de-
velopment and management of water resources 
(from ideal-type A towards B). 
Integrated River Basin Manage-
ment paradigm; New Public 
Management paradigm; Stable 
public actor/expert-driven water 
policy domain 
Aggregation: Both asymmetric, top-down deci-
sion-making and symmetric, consensus based 
decision-making examples on water policy and 
management plans at interrelated administrative 
levels (juxtaposition of ideal-types B and C). 
The Netherlands as decentralised 
unitary state; Subsidiarity; Interests 
representation in the General 
Assembly of a water management 
authority; Integrated River Basin 
Management paradigm; Tradition 
of informal consensus building 
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Rules-types in the 1990 to 2009 period ↓ Potential explanations ↓ 
Information: The river basin management plan-
ning process is driven by a mixture of a scientific-
technical and social-economic rationale. Validity, 
reliability, costs-benefits ratios and economic 
efficiency are central criteria for legitimised infor-
mation/knowledge (juxtaposition of ideal-types A 
and B). 
Stable, public actor/expert-driven 
water policy domain;  
Neo-liberalism 
Pay-off: Both rewards and sanctions from laws 
and regulations and economic incentives and 
market forces are major drivers for compliance 
with collective-choice rules (juxtaposition of ideal-
types A and B). 
Stable, public actor/expert-driven 
water policy domain;  
Neo-liberalism; Polluter pays, 
affordability, cost-effectiveness  
The grey-coloured cells indicate remarkable evolutions. 
 
Despite strong IRBM rhetoric, the national wish for integrated areal WFD implemen-
tation planning processes did not blossom in Brabant-West (scope rules). Part of the 
explanation is the historical path of a decentralised unitary state organisation in the 
Netherlands, which accounts for a continuous consciousness not to interfere too 
much with the authoritative autonomy at each subsequent political level. Furthermore, 
differences in both the focus and distribution of resources and power at the provincial 
and local level in combination with a mismatch of life cycle stages of different water-
related policy files guide the way to parallel local areal processes for WM21, Natura 
2000 and WFD issues. Whereas the North-Brabant Province guides the earlier started 
rural areas revitalisation processes (as triggered in 1997 by a severe outbreak of swine 
fever), in which the water management authorities actively succeed to integrate the 
WM21 issues, the Brabantse Delta Water Management Authority leads the subsequent 
and parallel WFD implementation planning process (as started at the end of 2005). 
Given the initial fear for the European obligations and the intentional nature of 
domestic WM21 objectives, the regional water management authority and the munici-
palities hesitate to integrate the WFD and WM21 assignments. Furthermore, despite 
its integrated river basin management discourse, the integrated areal analyses for sub-
basins, which have been initiated by the regional water management authority prior to 
the WFD areal process, predominantly focus on hydrological issues. The WFD’s eco-
logical objectives arrive rather too late to be substantially incorporated within these 
sub-basin analyses. Furthermore, whereas the WFD process mainly concentrates on 
water system management issues, the areal water chain optimisation processes run in 
parallel (Interviews 19, 22 and 26, Appendix I). Linkages between the two are only 
made in the final stage of the WFD process (Santbergen, Backx and Van den Berg, 
2008; Santbergen, 2010). The areal Natura 2000 processes, which are initiated by the 
province while the WFD process is running to its final stage, comes up rather too late 
for a sound incorporation of water-related conditions for the Natura 2000 objectives. 
Given this brief sketch of areal processes one may argue whether Brabant-West 
benefits from a functional redundancy or suffers from an integration deficit of parallel 
areal processes. Since the early 1990s, a general integration evolution becomes notice-
able both in a substantive and organisational sense. Quantity and quality authorities  
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merge into one integrated regional water management authority, both provincial inte-
grated water policy and related local integrated water management plans are drafted 
and the WFD brings in a more explicit and legally binding attention to ecological ob-
jectives and interactions between groundwater and surface water issues (choice rules). 
The continuous struggle of the provinces and water management authority for sur-
vival within the Dutch institutional landscape (although partly ritual in nature given a 
strong emphasis at maintaining Thorbeckes’ House) seems to invite a redundancy which 
may not be optimally from the substantive perspective of an integrated river basin 
management approach. The struggle also invites parallel processes to be steered by the 
one or the other.  
Limited financial and human resources from the side of the municipalities hinder 
their active participation in all the parallel running processes. For example, although 
the municipal actors generally participate actively in the extensive WFD areal process, 
they complain about the multiplicity of parallel processes. Non-governmental actors 
also complain about the multiplicity of information and consultation related to all the 
parallel processes. With regard to boundary and aggregation rules, the strict divide between 
public actors, who collect and aggregate information and who decide and private and 
civil actors, who are to be informed and consulted, does not trigger joint fact finding 
nor active participation for multi-stakeholder partnerships. With regard to information 
rules, technical-scientific and socio-economic argumentation lines intermingle in a 
persistent manner.  
 
Overall, the local Dutch public actors struggle with the generic intentional nature of 
Dutch policies. The perception of strict European obligations initially has created a 
fear which at the end of the day might proof to be counterproductive. Although the 
Dutch public actors acknowledge (well-known) critical bottlenecks and risks for timely 
compliance with the WFD’s requirements, they wish to avoid direct legally binding 
ecological objectives. Moreover, they warmly embrace the intrinsic escape options for 
a staged implementation until 2027. Although the fear for European obligations 
clearly demonstrated to be a barrier for a more integrated areal WFD process, itera-
tion may happen from a diversity of parallel running processes which are at different 
stages of the policy life cycle. Such iteration might be a virtue for integrated river basin 
management which points at functional redundancy, whenever actors from the parallel 
process networks manage to provide for timely and effective linkages. Although not 
the principal focus of this research, the observations show limited indications for such 
functional linkages in the 1990 to 2009 period.   
 
 
  
  
 
 
  
 
 
Higher quality crop per drop: this farmer in the Dutch territory 
 of the Scheldt RiverBasin District applies innovative technology  
for cost-efficient irrigation (Source: Leo Santbergen, June 24, 2010) 
 
 
The municipal water ambassadors such as Pierre Backx   
have boosted the cooperation between regional water management authorities 
 and local experts and politicians (Source: Leo Santbergen, May, 9, 2007) 
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Reflections: ambiguous ambitions support 
incremental rule change 
 
‘Some or all parties will probably have to revise, enlarge or reframe the way they relate to the issues 
and to each other, in order to create a vocabulary that can support mutual understanding and common 
action, which is crucial for reaching an effective collaborative management of natural resources.’ 
 Art Dewulf et al. (2005: 115) 
 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
As introduced in Chapter 1, the IRBM paradigm, in its contemporary interpretation, 
aims at collective-choice rules for the sustainable use, development and management 
of interrelated water and land resources within transboundary river basins (Molle, 
2009). As with sustainable development the paradigms is intrinsically ambiguous. De-
pending on the particular institutional context IRBM may trigger or hinder changes in 
collective-choice rules. As described in Chapter 2 (theoretical framework), a wide 
range of actors may embrace the IRBM paradigm but interpret its meaning and im-
plementation in diverse ways. Consequently, the WFD, which has provided for a set 
of European wide governance rules and policy principles for implementation of the 
IRBM paradigm, may be subject to ambiguous ambitions at all involved political levels 
within an international river basin. As introduced in Section 3.1, ambiguous concepts 
may trigger instrumental implementation attempts to protect the status quo or may 
facilitate a search for compromise and cooperation. In the latter case incremental rules 
change may be expected. Whenever ambiguous claims trigger sharp polarisation (for 
example among political parties), radical rules change may arise due to a significant 
change of those in power.  
This final chapter discusses the empirical findings of the research findings and 
presents the author’s conclusions and recommendations. To start with, Subsection 
9.2.1 compares and discusses the observations of the Chapters 4 to 8 regarding collec-
tive-choice rules in the 1990 to 2009 period for the interrelated European, multilateral 
and Dutch national, regional and local administrative levels in the International Meuse 
River Basin District. Potential explanations for continuity or change of collective-choice 
rules are derived from observations on developments in policy discourses (as expressed by 
paradigms, governance rules and policy principles), actors  (coalitions and oppositions) 
and distribution of resources and power. Based on a discussion of the empirical data and 
comparison with findings of peer researchers, this subsection explores to which extent 
the WFD has triggered or hindered collective-choice rules changes. Subsection 9.2.2 
continues with a brief discussion on how the studied WFD’s implementation planning 
process copes with deals with the challenge of multi-level governance for sustainable 
development. Subsequently, Subsection 9.2.3 presents a critical methodological reflec-
tion on the combination of the Institutional Analysis and Development framework 
and the Policy Arrangement Approach. To which extent does this “marriage” provide  
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for a powerful analytical framework for assessing and explaining continuity or change 
of collective-choice rules? Furthermore, the challenges of a participative and interpre-
tative analysis will be discussed, based on personal experiences of the author. Section 
9.3 presents the overall conclusions of the research by returning to the hypotheses, the 
scientific aim and the central question. Finally, Subsection 9.4 closes the dissertation 
by presenting recommendations for both further research and multi-stakeholder 
dialogues in the second WFD implementation planning round. 
 
 
9.2 Discussion 
 
9.2.1 Limited incremental rule changes 
 
Overall: continuity over change 
Table 9.1 presents an overview of observed collective-choice rules at the five studied 
political levels in the International Meuse River Basin District in the 1990 to 2009 
period. The observations have been benchmarked by means of ideal-type collective-
choice rules for IRBM as identified in Section 2.2. The grey coloured cells point at 
observed rule changes. In the context of this research, as defined by Weber, ideal-
types should be understood as analytical constructs (of the researcher) for observing 
and comparing phenomena in society. The observed rules may never match the ideal-
types for 100%. The ideal-types are neither normative pictures of the world, nor moral 
ideals (see also Coser, 1977: 223-224). They describe possible outlooks of organising 
the water policy domain. As such the formulated ideal-types act as benchmarks to 
track rule changes over time. The researcher’s interpretations are based on an exten-
sive literature review, intwerviews with involved actors, a written argumentation sur-
vey and (non-)participative observations. These interpreations have been discussed 
with peer researchers and actors in the water policy domain by means of reflexive 
mirror sessions and the editing of a bundle of essays (Van der Arend et al., 2010). 
Furthermore they have been compared with WFD process analysis publications of 
other scholars (Edelenbos et al., 2008; Raadgever et al., 2009; Uitenboogaart et al., 
2009; Ten Heuvelhof et al., 2010).  
For all studied political levels the observations mainly point at continuation of 
prior collective-choice rules and incremental changes that have become noticeable 
before adoption of the WFD. Notwithstanding the ambitious wording in the WFD 
and some of the informal guidance documents, the Directive’s implementation so far 
mainly confirms prior tendencies and contributes to their formal institutionalisation. 
At all political levels internal integration rules show most salient change, as expressed by 
observations on scope rules and (except for the multilateral level) choice rules (nature of the 
license system). More limited changes have been observed for boundary rules (at the 
multilateral level only) and choice rules (supply and demand management; at the 
European and multilateral levels). For the majority of rule types (organisational scope, 
external integration, position, aggregation, information and pay-off) continuity of 
collective–choice rules dominates over change, which means no substantial changes 
have been observed. The multilateral level shows most dissimilarity with the other 
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levels. The observed rules configurations for the Dutch domestic levels (national, 
regional and local) are the same. The assessment of the other three policy arrangement 
dimensions (policy discourses, distribution of resources and power and actor constel-
lations) accounts for potential explanations. Let us discuss these for continuity first 
before focussing on the incremental changes. 
The stable organisational scope rules in the water policy sub-domain reflect a similar 
policy discourse at all studied political levels, i.e. a preference for functional water 
agencies, committees and actor networks which follow hydrological (river basin) 
boundaries. These functional entities and networks are controlled by parliamentary 
institutions. At the European level, despite the WFD’s call for a further dialogue with 
other policy sectors, officials in the water policy domain dominate the informal meet-
ings of both the Strategic Coordination Group and the EU Water Directors (as 
chaired by DG Environment). These river basins oriented actor networks may be 
characterised as informal and functional in nature. Although the WFD stresses the 
importance of multilateral (and bilateral) coordination, it does not provide for legally 
binding transboundary instructions. By pointing at ‘existing structures stemming from 
international agreements’ (European Communities, 2000: 8) the WFD implicitly sup-
ports functional river basin management coordination structures without suprana-
tional authority. Under the principles of sovereignty and subsidiarity, individual Member 
States remain the competent authorities for timely compliance with the WFD’s re-
quirements. In the Dutch institutional context, informal structures and networks pro-
vide non-legally binding assessments and advise the parliamentary institutions. 
The observations on information rules point at a strong expert-driven water policy do-
main at all political levels. Its actors work relatively isolated from other, often politi-
cally more salient policy sectors. Furthermore, integration of water-related policy ob-
jectives into other policy sectors generally brings along investment offers from the 
latter without ex ante tangible and quantifiable socio-economic benefits. At all political 
levels these expected additional investments trigger opposition by agricultural and 
industrial entrepreneurs who are expected to pay for a substantial part of the addi-
tional WFD measures. Consequently, cross-sector integration attempts remain laborious 
and the level playing field rhetoric paves the way for identification and selection of cost-
effective measures that are feasible and affordable. Given the delicate cross-sector 
political context, initially high WFD implementation ambitions and expert expecta-
tions, were soon to be tempered. This context may also explain why public actors 
shelter in the safe, familiar and functional oriented heaven of river basin management 
planning and coordination structures. Their efforts concentrate on internal integration 
arrangements without being able to develop strong triggers for cross-sector integra-
tion of water policy objectives.  
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Table 9.1: Observed IRBM rules in the 1990 to 2009 period (expressed as ideal-types)  
 Rule type↓ Europe, Meuse, National, Regional, Local↓ 
Scope (organisa-
tional): 
Ideal-type B: Continuation and enforcement of functional water 
agencies, committees and actor networks which follow hydrologi-
cal (river basin) boundaries. These functional entities and actor 
networks are controlled by parliamentary institutions. 
Scope (internal 
integration): 
From ideal-type A to B: An evolution towards legislation, policy 
documents and management plans which include objectives and 
measures for both quantitative and qualitative aspects and for 
groundwater and surface water. 
Information: A juxtaposition of ideal-types A and B: The river basin manage-
ment planning process is driven by a mixture of a scientific-
technical and social-economic rationale. Validity, reliability, costs-
benefits ratios and economic efficiency are central criteria for 
legitimised information/knowledge. 
Pay-off: A juxtaposition of ideal-types A and B: Both rewards and sanc-
tions from laws and regulations and economic incentives and mar-
ket forces are major drivers for compliance with collective rules.   
 Rule type↓ Europe & Meuse↓ National, Regional & Local↓ 
Choice (supply 
and demand man-
agement): 
From ideal-type A to B: 
An evolution from supply 
management only to a 
mixed supply and demand 
management approach.  
A juxtaposition of ideal-types B and 
C: In general a mixed supply and 
demand management approach (B). 
In case of prolonged droughts the 
approach is more integrated as ex-
pressed by a hierarchy in user func-
tions (C).   
 Rule type↓ Meuse↓ Europe, National, Regional &  
Local↓ 
Scope (external 
integration): 
Ideal-type A: Separate 
legislation and plans for 
water policy and other 
policy domains without 
linkages. 
Ideal-type B: Legislation/plans for 
other policy domains take into ac-
count water issues and reversely. 
Regional level: also integrative, 
cross-sector environmental policy 
plans (ideal-type C). 
Position: Ideal-type A: Protection of 
prior water and land re-
sources user and property 
rights without precondi-
tions on environmental, 
social and economic  
externalities.  
Ideal-type B: Conditional mainte-
nance and acquirement of water & 
land resources user and property 
rights. Conditions include require-
ments to consider social, economic 
and/or environmental externalities  
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Table 9.1: continuation  
 Rule type↓ Meuse↓ Europe, National, Regional &  
Local↓ 
Choice (nature of 
the license sys-
tem): 
Ideal-type A: Separate, 
parallel licenses for quality 
and quantity objectives 
related to the use, devel-
opment and  management 
of water resources.  
From ideal-type A towards B: An 
evolution towards licenses that inte-
grate quantity and quality objectives 
related to the use, development and 
management of water resources. 
Boundary: From ideal-type A towards 
B: Enlarged access for non 
governmental actors to the 
water resources policy 
planning process under 
conditions set by the pub-
lic actors. Emphasis on co-
thinking and consultation. 
Ideal-type B: Non-governmental 
actors may have access to the water 
resources policies planning process 
under conditions set by the public 
actors. Emphasis on co-thinking and 
consultation. At the regional level 
also ideal-type C rules have been 
observed: Ample opportunities for 
all interested stakeholders to join the 
water resources policies planning 
process, including co-productions, 
co-decisions and self-realisation. 
Aggregation: A juxtaposition of ideal-
types A and C: Both inde-
pendent decision-making 
by riparian states and re-
gions and symmetric, con-
sensus based decision-
making. 
A juxtaposition of ideal-types B and 
C: Both asymmetric, top-down deci-
sion-making and symmetric, consen-
sus based decision-making examples 
on water policy and management 
plans at different administrative 
levels within the river basin. 
Legend: For definitions of all the A, B and C ideal-types see the Subsections 2.2.2 till 2.2.8).  
The grey colour indicates observed rule changes. 
 
The sovereignty and subsidiarity principles invite a juxtaposition of ideal-type aggregation rules. 
Top-down (predominantly technical-scientific) regulations and instructions intermin-
gle with bottom-up knowledge, practices and initiatives for selection of synergetic, 
innovative and above all cost-effective measures. In the supranational void of multi-
lateral coordination, actors of the involved riparian states and regions may not have a 
mandate to discuss potential alterations of domestic rules with regard to their trans-
boundary externalities. Whereas the European institutions provide for both legally 
binding directives and informal guidance documents, the International Meuse Com-
mission predominantly sums the rules of its independent public actors in the so-called 
multilateral roof reports. The similar collective-choice rules patterns for the three 
Dutch domestic levels (national, regional and local) may be explained by the historical 
path of a decentralised unitary state.  The actors of all domestic levels, as a matter of 
saying almost by genetic codification, acknowledge the importance of a balanced mix-
ture of top-down instructions and bottom-up room for manoeuvre and tailor-made 
compromises. The stable, expert-driven water community and the early decision in the 
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WFD’s implementation planning process not to alter Thorbecke’s House significantly are 
no exceptions that prove the rule.  
In the broader mixed authoritative and neo-liberal European context, economic in-
centives and market forces which work in addition to rewards and sanctions from laws and 
regulations are expected to pay-off compliance with collective-choice rules. In the 
studied period a strong politically driven socio-economic rationale is noticeable in the 
water policy domain which intermingles with critical scientific uncertainties, most 
notably on causal relations between measures and ecological objectives. In the first 
WFD’s implementation planning cycle the politicians warmly welcome affordability and 
cost-effectiveness criteria for protection of human development activities. Despite the 
common IRBM interpretation by the global water sector community, which links the 
state and functioning of water systems to pressures and impacts of diverse human 
activities, the public actors in the water policy domain are cautious not to affect the 
functional water dominated organisational scope and the historic positions of land 
owners and water users too dramatically. As a striking example, WFD’s Article 4 im-
plicitly labels a broad array of land-based and water-dependent activities, which pres-
sures on the state and function of Europe’s water resources are part of the reason of 
existence of the directive, as ‘important sustainable human development activities’ 
(European Communities: 2000: 9).  
 
Scope and choice rules (A): the persistent water quality and quantity divide  
At all studied political levels, since the 1990s the integration discourse clearly has trig-
gered an evolution towards more internal coherence, as expressed by legislation, policy 
and management documents that bring together qualitative and quantitative aspects of 
both groundwater and surface water systems. The WFD may be viewed both as a 
reflection of the integration discourse and an instrument that provides rules and principles 
for its enforced implementation. The directive has been formulated and adopted in an 
era in which the IRBM paradigm has been explicitly institutionalised internationally, 
most notably by the Helsinki Convention on the Protection and Use of Transbound-
ary Watercourses and International Lakes (UN-ECE, 1992). Both international Meuse 
treaties (Anonymous, 1994; 2002a) depart from the Helsinki Convention. In the 
Netherlands the water systems approach has been introduced in the 1980s with the 
aim to stimulate a more integrated policy and management approach. The Dutch inte-
gration tendencies also link with more generic notions of new public management 
discourse which includes calls for more simplicity, transparency and accountability. 
In the initial stage of the WFD drafting process a coalition of public actors from 
five Member States (United Kingdom, France, Germany, Netherlands and Spain) has 
been very active at the European level in order to ply for a more integrated, water 
policy directive (Melis and Boudewijn, 2002; Interview 43, Appendix I). Dutch posi-
tion papers (Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment, 1995; 
Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management, 1995a and b) and a joint 
coalition discussion paper (Summerton, 1995a), among calls from the European 
Parliament and non-governmental actors, have urged the European Commission to 
come forward with a proposal for the WFD. In the subsequent downloading process 
the European river basin management approach of the WFD has been one of the 
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three main arguments for conducting a new, Dutch integrated Water Act (Anony-
mous, 2009a).  
Notwithstanding broad discursive support for integration efforts within the water 
policy domain, rule changes for full incorporation of water quantity issues are chal-
lenged, especially at the European and multilateral levels. This is illustrated by the 
observations on the two identified dimensions of choice rules, respectively the nature of 
the license system and supply and demand management. At the European level, given the deli-
cate political nature of water quantity issues, the ambitious wording in the WFD on 
the importance of an integrated approach is remarkable (see the Statements 18, 19, 20 
and 23 of the Preamble and Article 1: European Communities, 2000: 2, 3, 5 and 6). 
The message of the WFD’s Preamble is that, without common principles and a coher-
ent, integrative approach, effective coordination of Member States’ efforts to improve 
the protection of Community waters in terms of quantity and quality will not be 
feasible (European Communities, 2000: 3). Without stating it explicitly, it is considered 
evident that both a more integrated license system for water-related activities and a 
mixed supply and demand management approach fit well in the European spirit as 
expressed by the referred statements of the WFD’s Preamble.  
Despite the WFD’s ambitious integration discourse, the different decision-
making rules on water quality and quantity issues (read: qualified majority voting versus 
unanimity) witness resistance by some water scarce Member States. So far, sovereignty and 
subsidiarity have prevented too much loss of control on water quantity issues towards 
supranational European institutions. However, the internal integration discourse con-
tinues to gain firmer ground, such as expressed by the water scarcity and droughts 
initiative of the European Commission (Commission of the European Communities, 
2007c). The observations for the European level point at an evolution from ideal-type 
A towards ideal-type B choice rules, both with regard to the license system and supply 
and demand management (see Table 9.1). Also at the multilateral level, discursive 
notions express the importance of a mixed supply and demand management 
approach. Remarkably, screening of the IMC documents did not deliver wording 
which points at the nature of license systems for water-related activities with trans-
boundary effects. So far, the IMC’s respect for the sovereignty of the riparian states 
and regions has “overruled” those specific integration notions in the WFD’s Preamble 
and the directive’s call for transboundary coordination (see Article 3, European 
Communities, 2000: 8). 
Regarding the license system for water-related activities, the assessments for the 
three Dutch domestic levels show a clear evolution from ideal-type A rules (separate 
water quantity and quality licenses) towards ideal-type B rules (one water license that 
brings together both water quantity and quality objectives). Furthermore, the Dutch 
collective choices for supply and demand management show a stable juxtaposition of 
ideal-type B and C rules. The former point at attention to both supply and demand 
management, whereas the latter point at a more integrated nature of the approach, as 
expressed by a hierarchy in user functions, albeit in cases of prolonged droughts only. 
Triggered by drought-related problems in 2003 environmental NGOs have managed 
to include prevention of irreversible alterations to ecosystems among high priority 
water uses (national level). On the other hand, due to controversies between 
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agricultural interest groups and environmental NGOs, the process for definition of 
desired surface and groundwater tables in the Brabant-West area has been delayed 
significantly (local level).  
The assessment of the related policy arrangement dimensions shows that espe-
cially the interaction between policy discourses and the distribution of power and 
resources may account for observed resistance to further changes in choice rules. The 
question remains whether the integration discourse will be advocated strong enough 
to pay-off in future rules change or will not overgrow the stage of lip-service. From 
the ‘Conclusions of the Ministerial Seminar on the future community water policy 
held in Frankfurt on 27 and 28 June 88’ (Commission of the European Communities, 
1988), it may be concluded that the DG Environment of the European Commission 
has seized the momentum of the Single European Act to try to enforce the European 
water policy sub-domain. The WFD’s wording on integration of water quantity and 
quality issues and discursive notions on the importance of supply and demand man-
agement date back to this seminar (as referred to in Statement 2 of the WFD’s Pre-
amble; European Communities, 2000: 1). The participants of the seminar agreed on 
the need for an integrated water management approach in which ‘control of water quality 
cannot be separated from water quantity problems’ and which includes ‘development 
of a policy for rational use of water resources’ (Commission of the European Com-
munities, 1988: 1-2). The seminar’s report lists several measures that should be con-
sidered in relation to quantity management, such as differentiated water prices, educa-
tion of consumers of water and water conservation (ibid.: 5-6). Another attempt by 
DG Environment is noticeable in the ‘Discussion Document on European Commu-
nity Water Policy’ as presented at the second informal meeting of the European 
Commission with the Water Directors (DG Environment, 1995: 2; italics added): 
 
This link between water quality and water quantity has become alarmingly clear in re-
cent years. The situation of chronic lack of water which exists in certain parts of the 
Community raises questions of quantity management which can be tackled at a Community level. 
 
Despite persistent integration rhetoric by a broad array of water policy and manage-
ment related actors, actual configurations of power and resources at the European 
level make a breakthrough of the water quantity and quality divide (in terms of aggre-
gation rules) a long and troublesome journey. In general upstream Member States in 
water scarce river basins seem to be more reluctant to change the status quo than 
downstream Member States. On the other hand, the prognosticated negative impact 
of climate change on the availability of water resources (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2007c) may trigger broader societal and political calls for stronger 
European rules and principles in the near future.  Given the downstream position of 
the Netherlands and its dependence on fresh water inflow from the transboundary 
Rhine, Meuse and Scheldt rivers (Saeijs and Van Berkel, 1995; Saeijs, 2006), it is re-
markable that the Dutch public actors did not emphasise the inclusion of (integrated) 
water supply and demand management issues in the WFD drafting stage (read the 
Dutch position papers: Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management, 
1995a and b and Ministtry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment, 1995). 
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Potential explanations may be the relatively limited overall problems with water avail-
ability, the floods issues driven political (water) agenda since the mid 1990s and the 
parallel international agreements on quality and quantity issues in the international 
Meuse River Basin. Since the latter have been agreed on in the 1990s after long and 
delicate negotiations (Meijerink, 1999), the Dutch may have been cautious to reopen 
these by new discussions at the European and multilateral tables.  
 
Scope and choice rules (B): a cross-sector integration struggle 
At all studied political levels the actors remain struggling with external, cross-sector 
integration. Notwithstanding continuous attempts from Europe’s DG Environment 
to stimulate incorporation of water policy objectives into other policy domains, both 
implementation of the cross-compliance procedures and the environmental policy integration 
initiatives remain laborious. At the multilateral table, although the multi-functionality of 
the Meuse River has been emphasised in the second Meuse Treaty (Anonymous, 
2002), the IMC strictly focuses on water management issues. In the Netherlands the 
leapfrog principle dominates which means that whenever a new national or provincial 
policy document is drafted it should incorporate relevant relations with and require-
ments of other policy domains, at least at the ambition level as expressed by earlier 
policy documents. In the studied period provincial authorities were free to opt for 
parallel sector policy plans or integrated cross-sector plans. Actors from the North-
Brabant Province and the Limburg Province express the limited actual difference 
between these two planning options (Interviews 41 and 46, Appendix I). The inte-
grated plan in the Limburg Province functions as a generic umbrella under which all 
relevant policy domains shelter. At the same time far more detailed documents (in-
cluding a water policy plan) are drafted for individual domains (ibid.). At the local 
level, the WFD does not change the barriers that water managers face with integrating 
water issues into other policy sectors. The regional water management authorities do 
not have many options to influence spatial development beyond the non-legally bind-
ing advises of the water assessment procedure. For environmental policy integration 
they largely depend on the political willingness of provinces and municipalities.  
The assessment of the related policy arrangement dimensions shows that sector 
wise organisation of policy issues acts like a fierce barrier for cross-sector integration 
of water-related objectives at all studied political levels. The interviews and written 
argumentation survey indicate that, due to a fear for dramatic limitations to social-
economic development initiatives, influential actor coalitions of other policy domains 
resist substantial rule-changes for compliance with the WFD’s environmental objec-
tives. The influence of the division of resources and power is implicitly expressed by 
the WFD’s wording, which shows a difference between internal and cross-sector inte-
gration. Whereas detailed articles provide explicit requirements for internal integration 
issues (such as environmental objectives for surface water and groundwater bodies, a 
combined approach for point and diffuse sources of pollution, cost-recovery for all 
water services; European Communities, 2000: 9-13), the importance of cross-sector 
integration is more cautiously supported by calls for ‘continued dialogue’ and ‘the 
development of strategies towards a further integration of policy areas’ (ibid.: 2).  
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Despite the legal anchorage of the environmental policy integration principle in the Single 
European Act and the empowerment of the European Parliament with the co-decision 
procedure for a number of environmental issues, the relatively weaker DG Environment 
depends on the willingness and efforts by other DGs and the Member States for ac-
tual implementation. At the multilateral table trust relations are fragile and the com-
mon acknowledgement of the multi-functionality of the Meuse River and its tributaries 
for human activities so far is insufficient for triggering a strong cross-sector focus of 
the riparian states and regions. At the Dutch national, regional and local levels, the 
leapfrog principle is too weak to overcome strong barriers as the speciality principle. Socio-
economic interests often act as counter forces for integration of water policy objec-
tives into other policy domains, as clearly expressed by the national WFD implemen-
tation mantra of pragmatic implementation by means of feasible and affordable meas-
ures. The widening of the opportunities within European funds for integration of 
environmental objectives into infrastructural development, regional cohesion and 
agriculture may trigger cross-sector integration tendencies. However, the available 
financial means are relatively limited and the success stories largely depend on the 
political willingness of actors within Member States to make use of these opportuni-
ties. 
 
Boundary and aggregation rules: conditioned information and consultation 
The WFD has been drafted and negotiated in the period when the European institu-
tions acknowledged that many Europeans were losing confidence in the ‘poorly un-
derstood and complex system to deliver policies that they want’ (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2001: 3). As a medicine, five principles of good governance 
have been formulated: openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and co-
herence (Commission on the European Communities, 2001: 10). The WFD’s Article 
14 can be understood as expression of the participation principle. Notwithstanding wide-
spread discursive notions of the importance of encouragement of active involvement 
of diverse stakeholders beyond information and consultation only, stable inner circles 
of public actors at all studied political levels draw clear division lines with non gov-
ernmental actors. In this respect the title of WFD’s Article 14, ‘Public information and 
consultation’ perfectly catches the essence of observed practices in the water policy 
domain. Although the informal Guidance Document n˚ 8 on Public Participation 
(European Communities, 2003h) suggests larger active involvement ambitions, Euro-
pean policy makers, adhering to the subsidiarity and sovereignty principles, are very cautious 
not to affect any domestic arrangements. They stay close to Article 14 but also offer 
room for implementation differences by stressing that the public participation process 
shall be organised and adapted to national, regional and local circumstances (Euro-
pean Communities, 2003h: 26).  
The assessment of the related policy arrangement dimensions shows that both 
the good governance discourse and a significant change in the power configuration at 
the European level (i.e. the empowerment of the EP by the co-decision procedure) 
accounts for observed changes in boundary rules. At the European level the water 
policy planning process has become more accessible yet to non-governmental stake-
holders at the WFD drafting and negotiation stage. Furthermore, ample co-thinking 
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opportunities are offered to multiple stakeholders in the Common Implementation 
Strategy (CIS). However, like at all studied political levels, public actors in the water 
policy domain continue conditioning the degrees of active involvement of non-
governmental actors. The emphasis is on controlled co-thinking and informal consul-
tation prior to formal consultation procedures.  
At the multilateral level, before embracing the WFD the International Meuse 
Commission (IMC) resembled a closed oyster. It only opened up its shells whenever it 
decided to inform the outside world on laboriously reached compromises between the 
involved public actors. Supported by WFD’s Article 14 and the related guidance 
document on Public Participation, non-governmental actors have attempted to open 
up the multilateral coordination process. However the public actors remained cautious 
not to lose control and hesitatingly offered limited, strictly conditioned co-thinking opportu-
nities. Consequently, the observed evolution from ideal-type A towards B rules is in its 
embryonic stage. The Meuse States and Regions also strongly emphasised that imple-
mentation of the Article 14 requirements is up to them individually. They argued that 
the IMC has no formal role to play and does not wish to interfere in the domestic 
participation traditions and procedures (read: sovereignty and subsidiarity rule the world).  
In the Netherlands, prior informal information and consultation traditions are 
continued and remarkably are labelled as encouragement of active involvement. Notwith-
standing a proliferation of WFD consultation platforms at the national, regional and 
local levels, boundary rules in the Dutch water policy domain have not been substan-
tially altered. With regard to public actors, the first WFD implementation planning 
process has boosted active involvement of Dutch municipal actors. Without discount-
ing the importance of local pilot projects for testing measures with municipal officials, 
farmers and drinking water companies, the Dutch competent authorities did not opt 
for the most ambitious options of the Guidance Document on Public Participation 
such as shared decision-making and self-determination. 
 
9.2.2 Multi-level governance for sustainable development 
As introduced in Chapter 1, IRBM may be characterised as a multi-level governance 
challenge for the sustainable use, development and management of common water 
pool resources. In this Subsection theoretical reflections on IRBM (see Chapter 2), 
multi-level governance (Bache and Flinders, 2004), sustainability in general (Dryzek, 
2005; Blewitt, 2008) and in the context of the European institutions (Baker et al., 
1997) and governing sustainability (Adger and Jordan, 2009) are confronted with ob-
servations of this research.  
Stirling (2009: 194) argues that ‘the language of sustainability as deployed in 
governance debates displays a series of significant ambiguities and tensions’. He dis-
tinguishes three quite distinct ways in which the concept of sustainability can be un-
derstood (ibid.: 193): ‘substantively – as a set of publicly deliberated goals; normatively 
– as a social process; and instrumentally – as a means discursively to support and jus-
tify narrow sectional interests’.  From a substantive perspective, the sustainability  
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challenge includes connecting the people, planet and profit dimensions, by means of 
defining a coherent set of cross-sector goals. A common definition of sustainable human 
development activities is required which might have significant impact on historical prop-
erty and user rights (position rules). Viewed normatively, sustainable development 
may be viewed as a multi-stakeholder process of change that, in the case of interna-
tional rivers basins, asks for principles and rules for good, multi-level governance. To 
avoid a predominantly instrumental use of the sustainability concept the challenge is 
to provide for a coherent configuration of collective-choice rules that includes strong 
barriers for free-rider behaviour. The observations of this research show both a prag-
matic approach towards weak sustainability and limited cross-level linkages. The com-
bination of both may explain a predominantly instrumental use of the sustain-nability 
language, as expressed by the continuation of prior position rules.  
 
A pragmatic approach towards weak sustainability 
Since pressures from land-based human development activities have a negative impact 
on the state and functioning of Europe’s groundwater and surface water resources, 
one would expect explicit multi-stakeholder deliberations for common definition of 
the ‘sustainable human development activities’ phrase of WFD’s Article 4 (European 
Communities, 2000: 9). Furthermore, integration of conditions for compliance with 
the WFD’s environmental objectives into objectives and measures of other policy 
domains is necessary in order to significantly diminish the pressures and impacts. A 
comparison of the implementation process of the WFD in five Member States 
(France, Germany, Netherlands, United Kingdom and Denmark) shows that a process 
for common definition of sustainable human development activities has not been 
triggered by the WFD so far (Uitenboogaart et al., 2009a; Wiering, Van Rijswick and 
Uitenboogaart, 2009). The competent authorities of these five Member States take the 
ambiguous definitions and requirements from WFD’s Article 4 for granted and, ex-
cept for the Netherlands, consider the environmental objectives as a legal obligation 
of results with intervention values for specific parameters. Furthermore, since these 
competent authorities struggle with the cross-sector and socio-economic implications, 
they all opt for regular use of the Article 4’s exemption options (ibid.).  
A screening of draft river basin management plans by environmental NGOs in 
15 Member States also points at regular use of the Article 4’s exemption options 
(Scheuer, 2009). Although the significant impact of diffuse emission sources from 
agriculture (for nutrients and pesticides) is broadly acknowledged, the competent 
WFD authorities are cautious not to challenge the powerful actors in this sector too 
much (Uitenboogaart et al., 2009a). Despite DG Environment’s call for full imple-
mentation of the Nitrates Directive and its portrait of the reform of the Common 
Agricultural Policy as a (co-financing) window of opportunity (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2007a), emphasis in the studied Member States (except for 
Denmark) remains on voluntary agreements with the agricultural sector (Uitenboogaart et al., 
2009a). All studied Member States prove to be cautious not to affect historical land 
use and property rights substantially (ibid.). 
In the designation of water bodies, the formulation of objectives and the selec-
tion of measures, the Dutch competent authorities have opted for a pragmatic 
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approach, as driven by both physical and political reasons (Uitenboogaart et al., 2009a 
and b; Ten Heuvelhof et al., 2010). Physically spoken, in the densely populated delta 
area of four European rivers (Rhine, Meuse, Scheldt and Ems) the hydromo-
rphological changes made in river systems are considered to be exceptionally signifi-
cant. From a political perspective, the regional water management authorities who had 
the lead in the first WFD implementation planning cycle have been cautious not be 
held accountable for too ambitious objectives. For compliance with the WFD’s objec-
tives, these water-related authorities are dependent on actors in other policy domains 
such as spatial planning and agriculture (ibid.). Both observations of this research and 
Ten Heuvelhof et al. (2010) point at a pragmatic approach in which, due to the 
national harmonisation process, initially high regional and local ambitions have been 
downsized gradually. Ten Heuvelhof et al. (2010) positively conclude that the 
functional redundant planning process has delivered broad political commitment for 
the harmonised programmes of measures. This research adds that perhaps the na-
tional Water Policy Department who, in the “battlefield” with other, powerful minis-
tries, could (or would) not enforce more challenging, additional WFD regulations for 
the agricultural sector, may have felt relieved to delegate part of the arduous imple-
mentation planning tasks to the provincial water policy and regional water manage-
ment authorities. As part of such a strategy, not only bottom-up support for the river 
basin management plans could be organised but part of the delicate cross-sector chal-
lenge could also be shared with others.  
 
Given the discursive context of the European institutions in which sustainability gen-
erally is expressed by terms of well-balanced economic growth (Baker, 1997), the observed 
protection of prior land use and property rights may not come as a surprise. The eco-
logical modernisation discourse is predominant, as acknowledged by the ‘Fourth Pro-
gramme of Action on the Environment’ (which covers the 1987-1992 period; Euro-
pean Communities, 1987 as interpreted by Baker, 1997). This anthropocentric ideol-
ogy holds that environmental protection is not in competition with, but rather an 
essential precondition for, growth and development (Weale and Williams, 1992). 
Baker (1997: 96; original italics) argues that the adoption of the ideology is logical: 
 
as it fits with the overall economic raison d’être of the Union. Its importance lies in the 
fact it allows the Union to justify its simultaneous pursuit of a rigorous programme 
of economic growth based on the completion of the internal market and of an ever-
expanding environmental protection policy. 
 
According to environmentalists the ideology of ecological modernisation has serious 
limitations since environmental protection policy is not grounded in the intrinsic 
worth of the environment and the limits that protection of life-sustaining natural 
processes and resources include for economic growth. It is an expression of weak 
sustainability since it puts no limits to economic growth (Kostermann, 2003). Al-
though the Fifth Action Programme for the Environment (which covers the 1992 to 
1997 period; European Communities, 1993) explicitly links environmental protection 
with sustainable economic development, anthropocentric interpretations (with a focus 
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on reducing environmental damage and risks to human health as much as feasible) 
remain dominant within the European institutions (Baker, 1997).  
Liberatore (1997) argues that for a new model of development that can be envi-
ronmentally and socially sustained in the long term, environmental factors explicitly 
will have to be taken into consideration in the formulation and implementation of 
social and economic policies. Cross-sector integration of environmental factors may be 
both supported and challenged by the subsidiarity principle (ibid.). The interpretation of 
this principle is ambiguous (Dehousse, 1992). On the one hand, Member States may 
use the principle to prevent the European institutions from affecting domestic tradi-
tions and practices. On the other hand, subsidiarity may trigger European institutions 
to act when supranational action is considered necessary (ibid.). The observations of 
this research point at a Dutch struggle with the ambiguous European ambitions. In 
implementing the WFD the Dutch opt for limited accommodation of domestic poli-
cies and management practices, to prevent dramatic alterations of prior land use prac-
tices. In this domestic game, the Article 4’s multi-interpretable wording on sustainable 
human development activities offers convenient political room for manoeuvre, as 
illustrated by the Dutch pragmatic approach for a feasible and affordable 
implementation.  
 
Limited cross-level linkages 
The answer to the questions to which extent cross-level linkages are required and who 
preferably should take care of establishing cross-level actor networks, largely depends 
on the normative stance one departs from. For example, if one considers IRBM pre-
dominantly as a game in which public actors should take the lead, a nested hierarchy 
of governmental decisions at involved political levels within an international river 
basin district could suffice. In this view, whenever uploading and downloading proc-
esses among the involved political levels are organised efficiently by a stable commu-
nity of public actors, there would be no need for a large multi-stakeholder population 
of policy entrepreneurs that work across political levels and policy domains. Viewed 
differently, if one considers IRBM as a multi-level, multi-sector and multi-stakeholder 
process of change, one would expect more (calls for) extensive across-level networks 
of policy entrepreneurs and opening up the public windows to non-governmental 
actors.  
The observations of this research show a central position of the public actors at 
all studied political levels in interpreting and planning the first implementation term of 
the WFD. The public actors determine the boundary rules with strong emphasis on 
consultation of and preconditioned co-thinking by non governmental actors. They are 
cautious not to loose steering control in the mixed technical-scientific and socio-
economic aggregation process, especially at the multilateral level. Within the popula-
tion of interviewees and participants of the written argumentation survey and the 
mirror sessions, there are only a few actors who operate at and across different politi-
cal levels. Although some Dutch national stakeholder groups appoint special lobbying 
officers in Brussels, personal contacts of these liaisons with diverse actors at the re-
gional and local levels are scarce. The interviews and written argumentation survey-
show a broad concensus that the WFD’s implementation planning process as the  
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formal task of public actors. Although non-governmental actors frequently express a 
wish to be allowed to participate more actively, at the same time they are cautious not 
to be formally co-opted by the coordination structures of the competent authrorities.  
Frthermore, since there are hardly any calls for deliberations on the decisions and 
activities of the European and multilateral levels, they seem to be taken for granted by 
the Dutch actors. They predominantly invest their limited financial and human re-
sources for exploring the implications of the WFD and its technically complicated and 
detailed requirements and annexes on the regional or local level at which they are 
directly involved. 
Stable configurations of resources and power, including upstream-downstream asym-
metries, may account for a barrier for rule changes towards both more transboundary 
and cross-sector integration of water policy objectives. Despite the rhetoric of the 
integration principle and the related cross-compliance procedure, the strongly special-
ised and sector organisation of the European institutions is part of the barrier (Baker, 
1997; Jordan and Schout, 2006). Jessop (2004: 72; italics added) points at the ‘key 
metagovernance role’ of the European Commission ‘in organising parallel power networks, 
providing expertise and recommendations, developing benchmarks, monitoring pro-
gress, exchanging best practice, promoting mutual learning and ensuring continuity 
and coherence across presidencies’. The EC‘s harmonisation ambitions such as ex-
pressed by its intercallibration exercise may act as a trigger for further internal integra-
tion, i.e. more coherence in the water policy domain across Member States. So far the 
coordination efforts by public actors mainly remain locked up in this sub-domain of 
European environmental policy. They do not trigger strong cross-sector integration 
initiatives.  
Both at the multilateral and the Dutch regional and local levels the informal guid-
ance documents for WFD implementation are taken for granted. No discussions take 
place on open endings in these documents. The Dutch national Water Policy Depart-
ment translates the guidance documents into national instructions and recommenda-
tions and takes the lead in the preparation of instructions for performances in the 
European and multilateral theatres. Some regional water management authorities par-
ticipate in working groups of the International Meuse Commission. In general, re-
gional and local politicians and officials in the Brabant-West Region are not aware of 
the decisions taken at the multilateral level and their implications for the domestic 
processes. The multilateral process is predominantly considered as too abstract and 
invisible (Interviews 28 and 34, Appendix I). Although the International Meuse 
Commission is supposed to closely monitor the bilateral coordination efforts, the 
regional and local actors do not notice such activity (ibid.). Whereas the national  
Water Policy Department takes the lead in preparing the multilateral and high-level 
bilateral negotiations, the provincial authorities and the regional water management 
authorities guide the local bilateral coordination attempts. Success stories are pre-
dominantly incidental and often related to available European subsidies and personal 
relations. Some Dutch environmental NGOs and the drinking water sector are active 
at different political levels. However, in general, regional and local based NGOs and 
interest groups predominantly focus on their own levels. 
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With regard to the transboundary inland waters bodies Dutch regional and local actors 
in the International Meuse River Basin District struggle with the bilateral coordination 
processes with their upstream German, Walloon and Flemish neighbours. The priority 
of the national Water Policy Department towards these bilateral coordination 
processes has been limited during the 1990 to 2009 period. For example, the strategic 
Flemish-Dutch Integrated Water Management Coordination Platform has entered a 
silent hibernation period, whereas the subordinate local transboundary river basin 
management committees have suffered from a lack of a political mandate and tasks in 
the first WFD implementation planning cycle. November 2011, at an explorative 
meeting in Antwerp on options for a restart of transboundary coordination, the Dutch 
and Flemish water management authorities (national, regional and local) agree to 
transform or replace the transboundary river basin management committees by in-
formal and flexible bilateral coordination structures (as related to the level of a specific 
issue to be solved). The Flemish authorities acknowledge that, as a downstream state, 
the Netherlands may ask more ambitious investments than the upstream partner is 
able or willing to offer. Consequently, expectation management is an important fea-
ture of the transboundary coordination efforts. 
There are no indications of a weakening of the state actors in the water policy 
domain. The Dutch national Water Policy Department has seized the momentum of 
increased political attention to water quality issues. The department explicitly takes the 
lead in an extensive informal domestic coordination exercise with regional and local 
actors. While officials at other ministries frown their eyebrows and warn the Water 
Policy Department for a loss of steering control in a legally binding European imple-
mentation file, the latter opts for an explicit mixed top-down and bottom-up process 
approach. As supported by financial triggers, many municipalities become actively 
involved in the search for synergy and innovation. The focus remains predominantly 
domestic and water sector oriented. There are no indications of Dutch municipalities 
who join forces to influence the European and multilateral water policy planning 
process or to influence the European drafting process of implementation guidance 
documents. For example, the municipalities in the Brabant-West Region have not 
been involved in the WFD process until the autumn of 2005. A series of information 
sessions and a local WFD pilot project (in 2005 and 2006) have triggered a gradual 
change of attitude from passive towards actively selecting feasible and affordable 
measures at the local level. 
 
Given the multi-actor and multi-level nature of European politics, no one, not even 
the most powerful state executive, is capable of predicting fully what will eventually 
emerge when a new policy is pitched into a dynamic diversity of actor alliances 
(Marks, 1993). Consequently, Member States cannot know exactly what they are 
agreeing to when they sign on to particular policies (ibid.). The WFD is not an excep-
tion that proves the rule. This research shows early uploading attempts of domestic 
water policy by high-ranking Dutch national water officials and experts. However, 
these actors have lost their substantive grip on the European negotiation process and 
partly became disappointed of the final result (Interviews 39, 40 and 43, Appendix I; 
Ten Heuvelhof et al., 2010). Due to expected dramatic socio-economic consequences  
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of a strict implementation, the Dutch politicians have opted for accommodation tac-
tics, including a staged implementation until 2027. In the Netherlands, a generic un-
derestimation of the directive’s rule-altering consequences has been apparent in the 
first three years after its adoption (Interviews 18, 30, 39, 40, 43; Ten Heuvelhof et al., 
2010). There has been a dominant domestic perception of the Dutch as a forerunner 
state in the European water policy sub-domain which rapidly dampened with the 
heated political discussion on the WFD’s socio-economic consequences after the 2003 
wake-up calls (ibid.).  
 
9.2.3 The research approach 
 
Strengths and pitfalls of the hybrid analytical framework 
The theoretical novelty of this research approach is the “marriage” between the IAD 
framework and the PAA. The expected added value of this combination is the ex-
planatory potential from the interactions of Ostrom’s rule types with the other three 
dimensions of a policy arrangement (policy discourses, division of resources and 
power and actor constellations). By formulating ideal-types of collective-choice rules 
for IRBM as a benchmark, the idea is to assess continuity and change in the water 
policy domain at interrelated political levels within the International Meuse River Ba-
sin District. Whereas the strength of the IAD framework is the detailed elaboration of 
the rule types, incorporation of these within the PAA as the rules dimension may en-
force the latter’s analytical power. The morning after the exciting wedding ceremonies 
the evaluation question rests, to which extent this hybrid analytical framework has 
delivered the expected added value. Table 9.2 sums the strengths and pitfalls of the 
hybrid PAA/IAD framework as experienced within this research.   
The “confrontation” between observations on the seven rule types of the IAD 
framework and observations on the other three dimensions of the PAA offers 
enlarged opportunities for discovering potential explanations for continuity or incre-
mental changes in collective-choice rules. From subsequent observations on the seven, 
partly overlapping rule types, potential explanations may be detected more easily. 
Furthermore, intrinsic notions in the rule types’ definitions of the IAD framework on 
actors, policy discourses and the distribution of resources and power are made more 
explicit by a categorical assessment of these dimensions of the PAA. On the other 
hand, given the explicit and detailed attention to one of the four dimensions (the 
rules), imbalance waits around every corner which may provoke unbalanced explana-
tions from observations on the less elaborated dimensions. Furthermore, given the 
diversity of theoretical concepts beyond all four dimensions of a policy arrangement, 
there is a pitfall of theoretical overdose (such as inclusion of incomparable theoretical 
concepts) hence limited or contradictory explanatory potential. Ostrom (1999: 36) 
translates these pitfalls as a research challenge for a coherent institutional framework: 
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[1] To develop a coherent approach to studying diverse types of institutional 
arrangements, including markets, hierarchies, firms, families, voluntary asso-
ciations, national governments and international regimes, one needs multiple 
inputs from diverse disciplines. [2] Given the multiple languages across disci-
plines, a coherent institutional framework is needed to allow for expression 
and comparison of diverse theories and models of theories applied to particu-
lar puzzles and problem settings. 
 
Table 9.2: Strengths and pitfalls of the hybrid PAA/IAD framework in this research 
Strengths↓ 
• By the categorical assessment of ideal-type rules (as a benchmark) in the context of 
developments within the other three dimensions of a policy arrangement (policy 
discourses, acors, resources and power), incremental rule changes may be detected.  
• The PAA may enforce the explanatory power for observed contunities and changes 
of collective-choice rules due to the richness of related theories. The elaboration of 
the dimensions of the PAA makes the intrinsic notions on actors, policy discourses 
and resources and power within the definition of the seven IAD’s rule types more 
explicit.  
Pitfalls↓ 
o Imbalance in level of detail for the four dimensions of the PAA may provoke un-
balanced explanations for observations on the less elaborated dimensions. Given 
the diversity of theoretical concepts beyond all four dimensions of a policy ar-
rangement, there is a pitfall of theoretical overdose (e.g. inclusion of incomparable 
theoretical concepts) hence limited or contradictory explanatory potential.  
o The combined analytical framework does not provide for deep insight in the inter-
linkages between/across political levels within an international river basin district. 
Although the IAD framework may be applied to several political levels, its design 
and application (so far) mainly derives from local level cases of CPRM. 
 
Although the hybrid approach allowed for a detailed assessment of each individual 
political level and a comparison of observed continuities and changes of collective-
choice rules at all these levels, it did not provide for deep insight in the interlinkages 
between/across the studied levels. Ostrom (2007) concludes that many studies on 
common pool resources management so far have focused on local settings, whereas a 
critical area of research is to understand the governance of larger level settings by 
analysing relationships among multiple levels of these complex systems. Heikkila, 
Schlager and Davis (2011: 122) argue that cross-level institutional linkages connect 
actors or collective bodies that function at different levels of social organisation or 
political jurisdiction: 
 
For common pool resources management, such linkages are thought to enhance the 
capacity of actors with distinct jurisdictional or organisational boundaries to simul-
taneously address problems or dilemmas in managing the common pool resources 
that may cross or overlap those boundaries.  
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Departing from Ostrom’s normative design principles of robust and enduring man-
agement of common pool resources (Ostrom, 1990: 88-102), Heikkila, Schlager and 
Davis (2011) assess and evaluate cross-level linkages of 14 interstate river basin com-
pacts in the western United States. Although these design principles seem to be intrin-
sically linked to the seven rule types of the IAD framework, they are formulated in 
partly different terms. These differences enlarge the interpretation complexity for 
researchers who wish to apply the rule types for studying multilateral settings. In order 
to bridge the analytical gap of assessing and evaluating the impact of interlinkages 
between/across political levels, the extension of the hybrid PAA/IAD framework 
with additional indicators for these linkages is strongly recommended.  
Notwithstanding the added value of the seven rule types of the IAD frame-
work, their translation into ideal-type collective-choice rules for IRBM has been 
somehow troublesome in two ways. Firstly, the definitions and descriptions of Os-
troms’ rule types are mainly oriented to studying operational action situations, e.g. 
governing of common pool resoures by local communities. By ascending the abstrac-
tion ladder from operational choices to collective choices, the distinction between 
some of the rule types becomes less clear. This goes for aggregation and boundary 
rules and, to a lesser extent, for scope and choice rules. As long as the subsequent 
redundancy remains functional, there is not a critical methodological problem to be 
solved. Secondly, the aforementioned design principles for robust governance of com-
mon pool resources (Ostrom, 1990 and 2005) should not be confused with the seven 
rule types of the IAD framework. Whereas the former are more normative in nature, 
the latter’s definitions aim to provide for a value-free analytical framework beyond 
common pool resources management only. However, the overlap between the two 
may cause misunderstandings and confusion. An additional methodological scrutiny 
would contribute to a further elaboration and strengthening of the framework, the 
potential range for its application and generic methodological innovation as required 
for multidisciplinary research on sustainable development, management and use of 
social-ecological systems.  
 
The added value of participatory analysis 
The experience of this research shows the added value of participatory research for 
easy access to inside information with interpersonal trust relationship building as an impor-
tant precondition. It partly deals with the major challenge as repeatedly posed by Os-
trom (1990, 1999, 2005 and 2011) to get a clear picture of the rules in use which often 
may not be written down or which the actors may not even be aware of. Extensive 
interviews/conversations may be useful to discover these unwritten rules (Ostrom, 
2011). The combination of participatory action and non-participatory attendance of 
meetings has delivered a rich array of empirical data and observations. The numerous 
in-between conversations and additional interviews with both governmental and non-
governmental stakeholders have provided valuable insight in their interests, policy 
strategies and negotiation tactics. Furthermore a questionnaire (as filled in by several 
actors) and mirror sessions with a selected number of key-players in the water policy 
domain have helped to get a clear picture of the range of dominant and opposing 
arguments. However, emphasis of the participatory research activities has been 
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predominantly on the regional, local and bilateral transboundary political levels. This 
has caused a (foreseen) imbalance in assessment detail for the studied political levels. 
Consequently, the assessments for the European and multilateral levels and, to a lesser 
extent, for the national domestic level have been based predominantly on document 
analysis, explorative interviews with a limited numbers of actors and analyses by peer 
researchers. This experience points at a major challenge of a mixed participatory and 
observational research approach within a multi-level governance context to meet a 
sufficient level of comparability for all studied levels.  
Notwithstanding the aforementioned added value of the mixed approach, one 
obvious pitfall is the intrinsic bias in the researcher’s observations and the methodo-
logical difficulty of assessing one’s own impact on the studied process. Additionally 
one may get caught by the norms, values and rituals of one’s own organisation, which 
makes a bird eye’s view troublesome. Whenever one is full-time involved at a given 
political level and from a particular disciplinary angle, it may be very difficult both to 
obtain deep insight in other levels and to profit from a multi-disciplinary perspective. 
Ostrom (1999: 37) emphasises that ‘decisions made about rules at any one level are 
usually made within a structure of rules existing at different levels’. Kiser and Ostrom 
(1982) distinguish a nested hierarchy of three tiers of rules, i.e. operational rules, col-
lective-choice rules and constitutional-choice rules. Ostrom (1999: 37, 38) stresses that 
institutional studies need to encompass multiple levels of analysis, although she admits 
that the nested structure of rules‘ is a particularly difficult analytical problem to solve 
for those interested in the study of institutions’. Additionally, ‘finding ways to com-
municate across these levels is a key challenge for all institutional theorists’ (ibid.: 39). 
Although this research includes notions on constitutional-choice rules, mainly as de-
rived from secondary analysis, the emphasis is on an in-depth analysis of collective-
choice rules in the water policy domain. Operational rules have not been included. An 
all encompassing assessment of all three tiers of rules at all included political levels for 
the chosen twenty years period would have been a mission impossible for one re-
searcher within the given requirements and restrictions of job fulfillment, time and 
resources for a PhD project.  
 
 
9.3 Conclusions 
 
The first hypothesis of this research is that policy-making and implementation in the 
context of the European environmental policy domain predominantly is subject to 
ambiguous concepts which invite incremental rules changes. In addition the particular 
history full of conflicts, upstream-downstream asymmetries and cultural diversity in 
combination with emphasis on the sovereignty and subsidiarity principles, has lead to 
the second hypothesis that one may not expect revolutionary changes in collective-
choice rules at the multilateral political level within the International Meuse River 
Basin District. As the third hypothesis, given both the active uploading attempts of 
Dutch national water policy officials and experts at the early WFD drafting stage and 
their perception of European forerunners, one may expect limited changes in the 
domestic rules configuration of the water policy domain. As introduced in Chapter 3, 
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ambiguous meanings have important political functions (Stone, 2002; Fischer, 2009). 
‘Ambiguous meanings often facilitate cooperation and compromise.’ (Fischer, 2009: 
175) Whenever they do so, incremental changes of collective-choice rules may be 
expected over radical shifts. 
The observed overall limited changes in collective-choice rules and cautious evo-
lutions at all studied political levels (see Table 9.1) support the three hypotheses. The 
complicated constellation of actor networks with a diversity of policy strategies, tactics 
and interests at the European level obviously has fed ambiguous formulations in order 
to hold everybody on board in the search for cooperation and compromise (see also 
Kaika, 2003; Kaika and Page, 2003). At the same time, at the multilateral level discus-
sions and negotiations remained laborious, although the WFD clearly has triggered 
progress in the coordination and internal integration efforts (most notably by the en-
trance of new actors and taking a flood issues working group on board). The IMC’s 
public actors kept struggling with opening up the windows to non-governmental 
stakeholders such as with regard to information and consultation procedures (by re-
ferring to the riparian states’ own responsibilities for such procedures).  
This research also shows limited changes at the level of collective-choice rules 
within the Dutch water policy domain. As contrary to the third hypothesis, these are 
not due to the perception of a forerunner state but related to European political com-
promises that reflect deviations from initial Dutch uploading ambitions. The uncer-
tainty about the socio-economic impact of these deviations has contributed to a politi-
cal domestic atmosphere of both resistance towards (too much) legally binding re-
quirements and emphasis on continuation of current institutions as precondition for 
the WFD’s implementation planning process (see also Edelenbos et al., 2008 and 
Raadgever et al., 2009, Ten Heuvelhof et al., 2010). After the two  political wake-up 
calls in 2003 the Dutch have opted for regularised application of the WFD’s exemp-
tion options. Although major shifts in the seven collective-choice rule types have not 
been observed, the Dutch had to transform their water quality objectives setting and 
monitoring systems dramatically. This has led to an ambiguous mixed system which 
includes a new methodology for the WFD water bodies and survival of the domestic 
methodology for smaller tributaries, ditches and isolated urban waters. 
In the early WFD drafting stage Dutch water official and experts feared a loss of 
the ambitious Dutch system of water quality objectives setting. Therefore, these 
Dutch actors tried to upload their system of setting (intentional) water quality objec-
tives in three ways: (1) by early position papers; (2) by coalition building with four 
other Member States; and (3) by informal conversations with the officials at Europe’s 
DG Environment. Adoption of this Dutch system would have urged midstream and 
upstream riparian states to accelerate their investments in water quality amelioration, 
hence could have contributed to a substantial reduction of the “transboundary no-
shift assignment” of these neighbouring states. Furthermore, the Dutch plied for 
simplification of the European corpus of water legislation by means of integration 
into a more generic framework directive. The observations of this research have made 
clear that these Dutch public actors lost their grip on the process. At the end of the 
European negotiation game, some expressed disappointment about the limited inte-
grated nature of the Directive and deviations from the initial Dutch proposals. 
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Besides, uncertainty around the impact of the diverse, sometimes detailed Articles and 
annexes triggered explicit Dutch calls for written down juridical statements about the 
intentional nature of the WFD’s environmental objectives. The ANF Ministry op-
posed any suggestions of obligations for the agricultural sector additional to those 
from the Nitrates Directive. Given the agreed intentional nature of Article 4 (e.g. as 
written down by Europe’s legal service) in combination with the extensive and intrin-
sic exemption options and the expressed Dutch satisfaction soon after adoption, it has 
been quite remarkable that in 2003 and 2004 a political fear of obligations of result has 
triggered extensive domestic discussions.  
As concluded in Subsection 9.2.1., overall, change of collective-choice rules has 
been rather limited. Continuity rules the water policy domain. The most pronounced 
rule changes concern internal integration tendencies, which have their roots in the era 
before adoption of the WFD. The directive supports the internal integration evolution 
by means of its integration discourse and its further explanation in the related gui-
dance documents. The actor networks of the water policy domain at all levels  
remained dominated by governments and experts and kept rather isolated from sur-
rounding networks of other policy domains. Although not analysed in detail in this 
research power and actor configurations of parallel operating policy domains which 
are supported by the specificity principle of sector institutions, are among the barriers 
for cross-sector integration attempts. In addition, the relatively modest financial 
resources for integration of environmental/water policy objectives into plans and 
programmes of other policy domains do not act as strong triggers as well.  
Part of the explanation for continuity of collective-choice rules lies in the am-
biguous wording of the WFD’s core Article 4 on environmental objectives. Until the 
final hours of the conciliation procedure, amendments have been subject to delicate 
political negotiation. Given that this Article protects a number of human activities 
which are one of the main reasons for existence of the WFD, an important potential 
trigger for more sustainable interferences has been paralysed from the onset. Fur-
thermore, persistent domestic confusion about both the juridical interpretation and 
socio-economic impact of the intrinsic exemption options and conditions has trig-
gered a cautious implementation approach. The early decision of the European Water 
Directors to interpret the exemption provisions as a regular instrument for prioritisa-
tion and a staged implementation of measures until the end of 2027 has supported the 
prudent Dutch approach. In this sense, the ambiguity of Article 4 predominantly has 
invited an instrumental use of the Directive for continuation of prior policies and 
practices. Until December 2009, it did not trigger extensive multi-stakeholder delibera-
tions on the driving forces behind human pressures and impacts. 
The limited connections across political levels, as observed in this research, may 
be explained by the WFD’s intrinsic acknowledgement of the inconsistencies between 
social, economic and political territories on the one hand and hydrological (river ba-
sin) units at the other. Protection of sovereignty and a call for subsidiarity, as ex-
pressed by the choice to appoint legally accountable, competent authorities at the level 
of Member States and not at the multilateral river basin level, has triggered first prior-
ity to domestic implementation planning processes. Consequently, the International 
Meuse Commission remains swimming in the misty atmosphere between the partly  
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supranational European institutions and national jurisdictions. Instead of guiding mul-
tilateral documents, summaries of national reports had to be brought together in the 
final hours of the first implementation planning cycle. To dissolve barriers to trans-
boundary coordination and cooperation, political willingness of involved competent 
authorities remains a decisive factor, especially in a context of upstream-downstream 
asymmetries and a history of international conflicts and distrust. Additionally, the 
rather complicated technical nature of the WFD’s annexes so far have triggered a 
scientific-rational search for uncertainty reduction by individual Member States over 
the formulation of shared transboundary objectives and measures. The diminished 
role of the bilateral, transboundary river basin committees between the Flemish 
Region of Belgium and the Netherlands may be interpreted as an indicator for that. 
 
To summarise: the main conclusion of this research is that, until December 2009, the 
ambiguities around the central governance rules, policy principles, environmental 
ojectives and exemptions options of the WFD have triggered limited changes in col-
lective-choice rules within the International Meuse River Basin District. These ambi-
guities have offered convenient political room for manoeuvre and accommodation 
efforts by stable, powerful actor coalitions who aim to avoid (too) dramatic alterations 
of prior position rules. Whereas the IRBM discourse has supported earlier started 
internal integration tendencies at all studied political levels, cross-sector integration 
attempts have remained too weak to trigger a significant change of the rules configura-
tion. The observations of this research point at a relatively isolated water policy do-
main which is strongly steered by public actors, who are cautious not to loose deci-
sion-making privileges. Especially in the supranational void at the multilateral level, 
the state actors emphasise their sovereignty. They mention the subsidiarity principle to 
stress limited opportunities for the International Meuse Commission to open up the 
multilateral arena for private and civil actors. At the Dutch domestic level, the national 
Water Policy Department has opted for an extensive mixed top-down and bottom-up 
WFD implementation planning process. This approach fits perfectly well in prior 
informal information and consultation procedures which are controlled by the public 
actors.  
Notwithstanding the limited changes so far, one might not rule out the rule-
altering potential of the diverse statements in the WFD and its related guidance 
documents on the importance of cross-sector integration of environmental policy 
objectives and sustainable human development activities. The offered integration dis-
course and range of options for (experiments with) more interactive and participatory 
policy planning and implementation processes could trigger (further) collective-choice 
rules changes in the second and third WFD’s implementation planning cycli up to  
December 2027. 
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9.4 Recommendations 
 
This final section closes the story of this dissertation by offering recommendations for 
future research and multi-stakeholder processes in the second WFD implementation 
planning cycle.  
 
Options for future research 
The hybrid analytical framework has provided potential explanations for observed 
continuity and incremental change of collective-choice rules at the five studied, inter-
related political levels within the International Meuse River Basin District. A first op-
tion for future research is to conduct a similar analysis for other European river basin 
districts in order to explore to which extent the observed continuity and changes of 
collective-choice rules (and the potential explanations) are more generic in nature. 
Additionally, the research scope could be enlarged towards IRBM processes outside 
Europe in a search for triggers and barriers for collective-choice rules changes within 
different physical, socio-economic and political contexts. As a second option, similar 
analyses could be conducted for the implementation planning processes of other 
European directives. To which extent are the observed rules configurations typical for 
the water policy sub-domain? Thirdly, in order to detect triggers and barriers for exter-
nal integration a cross-sector analysis of policy arrangements is another option. The 
analytical framework as developed by Jordan and Schout (2006), which pays explicit 
attention to cross-sector integration of Europe’s environmental objectives, may serve 
as a departure platform. 
Whereas the hybrid analytical framework has proven to be an appropriate tool 
for identifying incremental changes in collective-rules at individual political levels, its 
potential for assessing across-level linkages has not been explored by this research. 
Given the emphasis of the IRBM’s paradigm on coherent coordination within the 
context of transboundary river basins, a fourth option for future research is to define 
additional analytical indicators for covering this border-crossing lacuna. For example, 
the actors’ dimension might offer an interesting perspective by the concept of policy 
entrepreneurs. An in-depth analysis of policy entrepreneurs at and across political 
levels within an international river basin could provide for an identification of triggers 
and barriers in crossing borders and building collective-choice rules bridges. The five 
possible strategies that policy entrepreneurs can apply as identified by Huitema and 
Meijerink (2009: 12), may be a promising starting point for defining across-level ana-
lytical indicators: ‘the development of new ideas; building coalitions and selling ideas; 
the recognition and exploitation of windows of opportunity; the use of multiple ven-
ues; and the orchestration and management of networks’.  
The principal focus of this research has been on a detailed elaboration of the 
rules of the game dimension, by means of defining ideal-types as a benchmark. The 
subsequent assessment of developments over time for the other three dimensions 
(resources and power, policy discourses and actor constellations) has shown redun-
dancy in providing explanations for observed continuity and changes in collective-
choice rules. The question is whether a more detailed elaboration of these three di-
mensions would add to a disentangling the impact of each individually. Therefore, a  
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fifth option for future research is to explore whether a definition of ideal-type bench-
marks for the other three dimensions (resources and power, policy discourses and 
actor constellations) would enforce the explanatory potential of the hybrid analytical 
framework. Additionally, further elaboration of the relationships between all four 
dimensions of the PAA could be considered, for example by taking the relationships 
between the dimensions as named by Liefferink (2006; see Figure 2.1 in Section 2.1) 
as a starting point. 
As demonstrated by this research, triangulation of methods and sources and 
comparison with findings from other researchers adds to the richness of the analysis. 
The mixed participative and non-participative observations have proven their added 
value for an inside out assessment of a policy development and implementation proc-
ess. Interviews, mirror sessions (with peer scholars and actors in a studied process), 
surveys on actor’s arguments and analysis of documents all contribute to sufficiently 
counterbalance personal biases in interpretations. Such an assessment may be enriched 
in detail and insight when conducted by a pool of involved actors with different pro-
fessional backgrounds and interests who periodically reflect on and learn from their 
observations. Therefore, as a final option for future research, a multi-disciplinary pool 
of reflexive scholars and actors is recommended. If the research focus is on across-
level linkages within an international river basin district, a network of actors and 
scholars who cover all involved political levels may be considered. 
 
Multi-stakeholder dialogues in the next WFD implementation planning cycle 
As promised in Subsection 3.2.2, by combining practical experiences as a senior water 
policy adviser with theoretical insights, the societal research aim of this dissertation is 
to contribute to deliberations on how to efficaciously organise multi-stakeholder proc-
esses for IRBM. Since the mid 1990s, IRBM has become a dominant paradigm in the 
European water policy discourse. The ambiguous concept is both defined and inter-
preted differently by actors at multiple political levels, who represent a diversity of 
world views, policy Utopias and operational practices. Consequently, the IRBM para-
digm is considered both a hybridisation of life philosophies as well as an instrument to 
arrive at collective-choice rules for the sustainable use, development and management 
of shared water and other related natural resources. The configurations of collective-
choice rules at different, interrelated political levels within an international river basin 
district depends on the interplay among prior rules, actors, policy discourses and the 
division of resources and power on the one hand and the specific (historical) context 
of physical, social, economic and political characteristics, norms, values and driving 
forces on the other.   
The observations of this research have shown that the WFD’s ambiguities so far 
have both supported incremental internal integration tendencies and have prevented 
dramatic changes of position rules. The deliberations predominantly focussed on pres-
sures and impacts of priory accepted human development activities and cost-efficient 
options for mitigation and compensation over options for influencing underlying 
driving forces.The WFD has not triggered changes in cross-sector integration rules. 
The choice rules are partly subject to incremental changes, whereas organisational 
scope, information and pay-off rules were similar and remained unaltered at all studied  
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political levels. Observations on the boundary and aggregation rules show that, al-
though the WFD has triggered extensive coordination talks among the competent 
governmental authorities and experts at all studied political levels, limited and precon-
ditioned co-production and co-decision room has been offered to non-governmental 
stakeholders. The authorities remained within the save, well-known heaven of inner-
circle actors and mainly continued prior conditional information, co-thinking and 
consultation procedures. For example, the Dutch national Water Policy Department 
has opted for an extensive, mixed constellation of informal national coordination and 
regional river basin management planning platforms. On the one hand, these net-
works of officials, experts and water managers have delivered a politically acceptable, 
feasible and payable, WFD programme of measures for the 2010 to 2015 period.  On 
the other hand, the traditional approach of informal information and consultation of 
non-governmental stakeholders has neither delivered common frames nor a shared 
ownership of the new generation water and river basin management plans beyond the 
involved governmental actors.  
Whereas some stakeholder groups expressed their perception of too little change 
and too much business as usual scenarios, others were more satisfied with the ac-
commodation tactics in order to prevent too severe socio-economic consequences. 
The question to which extent the multi-stakeholder processes in the first WFD im-
plementation planning cycle in the International Meuse River Basin District have been 
organised efficaciously, may not be answered in a straightforward way. There is not 
one blueprint recipe such as more active participation of non-governmental stake-
holders will automatically deliver a better process and its outcome. The core observa-
tion of this dissertation is that no explicit, systematic deliberation has taken place on 
the desirability of changing the collective-choice rules. Instead, the ambiguities around 
the WFD’s principles and exemption options predominantly have been used in an 
instrumental sense to continue prior traditions and practices. Consciously or uncon-
sciously, as such the competent authorities and inner-circle experts may have blocked 
changes in collective-choice rules. 
 
For the second WFD implementation planning cycle, this author recommends that if 
the public actors wish to go beyond a predominant instrumental use of the WFD’s 
ambiguous terms and definitions, they should open the floor for a strategic multi-
stakeholder dialogue on the desireability of changing the collective-choice rules. Ex-
plicitly, such a dialogue should take into account the interdependencies of different 
political levels within an international river basin district. As a basic precondition for 
such a dialogue, it is important that the involved stakeholders are willing to invest in 
understanding and acknowledgement of the diverse frames on issues at stake. As ar-
gued by Dewulf et al. (2005: 115), ‘Some or all parties will probably have to revise, 
enlarge or reframe the way they relate to the issues and to each other, in order to cre-
ate a vocabulary that can support mutual understanding and common action, which is 
crucial for reaching an effective collaborative management of natural resources.’ Es-
sentially, all defined ideal-type collective-choice rules may occur and may function 
satisfactory, depending on the particular historical context and the institutional setting  
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of a given river basin district at a certain moment in time. There is not one generic 
best option.  
As a water policy adviser, the author considers the observed internal integration 
evolution towards legislation, policy documents and management plans which include 
objectives and measures for both quantitative and qualitative aspects and for ground-
water and surface water bodies (at all studied political levels; substantive scope rules) as 
positive. He recommends to invest more in interlinking the parallel actors networks 
for groundwater and surface water management in order to define the interdependen-
cies of objectives for the state and functioning of both and connected terrestrial eco-
systems. Given the persistent influence of the speciality principle, the integration of 
environmental objectives into other policy domains may be the hardest challenge of 
IRBM. This external integration challenge closely relates to position rules for land own-
ers and water users. To the opinion of the author, in a multi-level, multi-sector and 
multi-stakeholder dialogue for common (re)framing of sustainable land- and water-
related human activities, driving forces behind negative pressures and impacts should 
be seriously explored. Driving forces may be external and internal to the river (sub-) 
basin at stake. External driving forces (as defined by Swartz, 1991) are political, physi-
cal, social and economic developments that take place outside the river (sub-) basin 
that may influence the state and functioning of common pool resources and related 
institutions. Some of these external developments are obvious, others are not. Some 
of these might be predetermined, others might be more uncertain to predict. The 
most uncertain are the most difficult to anticipate (ibid.).  
With regard to organisational scope, boundary and aggregation rules, opening up the 
windows for more active contributions by non-governmental actors does not neces-
sarily asks for dramatic alteration of the functional river basin management coordina-
tion structures. Platforms that provide informal, non-legally binding advises to the 
competent authorities seem to fit well in the political traditions and cultures within the 
International Meuse River Basin District. However, the public actors could benefit 
from discussing more active involvement options with private and civil stakeholders, 
who may bring in relevant knowledge, resources and creative capital. Furthermore, 
linkages among the processes at interrelated political levels could be enforced. In the 
first WFD implementation planning cycle, the predominant focus of public actors has 
been on domestic issues and arrangements over upstream-downstream interdepend-
encies. For the long term, a parsimonious attitude for investments in spotting devel-
opments and driving forces at other, related political levels within a shared river basin 
would be a tactical misconception.  
Given the multi-level interdependencies, the author recommends to make rela-
tions among developments and decisions at the involved political levels more explicit 
in the implementation planning processes. For example, these interdependencies 
could be a permanent agenda item of the coordination structures. Additonally, to 
ensure that policy implementation strategies at the multilateral level make sense at the 
local level and reversely best local practices are uploaded, actors that serve as liaisons 
across political levels may prove their added value. These river basin ambassadors 
could actively invest in building personal trust relations across political levels and pol-
icy domains and in the announcement of relevant developments and activities. For 
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example the Dutch municipal water ambassadors may become part of such a multi-
level liaisons network. In the author’s view, the liaison function could be fulfilled by 
public, civil and/or private actors. In the Netherlands, actors of the regional river 
basin management platforms could increase their efforts in uploading best local and 
regional practices to the multilateral and European levels. Reversely, they could be 
more actively involved in downloading agreements and guidance documents of these 
levels. Given their water-related expertise and human and financial resources, con-
tinuation of the coordination role of the Dutch regional water management authorities 
in the local WFD implementation planning processes is strongly recommended. 
Watson (2007: 45) argues that ‘the success of collaboration will ultimately depend 
on the willingness of officials in government departments and agencies to engage and 
share decision-making power with private sector organisations, voluntary groups, 
communities and other stakeholders with legitimate interests in the integrated man-
agement of land and water resources’.  Verhallen, Warner and Santbergen (2007) pre-
sent IRBM as a mixed mode process in which both values and facts guide the substan-
tive process and in which learning and fighting alternate. Within their mixed mode 
model, both conflict and cooperation are acknowledged as basic features of a multi-
stakeholder process (ibid). The mixed mode model neither plies for an automatically 
and maximal stretching up of the boundary rules or ascending of the participation 
ladder. For example, depending on the types of issues at stake and the stage in policy 
implementation process, the chosen boundary rules may vary. When focussing on 
structured issues for which there is broad consensus on norms, values and required 
knowledge and methods, a relatively simple planning approach may suffice. Given the 
often unstructured nature of issues related to sustainable management of transbound-
ary water resourses, a mixed mode process with multiple stakeholders is often advo-
cated (Hendriks et al., 1999; Verhallen, Warner and Santbergen, 2007).  
The author advises to continue with the Dutch informal river basin management 
coordination structures in which the competent public authorities take the lead. At the 
same time, the advisory function of the WFD consultation platforms could be en-
forced by offering the nongovernmental actors more opportunities for active contri-
butions. In addition to information and consultation, more time and resources (e.g. by 
using European funds) could be invested in building public-private partnerships and 
cross-sector networks that explore options for innovative and synergetic implementa-
tion strategies, e.g. for reduction of arduous pressures. At the multilateral level the 
public actors could consider best practices with active contributions from other stake-
holders at the European level. The author advises the public actors to reconsider the 
options for widening up the multilateral participation windows in an open dialogue 
with the other stakeholders. 
With regard to choice rules, the Dutch actors involved in the WFD implementation 
planning process may benefit from cross-connections with the domestic process of 
the Deltaprogramme. Within this parallel process, long-term strategies for linking up 
fresh water supply and demand management in the context of expected climate 
change are explored. Given the predominant focus of the Deltaprogramme at quanti-
tative issues in relation to protection and stimulation of socio-economic development 
options, linking up its regional areal processes (which are scheduled for 2012 and  
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2013) with the second local WFD implementation planning processes (which will start 
in 2013), might offer opportunities for both maintaining political attention to issues of 
water quality and ecological restoration and integration with quantitative issues. The 
author advises to link up the multilateral coordination process and the Dutch domes-
tic processes with Europe’s Blueprint process. This process aims for ensuring good 
water quality in sufficient quantities for all legitimate uses, by means of an integrated, 
long-term demand- and supply management strategy in the context of climate change 
(www.ec.europe.eu/environment/water/blueprint). 
The author advises the competent authorities to make more use of the informa-
tion offers by other stakeholders and to include relevant sector information sources in 
the joint fact finding processes for periodical actualisation of the river basin charac-
terisations (information rules). As expressed by the European guidance documents joint 
fact finding by multiple stakeholders can be useful to develop a sense of ownership 
over the river basin management plans, with the river basins characterisation reports 
as a first important step. For example, local stakeholders may possess information 
sources and expertise of direct use for the pressures and impact analysis for individual 
water bodies. With regard to pay-off rules, the author recommends a distinction between 
the reporting obligations for compliance checking by the EC and the development of 
multi-stakeholder partnerships for shared ownership of river basin management plans 
and collaborative capital for their successful implementation. For the reporting obliga-
tions, stricter national instructions and less diffuse local and regional deliberations on 
technical details could pay off the Dutch. The informal regional river basin platforms 
may remain useful for continuous political attention to issues of water quality and 
ecological restoration. At the local level, a selection of water bodies could be consid-
ered for experiments with building shared visions and definition of common policy 
and research strategies, related management approaches and indicators implementa-
tion progress. Finally, active involvement of local communities and schools could help 
to overcome the easy argument that issues of the Water Framework Directive are too 
complicated to discuss with lay people.  
 
Finally, political willingness, courage and leadership are required to reconsider the 
generic sustainability label for all prior human development activities that are men-
tioned in WFD’s Article 4. The option of a dramatic alteration of prior position rules 
for the benefit of the Earth’s intrinsic natural values and dependent present and future 
human generations should be seriously acknowledged. Without a healthy planet and 
people living on it, it will make no sense to talk about profit any longer. 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
Summary 
 
 
‘But whatever one’s assessment, a type of policy analysis that does not make room for the cen-
trality of ambiguity in politics can be of little use in the real world.’  Deborah Stone (2002: 157) 
 
 
Introduction: ambiguous ambitions in the international Meuse theatre 
 
This research is inspired by a desire to understand how interpretation diversity of an 
ambiguous policy concept may trigger or hinder changes in collective-choice rules. 
The focus is on an in-depth analysis of the Dutch water policy domain within the 
European context of transboundary river basins. The departure platform is the Inte-
grated River Basin Management paradigm (IRBM). As introduced in Chapter 1 IRBM, 
in its contemporary interpretation by the global water management community, aims 
at collective-choice rules for the sustainable use, development and management of 
interrelated water and land resources within (inter-) national river basins (Molle, 2009). 
The paradigm, as with sustainable development, is intrinsically ambiguous. Ambiguous 
interpretations may lead both to a predominant instrumental use to protect the status 
quo and to a search for common ground and collective action (Stone, 2002; Fischer, 
2009). Whenever ambiguous meanings facilitate cooperation and compromise, incre-
mental changes of collective-choice rules may be expected over radical shifts. The 
opposite may also be true: whenever ambiguous claims trigger sharp polarisation (for 
example among political parties), radical rules change may arise due to a significant 
change of those in power (such as after parliamentary elections; ibid.).  
As adopted in October 2000, the Water Framework Directive (WFD; European 
Communities, 2000) offers a set of governance and policy principles for a harmonised 
implementation of IRBM across Europe. Including several multi-interpretable terms 
and conditions, the WFD is circumvented by ambiguity. Most notably, the Directive’s 
core Article 4 on environmental objectives implicitly acknowledges a broad range of 
human development activities as sustainable, while at the same time the pressures and 
impacts of these activities are among the reasons for the WFD’s existence. Further-
more the Directive offers detailed exemption options for a staged implementation and 
lowering of objectives. The rule-altering potential of the WFD depends on how stake-
holders in different policy domains at and across political levels within an (in-
ter)national river basin (district) will translate the Directive’s governance rules, policy 
principles, environmental objectives and exemption options.  
As elaborated in Chapter 2 (theoretical framework), a wide range of actors may 
embrace the IRBM paradigm, but interpret its meaning and implementation in diverse 
ways. Depending on the specific physical, social, economic and political conditions 
within a river basin, IRBM may trigger or hinder changes in rules-in-law and rules-in-
use. The scientific aim of the research is to explore the triggers and barriers for 
changes in collective-choice rules on the sustainable use, development and manage-
ment of water resources. This shall be shown by analysing the impact of the policy 
and governance principles, the environmental objectives and the exemption options of 
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the WFD at interrelated political levels within the International Meuse River Basin 
District (see Chapter 3 for a brief geographical characterisation). The central question 
is how continuity or change of collective-choice rules after adoption of the WFD may 
be explained. As the societal research aim, by combining practical experiences as water 
policy adviser with the theoretical insights resulting from scientific research, this dis-
sertation wishes to contribute to deliberations on how to efficaciously organise multi-
stakeholder dialogues for complicated issues in contemporary river basin manage-
ment.  
 
 
The theoretical fundament: a hybrid analytical framework 
 
Since this research is inspired by an interest in triggers and barriers for collective-
choice rule changes, there is a need for an analytical framework that includes a rules 
typology which, by the aid of related theories, describes potential explanations for 
observed (resistance to) changes. As a first clue, the Policy Arrangement Approach 
(PAA; Arts, Van Tatenhove and Leroy, 2000; Leroy and Arts, 2006) offers such a 
framework, linking four dimensions within a tetrahedron, i.e. rules of the game with policy 
discourses, actor constellations (oppositions and coalitions) and division of resources and power 
(Liefferink, 2006: 60; see Figure 1).  
 
 
Figure 1: The tetrahedron of a policy arrangement (in: Liefferink, 2006: 60). 
 
Due to the indissoluble interrelatedness of the four dimensions of a PAA, in principle 
a researcher should address the entire tetrahedron (ibid.: 48). According to Liefferink 
(2006), the four-dimensional analysis of a given policy domain allows for different 
analytical perspectives, dependent on the research question. The challenge within any 
research that departs from the PAA is to avoid becoming swamped (the curiosity that 
kills the cat), for example by choosing a principal corner to enter the tetrahedron, 
without losing sight on the interrelations with the other corners. The principal en-
trance of this research is the rules of the game corner. Prior rules may be reconfirmed or 
challenged by continuous interaction between the four dimensions on the one hand  
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and driving forces in the broader physical, social, economic and political context on 
the other. 
A second clue lies in the Institutional Analysis and Development framework 
(IAD framework; Kiser and Ostrom, 1982; Ostrom, 1999, 2005). The framework has 
its roots in studies on rules and games in governing common pool resources, hence 
providing the opportunity to further elaborate the rules of the game dimension. Ostrom 
(1990: 51) defines institutions as ‘the sets of [seven] working rules [types] that are used 
to determine who is eligible to make decisions in some arenas, which actions are al-
lowed or constrained, which aggregation rules will be used, which procedures must be 
followed, which information must or must not be provided and which pay-offs will be 
assigned to individuals dependent on their actions’. Ostrom, Gardner and Walker 
(1994: 37) denote that choices on collective action may not be studied in isolation, but 
as a configuration. A change in one rule type may affect the others. Additionally, these 
rules result from interactions among actors in action situations which are influenced 
by exogenous variables, i.e. biophysical/material conditions, attributes of a community 
and rules-in-use (Ostrom, 2011).  
The theoretical novelty of this research is the incorporation of the seven rule 
types from the IAD framework with the PAA as elaboration of the latter’s rules of the 
game dimension. Based on a review of IRBM literature, the seven rule types of the 
IAD framework have been translated into three ideal-types (as defined by Weber, 
1922; see Table A for an overview of constructed ideal-type collective-choice rules which are 
explained in detail in the Subsections 2.2.3 till 2.2.9). These ideal-types serve as a val-
uefree analytical benchmark to track incremental rule changes over time. By compar-
ing the observations on rules in the era before and after adoption of the WFD (re-
spectively 1990 to 2000 and 2001 to 2009), the degree of change may become trace-
able. Subsequently, analysis of developments within the other three dimensions of a 
policy arrangement may account for potential explanations for (triggers and barriers) 
of observed rules changes. Since the WFD’s river basin management approach fo-
cuses on shared river basins within the European environmental domain, its imple-
mentation depends on coherence among policy arrangements at all involved, interde-
pendent governance levels. Therefore, for the aim of this research the degrees of rules 
changes are assessed for both the European level and the interdependent political 
levels within the International Meuse River Basin District (multilateral, national, re-
gional and local). Figure 2 provides for a synthesis of the analytical framework as ap-
plied in this research. 
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Table A: Defined ideal-type collective-choice rules for IRBM (this research) 
Ideal-type A↓ Ideal-type B↓ Ideal-type C↓ 
1a. Scope rules (organisational): 
Water policy is imple-
mented by organisational 
structures and actor net-
works which are driven by 
social, economic and politi-
cal factors that do not fol-
low hydrological (river ba-
sin) boundaries. These 
structures/networks may be 
multi-purpose or sectoral in 
nature and are under par-
liamentary control. 
Water policy is imple-
mented by functional 
water agencies, commit-
tees and actor networks 
which follow hydrological 
(river basin) boundaries.  
These functional entities 
and actor networks are 
controlled by parliamen-
tary institutions. 
Water policy is imple-
mented by autonomous 
(sub) river basin authorities 
and/or communities that 
are organised along hydro-
logical boundaries. These 
authorities and communi-
ties are beyond parliamen-
tary control and do have 
their own polity rules. 
1b. Scope rules (internal integration): 
Separate legislation, policy 
documents and manage-
ment plans for both water 
quality and quantity issues. 
Surface water and ground-
water are dealt with in paral-
lel. 
Legislation, policy docu-
ments and management 
plans which includes par-
allel objectives and meas-
ures for both quantitative 
and qualitative aspects and 
for groundwater and sur-
face water. 
Water legislation, policy 
documents and manage-
ment plans with integrated 
objectives and measures 
for interrelated surface and 
groundwater bodies, in-
cluding quantitative and 
qualitative aspects. 
1c. Scope rules (external integration): 
Separate legislation, policy 
documents and manage-
ment plans from water 
policy and other policy 
domains without linkages. 
Legislation, policy docu-
ments and management 
plans from other policy 
domains take into account 
water issues and reversely. 
Cross-sector, integrative 
legislation, policies and 
management plans. 
2. Position rules: 
Separate policy documents 
and management plans 
from water policy and other 
policy domains without 
linkages. 
Policy documents and 
management plans from 
other policy domains take 
into account water issues 
and reversely. 
Cross-sector, integrative 
policies and management 
plans. 
3. Boundary rules:   
Access to the river basin 
management planning proc-
ess is restricted to public 
actors only. Other stake-
holders are informed. 
Non-governemental ac-
tors may have access to 
the river basin manage-
ment planning process 
under conditions set by 
the public actors. Empha-
sis on co-thinking and 
consultation. 
Ample opportunities for all 
interested stakeholders to 
join the river basin man-
agement planning process, 
including co-production, 
co-decision and self-
realisation. 
 
SUMMARY 433 
 
 
 
Table A: continuation 
Ideal-type A↓ Ideal-type B↓ Ideal-type C↓ 
4a. Choice rules (supply and demand management):  
Water supply management 
determines availability of 
fresh water for user func-
tions. 
Mixed supply and demand 
management determines 
fresh water availability 
without a hierarchy in user 
functions. 
Integrated supply and 
demand management, as 
expressed by a hierarchy in 
user functions. 
4b. Choice (the nature of the license system): 
Separate, parallel licences 
for quality and quantity 
objectives related to devel-
opment, management and 
use of water resources. 
Licenses that integrate 
quantity and quality objec-
tives related to develop-
ment, management and 
use of water resources. 
Integrated licences for 
interrelated development, 
management and use of 
related natural resources 
(e.g. air, water, land). 
5. Aggregation rules: 
Independent decision-
making on water policy and 
management plans at differ-
ent administrative levels 
within a river basin. 
Asymmetric, top-down 
decision-making on water 
policy and management 
plans at different adminis-
trative levels within a river 
basin: lower levels have to 
comply with the rules 
from the higher levels. 
Symmetric, consensus 
based decision making on 
water policy and manage-
ment plans at different 
administrative levels: 
mixed top-down and bot-
tom-up rules. 
6. Information rules: 
The river basin manage-
ment planning process 
(definition of means and 
ends) is predominantly 
driven by expert informa-
tion and knowledge from 
the natural sciences. Validity 
and reliability are central 
criteria for legitimised in-
formation and knowledge. 
The river basin manage-
ment planning process 
(definition of means and 
ends) is predominantly 
driven by expert informa-
tion and knowledge from 
the economic sciences. 
Costs-benefits ratios and 
economic efficiency are 
central criteria for legiti-
mised information and 
knowledge. 
The river basin manage-
ment planning process 
(definition of means and 
ends) is driven by multidis-
ciplinary information and 
knowledge from experts 
and lays. Joint fact finding 
and social robustness are 
central criteria for legiti-
mised information and 
knowledge. 
7. Pay-off rules: 
Rewards and sanctions from 
laws and regulations are 
major drivers for compli-
ance with collective rules 
(e.g. as expressed by stan-
dards and license condi-
tions). 
Economic incentives and 
market forces are major 
drivers for compliance 
with collective rules.   
(Sub-)Basin communities 
voluntarily invest resources 
(human, financial, exper-
tise) as collaborative capital 
for compliance with collec-
tive-choice rules. 
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Figure 2: The analytical framework of this research 
 
 
The research approach: participative analysis by means of triangulation 
 
This research can be characterised as a participative, interpretative analysis, in which 
the researcher aims to take advantage of his privileged position as one of the inner 
circle, local governmental actors in the WFD implementation process. This position 
offers direct access to first-hand information sources, ample opportunities for conver-
sations and interviews with a diversity of stakeholders and options for both participa-
tory and non-participatory observations. The principal aim of the chosen approach is 
to reconstruct a complicated transboundary policy implementation process, as value-
free as possible, in order to detect triggers and barriers for change of collective-choice 
rules over time. Given the dual role of the author in the studied process, both as re-
searcher and local governmental stakeholder, there is a challenge of dealing with the 
undeniable personal bias and impact of his own actions.  
The main advantage of a participative, interpretative approach is the potential for 
an inside-out, in-depth analysis of a (politicised) policy formulation, negotiation and 
implementation process, which may point the finger at informal, unwritten rules-in-
use in addition to and interacting with formal, written down rules (as emphasised by 
Ostrom, 1999, 2005). Or, as Fischer (2003: 141, 142) puts it, ‘In the world of politics, 
the “real” reasons and motives for an action – as opposed to those officially offered - 
are as important as the action itself.’ The main pitfall is that, the more the researcher  
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gets involved with his subject, the easier it may become to loose the required distance 
or helicopter view. The expected added value of this research is the synergy between 
the researcher as a policy implementation adviser and his role as analyst of the process 
in which he is involved. Both roles require an insight into arguments and strategies of 
different stakeholders involved. Furthermore, the role of adviser necessitates that the 
researcher does not allow his own preferences and expectations to unduly influence 
the presentation of information (including the pro’s and con’s for a range of options) 
to be acted upon by the politicians of the daily board and the interests’ representatives 
in the general assembly of the regional water management authority.  
In order to overcome too much bias and entrapment by the studied subject, tri-
angulation of information sources, methods and researchers is considered adequate. 
As a first step to arrive at sufficient credibility of the analysis and its conclusions, own 
observations and reconstructions are compared with findings of other peer research-
ers who have studied the WFD implementation process (both in the Netherlands and 
in other European Member States). As a second step, so-called mirror sessions with 
multiple stakeholders have been organised to present and discuss the research find-
ings. Thirdly, by means of interviews and a written survey, perceptions, argumentation 
lines and strategies of diverse stakeholders have been registered and interpreted. Fi-
nally, group meeting observations have been discussed with those stakeholders ob-
served.  
 
 
Conclusions  
 
Ambiguous European ambitions support incremental rule changes 
The first hypothesis of this research is that policy-making and implementation in the 
context of the European environmental policy domain predominantly is subject to 
ambiguous concepts which invite incremental rules changes. In addition, the particular 
history is full of conflicts, upstream-downstream asymmetries and cultural diversity in 
combination with emphasis on the sovereignty and subsidiarity principles which has 
lead to the second hypothesis that one may not expect revolutionary changes in collec-
tive-choice rules from the multilateral coordination game by the International Meuse 
Commission (IMC). As the third hypothesis, given both the active uploading attempts 
of Dutch national water policy officials and experts at the early WFD drafting stage 
and their perception of European forerunners, one may expect limited changes in the 
domestic rules configuration of the water policy domain.  
Table B summarises the observations of this research. For all studied political 
levels, the observations mainly point at continuation of prior collective-choice rules 
and incremental changes. Notwithstanding the ambitious wording in the WFD and 
some of the informal guidance documents, the Directive’s implementation until De-
cember 2009 does not trigger rule changes. It mainly confirms and supports earlier 
started evolutions and contributes to their further institutionalisation. At all political 
levels, internal integration rules show most pronounced change, as expressed by ob-
servations on scope rules and, except for the multilateral level, choice rules (nature of 
the license system). More limited changes have been observed for boundary rules (at 
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the multilateral level only) and choice rules (supply and demand management; at the 
European and multilateral levels).  
 
Table B: Observed IRBM rules in the 1990 to 2009 period (expressed as ideal-types)  
 Rule type↓ Europe, Meuse, National, Regional, Local↓ 
Scope (organisa-
tional): 
Ideal-type B: Continuation and enforcement of functional water 
agencies, committees and actor networks which follow hydrologi-
cal (river basin) boundaries. These functional entities and actor 
networks are controlled by parliamentary institutions. 
Scope (internal 
integration): 
From ideal-type A to B: An evolution towards legislation, policy 
documents and management plans which include objectives and 
measures for both quantitative and qualitative aspects and for 
groundwater and surface water. 
Information: A juxtaposition of ideal-types A and B: The river basin manage-
ment planning process is driven by a mixture of a scientific-
technical and social-economic rationale. Validity, reliability, costs-
benefit ratios and economic efficiency are central criteria for le-
gitimised information/knowledge. 
Pay-off: A juxtaposition of ideal-types A and B: Both rewards and sanc-
tions from laws and regulations and economic incentives and mar-
ket forces are major drivers for compliance with collective rules.   
 Rule type↓ Europe & Meuse↓ National, Regional & Local↓ 
Choice (supply 
and demand man-
agement): 
From ideal-type A to B: 
An evolution from supply 
management only to a 
mixed supply and demand 
management approach.  
A juxtaposition of ideal-types B and 
C: In general a mixed supply and 
demand management approach (B). 
In case of prolonged droughts, the 
approach is more integrated as ex-
pressed by a hierarchy in user func-
tions (C).   
 Rule type↓ Meuse↓ Europe, National, Regional &  
Local↓ 
Scope (external 
integration): 
Ideal-type A: Separate 
legislation and plans for 
water policy and other 
policy domains without 
linkages. 
Ideal-type B: Legislation/plans for 
other policy domains take into ac-
count water issues and reversely. 
Regional level: also integrative, 
cross-sector environmental policy 
plans (ideal-type C). 
Position: Ideal-type A: Protection of 
prior water and land re-
sources user and property 
rights without precondi-
tions on environmental, 
social and economic ex-
ternalities.  
Ideal-type B: Conditional mainte-
nance and acquirement of water & 
land resources user and property 
rights. Conditions include require-
ments to consider social, economic 
and/or environmental externalities  
Legend: For definitions of all the A, B and C ideal-types see the Subsections 2.2.2 till 2.2.8).  
The grey colour indicates observed rule changes. 
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Table B: continuation  
 Rule type↓ Meuse↓ Europe, National, Regional &  
Local↓ 
Choice (nature of 
the license sys-
tem): 
Ideal-type A: Separate, 
parallel licenses for quality 
and quantity objectives 
related to development, 
management and use of 
water resources.  
From ideal-type A towards B: An 
evolution towards licenses that inte-
grate quantity and quality objectives 
related to development, management 
and use of water resources. 
Boundary: From ideal-type A towards 
B: Enlarged access for non 
governmental actors to the 
water resources policy 
planning process under 
conditions set by the pub-
lic actors. Emphasis on co-
thinking and consultation. 
Ideal-type B: Non-governmental 
actors may have access to the water 
resources policies planning process 
under conditions set by the public 
actors. Emphasis on co-thinking and 
consultation. At the regional level 
also ideal-type C rules have been 
observed: Ample opportunities for 
all interested stakeholders to join the 
water resources policies planning 
process, including co-productions, 
co-decisions and self-realisation. 
Aggregation: A juxtaposition of ideal-
types A and C: Both inde-
pendent decision-making 
by riparian states and re-
gions and symmetric, con-
sensus based decision-
making. 
A juxtaposition of ideal-types B and 
C: Both asymmetric, top-down deci-
sion-making and symmetric, consen-
sus based decision-making examples 
on water policy and management 
plans at different administrative 
levels within the river basin. 
Legend: For definitions of all the A, B and C ideal-types see the Subsections 2.2.2 till 2.2.8).  
The grey colour indicates observed rule changes. 
 
For the majority of rule types (organisational scope, external integration, position, 
aggregation, information and pay-off) continuity of collective-choice rules dominates 
over change, which means no substantial changes have been observed. The          
multilateral level shows most dissimilarity with the other levels. The observed rules 
configurations for the three Dutch domestic levels are similar. 
The observations support the first two hypotheses. The complicated constella-
tion of actor networks with a diversity of policy strategies, tactics and interests at the 
European level obviously has fed ambiguous formulations in order to hold everybody 
on board in the search for cooperation and compromise (see also Kaika, 2003; Kaika 
and Page, 2003). At the same time, at the multilateral level, discussions and negotia-
tions remained laborious, although the WFD clearly has triggered progress in the co-
ordination and internal integration efforts (most notably by the entrance of new actors 
and taking a flood issues working group on board). The IMC’s public actors kept 
struggling with opening up the windows to other stakeholders, emphasising sovereignty 
and subsidiarity. The similar collective-choice rules patterns for the three Dutch do-
mestic levels (national, regional and local) may be explained by the historical path of  
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a decentralised unitary state. The public actors of all three domestic levels, as a matter 
of saying almost by genetic codification, acknowledge the importance of a balanced 
mixture of top-down instructions and bottom-up room for manoeuvre and tailor-
made compromises.  
With regard to the third hypothesis, the WFD’s implementation process so far 
indeed has not triggered significant rules changes in the Netherlands. But the explana-
tion does not lie in the Dutch forerunner perception, but relates to the European 
political compromise text of the WFD that reflects deviations from the initial Dutch 
uploading ambitions. In the early WFD drafting stage Dutch water officials and ex-
perts feared a loss of the Dutch system of ambitious intentional water quality objec-
tives. Since adoption of this Dutch system would have urged midstream and upstream 
riparian states to accelerate their investments in water quality amelioration, the Dutch 
tried to upload it. Furthermore, they plied for simplification of the European corpus 
of water legislation by means of integration into a more generic framework directive. 
During the European negotiation game, these Dutch public actors have lost their grip 
on the process. They expressed disappointment about the limited integrated nature of 
the Directive and deviations from the initial Dutch proposals. The uncertainty about 
the socio-economic impact of these deviations has contributed to a domestic political 
atmosphere of both resistance towards (too much) legally binding requirements and 
emphasis on continuation of present institutions as precondition for the WFD’s im-
plementation planning process (see also Edelenbos et al., 2008 and Raadgever et al., 
2009, Ten Heuvelhof et al., 2010). 
 
Continuity rules the water policy domain. The most pronounced rule changes concern 
internal integration tendencies, which have at least been supported by the integration 
discourse in the WFD and related guidance documents. The actor networks of the 
water policy domain at all levels remained dominated by governments and experts and 
kept rather isolated from networks of adjacent policy domains. Although not analysed 
in detail in this research stable power and actor configurations of parallel operating 
policy domains which are supported by the specificity principle of sector institutions 
are a strong barrier for cross-sector integration attempts. In addition, the relatively 
modest financial resources for integration of environmental/water policy objectives 
into plans and programmes of other policy domains act as a weak trigger.  
Part of the explanation for continuity of collective-choice rules lies in the am-
biguous wording of the WFD’s core Article 4 on environmental objectives (European 
Communities, 2000: 9-11). Until the final hours of the conciliation procedure, 
amendments have been subject to delicate political negotiation. Given that this Article 
protects a number of human activities which are one of the main reasons for existence 
of the WFD, an important potential trigger for more sustainable interference has been 
paralysed from the onset. Furthermore, persistent domestic confusion about the ju-
ridical interpretation and hence socio-economic impact of the intrinsic exemption 
options and conditions has triggered a cautious implementation approach. The early 
decision of the European Water Directors to accept the exemption provisions as a 
regular instrument for prioritisation and a staged implementation of measures until the 
end of 2027 has supported the prudent Dutch approach. In this sense, the ambiguity  
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of Article 4 has invited a predominant instrumental use of the Directive in order to 
protect prior policies and practices. Until December 2009, the amiguous ambitions did 
not trigger multi-stakeholder deliberations on the driving forces behind human pres-
sures and impacts. 
 
Limited cross-level linkages 
The observations of this research show a central position of the public actors at all 
studied political levels in interpreting and planning the first implementation term of 
the WFD. The public actors determine the boundary rules with strong emphasis on 
consultation of and to a lesser extent the co-thinking by non-governmental actors. 
They are cautious not to loose steering control in the mixed technical-scientific and 
socio-economic aggregation process, especially at the multilateral level. There are only 
a few actors who operate at and across different political levels. Although some Dutch 
national stakeholder groups appoint special lobbying officers in Brussels, personal 
contacts of these liaisons with diverse actors at the regional and local levels are scarce. 
Most interviewees take the decisions and activities of the European and multilateral 
levels for granted. They predominantly invest their (limited) financial and human re-
sources for exploring the implications of the WFD and its technically complicated and 
detailed requirements and annexes on the regional or local level at which they are 
directly involved. 
Both at the multilateral and the Dutch regional and local levels, the informal 
guidance documents for WFD implementation are taken for granted. No discussions 
take place on open endings in these documents. The Dutch national Water Policy 
Department translates the guidance documents into national instructions and recom-
mendations and takes the lead in the preparation of instructions for meetings at the 
European and multilateral levels. Some regional water management authorities partici-
pate in working groups of the International Meuse Commission. In general, regional 
and local politicians and officials in the Brabant-West Region are not aware of the 
decisions taken at the multilateral level and their implications for the domestic proc-
esses. The plays at the international Meuse Theatre are considered too abstract or 
remain unnoticed. Although the IMC is supposed to closely monitor the bilateral co-
ordination efforts, the regional and local actors do not notice such activity. Whereas 
the Dutch national Water Policy Department takes the lead in preparing the multilat-
eral and high-level bilateral negotiations, the provincial authorities and the regional 
water management authorities guide the local bilateral coordination attempts. Success 
stories are predominantly incidental and often related to available European subsidies 
and personal relations. Some Dutch environmental NGOs and the drinking water 
sector are active at different political levels. However, in general, regional and local 
based NGOs and interests groups predominantly focus on their own levels. 
With regard to transboundary, inland waters bodies Dutch regional and local ac-
tors in the International Meuse River Basin District struggle with the bilateral coordi-
nation processes with their upstream German, Walloon and Flemish neighbours. The 
priority of the national Water Policy Department towards these bilateral coordination 
processes has been limited over the 1990 to 2009 period. For example, the Flemish-
Dutch Integrated Water Management Coordination Platform has entered a silent  
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hibernation period whereas the subordinate local transboundary river basin manage-
ment committees have suffered from a lack of a political mandate and tasks in the first 
WFD implementation planning cycle. In November 2011 at an explorative meeting at 
Antwerp on options for a restart of transboundary coordination, the Dutch and Flem-
ish water management authorities (national, regional and local) agreed to transform or 
replace the transboundary river basin management committees by informal and flexi-
ble bilateral coordination structures (as related to the level of a specific issue to be 
solved). The Flemish authorities acknowledged that, as a downstream state, the Neth-
erlands may ask for more ambitious investments than the upstream partner is able or 
willing to offer. Consequently, expectation management is an important feature of the 
transboundary coordination efforts. 
The limited connections across political levels may be explained by the WFD’s 
intrinsic acknowledgement of the inconsistencies between social, economic and politi-
cal territories on the one hand and hydrological (river basin) units at the other. Protec-
tion of sovereignty and a call for subsidiarity, as expressed by the choice to appoint 
legally accountable, competent authorities at the level of Member States and not at the 
multilateral river basin level, has triggered first priority to domestic implementation 
planning processes. Consequently, the IMC remains swimming in the misty atmos-
phere between the (partly) supranational European institutions and national jurisdic-
tions. Instead of guiding multilateral documents, summaries of national reports had to 
be brought together in the final hours of the first implementation planning cycle. To 
dissolve barriers to transboundary coordination and cooperation, political willingness 
of involved competent authorities remains a decisive factor, especially in a context of 
upstream-downstream asymmetries and a history of international conflicts and dis-
trust. Additionally, the rather complicated technical nature of the WFD’s annexes has 
so far triggered a scientific-rational search for uncertainty reduction by individual 
Member States over the formulation of shared transboundary objectives and meas-
ures. The diminished role of the bilateral, transboundary river basin committees be-
tween the Flemish Region of Belgium and the Netherlands may be interpreted as an 
indicator for that. 
 
To summarise: the main conclusion from this research is that the ambiguities around 
the central governance rules, policy principles, environmental objectives and exemp-
tions options of the WFD have not triggered substantial collective-choice rules 
changes for IRBM. Until the end of the first WFD implementation planning cycle, the 
ambiguities have served accommodation efforts of stable, powerful actor coalitions 
who aim to prevent dramatic alterations of prior position rules. Whereas the integra-
tion dimension of the IRBM and sustainable development discourse have supported 
incremental internal integration tendencies at all studied political levels, cross-sector 
integration forces have remained too weak to trigger a significant change of the rules 
configuration. Despite the rhetoric of the integration principle and the related cross-
compliance procedure, the strongly specialised and sector organisation of the Euro-
pean institutions is part of the barrier (Baker, 1997; Jessop, 2004; Jordan and Schout, 
2006). Furthermore, this research points at a relatively isolated water policy sub-
domain which is strongly steered by public actors, who are cautious not to loose 
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decision-making privileges. Especially in the supranational void at the multilateral 
level, the state actors emphasise their sovereignty. They mention the subsidiarity prin-
ciple to stress limited opportunities for the International Meuse Commission to open 
up the multilateral arena for non-governmental actors. The Dutch national Water 
Policy Department has opted for an extensive mixed top-down and bottom-up WFD 
implementation process, which fits well in the tradition of informal information and 
consultation procedures (which are controlled by the public actors). 
Notwithstanding the limited changes so far, one should not underestimate the 
rule-altering potential of the diverse statements in the WFD and its related guidance 
documents on the importance of cross-sector integration of environmental policy 
objectives and sustainable human development activities. The offered integration dis-
course and range of options for (experiments with) more interactive and participatory 
policy planning and implementation processes could trigger (further) collective-choice 
rules changes in the second and third WFD’s implementation planning rounds up to 
December 2027. 
 
 
Recommendations 
 
Options for future research 
The hybrid analytical framework has provided potential explanations for observed 
continuity and incremental change of collective-choice rules at the studied, interrelated 
political levels within the International Meuse River Basin District. A first option for 
future research is to conduct a similar analysis for other European river basin districts 
in order to explore to which extent the observed continuity and changes of collective-
choice rules (and the potential explanations) are more generic in nature. Additionally, 
the research scope could be enlarged towards IRBM processes outside Europe in a 
search for triggers and barriers for collective-choice rules changes within different 
physical, socio-economic and political contexts. As a second option, similar analyses 
could be conducted for the implementation planning processes of other European 
directives. To which extent are the observed rules configurations typical for the water 
policy sub-domain? Thirdly, in order to detect triggers and barriers for external integra-
tion a cross-sector analysis of policy arrangements is another option. The analytical 
framework as developed by Jordan and Schout (2006), which pays explicit attenten-
tion to cross-sector integration of Europe’s environmental objectives, may serve as a 
departure platform. 
Whereas the hybrid analytical framework has proven to be a convenient tool for 
identifying incremental changes in collective-rules at individual political levels, its po-
tential for assessing across-level linkages has not been explored by this research. 
Given the emphasis of the IRBM’s paradigm on coherent coordination within the 
context of transboundary river basins, a fourth option for future research is to define 
additional analytical indicators for covering this border-crossing lacuna. For example, 
the actors’ dimension might offer an interesting perspective by exploring the concept 
of policy entrepreneurs. An in-depth analysis of policy entrepreneurs at and across 
political levels within an international river basin could provide for an identification of 
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triggers and barriers in crossing borders and building collective-choice rules bridges. 
The five possible strategies that policy entrepreneurs can apply as identified by 
Huitema and Meijerink (2009: 12), may be a promising starting point for defining 
across-level analytical indicators: ‘the development of new ideas; building coalitions 
and selling ideas; the recognition and exploitation of windows of opportunity; the use 
of multiple venues; and the orchestration and management of networks’.  
The principal focus of this research has been on a detailed elaboration of the 
rules of the game dimension, by means of defining ideal-types as a benchmark. The 
subsequent assessment of developments over time for the other three dimensions 
(policy discourses, actor constellations and resources and power) has shown redun-
dancy in providing explanations for observed continuity and changes in collective-
choice rules. The question is whether a more detailed elaboration of these three di-
mensions would add to a disentangling the impact of each individually. Therefore, a 
fifth option for future research is to explore whether a definition of ideal-type bench-
marks for the other three dimensions would enforce the explanatory potential of the 
hybrid analytical framework. Additionally, further elaboration of the relationships 
between all four dimensions of the PAA could be considered, for example by taking 
the relationships between the dimensions as named by Liefferink (2006) as a starting 
point. 
As demonstrated by this research, triangulation of methods, sources and com-
parison with findings from other researchers adds to the richness of the analysis. The 
mixed participative and non-participative observations have proven their added value 
for an inside out assessment of a policy development and implementation process. 
Interviews, mirror sessions (with peer scholars and actors in a studied process), sur-
veys on actor’s argumentation lines and analysis of documents all contribute to suffi-
ciently counterbalance personal biases in interpretations. Such an assessment may be 
enriched in detail and insight when conducted by a pool of involved actors with dif-
ferent professional backgrounds and interests who periodically reflect on and learn 
from their observations. Therefore, as a final option for future research, a multi-
disciplinary pool of reflexive scholars and actors is recommended. Whenever the re-
search focus is on across-level linkages within an international river basin district, a 
network of actors and scholars who cover all involved political levels may be consid-
ered. 
 
Multi-stakeholder dialogues in the next WFD implementation planning cycle 
The question to which extent the multi-stakeholder processes in the first WFD im-
plementation planning cycle in the International Meuse River Basin District have been 
organised efficaciously, may not be answered in a straightforward way. There is not 
one blueprint recipe such as more active participation of non-governmental stake-
holders will automatically deliver a better process and its outcome. The core observa-
tion of this dissertation is that no explicit, systematic deliberation has taken place on 
the desirability of changing the collective-choice rules, e.g. with regard to definition of 
sustainable human development activities. The deliberations predominantly focussed 
on pressures and impacts of priory accepted human development activities and cost-
efficient options for mitigation and compensation over options for influencing under 
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lying driving forces. The informal information and consultation of non-governmental 
stakeholders has neither delivered common frames nor a shared ownership of the new 
generation water and river basin management plans beyond the involved governmen-
tal actors. The ambiguities around the WFD’s principles and exemption options pre-
dominantly have been used in an instrumental sense to continue prior traditions and 
practices. Whereas some stakeholder groups expressed their perception of too little 
change and too many business as usual scenarios, others were more satisfied with the 
accommodation tactics in order to prevent too severe socio-economic consequences. 
Consciously or unconsciously, as such the competent authorities and inner-circle ex-
perts may have blocked changes in collective-choice rules. 
For the second WFD implementation planning cycle, this author recommends 
that if the public actors wish to go beyond a predominant instrumental use of the 
directive’s ambiguous terms and definitions, they should open the floor for a strategic 
multi-stakeholder dialogue on the desireability of changing the collective-choice rules. 
Explicitly, such a dialogue should take into account the interdependencies of different 
political levels within an international river basin district. As a basic precondition for 
such a dialogue, it is important that the involved stakeholders are willing to invest in 
understanding and acknowledgement of the diverse frames on issues at stake. As ar-
gued by Dewulf et al. (2005: 115), ‘Some or all parties will probably have to revise, 
enlarge or reframe the way they relate to the issues and to each other, in order to cre-
ate a vocabulary that can support mutual understanding and common action, which is 
crucial for reaching an effective collaborative management of natural resources.’ Es-
sentially, all defined ideal-type collective-choice rules may occur and may function 
satisfactory, depending on the particular historical context and the institutional setting 
of a given river basin district at a certain moment in time. There is not one generic 
best option.  
As a water policy adviser, the author considers the observed internal integration 
evolution towards legislation, policy documents and management plans which include 
objectives and measures for both quantitative and qualitative aspects and for ground-
water and surface water bodies (at all studied political levels; substantive scope rules) as 
positive. He recommends more investments for interlinking the parallel actor net-
works for groundwater and surface water management in order to define the interde-
pendencies of objectives for the state and functioning of these water systems and 
including interconnected terrestrial ecosystems. Given the persistent influence of the 
speciality principle, the integration of environmental objectives into other policy do-
mains may remain the hardest challenge of IRBM. This external integration challenge 
closely relates to position rules for land owners and water users. The author is of the 
opinion that in a multi-level and multi-stakeholder dialogue for common (re)framing 
of sustainable land- and water-related human activities, driving forces behind negative 
pressures and impacts should be seriously explored. Driving forces may be external 
and internal to the river (sub-) basin at stake. External driving forces (as defined by 
Swartz, 1991) are political, physical, social and economic developments that take place 
outside the river (sub-) basin that may influence the state and functioning of common 
pool resources and related institutions. Some of these external developments are 
444 SUMMARY 
 
obvious, others are not. Some of these might be predetermined, others might be more 
uncertain to predict. The most uncertain are the most difficult to anticipate (ibid.).  
With regard to organisational scope, boundary and aggregation rules, opening up the 
window for more active contributions by non-governmental actors does not necessar-
ily asks for dramatic alteration of the functional river basin management coordination 
structures. Platforms that provide informal, non-legally binding advice to the compe-
tent authorities seem to fit well in the political traditions and cultures within the Inter-
national Meuse River Basin District. However, the public actors could benefit from 
discussing more active involvement options with non-governmental stakeholders, who 
may bring in relevant knowledge, resources and creative capital. Furthermore, linkages 
among the processes at interrelated political levels could be enforced. In the first 
WFD implementation planning cycle, the predominant focus of public actors has 
been on domestic issues and arrangements over upstream-downstream interdepend-
encies. For the long term, a parsimonious attitude for investments in spotting devel-
opments and driving forces at other, related political levels within a shared river basin 
would be a tactical misconception.  
Given the multi-level interdependencies, the author recommends to make rela-
tions among developments and decisions at the involved political levels more explicit 
in the implementation planning processes. For example, these interdependencies 
could be a permanent agenda item of the coordination structures. Additonally, to 
ensure that policy implementation strategies at the multilateral level make sense at the 
local level and reversely best local practices are uploaded, actors that serve as liaisons 
across political levels may prove their added value. These river basin ambassadors 
could actively invest in building personal trust relations across political levels and pol-
icy domains and in the announcement of relevant developments and activities. For 
example the Dutch municipal water ambassadors may become part of such a multi-
level liaisons network. In the author’s view, the liaison function could be fulfilled by 
both public actors and non-governmental actors. In the Netherlands, actors of the 
regional river basin management platforms could increase their efforts in uploading 
best local and regional practices to the multilateral and European levels. Reversely, 
they could be more actively involved in downloading agreements and guidance docu-
ments of these levels. Given their water-related expertise and human and financial 
resources, continuation of the coordination role of the Dutch regional water manage-
ment authorities in the local WFD implementation planning processes is strongly 
recommended. 
 
Watson (2007: 45) argues that ‘the success of collaboration will ultimately depend on 
the willingness of officials in government departments and agencies to engage and 
share decision-making power with private sector organisations, voluntary groups, 
communities and other stakeholders with legitimate interests in the integrated man-
agement of land and water resources’.  Verhallen, Warner and Santbergen (2007) pre-
sent IRBM as a mixed mode process in which both values and facts guide the substan-
tive process in which learning and fighting alternate. Within their mixed mode model, 
both conflict and cooperation are acknowledged as basic features of a multi-
stakeholder process (ibid). The mixed mode model neither plies for an automatically 
SUMMARY 445 
 
 
 
and maximal stretching up of the boundary rules or ascending of the participation 
ladder. For example, depending on the types of issues at stake and the stage in policy 
implementation process, the chosen boundary and aggregation rules may vary. When 
focussing on structured issues for which there is broad consensus on norms, values 
and required knowledge and methods, a relatively simple planning approach may suf-
fice. Given the often unstructured nature of issues related to sustainable management 
of transboundary water resourses, a mixed mode process with multiple stakeholders is 
often advocated (Hendriks et al., 1999; Verhallen, Warner and Santbergen, 2007). 
The author advises to continue with the Dutch informal river basin management 
coordination structures in which the competent public authorities take the lead. At the 
same time, the advisory function of the WFD consultation platforms could be en-
forced by offering the non-governmental actors more opportunities for active contri-
butions. In addition to information and consultation, more time and resources (e.g. by 
using European funds) could be invested in building public-private partnerships and 
cross-sector networks that explore options for innovative and synergetic implementa-
tion strategies, e.g. for reduction of arduous pressures. At the multilateral level, to-
gether with other actors the public actors could explore and consider best practices 
with active participation in other (European) river basins. The author advises the pub-
lic actors to reconsider the options for widening up the multilateral participation win-
dows in an open dialogue with the other stakeholders. 
With regard to choice rules, the Dutch actors involved in the WFD implementation 
planning process may benefit from cross-connections with the domestic process of 
the Deltaprogramme. Within this parallel process, long-term strategies for linking up 
fresh water supply and demand management in the context of expected climate 
change are explored. Given the predominant focus of the Deltaprogramme at quanti-
tative issues in relation to protection and stimulation of socio-economic development 
options, linking up its regional areal processes (which are scheduled for 2012 and 
2013) with the second local WFD implementation planning processes (which will start 
in 2013), might offer opportunities for both maintaining political attention to issues of 
water quality and ecological restoration and integration with quantitative issues. The 
author advises to link up the multilateral coordination process and the Dutch domes-
tic processes with Europe’s Blueprint process. This process aims for ensuring good 
water quality in sufficient quantities for all legitimate uses, by means of an integrated, 
long-term supply and demand management strategy in the context of climate change 
(www.ec.europe.eu/environment/water/blueprint). 
The author advises the competent authorities to make more use of the informa-
tion offered by other stakeholders and to include relevant sector information sources 
in the joint fact finding processes for periodical actualisation of the river basin charac-
terisations (information rules). As expressed by the European guidance documents, joint 
fact finding by multiple stakeholders can be useful to develop a sense of ownership 
over the river basin management plans, with the river basins characterisation reports 
as a first important step. For example, local stakeholders may possess information 
sources and expertise of direct use for the pressures and impact analysis for individual 
water bodies. With regard to pay-off rules, the author recommends a distinction be-
tween the reporting obligations for compliance checking by the EC and the develop 
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ment of multi-stakeholder partnerships for shared ownership of river basin manage-
ment plans and collaborative capital for their successful implementation. For the re-
porting obligations, stricter national instructions and less diffuse local and regional 
deliberations on technical details could pay off the Dutch. The informal regional river 
basin platforms may remain useful for continuous political attention to issues of water 
quality and ecological restoration. At the local level, a selection of water bodies could 
be considered for experiments with building shared visions and definition of common 
policy and research strategies, related management approaches and indicators for im-
plementation progress. Finally, active involvement of local communities and schools 
could help to overcome the uneasy argument that issues of the Water Framework 
Directive are too complicated to discuss with lay people.  
 
Finally, political willingness, courage and leadership are required to reconsider the 
generic sustainability label for all prior human development activities that are men-
tioned in WFD’s Article 4. The option of a dramatic alteration of prior position rules 
for the benefit of the Earth’s intrinsic natural values and dependent present and future 
human generations should be seriously acknowledged. Without a healthy planet and 
people being able to survive on it, it will make no sense to talk about profit any longer. 
  
 
 
Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch) 
 
 
‘Ongeacht welk onderwerp, een type beleidsanalyse dat geen ruimte biedt aan de centrale rol die 
ambiguïteit speelt in de politiek zal weinig toegevoegde waarde hebben in de werkelijke wereld.’  
Deborah Stone (2002: 157; vertaald uit het Engels) 
 
 
Inleiding: ambivalente ambities in het internationaal Maas theater 
 
Dit onderzoek is gedreven door nieuwsgierigheid naar de wijze waarop diverse inter-
pretaties van een ambivalent beleidsconcept veranderingen in gemeenschappelijke 
spelregels (collective-choice rules) stimuleren of hinderen. Het vizier is gericht op een ana-
lyse van het Nederlandse waterbeleiddomein in de context van grensoverschrijdende 
Europese rivierstroomgebieden. Het vertrekplatform voor de reis is het integraal stroom-
gebiedbeheer paradigma. Zoals geïntroduceerd in Hoofdstuk 1, heeft integraal stroomge-
biedbeheer, in zijn dominante hedendaagse interpretatie door de mondiale waterge-
meenschap, als doel om gemeenschappelijke spelregels overeen te komen voor duur-
zame ontwikkeling, beheer en gebruik van met elkaar samenhangende water- en land-
systemen binnen (inter-) nationale rivierstroomgebieden (Molle, 2009). Vergelijkbaar 
met ‘duurzame ontwikkeling’ is het paradigma intrinsiek ambivalent. Ambivalente 
interpretaties kunnen zowel leiden tot overwegend instrumentele praktijken ter 
bescherming van de status quo als tot een gezamenlijke zoektocht naar gemeen-
schappelijke kaders en acties (Stone, 2002; Fischer, 2009). Indien ambivalente bete-
kenissen compromisvorming en samenwerking stimuleren, dan mogen er over-
wegend geleidelijke veranderingen in gemeenschappelijke spelregels worden verwacht 
in plaats van radicale wijzigingen. Het omgekeerde kan zich ook voordoen: wanneer 
ambi-valente claims een scherpe polarisatie uitlokken (bijvoorbeeld tussen politieke 
partijen) en een aardverschuiving veroorzaken in de verdeling van politieke macht 
(zoals mogelijk na parlementsverkiezingen), dan kunnen er zich radicale spelregel-
wijzigingen voordoen (idem). 
Sinds december 2002 biedt de Kaderrichtlijn Water (KRW; European Commu-
nities, 2000) een set aan bestuurskundige en beleidprincipes voor een geharmoniseerde 
vertaling van het integraal stroomgebiedbeheer paradigma door alle Europese lid-
staten. De ambiguïteit van de richtlijn komt tot uitdrukking in de multi-interpretabele 
termen en bepalingen. Meest illustratief is het kernartikel 4 over milieudoelstellingen. 
Dit artikel erkent een brede range aan menselijke activiteiten impliciet als duurzaam, 
terwijl juist de belastingen en gevolgen van deze activiteiten hebben bijgedragen tot de 
noodzaak van de richtlijn. Het artikel schrijft enerzijds milieudoelstellingen voor 
anderzijds biedt het ook gedetailleerde uitzonderingbepalingen voor een gefaseerde 
realisatie en/of het verlagen ervan. Het spelregelveranderende potentieel van de KRW 
hangt sterk af van hoe belanghebbenden in verschillende beleidsdomeinen en op ver-
schillende administratieve schaalniveaus binnen een (inter-)nationaal stroomgebied-
district de bestuurskundige en beleidprincipes, de milieudoelstellingen en de 
uitzonderingsbepalingen zullen vertalen naar dagelijkse praktijken. 
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Zoals uitgewerkt in Hoofdstuk 2 (theoretisch kader) kan een brede range aan actoren 
het integraal stroomgebiedbeheer paradigma omarmen, maar het vervolgens op uit-
eenlopende manieren interpreteren en implementeren. Afhankelijk van de specifieke 
fysische, sociale, economische en politieke karakteristieken van een rivierstroomgebied 
zal het paradigma veranderingen in formeel verankerde spelregels (rules-in-law) en 
ongeschreven gewoonteregels (rules-in-use) stimuleren of belemmeren. Het weten-
schappelijke doel van het onderzoek is het verkennen van stimulatoren en barrières 
voor veranderingen in gemeenschappelijke spelregels voor duurzame ontwikkeling, 
beheer en gebruik van watervoorraden, door een analyse van de impact van bestuurs-
matige en beleidsprincipes, de milieudoelstellingen en de uitzonderingsbepalingen van 
de KRW op met elkaar samenhangende administratieve schaalniveaus binnen het 
internationale Maas stroomgebieddistrict. Zie Hoofdstuk 3 voor een korte geo-
grafische karakterisering van dit onderzoeksgebied. De centrale onderzoeksvraag is 
hoe kunnen continuïteit en/of verandering van gemeenschappelijke spelregels, in de 
periode waarin de KRW van kracht is geworden, worden verklaard. Het maatschap-
pelijke onderzoeksdoel van dit proefschrift is het formuleren van aanbevelingen voor 
het effectief en efficiënt organiseren van multi-stakeholder dialogen voor complexe 
onderwerpen in het hedendaagse stroomgebiedbeheer. Hiervoor zijn de praktijk-
ervaringen van de auteur gepiegeld aan theoretische inzichten van dit onderzoek. 
 
 
Het theoretisch fundament: een hybride analytisch kader 
 
Gegeven de focus op stimulatoren en barrières voor gemeenschappelijke spelregel-
veranderingen is er behoefte aan een analytisch kader dat zowel een spelregeltypologie 
bevat als, met behulp van gerelateerde theorieën, informeert over mogelijke verklaren-
de (f)actoren voor geobserveerde veranderingen (of weerstand daartegen). De beleids-
arrangementenbenadering (Arts, Van Tatenhove and Leroy, 2000; Leroy and Arts, 
2006) biedt een eerste handvat. Deze benadering presenteert vier dimensies van een 
beleiddomein als een samenhangend tetrahedron, namelijk (inhoudelijke en orga- 
nisatorische) spelregels, discours, actorenconstellaties (coalities en opposities) en de verdeling 
van macht en middelen (zie Figuur 1, Liefferink, 2006: 60). Vanwege de onlosmakelijke 
verbondenheid van de vier dimensies moet elke onderzoeker in principe het gehele 
tetrahedron in beschouwing nemen. Volgens Liefferink laat de vierdimensionale 
analyse van een gegeven beleidsdomein het toe verschillende analytische perspectieven 
te kiezen, afhankelijk van de gestelde onderzoeksvraag (idem: 48). De uitdaging voor 
elke onderzoeker die werkt met de beleidsarrangementenbenadering is voorkomen dat 
nieuwsgierigheid het onderzoeksonderwerp doet verdwijnen in een overdosis perspec-
tieven en observaties. Het verdient bijvoorbeeld aanbeveling om een dimensie te 
kiezen als hoofdingang tot het tetrahedron, zonder de relaties met de andere drie 
dimensies uit het beeld te verliezen. De hoofdingang voor dit onderzoek is de 
dimensie van de gemeenschappelijke spelregels. Aanname daarbij is dat bestaande 
spelregels herbevestigd of uitgedaagd kunnen worden door continue interacties tussen 
de vier dimensies onderling en tussen het tetrahedron en drijvende krachten in de 
bredere fysieke, sociale, economische en politieke context. 
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Figuur 1: Het beleidsarrangement tetrahedron (Liefferink, 2006: 60). 
 
Het Institutionele Analyse- en Ontwikkelingskader (Institutional Analysis and Development 
framework; Kiser and Ostrom, 1982; Ostrom, 1999, 2005) biedt een tweede handvat. 
Dit kader heeft zijn wortels in studies naar onderhandelingen tussen actoren over 
gemeenschappelijke spelregels voor het beheer van collectieve goederen (common pool 
resources) en biedt daarmee de kans voor het operationaliseren van de spelregeldimen-
sie. Ostrom (1990: 51) definieert instituties als: “De verzameling van [zeven typen] 
regels die worden toegepast voor het bepalen van wie bevoegd is om besluiten te ne-
men voor een bepaald onderwerp, welke activiteiten toegestaan of beperkt zijn, welke 
besluitvormingsregels zullen worden toegepast, welke procedures moeten worden 
gevolgd, welke informatie wel en niet moet worden verschaft, en welke opbrengsten 
aan welke individuen worden toegekend, afhankelijk van hun acties.” Ostrom,  
Gardner and Walker (1994: 37) benadrukken dat spelregels voor collectieve actie niet 
als op zichzelf staand moeten worden bestudeerd, maar als een configuratie. Een ver-
andering in een spelregeltype kan ook andere doen veranderen. Een configuratie van 
spelregels is het resultaat van interacties tussen actoren in actiesituaties die worden 
beïnvloed door exogene variabelen, namelijk biofysische/materiële condities, eigen-
schappen van een gemeenschap en ongeschreven gewoonteregels (Ostrom, 2011). 
De theoretische vernieuwing van dit onderzoek is het incorporeren van de zeven 
regeltypen van het Institutionele Analyse- en Ontwikkelingskader in het tetrahedron 
van de beleidsarrangementenbenadering, als nadere operationalisering van de spelre-
gel-dimensie. Gebaseerd op een brede screening van literatuur over integraal stroom-
gebiedbeheer zijn de zeven spelregeltypen elk vertaald naar drie ideaaltypische 
verschijningsvormen (zoals bedoeld door Weber, 1922; zie Tabel A voor een over-
zicht van alle geconstrueerde ideaaltypen welke in detail zijn toegelicht in de          
paragrafen 2.2.3 tot en met 2.2.9). Deze ideaaltypen dienen als waardevrije indicatoren 
voor het kunnen waarnemen van spelregelveranderingen in een bepaalde periode.  
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Tabel A: Geconstrueerde ideaaltypische gemeenschappelijke spelregels (dit onderzoek) 
Ideaaltype A↓ Ideaaltype B↓ Ideaaltype C↓ 
1a. Scoop regels (organisatie): 
Waterbeleid wordt uitgevoerd 
door organisatorische struc-
turen/actornetwerken die 
gedreven worden door socia-
le, economische en politieke 
factoren die niet bepaald 
worden door hydrologische 
grenzen (stroomgebieden). 
Deze structuren/netwerken 
kunnen multifunctioneel of 
sectoraal van karakter zijn en 
zijn onderhevig aan parle-
mentaire controle. 
Waterbeleid wordt uitge-
voerd door functionele 
wateragentschappen,  
comités en actornetwerken 
die georganiseerd zijn  
conform hydrologische 
grenzen (stroomgebieden). 
Deze structuren/netwerken 
zijn onderhevig aan parle-
mentaire controle.  
Waterbeleid wordt 
 uitgevoerd door autonome, 
(deel)stroomgebied 
autoriteiten en actor  
netwerken die georganiseerd 
zijn conform hydrologische 
grenzen (stroomgebieden). 
Deze autoriteiten en ge-
meenschappen kennen hun 
eigen constitutionele 
spelregels.  
1b. Scoop regels (interne integratie): 
Aparte wetgeving, beleids-
documenten en beheerplan-
nen voor zowel water 
kwaliteit als kwantiteit. 
Grondwater en oppervlakte-
water worden parallel 
behandeld.  
De wetgeving, beleids-
documenten en beheer-
plannen bevatten parallelle 
doelstellingen en maatrege-
len voor kwantitatieve en 
kwalitatieve aspecten en 
voor grond- en oppervlak-
tewater. 
De wetgeving, beleids-
documenten en beheerplan-
nen bevatten integrale doel-
stellingen en maatregelen 
voor gerelateerde oppervlak-
tewater- en grondwater-
lichamen en gaan over zowel 
kwalitatieve als kwantitatieve 
aspecten. 
1c. Scoop regels (externe integratie): 
Aparte wetgeving, beleids-
documenten en beheerplan-
nen voor water and andere 
beleidsdomeinen zonder 
aangebrachte dwars-
verbanden.  
 
Wetgeving, beleids-
documenten en beheer-
plannen voor andere be-
leidsdomeinen nemen rela-
ties met watergerelateerde 
onderwerpen in be-
schouwing en omgekeerd. 
Integrale wetgeving, 
beleidsdocumenten en be-
heerplannen waarin water en 
andere beleidsonderwerpen 
in samenhang worden be-
schouwd. 
2. Positieregels: 
Bescherming van historische 
rechten voor bezit en beheer 
van land en watervoorraden 
zonder randvoorwaarden 
vanwege milieu, sociale en 
economische externaliteiten.  
Geconditioneerd behoud 
en verwerving van rechten 
voor bezit en beheer van 
land en watervoorraden. 
Condities op grond van 
milieu, sociale en economi-
sche externaliteiten. 
Herverdeling van rechten 
voor bezit en beheer van 
land en watervoorraden, 
gebaseerd op met elkaar 
samenhangende condities 
voor ecologische, economi-
sche en sociale veerkracht. 
3. Toegangsregels: 
Toegang tot het rivierbeheer 
planning proces is voor-
behouden aan publieke acto-
ren. Andere belanghebbende 
actoren worden geïnfor-
meerd. 
Maatschappelijke actoren 
kunnen toegang krijgen tot 
het rivierbeheer planning 
proces onder voorwaarden 
die de overheden bepalen. 
Meedenken en consultatie. 
Ruime mogelijkheden voor 
maatschappelijke actoren 
om deel te nemen aan het 
rivierbeheer planning proces 
(coproductie, meebeslissen 
& zelforganisatie). 
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Tabel A: vervolg 
Ideaaltype A↓ Ideaaltype B↓ Ideaaltype C↓ 
4a. Autorisatieregels (vraag en aanbod beheer):  
Wateraanvoer beheer bepaalt 
de beschikbaarheid van 
zoetwater voor gebruiks-
functies. 
Een combinatie van water-
aanvoerbeheer en maat-
regelen om de vraag naar 
water te beperken bepaalt 
de beschikbaarheid van 
zoetwater zonder een  
hiërarchie aan te brengen in 
gebruiksdoeleinden.  
Een geïntegreerd vraag- en 
aanbodbeheer bepaalt de 
beschikbaarheid van zoet-
water, waarbij zonodig een 
hiërarchie in gebruiksdoel-
einden wordt aangebracht. 
4b. Autorisatieregels (het karakter van het vergunningenstelsel): 
Eigenstandige, parallelle 
vergunningen voor kwaliteits- 
en kwantiteitsdoelstellingen 
in relatie tot ontwikkeling, 
beheer en gebruik van  
watervoorraden.  
Een integrale vergunning 
voor kwaliteits- en kwanti-
teitsdoelstellingen in relatie 
tot ontwikkeling, beheer en 
gebruik van 
watervoorraden.  
Een integrale vergunning 
voor ontwikkeling, beheer 
en gebruik van met elkaar 
samenhangende natuurlijke 
hulpbronnen (lucht, water, 
land). 
5. Besluitvormingsregels:   
Onafhankelijke besluit-
vorming over waterbeleid en 
waterbeheerplannen op ver-
schillende administratieve 
schaalniveaus binnen een 
rivierstroomgebied. 
Asymmetrische, hiërar-
chische besluitvorming over 
waterbeleid en waterbe-
heerplannen op verschillen-
de administratieve schaal-
niveaus binnen een rivier-
stroomgebied: lagere 
schaalniveaus moeten vol-
doen aan de spelregels die 
een hoger niveau stelt. 
Symmetrische, op consensus 
gebaseerde besluitvorming 
over waterbeleid en water-
beheerplannen op verschil-
lende administratieve 
schaalniveaus binnen een 
rivierstroomgebied:  
gemengde topdown en 
bottomup spelregels. 
6. Informatieregels: 
Het rivierbeheer planning-
proces (definitie van doelen 
en maatregelen) wordt voor-
namelijk gedreven door na-
tuurwetenschappelijke kennis 
en informatie van experts. 
Validiteit en betrouwbaarheid 
zijn centrale criteria voor 
legitimiteit van kennis en 
informatie. 
Het rivierbeheer planning-
proces (definitie van doelen 
en maatregelen) wordt 
voornamelijk gedreven 
door economische kennis 
en informatie van experts. 
Kostenbaten ratios en eco-
nomische efficiëntie zijn 
centrale criteria voor legiti-
miteit van kennis en infor-
matie. 
Het rivierbeheer planning-
proces (definitie van doelen 
en maatregelen) wordt 
voornamelijk gedreven door 
kennis en informatie van 
verschillende disciplines en 
van zowel experts als leken. 
Joint fact finding en sociale 
robuustheid zijn centrale 
criteria voor legitimiteit van 
kennis en informatie. 
7. Opbrengst & nalevingstregels: 
Wettelijk geregelde 
beloningen en sancties zijn de 
belangrijkste drijfveren om 
aan gemeenschappelijke 
spelregels te voldoen (zoals 
uitgedrukt door normen en 
vergunning-voorschriften).  
Economische prikkels en 
marktwerking zijn de be-
langrijkste drijfveren om 
aan gemeenschappelijke 
spelregels te voldoen.  
(Deel)Stroomgebiedgemeen-
schappen investeren vrij-
willig middelen (mensen, 
financiën, expertise) als 
samenwerkingskapitaal voor 
het voldoen aan gemeen-
schappelijke spelregels.  
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Door de observaties voor de spelregeltypen te vergelijken voor twee periodes, voor en 
na vaststelling van de KRW (respectievelijk van 1990 tot eind 2000 en van 2001 tot 
eind 2009), kan de mate van spelregelverandering worden vastgesteld. Vervolgens 
kunnen via een analyse van ontwikkelingen van de andere drie dimensies van een 
beleidsarrangement mogelijke verklaringen worden gegeven voor geobserveerde con-
tinuïteit en verandering van de spelregels. Omdat de KRW’s stroomgebiedbenadering 
betrekking heeft op gedeelde, grensoverschrijdende rivieren in de politieke context 
van de Europese Unie, is de vertaling ervan naar de dagelijkse praktijk afhankelijk van 
samenhang tussen beleidsarrangementen op alle betrokken, administratieve schaal-
niveaus. Voor het doel van dit onderzoek is de mate van spelregelverandering geana-
lyseerd voor vijf administratieve schaalniveaus in het internationale Maas stroomge-
bieddistrict: Europa (lees: het Europese Waterdirecteuren Overleg), multilateraal (lees: 
de Internationale Maas Commissie) en Nederland (nationaal, regionaal en lokaal). 
Figuur 2 vat het analytisch kader van dit onderzoek samen. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figuur 2: Analytisch kader van dit onderzoek 
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De onderzoeksaanpak: participatieve analyse door triangulatie 
 
Dit onderzoek kan gekarakteriseerd worden als een participatieve, interpretatieve 
analyse, waarbij de onderzoeker het voordeel benut van zijn positie als een van de 
direct betrokken, lokale actoren in het Nederlandse implementatieproces voor de 
Kaderrichtlijn Water. Deze positie zorgt voor eenvoudige toegang tot informatie van 
primaire bronnen en biedt veel mogelijkheden voor informele gesprekken en inter- 
views met diverse belanghebbenden. Tevens kunnen participatieve (lees: de onder-
zoeker als deelnemer) en niet-participatieve (lees: de onderzoeker als waarnemer) 
observaties worden gecombineerd. De hoofddoelstelling van de gekozen benadering is 
het reconstrueren van een gecompliceerd grensoverschrijdend beleidimplementatie-
proces, zo waardevrij als mogelijk, waarbij het vizier gericht is op het ontdekken van 
stimulatoren en barrières voor veranderingen in gemeenschappelijke spelregels door 
de tijd heen. Gezien de duale rol van de auteur in het bestudeerde proces, zowel on-
derzoeker als lokale belanghebbende, ligt er de uitdaging om de onvermijd-bare per-
soonlijke bias en impact van de eigen acties te onderkennen.  
Het belangrijkste voordeel van een participatieve, interpretatieve benadering is de 
kans voor een diepgaande, van binnen naar buiten gerichte analyse van een beleids-
formulering, -onderhandelings en –implementatieproces. Hierbij kan de vinger wor-
den gelegd op informele, ongeschreven gewoonteregels in aanvulling op en in inter-
actie met formeel verankerde spelregels (waarvan het belang is benadrukt door 
Ostrom, 1999, 2005). Of, zoals Fischer (2003: 141, 142) het uitdrukt: “In de wereld 
van de politiek zijn de ‘echte’ redenen en motieven voor een actie – tegenover de for-
meel aangeboden – even belangrijk als de actie zelf.” De gevaarlijkste valkuil is dat, 
hoe meer de onderzoeker verbonden raakt met zijn onderwerp, hoe gemakkelijker het 
wordt om de benodigde afstand of helikopterkijk te verliezen. De verwachte meer-
waarde van dit onderzoek is de synergie tussen de onderzoeker als een beleids-
implementatieadviseur en zijn rol als analyticus van het proces waarvan hij onderdeel 
uitmaakt. Beide rollen vragen namelijk om inzicht in argumentatielijnen en strategieën 
van de verschillende betrokken actoren. De rol van adviseur dwingt de onderzoeker 
om voldoende afstand te nemen van zijn eigen voorkeuren en verwachtingen ten 
behoeve van het evenwichtig presenteren van de mogelijke voor- en nadelen van een 
range aan opties waaruit de besluitvormers in zowel het dagelijks als het algemeen 
bestuur van het waterschap kunnen kiezen.  
Om teveel persoonlijke bias en vergroeid raken met het bestudeerde onderwerp 
te voorkomen is gekozen voor een triangulatie van informatiebronnen, onderzoeks-
methoden en onderzoekers. Een eerste stap om te komen tot een voldoende geloof-
waardige analyse en gerelateerde conclusies is het vergelijken van de eigen observaties 
en reconstructies met die van andere onderzoekers die de implementatie van de 
Kaderrichtlijn Water hebben geanalyseerd (zowel in Nederland als andere Europese 
lidstaten). Als een tweede stap zijn zogeheten spiegelsessies georganiseerd met ver-
schillende belanghebbende actoren en onderzoekers waarin de onderzoeksresultaten 
zijn gepresenteerd en besproken. Als derde stap zijn met behulp van een geschreven 
argumentatie survey en interviews argumentatielijnen en strategieën van diverse 
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belanghebbende actoren geregistreerd en geïnterpreteerd. Als vierde stap zijn ook 
observaties van vergaderingen gepresenteerd aan en besproken met de 
geobserveerden. 
 
 
Conclusies  
 
Ambivalente Europese ambities triggeren incrementele spelregelveranderingen 
De eerste hypothese van dit onderzoek is dat maken en implementeren van milieube-
leid in de Europese context onderwerp is van ambivalente concepten die voornamelijk 
incrementele spelregelveranderingen in de hand werken. De tweede hypothese heeft 
betrekking op het multilaterale administratieve schaalniveau: De specifieke historie vol 
conflicten, asymmetrieën tussen bovenstrooms en benedenstrooms gelegen staten en 
culturele diversiteit, in combinatie met de principes van soevereiniteit en subsidiariteit, 
zorgt ervoor dat men geen revolutionaire spelregelveranderingen mag verwachten van 
de grensoverschrijdende coördinatie door de Internationale Maas Commissie. De 
derde hypothese is dat, gegeven zowel de actieve pogingen van Nederlandse ambte-
naren en experts om Nederlandse tradities en praktijken in de Kaderrichtlijn Water te 
verankeren en hun perceptie van Europese voorlopers op het gebied van integraal 
stroomgebiedbeheer, men beperkte veranderingen zou mogen verwachten in de 
gemeenschappelijke spelregels van het Nederlandse waterbeleiddomein. 
Tabel B vat de observaties van dit onderzoek samen. Voor alle bestudeerde 
administratieve schaalniveaus in de periode van 19990 tot eind 2009 wijzen de obser-
vaties vooral op continuïteit van gemeenschappelijke spelregels. Incrementele veran-
deringen zijn beperkt. Ondanks de ambitieuze woorden in de KRW en sommige van 
de gerelateerde informele handreikingen (guidance documents) heeft de eerste implemen-
tatieplanningcyclus geen significante spelregelveranderingen gestimuleerd. Het proces 
tot nu toe bevestigt en versterkt eerder in gang gezette evoluties en draagt bij aan de 
verdere institutionalisering ervan. Op alle bestudeerde administratieve schaalniveaus 
laten de interne integratie spelregels de duidelijkste verandering zien, zoals zichtbaar in 
de scoop regels en, met uitzondering van het multilaterale schaalniveau, de autoriteit-
regels (karakter van het vergunningstelsel). Meer beperkte veranderingen zijn waar-
genomen voor toegangsregels (alleen op het multilaterale schaalniveau) en autoriteits-
regels (vraag- en aanbodbeheer; op het Europese en multilaterale schaalniveau). Voor 
de meerderheid van spelregeltypen (organisatorische scoop, externe integratie, positie, 
besluitvorming, informatie en opbrengst) is continuïteit dominant over verandering. 
Dit betekent dat er geen substantiële veranderingen waargenomen zijn. Het multi-
laterale schaalniveau laat de meeste verschillen zien met de andere schaalniveaus. De 
geobserveerde spelregelconfiguraties voor de drie Nederlandse schaalniveaus 
(nationaal, regionaal en lokaal) zijn gelijk. 
De waarnemingen ondersteunen de eerste twee hypotheses. Op het Europese 
schaalniveau heeft de ingewikkelde constellatie van actornetwerken met een diversiteit 
aan beleidstrategieën, tactieken en belangen duidelijk geleid tot ambivalente formule-
ringen met de bedoeling om iedereen aan boord te houden in de zoektocht naar 
samenwerking en compromissen (zie ook Kaika, 2003; Kaika en Page, 2003). 
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Tegelijkertijd bleven de multilaterale discussies en onderhandelingen moeizaam van 
karakter, ofschoon de KRW duidelijk voortgang heeft gestimuleerd in de coördinatie 
en interne integratie inspanningen. Dit is het best zichtbaar in de toetreding van 
nieuwe actoren zoals overheidsdienaren uit Duitsland en Luxemburg en het incorpo-
reren van de bestaande hoogwaterwerkgroep. De overheidsactoren van de Internatio-
nale Maas Commissie blijven worstelen met het openen van de participatieramen naar 
andere actoren, waarbij sterk de nadruk wordt gelegd op soevereiniteit en subsidiari-
teit. Met andere woorden: elke deelnemend land en gewest kan dit het beste zelf naar 
eigen inzichten regelen. De gelijke gemeenschappelijke spelregelpatronen voor de drie 
Nederlandse administratieve schaalniveaus kunnen grotendeels worden verklaard door 
het stabiele, historische pad van een gedecentraliseerde eenheidstaat. Al de betrokken 
overheden, bij wijze van spreken bijna aangestuurd door een genetische codering, 
erkennen het belang van een gemengde topdown en bottomup benadering met 
voldoende beweegruimte voor maatwerkoplossingen en compromissen. 
Wat betreft de derde hypothese kan worden geconcludeerd dat het KRW imple-
mentatieplanningproces (nog) niet heeft geleid tot significante spelregelveranderingen 
in Nederland. Maar anders dan de hypothese stelt ligt de verklaring hiervoor niet in de 
Nederlandse perceptie van Europese voorloper. Deze moet eerder worden gezocht in 
de Europese compromistekst die afwijkt van de oorspronkelijke voorstellen van de 
Nederlandse wateroverheden en experts. In de vroege ontwerpfase van de KRW 
vreesden de Nederlandse ambtenaren en experts het inleveren van het nationale 
systeem voor het formuleren van ambitieuze, intentionele waterkwaliteitsdoelstel-
lingen. De gedachte was dat het overnemen van het Nederlandse model op Europees 
niveau bovenstrooms gelegen landen ervan zou overtuigen om investeringen ter ver-
betering van de waterkwaliteit te versnellen. Daarnaast pleitten de Nederlanders voor 
een vereenvoudiging van het Europese arsenaal aan waterwetgeving door integratie 
van een aantal richtlijnen in een meer generiek kader. Gedurende het delicate Europe-
se onderhandelingsspel verloren de Nederlandse wateractoren echter de inhoudelijke 
grip op het proces. Uiteindelijk waren zij teleurgesteld over het beperkte integrale 
karakter van de KRW en de afwijkingen daarin van de Nederlandse voor-stellen.  
Samen met de onzekerheid over de sociaaleconomische consequenties van deze 
afwijkingen heeft de teleurstelling bijgedragen aan een nationaal politiek klimaat van 
zowel weerstand tegen teveel juridisch beperkende voorschriften als nadruk op het 
behoud van formele organisatiestructuren (zie ook Edelenbos e.a., 2008; Raadgever 
e.a., 2009; Ten Heuvelhof e.a., 2010). 
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Tabel B: Waargenomen spelregels in de periode van 1990 t/m 2009 (ideaaltypen)  
Spelregeltype↓ Europa, Maas, Nationaal, Regionaal en Lokaal↓ 
Scoop (organisato-
risch): 
Ideaaltype B: Voortzetting en versterking van functionele 
wateragentschappen, comités en actornetwerken die hydrologi-
sche (stroomgebied) grenzen volgen. Deze functionele entiteiten 
en netwerken staan onder parlementaire controle. 
Scoop (interne 
integratie): 
Van ideaaltype A naar B: Een evolutie richting wetgeving, 
beleidsdocumenten en beheerplannen die doelstellingen en maat-
regelen bevatten voor zowel kwantitatieve als kwalitatieve aspec-
ten, en van grondwater en oppervlaktewater. 
Informatie: Een mengeling van ideaaltypes A en B: Het rivierbeheerplanning-
proces wordt gedreven door een mix van een wetenschappelijk-
technische en een sociaaleconomische rationale. Validiteit,  
betrouwbaarheid, kostenbaten ratios en economische efficiëntie 
zijn centrale criteria voor legitieme kennis en informatie. 
Opbrengst & nale-
ving: 
Een mengeling van ideaaltypen A en B: Zowel wettelijk veranker-
de beloningen als sancties, economische prikkels en marktwerking 
zijn belangrijke drijfveren om aan gemeenschappelijke spelregels 
te voldoen.  
Spelregeltype↓ Europa & Maas↓ Nationaal, Regionaal en  
Lokaal↓ 
Autorisatie (vraag- 
en aanbodbeheer): 
Van ideaaltype A naar B: 
Een evolutie van aanbod-
beheer naar een gemengd 
vraag- en aanbodbeheer. 
Een mengeling van ideaaltypen B 
en C: over het algemeen een 
gemengd vraag- en aanbodbeheer 
(B). In geval van aanhoudende 
droogte is de aanpak geïntegreer-
der van karakter zoals uitgedrukt 
door een dan geldende hiërarchie 
van gebruikersdoeleinden (C).  
 Spelregeltype↓ Maas↓ Europa, Nationaal, Regionaal 
en Lokaal↓ 
Scoop (externe 
integratie): 
Ideaaltype A: Afzonderlijke 
plannen voor water en 
andere beleidsdomeinen 
zonder dwarsverbanden. 
Ideaaltype B: Plannen van andere 
beleidsdomeinen nemen water-
aspecten in beschouwing en om-
gekeerd. Op het regionale schaal-
niveau zijn ook integrale, sector-
overstijgende milieubeleidsplannen 
waargenomen (ideaaltype C). 
Positie: Ideaaltype A: Bescherming 
van historische rechten 
voor gebruik en bezit van 
water en land, zonder 
voorwaarden over milieu, 
sociale en economische 
externaliteiten. 
Ideaaltype B: Voorwaardelijk be-
houd en toekenning van rechten 
voor gebruik en bezit van water en 
land. De voorwaarden hebben 
betrekking op milieu, sociale en 
economische externaliteiten.  
Legenda: Zie Tabel A en Hoofdstuk 2 (de paragrafen 2.2.3 t/m 2.2.9) voor definities van alle 
A, B en C ideaaltypen. De lichtgrijs gekleurde cellen markeren spelregelveranderingen. 
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Tabel B: vervolg 
Spelregeltype↓ Maas↓ Europa, Nationaal, Regionaal 
en Lokaal↓ 
Autorisatie (karak-
ter van het ver-
gunningen-stelsel): 
Ideaaltype A: Eigenstandi-
ge, parallelle vergunningen 
voor kwaliteits- en  
kwantiteitsdoelstellingen in 
relatie tot ontwikkeling, 
beheer en gebruik van wa-
tervoorraden.  
Van ideaaltype A naar B: Een 
evolutie naar vergunningen die 
kwaliteits- en kwantiteitsdoelstel-
lingen in relatie tot ontwikkeling, 
beheer en gebruik van watervoor-
raden integreren. 
Toegang: Van ideaaltype A naar B: 
Meer toegang voor maat-
schappelijke actoren tot het 
rivierbeheerplanning-proces 
waarbij de voorwaarden 
worden bepaald door de 
overheden. Nadruk ligt op 
meedenken en consultatie. 
Ideaaltype B: Maatschappelijke 
actoren kunnen toegang krijgen tot 
het rivierbeheer planning proces 
onder voorwaarden die de over-
heden bepalen. De nadruk ligt op 
meedenken en consultatie. Op het 
regionale schaalniveau is ook 
ideaaltype C waargenomen: Ruime 
mogelijkheden voor geïnteresseer-
de belanghebbenden om deel te 
nemen aan the rivierbeheer plan-
ning proces (inclusief coproductie, 
meebeslissen en zelforganisatie). 
Besluitvorming: Een mix van ideaaltypen A 
en C: Zowel onafhankelijke 
besluitvorming door landen 
en gewesten als sym-
metrische, consensus 
gebaseerde besluitvorming. 
Een mix van ideaaltypen B en C: 
Zowel asymmetrische, hier-
archische besluitvorming als voor-
beelden van symmetrische consen-
sus gebaseerde besluitvorming 
over waterbeleid- en beheerplan-
nen op verschillende admini-
stratieve schaalniveaus binnen het 
rivierstroomgebied. 
Legenda: Zie Tabel A en Hoofdstuk 2 (de paragrafen 2.2.3 t/m 2.2.9) voor definities van alle 
A, B en C ideaaltypen. De lichtgrijs gekleurde cellen markeren spelregelveranderingen. 
 
Continuïteit heerst in het waterbeleiddomein. De meest uitgesproken spelregel-
veranderingen betreffen interne integratietendensen, die zijn versterkt door de integra-
tie discours in de KRW en de gerelateerde informele handreikingen. De actornet-
werken van het waterbeleiddomein op alle bestudeerde administratieve schaalniveaus 
worden gedomineerd door overheden en experts en zijn grotendeels geïsoleerd van 
actornetwerken in aangrenzende beleidsdomeinen. Ofschoon niet in detail geana-
lyseerd in dit onderzoek, zijn er indicaties voor stabiele macht en actoren configuraties 
van parallel opererende beleidsdomeinen die ondersteund worden door het speciali-
teitbeginsel. Dit beginsel vormt een sterke barrière voor externe integratie pogingen. 
Daartegenover werken de relatief bescheiden financiële middelen die vrijgemaakt 
worden voor integratie van waterbeleidsdoelstellingen in de plannen en beheerpro-
gramma’s van andere beleidsdomeinen als een zwakke stimulator.  
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Een deel van de verklaring voor continuïteit van gemeenschappelijke spelregels ligt in 
de ambivalente formuleringen van het kernartikel van de KRW over milieudoel-
stellingen (Artikel 4). Tot in de laatste seconden van de conciliatieprocedure is er on-
derhandeld over gevoelige amendementvoorstellen. Gegeven dat Artikel 4 een aantal 
menselijke activiteiten beschermt die mede de reden zijn van de noodzaak voor het 
opstellen van de KRW, is een belangrijke potentiële stimulator voor spelregelver-
andering afgezwakt vanaf het begin. Bovendien heeft een hardnekkige verwarring in 
Nederland over de juridische status van de KRW doelstellingen en de uitzonderings-
bepalingen in combinatie met een vrees voor de mogelijke sociaaleconomische gevol-
gen geleid tot een voorzichtige implementatiebenadering. De vroege overeenstemming 
van de Europese waterdirecteuren om de uitzonderingsbepalingen te beschouwen als 
een regulier instrument voor het stellen van prioriteiten en een gefaseerde uitvoering 
van maatregelen in drie periodes van elk 6 jaar (tot uiterlijk 2027), heeft de voorzich-
tige Nederlandse aanpak ondersteund. Zo geïnterpreteerd heeft de ambivalentie van 
Artikel 4 een overwegend instrumentele toepassing van de richtlijn in de hand gewerkt 
om bestaande beleid- en beheerpraktijken zoveel mogelijk te kunnen voortzetten. In 
elk geval hebben de Europese ambivalente ambities (nog) geen expliciete multi-
stakeholder dialogen op gang gebracht over de drijvende krachten achter menselijke 
belastingen en hun impact op de milieudoelstellingen.  
 
Beperkte grensoverschrijdende connecties 
De waarnemingen in dit onderzoek tonen een centrale positie van de overheden op 
alle bestudeerde administratieve schaalniveaus in het interpreteren van de KRW en in 
het plannen van de eerste implementatieronde. De overheden bepalen de toegangs-
regels en leggen daarbij sterk de nadruk op consultatie van en in beperktere mate 
meedenken van andere belanghebbende actoren. Ze lijken voorzichtig om te voorko-
men dat ze sturingscontrole verliezen in het gemengde technisch-wetenschappelijke en 
sociaaleconomisch aggregatie proces, vooral op het multilaterale schaalniveau. Er zijn 
weinig actoren die actief zijn op meerdere administratieve schaalniveaus tegelijkertijd. 
Ofschoon sommige Nederlandse organisaties (nationaal niveau) speciale lobbyisten 
aanstellen in Brussel, laat dit onderzoek beperkte contacten zien tussen deze personen 
met actoren op het regionale en locale schaalniveau. De voorstellingen in het inter-
nationale Maas Theater worden als te abstract ervaren of ontsnappen aan de aandacht 
van de Nederlandse regionale en lokale actoren. Zij wenden hun financiële en per-
sonele middelen vooral aan voor het verkennen van de implicaties van de KRW en 
zijn technisch ingewikkelde en gedetailleerde vereisten en bijlagen voor het regionale 
of lokale schaalniveau waarop zij direct betrokken en actief zijn.  
Op zowel het multilaterale als het Nederlandse regionale en lokale schaalniveau 
worden de informele Europese handreikingen niet expliciet besproken. Er vinden 
geen discussies plaats over de open eindjes en interpretatieruimte in deze documenten. 
De Nederlandse nationale overheid vertaalt de handreikingen naar nationale instruc-
ties en aanbevelingen en voert tevens de regie in de voorbereiding van nationale dele-
gatie-instructies voor vergaderingen op het Europese en multilaterale schaalniveau. 
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Sommige waterschappers participeren in werkgroepen van de Internationale Maas 
Commissie. Over het algemeen zijn regionale en lokale bestuurders zich niet bewust 
van de afspraken in het multilaterale overleg en de mogelijke gevolgen ervan voor het 
eigen waterbeheerproces. De meerderheid van de geïnterviewden beschouwt deze 
afspraken als te abstract en onzichtbaar. Ondanks dat de Internationale Maas 
Commissie verondersteld wordt de bilaterale grensoverschrijdende overlegstructuren 
nauwlettend te volgen, merken de ondervraagde regionale en lokale actoren hier 
weinig tot niets van. Terwijl het nationale Directoraat-generaal Water de leiding neemt 
in de multilaterale en strategische bilaterale onderhandelingen, trekken provincies en 
waterschappen de meer lokale beleidsmatige en operationele afstemming met de buur-
landen. Succesverhalen zijn vooral incidenteel van karakter en zijn vaak toe te 
schrijven aan Europese subsidies en persoonlijke connecties. Sommige Nederlandse 
natuur- en milieuorganisaties en de drinkwatersector zijn actief op meerdere admini-
stratieve schaalniveaus. Daartegenover staat dat over het algemeen de regionale en 
lokale belangenorganisaties zich vooral concentreren op hun directe omgeving. 
De Nederlandse regionale en lokale actoren in het internationale Maasstroomge-
bieddistrict worstelen met de bilaterale, grensoverschrijdende afstemming met de 
bovenstrooms gelegen Walen, Duitsers en Vlamingen. Het nationale Directoraat-
generaal Water heeft weinig prioriteit toegekend aan deze afstemming in de periode 
van 1990 tot eind 2009. Zo is het overkoepelende Vlaams-Nederlandse Integraal 
Wateroverleg stilzwijgend in een lange winterslaap terecht gekomen. Mede als gevolg 
daarvan hebben de eronder ressorterende bilaterale stroomgebiedcomités te kampen 
gehad met een gebrek aan een bestuurlijke opdracht. Ze hebben geen rol van beteke-
nis gespeeld in de eerste KRW implementatieplanningsronde. Op een informele, ver-
kennende afstemmingsvergadering te Antwerpen in november 2011 spreken Neder-
landse en Vlaamse waterautoriteiten (nationaal, regionaal en lokaal) af om de stroom-
gebiedcomités om te vormen of te vervangen door informele en flexibele coördinatie-
structuren. Het schaalniveau en de samenstelling zijn afhankelijk van de onderwerpen 
die worden behandeld. De Vlaamse partners erkennen dat Nederland als meest 
benedenstrooms gelegen staat in de regel ambitieuzere investeringen vraagt dan zij 
kunnen of willen realiseren. Daarom is verwachtingenmanagement een belangrijk 
onderdeel van de bilaterale, grensoverschrijdende coördinatie-inspanningen.  
De beperkte connecties tussen de bestudeerde administratieve schaalniveaus 
kunnen gedeeltelijk worden verklaard door de intrinsieke erkenning in de KRW van 
de verschillende grenzen van sociale, economische en politieke systemen en op hydro-
logische grenzen gebaseerde eenheden voor het beheer van rivierstroomgebieden. Het 
beschermen van de soevereiniteit en de roep om subsidiariteit, zoals uitgedrukt in de 
keuze om juridisch verantwoordelijke, op de resultaten afrekenbare competente auto-
riteiten aan te duiden op het niveau van de lidstaten, en bijvoorbeeld niet op het multi-
laterale niveau, heeft een eerste prioriteit voor nationale implementatieprocessen 
 gestimuleerd. Het gevolg is dat de Internationale Maas Commissie zwemt in de mis-
tige atmosfeer tussen de (gedeeltelijk) supranationale Europese instituties en nationale 
jurisdicties. In plaats van richtingbepalende multilaterale documenten moesten samen-
vattingen van nationale rapportages op het laatste moment van de eerste implementa-
tieplanningtermijn worden samengebracht. Om barrières voor multilaterale en  
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bilaterale coördinatie en samenwerking af te breken, blijft politieke wil van de betrok-
ken competente autoriteiten een doorslaggevende factor, vooral in een context van 
bovenstrooms-benedenstrooms asymmetrieën en een historie van internationale con-
flicten en wantrouwen. Het tamelijk ingewikkelde technische karakter van de KRW 
bijlagen heeft eerder een wetenschappelijk-rationele zoektocht van de individuele lid-
staten op gang gebracht om onzekerheden te reduceren, dan een gezamenlijke formu-
lering van grensoverschrijdende doelstellingen en maatregelen. De geringere rol die de 
bilaterale stroomgebiedcomités tussen Vlaanderen en Nederland zijn gaan spelen mag 
worden geïnterpreteerd als een indicator hiervoor.  
 
Samenvattend is de belangrijkste conclusie van dit onderzoek dat de ambivalente 
ambities rond de Europese bestuurs- en beleidsmatige principes, milieudoelstellingen 
en uitzonderingsbepalingen van de KRW niet hebben geleid tot een substantiële ver-
andering van de gemeenschappelijke spelregels voor integraal stroomgebiedbeheer. 
Tot het einde van de eerste implementateplanningronde hebben de ambiguïteiten de 
geringe aanpassingswensen gediend van machtige actorcoalities die ernaar streven 
significante veranderingen van historische gebruiks- en bezitrechten voor natuurlijke 
hulpbronnen als water en land zoveel mogelijk te voorkomen. Daar waar het KRW 
discours eerder ingezette interne integratietendensen op alle administratieve schaal-
niveaus heeft versterkt, zijn de externe integratie krachten te zwak gebleven om een 
significante verandering van de spelregelconfiguraties in gang te zetten. Ondanks de 
retoriek van het integratieprincipe en de eraan gerelateerde cross-compliance procedure, 
vormt de sterk gespecialiseerde en sectorale organisatie van de Europese instituties 
een belangrijke barrière (Baker, 1997; Jessop, 2004; Jordan and Schout, 2006). Verder 
wijst dit onderzoek op een relatief geïsoleerd waterbeleiddomein dat sterk wordt 
gestuurd door overheden die voorzichtig zijn om hun besluitvormende primaat te 
behouden. Vooral in het supranationale vacuüm van het multilaterale schaalniveau 
benadrukken de overheidsactoren hun soevereiniteit. Onder de noemer van subsi-
diariteit benadrukken zij de beperkte mogelijkheden voor de Internationale Maas 
Commissie om de multilaterale arena verder open te stellen voor andere belangheb-
bende actoren. De Nederlandse nationale overheid heeft geopteerd voor een groot-
schalig, gemengd topdown en bottomup KRW implementatieproces dat goed past in 
de traditie van informele, door de overheid georganiseerde informatie en consultatie-
procedures. 
Ondanks de geringe waargenomen veranderingen in gemeenschappelijke spelre-
gels tot eind 2009, bieden diverse statements in de KRW and de informele hand-
reikingen over het belang van externe integratie en duurzame menselijke activiteiten 
een niet te onderschatten veranderingspotentieel. Het aangeboden integratiediscours 
en de range aan opties voor (experimenten met) meer interactieve en participatieve 
beleidsplanning- en implementatieprocessen sluiten verdergaande spelregelveranderin-
gen in de tweede en derde implementatietermijn (respectievelijk van 2016 t/m 2021 en 
van 2022 t/m 2027) niet uit.  
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Aanbevelingen 
 
Opties voor toekomstig onderzoek 
Het hybride analytische kader heeft potentiële verklaringen opgeleverd voor geobser-
veerde continuïteit en incrementele veranderingen in gemeenschappelijke spelregels 
op de bestudeerde gerelateerde administratieve schaalniveaus binnen het internationale 
Maas stroomgebieddistrict. Een eerste optie voor toekomstig onderzoek is het uit-
voeren van een vergelijkbare analyse voor andere Europese rivierstroomgebieddistric-
ten om zo te verkennen in hoeverre de aangetroffen spelregelpatronen voor het wa-
terbeleiddomein meer generiek van karakter zijn. Aanvullend zou de onderzoeksscoop 
uitgebreid kunnen worden naar integrale stroomgebiedbeheerprocessen buiten Europa 
in een zoektocht naar stimulatoren en barrières voor gemeenschappelijke spelregel-
veranderingen in verschillende fysieke, sociaaleconomische en politieke contexten. Als 
een tweede optie zouden vergelijkbare analyses uitgevoerd kunnen worden voor de 
implementatieprocessen van andere Europese richtlijnen. Tot op welke hoogte zijn de 
aangetroffen spelregelconfiguraties typisch voor het waterbeleiddomein? Een derde 
optie is om stimulatoren en barrières voor externe integratie te ontdekken via een 
simultane multi-sector analyse van beleidsarrangementen. Het analytisch kader van 
Jordan en Schout (2006), dat expliciete aandacht besteed aan integratie van Europese 
milieudoelstellingen in andere beleidsvelden, kan hiervoor als vertrekpunt dienen. 
Hoewel het hybride analytische kader van dit onderzoek zijn waarde voor het 
identificeren van incrementele veranderingen bewezen heeft, is zijn potentieel voor 
het analyseren van connecties tussen verschillende administratieve schaalniveaus nog 
niet verkend. Gegeven de nadruk van het integraal stroomgebiedbeheer paradigma op 
coherente coördinatie in de context van grensoverschrijdende rivierstroomgebieden, is 
een vierde optie voor toekomstig onderzoek het definiëren van bijkomende analytische 
indicatoren voor dwarsverbanden tussen schaalniveaus. Zo kan de actordimensie een 
interessant aanknopingspunt vormen via het concept van beleidsondernemers (policy 
entrepreneurs). Een diepteanalyse van dergelijke actoren die op bepaalde schaalniveaus 
actief zijn en welke verbanden zij al dan niet leggen tussen de verschillende niveaus 
binnen een (inter-)nationaal stroomgebied kan inzicht verschaffen in mogelijke stimu-
latoren en barrières voor grensoverschrijde gemeenschappelijke spelregels. Huitema 
en Meijerink (2009: 12) hebben vijf mogelijke strategieën geïdentificeerd die beleids-
ondernemers kunnen toepassen: “(1) het ontwikkelen van nieuwe ideeën, (2) het  
smeden van coalities en het verkopen van ideeën, (3) de herkenning en exploitatie van 
windows of opportunity, (4) het gebruik van diverse evenementen en bijeenkomsten, 
en (5) het orchestreren en managen van netwerken”. Deze strategieën kunnen een 
basis vormen voor het definiëren van voornoemde, bijkomende indicatoren. 
De primaire focus in dit onderzoek is een operationalisering van de spelregel-
dimensie, door het definiëren van ideaaltypen als incrementele veranderingsindicato-
ren. De achtereenvolgende analyses van ontwikkelingen in de andere drie dimensies 
door de tijd (beleidsdiscours, actorconstellaties en verdeling van macht en middelen) 
heeft redundantie laten zien in de mogelijke verklaringen voor de waargenomen spel-
regelpatronen. De vraag stelt zich in hoeverre een meer gedetailleerde operationalise-
ring van deze drie dimensies bij zou dragen aan het ontrafelen van de impact van elke  
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individuele dimensie. Daarom is een vijfde optie voor toekomstig onderzoek het ver-
kennen of een definiëring van ideaaltypen voor de andere drie dimensies de ver-
klarende kracht van het hybride analytisch kader zou versterken. Aanvullend kan een 
verdere uitwerking van de relaties tussen de vier dimensies van de beleidsarrangemen-
tenbenadering overwogen worden, bijvoorbeeld door de definities van Liefferink 
(2006) als vertrekpunt te nemen. 
Zoals dit onderzoek heeft laten zien draagt triangulatie van methoden, infor-
matiebronnen en het spiegelen aan onderzoeksresultaten van andere onderzoekers bij 
aan de rijkdom van de analyse. De gecombineerde participatieve en non-participatieve 
observaties hebben hun toegevoegde waarde bewezen voor een van binnen naar 
buiten gerichte reconstructie van een beleidsontwikkeling en –implementatieproces. 
Interviews, spiegelsessies (met collega onderzoekers en de actoren in het bestudeerde 
proces), surveys naar de argumentatielijnen van actoren en documentenanalyse dragen 
allemaal bij aan het afdoende neutraliseren van persoonlijke bias in de analyses. Een 
dergelijke aanpak kan verder worden verrijkt in reikwijdte en diepgang indien uitge-
voerd door een pool van betrokken actoren met verschillende disciplinaire achter-
gronden en belangen die periodiek reflecteren op en leren van hun observaties. 
Daarom is een zesde en laatste optie voor toekomstig onderzoek een multidisciplinaire 
pool van reflexieve onderzoekers en actoren aanbevolen. Indien de onderzoeksfocus 
ligt op connecties tussen administratieve schaalniveaus binnen een internationaal 
rivierstroomgebieddistrict, dan kan een netwerk van actoren en onderzoekers die ac-
tief zijn op de verschillende niveaus worden overwogen. 
 
Multi-stakeholder dialogen in de tweede KRW implementatieplanningsronde 
De vraag in hoeverre de multi-stakeholder processen in het internationale Maas 
stroomgebieddistrict in de eerste KRW implementatieplanning cyclus efficiënt zijn 
georganiseerd, kan niet eenvoudig worden beantwoord. Er is niet een blauwdruk 
recept voorhanden zoals meer actieve participatie van niet-gouvernementele organisa-
ties zal automatisch leiden tot een beter proces en de opbrengst ervan. De kernobser-
vatie van deze dissertatie is dat er geen expliciete, systematische gesprekken hebben 
plaatsgevonden over de wenselijkheid van het al dan niet veranderen van de gemeen-
schappelijke spelregels, bijvoorbeeld in relatie tot een nader definiëren van duurzame 
menselijke activiteiten. De focus van het proces lag vooral op het in beeld brengen 
van belastingen van watersystemen door eerder toegestane menselijke activiteiten, en 
het selecteren van kosteneffectieve opties voor mitigatie en compensatie van de 
nadelige gevolgen van die belastingen. De informele informatie en consultatie van 
niet-gouvernementele actoren heeft niet geleid tot gemeenschappelijke beelden als 
basis voor een gedeeld eigenaarschap van de nieuwe generatie waterbeheer en stroom-
gebiedbeheerplannen. De ambivalenties rondom de KRW’s principes, milieudoelstel-
lingen en uitzonderingsbepalingen zijn vooral instrumenteel aangewend om eerdere 
tradities en praktijken zoveel mogelijk te kunnen voortzetten. Sommige belangen-
organisaties hebben hun teleurstelling geuit over de in hun beleving te geringe veran-
deringen en teveel business as usual scenario’s. Anderen zijn meer tevreden met de 
gekozen accommodatietactiek om te nadelige sociaaleconomische gevolgen te voor-
komen. 
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Bewust of onbewust hebben de competente autoriteiten en waterexperts op deze ma-
nier substantiële veranderingen in gemeenschappelijke spelregels geblokkeerd. 
Voor de tweede KRW implementatieplanningcyclus beveelt de auteur aan dat, 
indien de overheden verder wensen te gaan dan een voornamelijk instrumentele uit-
werking van de ambivalente termen en condities in de richtlijn, zij ruimte organiseren 
voor een multi-stakeholder dialoog over een gezamenlijke definitie van duurzame 
menselijke activiteiten en de wenselijkheid van het aanpassen van de gemeenschappe-
lijke spelregels. Een dergelijke dialoog zou expliciet de onderlinge afhankelijkheden 
van de administratieve schaalniveaus binnen een (inter-)nationaal rivierstroomgebied 
in beschouwing moeten nemen. Als een basisvoorwaarde voor een dergelijke dialoog 
is het belangrijk dat de deelnemende actoren bereid zijn te investeren in het begrijpen 
en (h)erkennen van diverse frames voor onderwerpen die onderdeel van de discussie 
zijn. Zoals Dewulf en andere auteurs stellen (2005: 115; vertaald uit het Engels): 
“Sommige of alle partijen zullen mogelijk de manier waarop zij in relatie staan tot de 
kwesties en tot elkaar moeten herzien, vergroten of reframen, met als doel om een 
vocabulaire te creëren dat wederzijds begrip en collectieve actie kan ondersteunen, wat 
cruciaal is voor de totstandbrenging van een effectief, gezamenlijk beheer van natuur-
lijke hulpbronnen.” In essentie geldt dat alle ideaaltypische gemeenschappelijke spel-
regels zoals geconstrueerd voor het doel van dit onderzoek in werkelijkheid zouden 
kunnen voorkomen en naar tevredenheid kunnen functioneren, afhankelijk van de 
specifieke historische context en de institutionele setting van een rivierstroomgebied-
district op een bepaald moment. Er bestaat niet een generieke beste optie.  
Als waterbeleidsadviseur beschouwt de auteur de geobserveerde interne integra-
tie-evolutie als een positieve ontwikkeling (substantiële scoopregels). Hij beveelt aan om 
meer te investeren in het verbinden van de grotendeels parallel opererende actornet-
werken voor grondwater- en oppervlaktewaterbeheer. Zo kunnen samenhangende 
doelstellingen worden geformuleerd met inbegrip van relaties met de afhankelijke 
terrestrische ecosystemen. Gegeven de hardnekkige invloed van het specialiteitbegin-
sel zal integratie van milieudoelstellingen in andere beleidsdomeinen de grootste uitda-
ging van integraal stroomgebiedbeheer blijven. Deze uitdaging staat in nauwe relatie 
tot positieregels voor bescherming van landeigenaren en watergebruikers. De auteur 
adviseert om in een multi-level, multi-sector en multi-stakeholder dialoog gemeen-
schappelijk duurzame land- en watergerelateerde menselijke activiteiten te (re)framen 
en de drijvende krachten achter negatieve drukken en hun impact grondig te verken-
nen. Drijvende krachten kunnen hun oorsprong hebben zowel binnen als buiten een 
stroomgebied dat bestudeerd wordt. Externe drijvende krachten (zoals gedefinieerd 
door Swartz, 1991) zijn politieke, fysieke, sociale en economische ontwikkelingen in de 
omgeving van een rivier(deel)stroomgebied die de toestand en het functioneren van 
gemeenschappelijke natuurlijke hulpbronnen en gerelateerde instituties kunnen beïn-
vloeden. Sommige van deze externe ontwikkelingen zijn eenvoudig te karakteriseren, 
andere niet of minder. Sommige drijvende krachten zijn voorspelbaar voor wat betreft 
hun ontwikkeling, andere kunnen meer onzeker en lastiger te voorspellen zijn. De 
meest onzekere zijn het moeilijkst om op te anticiperen (idem).  
Wat de organisatorische scoop-, toegangs- en besluitvormingsregels betreft zal 
het bieden van meer ruimte voor meer actieve bijdragen van niet-gouvernementele 
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actoren niet noodzakelijkerwijs vragen om substantiële verandering van de functionele 
coördinatiestructuren voor stroomgebiedbeheer. Platforms die informele, niet 
juridisch bindende adviezen geven aan de competente autoriteiten lijken goed te pas-
sen in de politiek tradities en culturen binnen het internationale Maas stroomgebied-
district. In elk geval kunnen de overheden hun voordeel doen met het bespreken van 
opties voor meer actieve betrokkenheid met belangenorganisaties, omdat deze rele-
vante informatie en kennis, middelen en creatief kapitaal kunnen inbrengen. Voorts 
zouden dwarsverbanden tussen de wederzijds afhankelijke processen op verschillende 
administratieve schaalniveaus versterkt kunnen worden. In de eerste KRW implemen-
tatieplanningcyclus heeft de focus van de overheden vooral gelegen op het eigen 
proces en minder op de onderlinge afhankelijkheden. Voor de lange termijn zou een 
terughoudende houding om te investeren in het volgen van ontwikkelingen en 
drijvende krachten op andere administratieve schaalniveaus binnen een gedeeld rivier-
stroomgebied een tactische misvatting zijn. 
Gegeven de diverse wederzijdse afhankelijkheden beveelt de auteur aan om 
relaties tussen ontwikkelingen en besluiten op de verschillende administratieve schaal-
niveaus explicieter te bespreken in de implementatieplanningprocessen. Zo zouden 
deze een permanent agendaonderdeel kunnen worden van de informele coördinatie-
structuren. Aanvullend, om te waarborgen dat aanbevelingen op het multilaterale 
schaalniveau praktisch relevant zijn op het lokale schaalniveau, en omgekeerd dat 
goede lokale praktijkvoorbeelden succesvol worden meegenomen, zouden actoren die 
vrijgemaakt worden om verbindingen te leggen tussen de diverse schaalniveaus hun 
meerwaarde kunnen bewijzen. Dergelijke ‘integrale stroomgebiedambassadeurs’ 
zouden actief kunnen investeren in het bouwen van persoonlijke vertrouwensrelaties 
tussen administratieve schaalniveaus en beleidsdomeinen en in het onder de aandacht 
brengen van relevante ontwikkelingen en activiteiten. De Nederlandse gemeentelijke 
waterambassadeurs zouden bijvoorbeeld deel kunnen gaan uitmaken van een dergelijk 
multi-level netwerk van ‘verbindingsofficieren’. Naar de mening van de auteur zou die 
functie vervuld kunnen worden door verschillende typen actoren. In Nederland zou-
den de actoren van de regionale stroomgebiedbeheerplatforms hun inspanningen 
kunnen vergroten om goede lokale en regionale praktijkvoorbeelden te ‘uploaden’ 
naar het Europese en het multilaterale schaalniveau. Omgekeerd zouden ze actiever 
betrokken kunnen worden in het ‘downloaden’ van afspraken en handreikingen van 
deze internationale schaalniveaus. Gegeven hun watergerelateerde expertise en 
beschikbare personele en financiële middelen, wordt voortzetting van de coör-
dinerende rol van de Nederlandse waterschappen in de lokale KRW implementatie-
planning processen sterk aanbevolen. 
 
Watson (2007: 45; vertaald uit het Engels) stelt dat “het succes van samenwerking 
uiteindelijk afhankelijk is van de wil van officials in overheidsdepartementen en agent-
schappen om zich te engageren, en besluitvormende macht te delen met private 
organisaties, vrijwilligersorganisaties, lokale gemeenschappen en andere belangheb-
benden met legitieme belangen in een integraal beheer van land en water voorraden”. 
Verhallen, Warner and Santbergen (2007) presenteren integraal stroomgebiedbeheer  
als een multi-stakeholder proces waarin zowel feiten als waarden een rol spelen en 
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leren en vechten elkaar afwisselen. In hun mixed mode model zijn zowel conflicten als 
samenwerkingsverbanden basale elementen (idem). Dit model pleit niet voor een 
automatisch en maximaal oprekken van de toegangs- en besluitvormingsregels of het 
beklimmen van de hoogste trede van de participatieladder. Afhankelijk van het type 
onderwerpen dat besproken wordt en het stadium in een beleidsimplementatieproces 
kunnen de toegangsregels variëren. Bijvoorbeeld, wanneer de focus ligt op gestructu-
reerde onderwerpen waarvoor een brede consensus bestaat over normen, waarden en 
benodigde kennis en methodieken, dan kan een relatief eenvoudige planmatige aanpak 
afdoende zijn. Gegeven het vaak ongestructureerde karakter van onderwerpen met 
betrekking tot duurzaam beheer van grensoverschrijdende watervoorraden, met 
uiteenlopende beelden over normen, waarden en benodigde kennis en methodieken, 
zijn multi-stakeholder dialogen aan te bevelen (Hendriks e.a., 1999; Verhallen, Warner 
and Santbergen, 2007).  
De auteur adviseert om de informele Nederlandse coördinatiestructuren voor 
stroomgebiedbeheer voort te zetten onder leiding van de competente autoriteiten voor 
de KRW. Tegelijkertijd zou de adviserende functie van de maatschappelijke klank-
bordgroepen kunnen worden verstrekt door de non-gouvernementele actoren meer 
mogelijkheden te beiden voor actieve, eigen bijdragen en coproducties. Aanvullend op 
wederzijdse informatieverstrekking en consultatie zou meer tijd en geld geïnvesteerd 
kunnen worden in het ontwikkelen van publiekprivate samenwerkingsverbanden die 
de grenzen van beleidsdomeinen kunnen doorbreken. Deze samenwerkingsverbanden 
zouden opties kunnen verkennen voor innovatie en synergie, bijvoorbeeld gericht op 
het reduceren van hardnekkige diffuse bronnen van verontreiniging. Op het multi-
laterale schaalniveau zouden de overheden samen met andere actoren goede voor-
beelden van actieve participatie in andere (Europese) stroomgebieden kunnen 
verkennen. De auteur adviseert de overheden om in een open dialoog met andere 
actoren opties voor het verbreden van de toegangsregels te verkennen. 
Met betrekking tot autorisatieregels kunnen de Nederlandse actoren hun voordeel 
doen met het leggen van dwarsverbanden met het proces voor het Deltaprogramma. 
In dit nu grotendeels parallelle proces worden mogelijke en kansrijke lange termijn 
strategieën verkend voor waterveiligheid en een vraag- en aanbod gestuurde zoetwa-
tervoorziening in de context van verwachte klimaatverandering. De focus van het 
Deltaprogramma ligt vooral op kwantitatieve onderwerpen in relatie tot bescherming 
en stimulering van sociaaleconomische ontwikkelingen. Het verbinden van de regio-
processen van het Deltaprogramma (die zijn voorzien voor 2012 en 2013) met de 
tweede lokale KRW implementatieplanningprocessen (die zullen starten in 2013), 
biedt kansen voor zowel blijvende politiek aandacht voor waterkwaliteit en ecologisch 
herstel als een integrale aanpak van kwaliteit en kwantiteit. De auteur adviseert om het 
multilaterale coördinatieproces en de Nederlandse processen voor de KRW en het 
Deltaprogramma te verbinden met Europa’s Blueprint Process. Dit proces richt zich op 
het waarborgen van een goede waterkwaliteit in voldoende hoeveelheden voor alle 
gelegitimeerde menselijke activiteiten door middel van een integrale lange termijn 
vraag- en aanbod gestuurde beheerstrategie in de context van klimaatverandering 
(www.ec.europe.eu/environment/water/blueprint).  
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De auteur adviseert de bevoegde autoriteiten om meer gebruik te maken van de in-
formatie en expertise die andere actoren tot hun beschikking hebben. Relevante in-
formatiebronnen kunnen worden benut in een periodiek ‘joint fact finding’ proces 
voor actualisatie van de stroomgebiedkarakteriseringen (de Artikel 5 rapportages; in-
formatieregels). Zoals verwoord in de Europese handreikingen kan ‘joint fact finding’ 
door diverse belanghebbende actoren nuttig zijn voor het ontwikkelen van een gevoel 
van gedeeld eigenaarschap voor de stroomgebiedbeheerplannen, met de stroom-
gebiedkarakteriseringen als een belangrijke eerste stap. Zo kunnen bijvoorbeeld lokale 
actoren belangrijke kennis en informatie bezitten voor de analyse van drijvende krach-
ten, belastingen en de impact ervan op de toestand en het functioneren van land-
watersystemen. 
Met betrekking tot opbrengst- en nalevingsregels beveelt de auteur aan een onder-
scheid te maken tussen de rapportageverplichtingen voor ‘compliance checking’ door 
de Europese Commissie en de ontwikkeling van multi-stakeholder partnerships 
gericht op gedeeld eigenaarschap van de stroomgebiedbeheerplannen en samen-
werkingskapitaal voor de succesvolle realisatie ervan. Voor de rapportageverplichtin-
gen kunnen stringentere nationale instructies en minder diffuse locale en regionale 
discussies over technische details de Nederlandse actoren van dienst zijn. De informe-
le regionale coördinatiestructuren voor stroomgebiedbeheer kunnen een belangrijke 
rol blijven vervullen voor het genereren van voldoende politieke aandacht voor water-
kwaliteit en ecologisch herstel. Op het lokale schaalniveau kan een selectie van water-
lichamen worden overwogen om te experimenteren met het ontwikkelen van 
gezamenlijke toekomstvisies en het verkennen van gemeenschappelijke beleids- en 
onderzoeksstrategieën, kansrijke beheeropties en het definiëren van indicatoren voor 
het volgen en evalueren van resultaten. Actieve betrokkenheid van lokale gemeen-
schappen waaronder scholen kan helpen om het ongemakkelijke argument te verlaten 
dat onderwerpen uit de KRW te ingewikkeld zouden zijn om te bespreken met 
burgers. 
 
Tenslotte: Politieke wil, moed en leiderschap zijn nodig om het generieke duurzaam-
heidslabel voor typen menselijke activiteiten zoals opgenomen in Artikel 4 van de 
KRW te heroverwegen. De optie van een substantiële, geleidelijke verandering van 
bestaande positieregels zou daarbij serieus in overweging moeten worden genomen. 
Immers, zonder een gezonde planeet en mensen die er op kunnen overleven zal het 
geen zin meer hebben om over winst te spreken. 
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Appendix I: Interviewees 
N0 Date ↓ Interviewee(s) (organisation and  role(s) in the 
WFD process)↓ 
Political 
Level(s)↓ 
1 2004/11/15 Mr. Frans van Pelt (Zeeland Province; secretary of the 
Eastern Scheldt National Park; member of the Re-
gional Scheldt WFD Consultation Platform) 
Reg-Scheldt 
2 2004/11/15 Mr. Christian Dees (Chair of  the Zeeland Agricultural 
Youth Contact) 
Reg-Scheldt 
3 2004/11/15 Mrs. Loes de Jong (Rijkswaterstaat Zeeland; WFD 
implementation project leader) 
Mult-Scheldt 
Nat-Reg 
Reg-Scheldt 
4 2004/11/17 Mrs. Carla Michielse (Zeeland Agriculture and Horti-
culture Organisation – ZLTO; member of the Re-
gional Scheldt WFD Consultation Platform) 
Mult-Scheldt 
Reg-Scheldt 
Local-Meuse 
5 2004/11/19 Mr. Wieger de Vries (HISWA – Dutch umbrella asso-
ciation for water-related recreation entrepreneurs) 
National 
Reg–Scheldt 
6 2004/11/23 Mr. Jan Bruurs (Chamber of Commerce; vice-chair of 
the Regional Scheldt WFD Consultation Platform) 
Reg-Scheldt 
7 2004/11/23 Mr. Erik Buijnck (State Forestry Agency; Regional 
Scheldt WFD Consultation Platform) 
Reg-Scheldt 
8 2004/11/25 Mr. Gijs van Zonneveld (Zeeland Environment Asso-
ciation; Regional Scheldt WFD Consult. Platform) 
Reg-Scheldt 
9 2004/12/02 
 
Mr. Maarten Velthoen (BOD – umbrella organisation 
for regional water-related recreation in Zeeland;  
Regional Scheldt WFD Consultation Platform) 
Reg-Scheldt 
10 2004/12/02 Mrs. Marion Hommels (BOD – umbrella organisation 
for regional water-related recreation in Zeeland;  
Regional Scheldt WFD Consultation Platform) 
Reg-Scheldt 
11 2005/11/17 Mr. Harry van Huet (WFD Meuse Project Bureau & 
policy advisor at the Limburg Province) 
Reg-Meuse 
12 2005/11/17 Mr. Jan Bovendeur (project director of the WFD 
Meuse Project Bureau) 
Nat-Reg 
Reg-Meuse 
13 2007/11/30 Mr. Sluiter (Brabant Private Landowners; Regional 
Meuse WFD Consultation Platform) 
Reg-Meuse 
Local-Meuse 
14 2007/11/30 Miss. Anke Lodder (Limburg Environmental Federa-
tion; Regional Meuse WFD Consultation Platform) 
Reg-Meuse 
15 2007/11/30 Mr. Johan Elshof (Zeeland Agriculture and Horticul-
ture Organisation; Regional Meuse WFD 
Consultation Platform) 
Reg-Meuse 
Local-Meuse 
16 2007/11/30 Mr. Sef Philips (Brabant Water; member of the  
Regional Meuse WFD Consultation Platform) 
Reg-Meuse 
17 2007/12/07 Mr. Jacques Hendriks (State Forestry Agency;  
Regional Meuse WFD Consultation Platform) 
Reg-Meuse 
 
18 2008/09/05 
 
Mr. Jaap Verhulst (WFD programme manager/Water 
Policy Department/TPW Ministry; from Jan 2004 to 
July 2010) 
Mult-Meuse 
National 
Nat-Reg 
Reg-Meuse 
Reg-Scheldt 
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N0 Date ↓ Interviewee(s) (organisation and  role(s) in the 
WFD process)↓ 
Political 
Level(s)↓ 
19 2009/04/20 
 
Mr. Ad Sweere (programme manager at the Brabantse 
Delta Water Management Authority) 
Reg-Meuse 
Reg-Scheldt 
20 2009/06/18 
 
Mr. Henk van Wezel (Consultant at the National 
WFD Coordination Office for the Dutch River Basins 
between 2003 and 2010) 
National 
Nat-Reg 
Reg-Meuse 
21 2009/06/22 
 
Mrs. Henny Bron (waste water treatment adviser at 
the Brabantse Delta Water Management Authority) 
Local-Meuse 
Local-Scheldt 
22 2009/06/22 
 
Mr. Edwin Arens (local water management adviser at 
the Brabantse Delta Water Management Authority) 
Local-Meuse 
Local-Scheldt 
23 2009/06/23 
 
Mr. René van Bedaf (Rucphen Municipality; water 
policy adviser) 
Local-Meuse 
24 2009/06/25 
 
Mr. Cees Meulman (alderman of Zundert Municipal-
ity) and Ronald Rombouts (project leader at Zundert 
Municipality) 
Local-Meuse 
25 2009/06/29 
 
Mr. Steven Adriaanse (alderman of Roosendaal Mu-
nicipality) 
Reg-Meuse 
Local-Meuse 
26 2009/06/29 
 
Mr. Pierre Backx (senior water policy adviser at 
Roosendaal Municipality) 
Reg-Meuse 
Local-Meuse 
27 2009/07/03 Mr. Wouter Stapel (project leader at DHV 
Consultancy) 
Local-Meuse 
Local-Scheldt 
28 2009/07/14 
 
Mr. Joseph Vos (political chair of the Brabantse Delta 
Water Management Authority) 
Reg-Meuse 
Reg-Scheldt 
Local-Meuse 
Local-Scheldt 
29 2009/07/15 
 
Mr. Arthur Meuleman (Manager of the Water Systems 
Department at the Brabantse Delta Water Manage-
ment Authority) 
Reg-Meuse 
Local-Meuse 
Local-Scheldt 
30 2009/07/16 Mr. Ad Mol (senior water policy adviser and WFD 
implementation coordinator at the North-Brabant 
Province) 
Nat-Reg 
Reg-Meuse 
Reg-Scheldt 
31 2009/07/20 
 
Mr. Piet Blom (water management consultant at 
Oosterhout Municipality) 
Local-Meuse 
32 2009/08/10 
 
Mr. Jack Jonk (Manager of the Waste Water Treat-
ment Unit at the Brabantse Delta Water Management 
Authority) 
Nat-Regional 
Local-Meuse 
Local-Scheldt 
33 2009/08/10 
 
Mr. Arie van Rijn (Waste Water Chain Manager at the 
Brabantse Delta Water Management Authority) 
Local-Meuse 
Local-Scheldt 
34 2009/08/11 
 
Mr. Victor Witter (Manager of the Water Policy Unit 
at the Brabantse Delta Water Management Authority) 
Mult-Meuse 
Reg-Meuse 
35 2009/09/15 Mr. Jan Zwiers (private consultant; project leader at 
the Brabantse Delta Water Management Authority) 
Local-Meuse 
Local-Scheldt 
36 2009/09/15 
 
Mr. Ad van Goch (water policy adviser at the Ooster-
hout Municipality) 
Local-Meuse 
37 2009/09/15 Mr. Peter van Tilburg (sewerage system expert at the 
Oosterhout Municipality) 
Local-Meuse 
38 2009/11/10 Mrs. Etteke Wypkema (waste water treatment adviser 
at the Brabantse Delta Water Management Authority) 
Local-Meuse 
Local-Scheldt 
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N0 Date ↓ Interviewee(s) (organisation and  role(s) in the 
WFD process)↓ 
Political 
Level(s)↓ 
39 2010/02/05 
 
Mr. Fred Wagemaker (senior water policy adviser at 
the National Water Service; involved in the Dutch 
WFD implementation activities as of 2001) 
Mult-Scheldt 
Nat-Reg 
Reg-Scheldt 
40 2010/02/05 
 
Mr. Paul Latour (senior water policy adviser, involved 
in the European and national WFD processes since 
1995) 
European 
National 
Nat-Reg 
41 2010/10/27 Mr. Harry ter Heegde (senior policy advisor at the 
Limburg Province. 
Nat-Reg 
Reg-Meuse 
42 2011/01/31 
 
Mr. Mario Cerutti  (secretary-general of the IMC from 
Feb. 1, 2003 to Feb.1, 2010) 
Mult-Meuse 
43 2011/01/31 
 
Mr. Bob Dekker (European Water Director of the 
Netherlands, as of 1995) 
European 
44 2011/02/11 
 
Mrs. Sarie Buijze (water and nature policy adviser at 
the North-Brabant Province) 
Nat-Reg 
Reg-Meuse 
45 2011/02/11 Mrs. Desirée van Zwieten (juridical water expert at the 
North-Brabant Province) 
Nat-Reg 
Reg-Meuse 
46 2011/02/11 
 
Mr. Ad Mol (senior water policy adviser/WFD coor-
dinator at the North-Brabant Province) 
Nat-Reg 
Reg-Meuse 
Reg-Scheldt 
47 2011/02/11 
 
Mr. Adrie Geerts (agricultural and water policy adviser 
at the North-Brabant Province) 
Nat-Reg 
Reg-Meuse 
48 2011/02/11 
 
Mr. Clemens Kraemer (groundwater expert at the 
North-Brabant Province) 
Reg-Meuse 
49 2011/02/14 
 
Mr. Fred Schippers (secretary of the Baronie Recon-
struction Committee; North-Brabant Province) 
Local-Meuse 
50 2011/02/14 
 
Mrs. Karla Niggebrugge (Provincial Water Plan 
project leader) 
Nat-Reg 
Reg-Meuse 
Reg-Scheldt 
51 2011/02/17 Mr. Marc de Rooij (senior policy adviser at the  
National Water Policy Department of the TPW 
Ministry) 
European 
National 
Mult-Meuse 
52 2011/02/17 Mr. Willem-Jan Goossen (national coordinator of the 
WFD river basin management plans at the National 
Water Policy Department of the TPW Ministry) 
European 
Nat-Reg 
Mult-Meuse 
Reg-Meuse 
53 2011/02/11 Mr. Willem Mak (national WFD programma manager 
at the Water Policy Department of the TPW Ministry 
as of August 2010) 
European 
National 
Mult-Meuse 
Reg-Meuse 
Legend: Nat-Reg = National-Regional; Reg-Meuse = Regional Meuse; Reg-Scheldt =  
Regional Scheldt; Mult-Meuse = Multlateral Meuse; Mult-Scheldt = Multilateral Scheldt 
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Appendix II-A: Written argumentation survey - participants 
No. Participant  (Organisation/Role(s) in the WFD 
process)↓ 
Involved political 
Level(s) ↓ 
1 Mrs. Gerda van Roode (De Dommel Water Manage-
ment Authority/Implementation coordinator in the  
Brabant-Centre Region) 
Nat-Reg; Reg-Local; Bilat-
Meuse; Reg-Meuse ; Local-
Meuse 
2 Mrs. Karla Niggebrugge (North-Brabant  
Province/water policy plan project leader) 
Nat-Reg; Reg-Meuse; Reg-
Scheldt 
3 Mr. Harold Sofner (Bernheze Municipality/ Local 
water ambassador in the Brabant-East Region) 
Nat-Local; Reg-Local; 
Local-Meuse 
4 Mr. Carlos Ceelaert (Overall WFD Coordinator for the 
Regional Water Management Authorities in North-
Brabant/Chair of the WFD Meuse Coordinators 
Platform) 
Reg-Meuse; Reg-Local 
5 Mr. Harry van Buggenum (Roer and Overmaas Water 
Management Authority; Implementation coordinator 
in the Limburg-South Region) 
Nat-Reg; Reg-Local; Bilat-
Meuse; Reg-Meuse; Local-
Meuse 
6 Mrs. Desiree Rijnders-Huisman (Tilburg Municipal-
ity/Local water ambassador in the Brabant-Centre 
Region) 
Nat-Local; Reg-Local; 
Local-Meuse 
7 Mr. Harry van Huet (Limburg Province/ WFD Meuse 
Project Bureau; Project leader) 
Bilat-Meuse; Nat-Reg; Reg-
Local; Reg-Meuse 
8 Mr. Marcel Tonkes (Overijjsel Province/Chair RAO 
Rhine-East; Secretary RBO Rhine-East; project leader 
Rhine-East) 
Nat-Reg; Reg-Rhine 
9 Mr. Victor Witter (Brabantse Delta Water Management 
Authority/ Participant IMC; Participant RAO-Meuse) 
Mult-Meuse ; Reg-Local; 
Local-Meuse 
10 Mr. Guido Waajen (Brabantse Delta Water Manage-
ment Authority/Ecological expert) 
Nat-Local; Local-Meuse; 
Local-Scheldt 
11 Mr. Ton Ruigrok (Rivierenland Water Management 
Authority/Implementation coordinator in Rivier-
enland) 
Nat-Reg; Nat-Local; Reg-
Rhine; Reg-Meuse 
12 Mr. André van der Straat (Zeeland Province/ WFD 
Scheldt Project Office; Regional implementation 
coordinator) 
Mult-Scheldt; Bilat-Scheldt; 
Nat-Reg; Reg-Local; Reg-
Scheldt 
13 Mr. Rolf Koops (Rolf Advice and Coaching BV/Chair 
RAO –Rhine-Centre; process manager) 
Nat-Reg; Reg-Rhine 
14 Mr. Henk van Wezel (Private consultant at the Na-
tional WFD Coordination Office for the Dutch River 
Basins; Process manager) 
Nat-Reg; Reg-Meuse; Reg-
Rhine 
15 Mr. Reinier van Nispen (Zeeland Province/ WFD 
Scheldt Project Office; Chair RAO – Scheldt;  
Ecological expert) 
Mult-Scheldt; Bilat-Scheldt; 
Nat-Reg; Reg-Local; Reg-
Scheldt; Local-Meuse 
16 Mr. Hans Thewissen (Maastricht Municipality/ Local 
water ambassador in the Limburg-South Region) 
 
 
Nat-Local; Reg-Local; 
Local-Meuse 
 
17 Mr. Pierre Backx (Roosendaal Municipality/ Local 
water ambassador in the Brabant-West Region) 
Nat-Local; Reg-Local; 
Local-Meuse 
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No. Participant  (Organisation/Role(s) in the WFD 
process)↓ 
Involved political 
Level(s) ↓ 
18 Mr. Wim van der Pennen (Brabant-North Province 
and private consultant/ WFD Meuse Project Bureau; 
Project leader) 
Reg-Local; Reg-Meuse 
19 Mrs. Plonie van Campen (Brabant Environmental 
Federation and De Dommel Water Management 
Authority - General Assembly/Member of the WFD 
Brabant-West Consultation Platform) 
Local-Meuse 
20 Mr. Twan Tiebosch (Esplanada Advise BV/WFD 
Meuse Project Bureau; National WFD Coordination 
Office for the Dutch River Basins; Communication & 
process manager) 
Nat-Reg; Reg-Meuse 
21 Mr. Nol Verdaasdonk (Brabant Environmental Federa-
tion and Brabantse Delta Water Management 
Authority - General Assembly; Member of the Re-
gional WFD Meuse Consultation Platform) 
Reg-Meuse; Local-Meuse 
22 Mr. Sef Philips (Brabant Water/Member of the Re-
gional Meuse WFD Consultation Platform) 
Reg-Meuse 
23 Mr. E. Rokx (Zeeland Agriculture and Horticulture 
Organisation/Member of the WFD Brabant-West 
Consultation Platform) 
Local-Meuse 
24 Mrs. Carla Michielsen (Zeeland Agriculture and Horti-
culture Organisation/Member of the Regional Scheldt 
WFD Consultation Platform and the Brabant-West 
WFD Consultation Platform) 
Mult-Scheldt; Reg-Scheldt; 
Local-Meuse 
25 Mr. Jan Weterings (IVN Mark and Donge/Member of 
the Brabant-West WFD Consultation Platform) 
Local-Meuse 
26 Mr. Ruud Scheffer (Loon op Zand Municipality/Water 
policy adviser) 
Local-Meuse 
27 Mr. Frans Wessels (Breda Municipality/Water policy 
adviser) 
Local-Meuse 
28 Mr. Marty Braat (Moerdijk Municipality/Water policy 
adviser) 
 
Local-Meuse 
29 Mr. René van der Sande (Bergen op Zoom Municipal-
ity/Local Water ambassador Scheldt Region) 
Local-Scheldt 
30 Mr. René van Bedaf (Rucphen Municipality/Water 
policy adviser) 
Local-Meuse 
31 Mrs. Ineke Barten (Dommel Water Management Au-
thority/ecological expert) 
Reg-Meuse 
Local – Meuse 
Legend: Nat-Reg = National-Regional; Reg-Meuse = Regional Meuse; Reg-Scheldt =  
Regional Scheldt; Reg-Rhine = Regional Rhine; Mult-Meuse = Multlateral Meuse; Mult-
Scheldt = Multilateral Scheldt; Bilat-Meuse = Bilateral Meuse; Bilat-Scheldt = Bilateral 
Scheldt 
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Appendix II-B:  
Written Argumentation Survey -Questionnaire  
 
Name: 
Organisation: 
Role(s) in the WFD process: 
 
 
1. Levels of integration 
1a The National Water Platform has decided to integrate the implementation of meas-
ures for water quality amelioration/ecological restoration with these for flood 
prevention/control and droughts prevention/mitigation. This should be realised in 
a staged way. In your opinion, which (f)actors so far have stimulated or hindered 
such an integrated approach? 
1b To your opinion, in addition to the Water Framework Directive, which issues 
should be or should not be discussed and decided on in the Regional Political River 
Basin Platforms in the near future? For example, consider topics like Water 
Management in the 21st Century, water availability, the Floods Directive, the 
National Deltaprogramme, Natura 2000 and water chain cooperation. 
 
2. Water and agriculture 
2a To your opinion, has the Water Framework Directive triggered a tightening or a 
weakening of the environmental requirements in Dutch agricultural policy? Or does 
the WFD have no impact? For example, consider manure and chemical crop 
protection issues. 
2b To your opinion, which (f)actors so far have stimulated or hindered best pratices in 
Dutch agriculture? Please exemplify your answer.  
 
3. Water and spatial planning 
3a To your opinion, so far, has the Water Framework Directive enforced or weakened 
the role of water as a guiding principle in Dutch spatial spatial planning? What have 
been stimulating or hindering (f)actors? Please exemplify your answer. 
3b In Article 4, the Water Framework Directive speaks about ‘important sustainable 
human development activities’. To your opinion, how have these activities been 
defined in the Dutch WFD implementation proces? 
3c To your opinion, to which extent does the Water Framework Directive contribute 
to sustainable human activities/sustainable land use? What are stimulating and 
hindering (f)actors? 
 
4. Implementation planning coordination 
4a How do you value the coordination role by the Regional River Political Platform in 
the first WFD implementation planning cycle? Please exemplify your answer. 
4b How do you value the influence of the Regional River WFD Consultation Platform 
in the first WFD implementation planning cycle? Please exemplify your answer. 
4c How do you value the balance between top-down steering by the national  
authorities and autonomy of regional/local implementation processes? Please 
exemplify your answer.  
APPENDICES 511 
 
 
 
4d How do you value the inter-ministerial coordination? To your opinion, what has 
been the strongest element? What should be improved? Please exemplify your 
answer. 
 
5. Domestic translation of European requirements 
5a What is your opinion on the Dutch translation of the level playing field principle 
in the first WFD implementation planning cycle? Please exemplify your answer. 
5b How do you value the way the societal costs and benefits have been conducted in 
the first WFD implementation planning cycle? Please exemplify your answer. 
5c What is your opinion on the way that the environmental objectives of Article 4 for 
water bodies and other water systems have been incorporated into Dutch legisla-
tion? Please exemplify your answer.  
5d What is your opinion on the Dutch translation of the principle of no-shift of envi-
ronmental problems to other areas and/or future generations? Which (f)actors do 
stimulate or hinder best practices with regard to this principle?  Please exemplify 
your answer. 
 
6. Water and nature (the Water Framework Directive and Natura 2000) 
6a How do you value the way objectives and measures of the WFD and Natura 2000 
have been interconnected? Please exemplify your answer. 
6b To your opinion, so far, what have been stimulating and hindering (f)actors) for an 
integrated implementation approach for the WFD and Natura 2000? Please 
exemplify your answer. 
 
7. Stakeholder participation 
7a How do you value the way local, municipal measures have been selected for  
incoorporation in the WFD river basin management plans? Please exemplify your 
answer. 
7b What is your opinion on the way socio-economic and environmental interests 
groups have been involved in the first WFD implementation planning cycle? 
Please exemplify your answer. 
7c Have you been part of certain coalitions and/or oppositions in the WFD process 
so far? If yes, which ones and with which aim(s)? If no, how did you try to influ-
ence the outcome of the process? 
7d What is your opinion on the chosen procedures for the formal consultation on 
WFD documents? Please exemplify your answer. 
 
8. Information aggregation and presentation 
8a How do you value the way information has been collected, aggregated and pre-
sented in the first WFD implementation planning cycle? 
8b To your opinion, to which extent have facts and figures been agreed upon in a 
joint process (‘joint fact finding’)?  What have been stimulating and/or hindering 
(f)actors? 
8c How do you value the coherence among the WFD river basin management plans 
and the Dutch water management plans? Please exemplify your answer. 
 
9 Which question did you expect but did not come? Please ask this question and 
answer it.  
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Appendix III:  
Mirror sessions (issues and participants) 
 
Title: Evaluation of the role, position and functioning of the Regional Scheldt WFD 
Consultation Platform – Session 1 
Date & Place: February 4, 2005 at Rijkswaterstaat Zeeland in Middelburg (Netherlands) 
Issues: The author has observed a number of meetings of the Regional Scheldt WFD Con-
sultation Platform in a no-participatory way. He presents his findings in this meeting of the 
platform. An advisory report will be finished for the next meeting. Reflection on the obser-
vations: the participants recognise the major findings and decide to discuss the process 
recommendations in the next meeting. One participant (agriculture) asks to simplify the 
presentation in order te make it understandable for individual farmers. Some members 
(chamber of commerce and environmental federation) ask whether the platform formally 
may go beyond transmitting societal signals to the politicians only by providing advices and 
contributing to public support. The politicians will be asked how they view the role and 
position of the platform. Another question is how to deal with fundamental differences of 
opinion within the platform. The Scheldt WFD Project Office will prepare a reaction at the 
process recommendations from the author. Furthermore a special meeting will be arranged 
about the method for ecological objectives setting. 
Participants: Mr. Nico Oskam (vice-chair; Zeeland Province); Mrs. Loes de Jong (WFD 
Scheldt Project Office; Rijkswaterstaat Zeeland); Mr. Jan Bruurs (Chamber of Commerce); 
Mr. Erik Buijinck (State Forestry Agency); Mr. Edwin de Feijter (Rijkswaterstaat Zeeland); 
Mr. Hans Hamelink (Zeeland Province); Mrs. Carola Helmendach (Zeeland Agricultural 
Youth Contact);  Mrs. Carla Michielsen (Zeeland Agriculture and Horticulture Organisa-
tion); Mr. Frans van Pelt (Eastern-Scheldt National Park); Mr. Leo Santbergen (Wageningen 
University); Mrs. Annemiek Verhallen (Wageningen University); Mr. Gijs van Zonneveld 
(Zeeland Environmental Federation); Mrs. J. Blom-Hummel (Zeeland Province; secretary). 
 
 
Title: Evaluation of the role, position and functioning of the Regional Scheldt WFD 
Consultation Platform – Session 2 
Date & Place: March 31, 2005 at Rijkswaterstaat Zeeland (Middelburg; Netherlands) 
Issues: The members of the Regional Scheldt WFD Consultation Platform discuss the 
process recommendations of the authors. They decide to propose the politicians to widen 
the role of the platform towards an explicit advisory function. The platform intends to pro-
vide for advices based on consensus, although minority views/opinions will always made 
visible for the politicians. Another proposal is to enlarge the opportunities for ex-
change/interaction between the members of the platform and the politicians. 
Participants: Mr. John Lilipaly (independent chair); Mr. Nico Oskam (vice-chair; Zeeland 
Province); Mrs. Loes de Jong (WFD Scheldt Project Office; Rijkswaterstaat Zeeland); Mr. 
Jan Bruurs (Chamber of Commerce); Mr.Gert-Jan Buth (Zeeland Landscape); Mr. Edwin de 
Feijter (Rijkswaterstaat Zeeland); Mrs. Carola Helmendach (Zeeland Agricultural Youth 
Contact);  Mrs. Carla Michielsen (Zeeland Agriculture and Horticulture Organisation); Mr. 
Frans van Pelt (Eastern-Scheldt National Park); Mr. Leo Santbergen (Wageningen Univer-
sity); Mrs. J. Blom-Hummel (Zeeland Province; secretary); Mr. Quirin Smeele (Nature  
Monuments); Mr. Ton Wegman (Recron). 
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Title: Evaluation of the role, position and functioning of the Regional Scheldt WFD 
Consultation Platform – Session 3 
Date & Place: April 6, 2005 at the Zeeland Province (Middelburg; Netherlands) 
Issues: The politicians of the Regional Scheldt Political Platform discuss the author’s find-
ings and recommendations on the functioning of the Regional Scheldt WFD Consultation 
Platform. They decide to extend the role of the platform with an advisory function. The 
chair of the platform is invited to attend the meetings of the political platform in order to 
bring in the societal voices and advises more explicitly. 
Participants: Mr. Thijs Kramer (chair Zeeland Province); Mr. Sjef Jabos and Mrs. Loes de 
Jong (Rijkswaterstaat Zeeland); Mr. T. Wemaer (Zeeuws-Vlaanderen Water Management 
Authority); Mr. Wim Gosselaar (Zeeuwse Eilanden Water Management Board); Mr. Jan 
Bostelaar (Veere Municipality); Nr. E. De Deckere (Hulst Municipality); Mr. J. Bliek (Reim-
erswaal Municipality); Mr. Henk Ketelaars (Evides Drinking Water Company); Mr. Nico 
Oskam, Mr. Harry Benschop and Mrs. W. Bezuyen (Zeeland Province). 
 
 
 
 
 
Title: Workshop: Critical (f)actors in Flemish-Dutch cooperation for integrated river 
basin management 
Date & Place: July 2, 2007 at the Brabantse Delta Water Management Authority (Breda, 
Netherlands) 
Issues: Dilemmas in integrated river basin management in general and the Flemish-Dutch 
coordination in specific are presented and discussed. The policy arrangement approach is 
applied as an instrument for formulating recommendations for dealing with the identified 
dilemmas in terms of actors, policy discourses, rules and configuration of resources and 
power. 
Participants:Victor Witter, Edwin Arens, Joseph Vos, Anton Merks, Jolanda Nooijens, 
Yvonne de Hond, Leo Santbergen (all of the Brabantse Delta Water Management Author-
ity); Huub Ploegmakers (Msc. Student Radboud University Nijmegen); Sander Meijerink, 
Pieter Leroy and Gabi Steentjes (all from Radboud University Nijmegen); Ann Crabbé and 
Jan Staes (Antwerp University); Jeroen Warner, Annemiek Verhallen (Wageningen Univer-
sity and Research Centre); Erik Matla (Brabantse Delta Water Management Authority); Luc 
can Craen and Henk Mackelberghe (Flemish Environmental Agency); Freek Willems and 
Gerda van Roode (De Dommel Water Management Authority); Jac Slikker, Ad Mol and 
Arja Span (North-Brabant Province); Iris Baijens (DHV Consultancy); Marco Vroege (Ar-
cadis Consultancy); Wim Boonen (N.V. De Scheepvaart); Bert van Eck (Rijkswaterstaat 
RIKZ); Marco Visser (WFD Meuse Project Bureau); Pierre Backx (Roosendaal Municipal-
ity); Gabi Steentjes. 
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Title: Panel and Discussion Session as part of the Freude am Fluss Final  
Conference: The European Water Framework Directive, Holy Grail of  
Integrated River Basin Management?  
Date & Place: August 22, 2008 in Nijmegen (Netherlands) 
Issues: The aim of the session is to exchange experiences and observations of both 
practitioners and researchers on the WFD’s implementation processes in different insti-
tutional and hydro-geographic circumstances. Central question is to which extent the 
WFD helps to translate the principles of sovereignty, subsidiarity, no-shift of problems to 
other areas and/or future generations and active stakeholder involvement into effective 
management solutions and daily practices. What are best practices considered? More 
specifically: 
 
1. How to translate the sovereignty and subsidiarity principles into effective coordina-
tion and collaboration processes in a nested hierarchy of scales within (inter-
)national river basins? By other means, how to divide and balance competences of 
(inter-)national, regional and local authorities with those of water management 
agencies, in order to avoid “grey-zones” in which nobody feels responsible and 
does not provide answers? 
2. How to translate the no-shift principle into effective collective arrangements within 
and between related upstream and downstream social-ecological sub-basins within 
the same river basin or across river basins? For example, how to apply economic 
principles (e.g. polluters pay, user pays and cost-recovery principle) in order to 
meet equitable and ethical sharing of societal costs and benefits? Or, how to apply 
the precautionary principle in relation with the mitigation and compensation prin-
ciples for the sake of healthy ecosystems (biodiversity) without limiting human ac-
tivities (socio-economic development)? 
3. What are desirable process conditions for active stakeholder involvement and how 
can competent authorities steer/guide multiple stakeholder challenges in a trans-
parent way? For example, what are experiences with top-down and bottom-up 
process constellations? And, what about social legitimacy? By other means, to 
which extent do existing or emerging multi-stakeholder coalitions from institution-
alised platforms receive grass-roots support and to which extent are those coali-
tions supported by actor networks at interconnected political levels? And how to 
deal with no-represented interests? By other words, do the no-represented stake-
holder groups, both powerful and powerless, ignore, hinder or support a multi-
stakeholder process? Do they interact informally with platform participants, or go 
around a platform/network to access those in power to get what they want? 
 
 
Participants: Presentations by: Leo Santbergen (Brabantse Delta Water Management 
Authority); Prof. dr. Wim van Leussen (Twente University); dr. Ann Crabbé (Antwerp 
University); Prof. mr. Marleen van Rijswick (Utrecht University); Erik Matla (Oranjewoud 
Consultancy); Jelle Behagel (Wageningen University). Circa 40 participants from different 
disciplines and countries. 
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Title: Presentation by the author and discussion on findings of observations on the 
WFD implementation process in the Dutch part of the Scheldt and Meuse River 
Basins. Part of the meeting of the Regional Scheldt Political Platform. 
Date & Place: April 1, 2009 at Zeeland Province (Middelburg, Netherlands) 
Issues: Comparison of the role, position and functioning of the WFD Consultation Plat-
forms in the Meuse and Scheldt River Basins. 
Participants: Mr. Frans Hamelink (chair); Mr. Wim Gosselaar (chair of the Daily Board and 
General Assembly of the Zeeuwse Eilanden Water Management Authority); Mr. Ad Ver-
seput (Zeeland Association of Municipalities); Mr. Clen de Kraker (Zeeland Association of 
Municipalities), Mr. Jan Dees (Zeeuws-Vlaanderen Water Management Authority); Mr. Hans 
Hamelink (Zeeland Province; secretary); Mr. John Lilipaly (chair of the Regional Scheldt 
WFD Consultation Platform); Mr. Joseph Vos (chair of the Daily Board and General As-
sembly of the Brabantse Delta Water Management Authority); Mr. René van de Sande (wa-
ter ambassador; Bergen op Zoom Municipality); Mr. Jaap Verhulst (Ministy of Transport, 
Public Works and Water Management; national WFD programme manager); Mr. Cor Ber-
revoets (WFD Scheldt River Basin Coordinator at the Ministry of Transport, Public Works 
and Water Management); Mr. Hans van de Zwan (Rijkswaterstaat Zeeland); Mr. Willy 
Oorthuijssen (Rijkswaterstaat Zeeland); Mr. Nico Oskam (Zeeland Province); Mr. Reinier 
van Nispen (Zeeland Province). 
 
 
Title: Workshop: The Floods Directive and the Water Framework Directive,  
Best Practices in Integrated River Basin Management? 
Date & Place: August 29, 2009 at Brabantse Delta Water Management Authority (Breda) 
Issues: European Directives and success and failure (f)actors in Integrated River Basin 
Management. What may Flemish and Dutch stakeholders learn from the implementation 
process of the Water Framework Directive (WFD) so far? Wat are best practices so far to 
build on in the implementation of the Floods Directive? Which opportunities do the Floods 
Directive and the second WFD implementation planning cycle offer for enforcement of 
bilateral, transboundary coordination efforts? 
Participants: Mr. Joseph Vos (chair of the Daily Board and General Assembly of the Bra-
bantse Delta Water Management Authority); Mr. Pieter Leroy (professor in environmental 
policies at Radboud University Nijmegen); Mr. René van de Sande (water ambassador; Ber-
gen op Zoom Municipality); Mr. Jaap Verhulst (Ministy of Transport, Public Works and 
Water Management; national WFD programme manager); Mr. Piet van Iersel (ecological 
expert at Brabantse Delta Water Management Authority); Mr. Mark Wiering (WFD  
researcher at Radboud university Nijmegen); Mrs. Sonja van den Arend (WFD researcher at 
Delft University of Technology); Mr. Ronald van Heeswijk (North-Brabant Province); Mr. 
Wim van der Pennen (WFD Meuse Project Bureau); Mr. Marc de Rooij (National Water 
Department at the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management), Mr. Wim 
van Leussen (professor in integrated river basin management at Twente University); Mr. 
Wouter Vanneuville (Water Hydraulics Laboratory of the Flemish Region of Belgium), Mr. 
Didier Soens (water policies  director at Antwerp Province); Mr. Sjoerd Hoornstra (national 
Floods Directive project leader at the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Man-
agement). 
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Title: i-Five International Workshop: Innovative Instruments and Institutions in 
Implementing the Water Framework Directive – Comparing experiences from 
actors in France, Germany and the Netherlands 
Date & Place: January 18 and 19, 2010 at Brabantse Delta Water Management Author-
ity (Breda, Netherlands) 
Issues: WFD implementation experiences from three European river basins have been 
presented and discussed, i.e. the Thau River Basin (France), the Weser (Germany) and 
the Brabant-West Region in the Meuse River Basin (Netherlands). Since Germany and 
France both are involved Member States in the International Meuse River Basin  
District, their experiences are of importance for the analysis of this research. 
Participants: Sylvain Barone and Gabriëlle Bouleau (CEMAGREF), Ilke Borowski and 
Edi Interwies (SEECON), Pieter Bots, Sandra Junier and Erik Mostert (Delft Univer-
sity of Technology), Marie Cugny-Seguin (French Ministry of Ecology), Marie-Perrine 
Durot (ONEMA), Simon Henneberg (Weser River Basin Commission), Flore Lafaye de 
Micheaux (Regional State Environmental Office), Julian Maijers, Victor van den Berg, 
Piet van Iersel and Leo Santbergen (Brabantse Delta Water Management Authority). 
 
 
 
 
 
Title: i-Five Dutch Reflection Session: Innovative Instruments and Institutions in 
Implementing the Water Framework Directive – What can the Dutch water  
managers learn from the WFD implementation in Germany and France? 
Date & Place: November, 24th, 2010 at Brabantse Delta Water Management Authority in 
Breda (Netherlands) 
Issues: Dutch water managers and WFD researchers have presented and discussed their 
experiences with the first WFD implementation planning cycle. Researchers from Delft 
University of Technology have presented experiences from France and Germany. The meet-
ing participants have concluded lessons to be learned from abroad. 
Participants: Victor van der Berg, Piet van Iersel and Leo Santbergen (all from Brabantse 
Delta Water Management Authority), Ronald van Dokkum, Anton Gerrritsen and Hannie 
Maas (National Centre for Water Management), Jan Lemkes (Hollandse Delta Water Man-
agement Authority),  Harrie Menning (Aa and Maas Water Management Authority), Reinier 
van Nispen (Zeeland Province), Ilse Posch (Hollandsch Noorderkwartier Water Manage-
ment Authority), Annelien Ronda (Rijkswaterstaat),  Marielle Tietz-Groenenberg (Rijkswa-
terstaat Limburg), Erik Mostert and Sandra Junier (Delft University of Technology). 
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Appendix IV:  
Analysed multi-stakeholder platform meetings 
 
Political 
level↓ 
Multi-Stakeholder Platforms and information 
sources↓ 
Covered 
Period↓ 
European: 
 
 
Water policy before the Water Framework Directive: 
o Reports of Council of Environmental Ministers 
o Conference declarations and international conven-
tions/treaties 
Strategic Co-ordination Group and European Water 
Directors:  
o Instructions and meeting reports of the  Dutch 
delegation 
o Formal meeting reports, documents and presenta-
tions 
o Attendance of conferences 
o Interviews and stakeholders’ position papers 
 
1988 to 2000 
1988 to 2000 
 
 
 
1995 to 2009 
 
1995 to 2009 
 
2006 to 2009 
1995 to 2009 
Multi-lateral: Life before the International Meuse Commission: 
o Secondary analysis  
International Meuse Commission (IMC): 
o Instructions and meeting reports of the  Dutch 
delegation  
o Formal meeting reports, documents and presenta-
tions 
o Interviews and stakeholders’ position papers 
o Attendance of conferences 
Informal Scheldt Group (ISC): 
o Meeting reports, documents and presentations 
o Participatory observations 
International Scheldt Commission (ISC): 
o Instructions and meeting reports of the  Dutch 
delegation  
o Formal meeting reports, documents and presenta-
tions 
o Attendance of conferences 
o Interviews and stakeholders’ position papers 
 
1990 to 1994 
 
1995 to 2009 
 
1995 to 2009 
 
1995 to 2009 
2006 to 2009 
 
1991 to 1994 
1991 to 1994 
 
1995 to 2009 
 
1995 to 2009 
 
1995 to 2009 
1995 to 2009 
Bilateral: Flemish-Dutch coordination before the Mark River 
Basin Committee: 
o Interviews; policy and management documents 
Mark River Basin Committee: 
o River basin analysis reports 
o Participatory observations 
o Formal meeting reports, documents and presenta-
tions 
o Interviews and process evaluation sessions (mirror 
sessions) 
 
 
 
 
1990 to 1994 
 
1995 to 2004 
2005 to 2009 
1995 to 2009 
 
1995 to 2009 
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Political 
level↓ 
Multi-Stakeholder Platforms and information 
sources↓ 
Covered 
Period↓ 
Dutch do-
mestic-
national: 
Life before the Water Framework Directive: 
o Policy and management documents; research and 
advisory reports 
o Documents of the WFD Project Implementation 
Team 
o Interviews 
National Water Committee*) and National Water Man-
agement Consultation Platform (in Dutch: Overlegor-
gaan Water en Noordzee): 
o Formal/informal meeting reports, documents and 
presentations 
o Interviews and stakeholders’ position papers 
o Attendance of workshops and conferences 
o Process evaluation sessions (mirror sessions) 
 
1990 to 1999 
 
1998 to 2003 
 
1998 to 2003 
 
 
 
2003 to 2009 
 
2003 to 2009 
2003 to 2009 
1998 to 2009 
Dutch do-
mestic -
national/ 
regional: 
National-Regional Political Water Platform (in Dutch: 
Landelijk Bestuurlijk Overleg Water met RBO voorzitters - 
LBOR) and Regional Administrative Chairmen Com-
mittee (in Dutch: Regionaal Ambtelijk Overleg Voorzitters): 
o Meeting instructions and documents, for-
mal/informal meeting reports, documents and 
presentations 
o Interviews and process evaluation sessions (mirror 
sessions) 
 
 
 
 
2003 to 2009 
 
 
2003 to 2009 
Dutch do-
mestic-
Regional: 
Life before the Water Framework Directive: 
o Secondary analysis, documents and interviews 
Regional Meuse Political Platform (in Dutch: Regionaal 
Bestuurlijk Overleg Maas -RBOM); Regional Meuse Admi-
nistrative Platform (in Dutch: Regionaal Ambtelijk Overleg 
Maas – RAOM); Regional Meuse WFD Consultation 
Platform (in Dutch: Klankbordgroep KRW Maas): 
o (Non-)participatory observations 
o Meeting instructions and documents, for-
mal/informal meeting reports, documents and 
presentations 
o Attendance of workshops and conferences 
o Interviews and stakeholders’ position papers 
o Written argumentation survey 
o Process evaluation sessions (mirror sessions) 
Regional Scheldt Political Platform (in Dutch: Regionaal 
Bestuurlijk Overleg Schelde - RBOS); Regional Scheldt 
Administrative Platform (in Dutch: Regionaal Ambtelijk 
Overleg Schelde – RAOS);Regional Scheldt WFD Con-
sultation Platform (in Dutch: Klankbordgroep KRW Schel-
de): 
o (Non-)participatory observations 
o Meeting instructions and documents, for-
mal/informal meeting reports, documents and 
presentations 
 
1990 to 2000 
 
 
 
 
 
2005 to 2009 
2002 to 2009 
 
 
2005 to 2009 
2002 to 2009 
2002 to 2009 
2002 to 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2003 to 2009 
2003 to 2009 
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Political 
level↓ 
Multi-Stakeholder Platforms and information 
sources↓ 
Covered 
Period↓ 
o Attendance of workshops and conferences 
o Interviews and stakeholders’ position papers 
o Process evaluation sessions (mirror sessions) 
2003 to 2009 
2003 to 2009 
2003 to 2009 
Dutch do-
mestic - local: 
Life before the Water Framework Directive: 
o Secondary analysis, documents and interviews 
Brabantse Delta Water Management Authority (Daily 
Board and General Assembly); Brabant-West WFD 
Project Team; the Brabant-West WFD Consultation 
Platform; WFD meetings with municipalities; the 
Roosendaal WFD Pilot Team: 
o (Non-)participatory observations 
o Meeting instructions and documents, for-
mal/informal meeting reports, documents and 
presentations 
o Attendance of workshops and conferences 
o Interviews and written argumentation survey 
o Process evaluation sessions (mirror sessions) 
 
1990 to 2004 
 
 
 
 
 
2005 to 2009 
2005 to 2009 
 
 
2005 to 2009 
2005 to 2009 
2005 to 2009 
*) Between 2003 and 2008: Landelijk Bestuurlijk Overleg Water (LBOW) and since 2009: Nationaal 
Water Overleg (NWO) 
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Appendix V: Chronology of the drafting and negotiation  
process of the Water Framework Directive 
 
Information sources: Kaika (2003); Kaika and Page (2003); documents of the informal meetings 
between the EU Water Directors of the Member States and the European Commission; memoranda 
and position papers of Member States; meeting and negotiation instructions of the Netherlands;  
Interviews with Dutch actors (see Appendix II-A); documents of the European Commission, the 
European Parliament and the Council of Environmental Ministers. 
 
Date↓ Remarkable event(s), meeting(s), or decision(s)↓ 
1988/06/27 
1988/06/28 
Ministerial Seminar on the future community water policy held in Frankfurt.  
Water is declared ‘a precious resource which must be carefully managed and 
priced accordingly’ (European Communities, 2000: 1). The conclusions 
include statements on the importance of guidelines for integrated water 
management (water quantity and quality), development of a policy for ra-
tional use of water resources, ‘general support for Community legislation 
covering ecological quality of surface water’, the need for a combined ap-
proach of quality objectives and emission standards, the importance of ade-
quate waste water treatment infrastructure, the need for measures to reduce 
pollution  from diffuse sources and in particular nutrients and pesticides 
from agriculture and integration of water policy (as part of an overall envi-
ronmental policy) with industrial, agricultural and regional policy (ibid.). 
1988/06/28 The Council of Ministers asks the European Commission to submit propos-
als on improvement of ecological quality in the Community’s surface waters 
(European Communities, 2000: 1) 
1991 Ministerial Seminar on groundwater held at The Hague. The Ministers ‘rec-
ognised the need for action to avoid long-term deterioration of freshwater 
quality and quantity and called for a programme of actions to be imple-
mented by the year 2000 aiming at sustainable management and protection 
of freshwater resources’ (European Communities, 2000: 1). 
1992 The UN-ECE Helsinki Convention on the Protection and Use of Trans-
boundary Watercourses and International Lakes (UN-ECE, 1992). This 
convention stresses the importance of integrated river basin management.  
1992 Treaty on the European Union (“Maastricht Treaty”): The European Union 
consists of three pillars, the European Community being one of them 
(European Communities, 1992a). Strictly speaking, environmental policy is 
part of the EC pillar. Environmental policy measures, on the basis of Article 
100a, are now to be decided by Qualified Majority Voting (QMV), although 
some issues that fall under Article 130s have to be decided on by unanimity 
(e.g. water quantity issues). Introduction of ‘sustainable growth’ as key EU 
objective. Creation of the Cohesion Fund which is intended to support 
transport infrastructure and environmental improvements in the poorest 
Member States of the EU (then Greece, Portugal, Spain and Ireland).  One 
of the priorities of the Treaty is to integrate environmental protection as-
pects into all EU policies (including the Common Agricultural Policy). 
 
1994 The European Commission launches a proposal on a ecological water qual-
ity directive. 
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Date↓ Remarkable event(s), meeting(s), or decision(s)↓ 
1995/01/26 At an expert meeting in Brussels, the Dutch national government launches a 
position paper:  ‘The Commission Proposal on Ecological Water Quality 
(EQW) and the integration of European Water directives’ (Ministry of 
Transport, Public Works and Water Management, 1995a). High-rank water 
policy officials from France and the Netherlands agree to meet bilaterally. 
1995/02/15 Informal meeting of the EU water Directors from France (Jean Luc 
Laurent) and the Netherlands (Jan Hoogland). Both directors are not in 
favour of the idea from the European Commission to arrive at a sectoral 
directive on a basic European ecological water quality. Instead they opt for a 
more integrated approach of European water policy legislation in order to in-
crease transparency and with sufficient implementation room for the Mem-
ber States (subsidiarity). 
1995/03/22 The Dutch national government launches a short memorandum in “Brus-
sels”: ‘Suggestions of the Netherlands delegation: Ecological Quality of 
Water/River basin Approach’ (Ministry of Transport, Public Works and 
Water Management, 1995b). 
1995/04/07 As an initiative of the French, an informal meeting of five EU Water Direc-
tors (“Gang of Five”) takes place at Paris: France (Jean Luc Laurent), Ger-
many (Hans Möbs), United Kingdom (Neil Summerton), the Netherlands 
(Bob Dekker) and Spain (Francisco Gil Garcia).  After discussion of the 
Dutch position paper (Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Man-
agement, 1995a), they decide to draft a common discussion paper on EU 
water policy. Summerton will draft a first proposal and Laurent will try to 
urge the European Commission to organise an informal meeting with all 15 
Member States (letter of April, 4th). 
1995/05/05 Launch of the Dutch memorandum: ‘Environmental framework Directives 
of the European Union – Ideas on Coherence and Suggestions for a Logical 
Basic Structure’ (Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environ-
ment, 1995). Presentation at the Environmental Policies Review Group 
(ERPG). 
1995/06/13 Release of the ‘Discussion Paper on EU Water Policy’ drafted by Neil 
Summerton (United Kingdom) on behalf of the “Gang of Five” to all Water 
Directors and the European Commission (Summerton, 1995a). 
1995/06/19 DG Environment invites the first informal meeting with the EU Water 
Directors (Brussels). The DG agrees to prepare a strategic document on 
future EU water policy. The Water Directors are asked to provide for exam-
ples of inconsistencies within the present corpus of EU water legislation.  
1995/06/20 Public Hearing of the Environment Committee of the European Parliament 
on water policy legislation. The EP urges the European Commission to 
come forward with a proposal on simplification and integration of EU water 
policy legislation.  
1995/06/23 The Council of Environmental Ministers concludes that the EU water legis-
lation should be revised fundamentally.  
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Date↓ Remarkable event(s), meeting(s), or decision(s)↓ 
1995/10/18 Environment Commissioner Bjerregaard presents DG Environment’s dis-
cussion document on European Community Water Policy (DG Environ-
ment, 1995) at the second informal meeting with the EU Water Directors 
(Brussels). Also, the British memorandum with examples of a lack of coher-
ence in EU water policy (Summerton, 1995b) is discussed. 
1995/10/20, 
21 and 22 
Informal Council of Europe’s Environment Ministers to discuss the EU 
water policy legislation. According to the Dutch minutes, all Ministers wish a 
not too ambitious framework directive that structures the existing obligation. 
Integrated water resources management should be the central point of de-
parture (but with emphasis on water quality) and responsibilities should be 
divided in an equitable way. 
1995/12/18 The Council of Environmental Ministers concludes that there is a need for a 
new framework directive in which the principles for sustainable water re-
sources management in the European Union are anchored. The ecological 
water quality proposal may serve as the starting point.  
1996/01/31 The Dutch and British EU Water Directors (i.e. Jan Hoogland and Neil 
Summerton) hold an informal meeting at London. Both share the opinion 
that the DG Environment’s ambition for restoration of the natural state of 
all water systems is not realistic (An internal Dutch communication points at 
the influence of Danish environmentalists within the DG and a subsequent 
replacement of those by British officials). Together they will propose the 
need for a (more realistic) good ecological state and a combined, comple-
mentary approach of water quality objectives and emission limit values. Both 
Water Directors are no supporter of a generic license obligation for all water 
abstractions.  
1996/02/21 The European Commission releases a Communication on European Com-
munity Water Policy setting out the leading principles for a water framework 
directive (COM(96)59 final; Commission of the European Communities, 
1996). The EC starts an open consultation round and invites specific inter-
ests groups and organisations to participate. 
1996/03/29 Third meeting of DG Environment with the EU Water Directors of the 
Member States (Brussels).  
1996/06/25 The Council of Environmental Ministers ‘urges the Commission to come 
forward as soon as possible and at the latest by the end of the year, with a 
proposal for a Water Resources Framework Directive. The Council consid-
ers this communication to constitute one useful basis to develop a new 
Community water policy.’ (Council conclusions on a European Community 
Water Policy).   
1996/07/12  Informal meeting of the Water Directors from France, Germany, United 
kingdom and the Netherlands and subsequent lunch with the most involved 
(British) officials of DG Environment (Paris). At the meeting Informal 
(non-) papers of France and the Netherlands and a suggestions letter of the 
United Kingdom on the set-up of a water framework directive have been 
discussed.  
July 1996 In reaction to the Commission’s Communication, the EU Water Directors 
of France, United Kingdom, Germany and the Netherlands release a joint 
document: ‘Summary of Discussions about Guidelines for a Water Policy of 
the Union’ (Roussel et al., 1996). 
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Date↓ Remarkable event(s), meeting(s), or decision(s)↓ 
1996/09 
1996/10 
Subsequently, the Committee of the Regions, the Economic and Social 
Committee and the European Parliament all request the EC to come for-
ward with a proposal for a Council Directive establishing a framework for a 
European water policy.  
1996/12/04 The EC releases its first draft proposal for the Water Framework Directive. 
The draft proposal will be developed further in informal meetings with 
technical experts and the EU Water Directors. A working group of technical 
experts, as chaired by Luxembourg, will elaborate proposals for the technical 
definitions and requirements of good ecological status of water bodies.    
1996/12/20 DG Environment organises a meeting (Brussels) to consult national experts 
on the draft proposal for the Water Framework Directive.  
1997/01/14 
1997/01/15 
At the fourth meeting of DG Environment with the EU Water Directors of 
the Member States (Brussels), the draft proposal for the Water Framework 
Directive is discussed.   
1997/01/20 The Dutch EU Water Director sends a letter to DG Environment with 
written remarks on the first draft proposal for the Water Framework Direc-
tive (letter HW/AI 97/1501). 
1997/02/26 Adoption by the European Commission of the proposal for a Council Di-
rective establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water 
policy (COM(97)49 final; Commission of the European Communities, 
1997a). 
1997/03/19 The Dutch EU Water Director invites his colleagues from the United King-
dom, France, Germany, Denmark, Spain and Luxembourg for an informal 
meeting (The Hague) to prepare the discussions on the draft Water Frame-
work Directive in the Council of Environmental Ministers (under Dutch EU 
Presidency). Also DG Environment is present. This may be considered the 
fifth meeting of the EU Water Directors and DG Environment, although 
not all Member States have been invited. 
1997/07/16 
1997/07/17 
Sixth informal meeting of DG Environment with the EU Water Directors 
of the Member States (Luxembourg). The Luxembourg Presidency an-
nounces that the discussion on the WFD in the Council of Environmental 
Ministers will be postponed till October, since revision of the Drinking 
Water Directive will receive first priority. Text proposals by DG Environ-
ment on economic analysis and full cost recovery for water services, on the 
combined approach and on the role and status of the Article 21 Committee 
(in the then draft text Article 24 and 25). 
1997/09/12, 
13 and 14 
The Dutch Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment 
invites the Environment Committee of the EP for a visit to the Netherlands. 
The proposal for a WFD is one of the agenda items. [Then the Dutch chair 
the Council of Ministers]. 
1997/10 First meeting of the (Dutch) inter-ministerial WFD platform (KARVO = 
Kaderrichtlijn Water Vooroverleg; October, 9th; The Hague). This is an informal 
forum that prepares the Dutch position and strategy for the European nego-
tiations on the WFD. 
1997/10/01 Letter from the Dutch Water Director to DG Environment on his opinion 
about the ‘draft modification to the Commission Proposal for a Council 
Directive establishing a framework for Community action in the field of 
water policy (COM(97)49)’ (document HW/AI/97/10581).  
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Date↓ Remarkable event(s), meeting(s), or decision(s)↓ 
1997/10/14 
1997/10/15 
Seventh informal meeting of DG Environment with the EU Water Direc-
tors of the Member States (Bonn). Germany presents its ideas on the river 
basin management approach as rooted in experiences with the International 
Rhine Commission. The EC presents its ideas on incorporation of the Dan-
gerous Substances Directive (76/464/EEC; under revision) into the Water 
Framework Directive. The Dutch minutes mentions progress with the ex-
pert group on good ecological status despite the lack of a task description.  
1997/11/18 Eight informal meeting of DG Environment with the EU Water Directors 
of the Member States (Brussels).  The draft modification to the Commis-
sion’s proposal for the WFD is mentioned. The Fraunhofer study paper on 
development of a pollution prioritisation system in the context of the WFD 
is presented and discussed. According to the Dutch minutes ‘only four EU 
Water Directors were present and discussion on important new develop-
ments in the WFD file hardly took place’. 
1997/11/26 Adoption by the European Commission of the draft modification to its 
proposal for a Council Directive establishing a framework for Community 
action in the field of water policy (COM(97)614 final; Commission of the 
European Communities, 1997b). 
1998/01 DG Environment involves environmental NGOs in amending Annex V of 
the proposed WFD (ecological status qualification). 
1998/02/17 The European Commission adopts the second modified WFD proposal 
following consultation (COM(98)76 final; Commission of the European 
Communities, 1998a). 
1998/04 Dutch inter-ministerial workshop on ecological quality assessment systems 
in relation to the (draft) WFD.  The workshop is organised to provide for a 
clear instruction for the Dutch delegation that negotiates about the WFD 
proposals in Brussels (April, 8th). 
1998/06/16 
1998/06/17 
The Council of Environmental Ministers (under British EU Presidency) 
adopts a provisional common position on the draft WFD. To satisfaction of 
the Dutch, this position includes intentional objectives. The EP is not 
amused since it did not finish its first reading yet. The United Kingdom is 
among the Member States that favours WFD adoption before the 1997 
Amsterdam Treaty will come into force. 
1998/07  The Environment Committee of the EP formulates about 230 amendments 
to the WFD proposal and reveals substantial differences between the EP 
and the Council of Environmental Ministers. The Environmental Commit-
tee tries to reach informal compromises with the then Austrian chair of the 
Council about major issues (i.e. a selection from the 230 amendments) in the 
draft WFD text. 
1998/10 A conversation between the EP and the Council in order to better under-
stand the different opinions. 
1998/11/24 
1998/11/25 
Ninth informal meeting of DG Environment with the EU Water Directors 
of the Member States (Wien).  
1998/12 
1999/01 
Informal conciliation talks (under German EU Presidency) between EP, the 
Council and the EC as an attempt to reach agreement before the first formal 
reading by the EP. The wish of the EP is to agree on a final WFD text be-
fore Summer 1999 (European elections). From the informal talks it becomes 
clear that the differences may be too large to arrive at an early compromise. 
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Date↓ Remarkable event(s), meeting(s), or decision(s)↓ 
1998/1999 Autumn/Winter: The EP deliberately delays the first formal WFD proposal 
a first formal reading in order to achieve co-decision position (after com-
pleted ratification under the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty).  
1999/02/10 
1999/02/11 
In its first reading of the proposed WFD the EP (by voting) adopts 133 of 
the 230 amendments as proposed by its Environment Committee. Agree-
ment with the Council only concerns minor issues from the proposed WFD 
text. Expectation: main differences may not be solved before Summer 1999. 
1999/03/11 The Council of Environmental Ministers reaches political agreement on its 
common position towards the proposal for the WFD.   
1999/05/01 The Amsterdam Treaty enters into force. The WFD falls under the co-
decision procedure which means that both the Council and the EP will have 
to decide on adoption of the WFD.  
1999/05/03 
1999/05/04 
Tenth informal meeting of DG Environment with the EU Water Directors 
of the Member States (Friedrichshafen). 
1999/08 The elections for a new EP cause a delay of the legislative process. The EC 
accepts many of the EP’s amendments, but the Council does not and reverts 
to its (provisional) common position of June 1998. 
1999/10/22 By unanimity, the Council of Environmental Ministers decides on its com-
mon position with regard to the proposed (modified) WFD text. Within 
four months the second formal reading of the EP should take place. 
1999/10-12 
2000/01 
The Ènvironment Committee of the new elected EP revises proposed 
amendments, knowing the WFD will have co-decision status. 
2000/02/16 Second formal reading: The EP accepts the majority (74) of the revised 
amendments from its Environment Committee. The EP challenges the 
common position by the Council. 
2000/02/28 
2000/02/29 
11th informal meeting of the EU Water Directors and DG Environment 
(Lisbon). The EU Water Directors attempt to bridge the differences of 
opinions between the EP and the Council. They formulate advises at the 60 
amendments in order to arrive at a final compromise. They call the Council 
to be more flexible in order to prevent formal conciliation talks. 
2000/03/30 The Council of Environmental Ministers (Brussels) does not reach agree-
ment on the advices from the EU Water Directors on the EP amendments. 
2000/05/11 The first trialogue of the EC, the chair of the Council and the reporter from 
the EP. The negotiations on compromise text proposals for some of the 
Articles do not lead to a full agreement. 
2000/05/11 Start of the first round of formal conciliation talks between the European 
institutions. This first round does not lead to a common agreement.  
2000/06/28 Second round of conciliation talks: compromise on the WFD text. 
2000/10/23 Political adoption of the Water Framework Directive by the EP and the 
Council of Environmental Ministers. 
2000/10/23 
2000/10/24 
12th meeting of DG Environment with the EU Water Directors of the 
Member States (Paris). 
2000/12/22 The WFD enters into force by publication in the Official Journal of the 
European Communities (European Communities, 20000. 
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Appendix VI: Guidance documents of the Common 
Implementation Strategy (CIS) 
 
No CIS guidance document↓  
1 Economics and the Environment (European Communities, 2003a). 
2 Identification of water bodies (European Communities, 2003b).  
3 Analysis of Pressures and Impacts (European Communities, 2003c). 
4 Identification and Designation of Heavily Modified and Artificial Water Bodies 
(European Communities, 2003d).  
5 Characterisation of Coastal Waters (European Communities, 2003e). 
6 Intercalibration (European Communities, 2003f). 
7 Monitoring (European Communities, 2003g).  
8 Public participation (European Communities, 2003h).  
9 Implementing the Geographical Information System Elements (GIS) of the Water 
Framework Directive (European Communities, 2003i).  
10 Rivers and Lakes – Typology, Reference Conditions and Classification Systems 
(European Communities, 2003j).  
11 Planning Process (European Communities, 2003k).  
12 The Role of Wetlands in the Water Framework Directive (European Communities, 
2003l). 
13 Strategic Guidance on the principles and communication of the first analysis under 
the WFD (European Communities, 2005a) 
14 Discussion Document on Environmental Objectives under the Water Framework 
Directive (European Communities, 2005b) 
15 Overall Approach to the Classification of Ecological Status and Ecological Potential 
(European Communities, 2005c).  
16 Intercallibration Process 2004-2006 (European Communities, 2005d).  
17 Groundwater Monitoring (European Communities, 2007a).  
18 Groundwater in Drinking Water Protected Areas (European Communities, 2007b).  
19 Preventing or Limiting Direct and Indirect Inputs in the Context of the 
2006/118/EC Directive (European Communities, 2007c).  
20 Ground Water Status and Trend Assessment (European Communities, 2009a). 
21 Surface Water Chemical Monitoring (European Communities, 2009b). 
22 Exemptions to the Environmental Objectives (European Communities, 2009c). 
23 Reporting under the WFD (European Communities, 2009d). 
24 Updated guidance document 9: Implementing the Geographical Information System 
Elements (GIS) of the EU Water Policy (European Communities, 2009e). 
25 Eutrophication Assessment in the Context of the European Water Policies (Euro-
pean Communities, 2009f). 
26 River Basin Management in a Changing Climate (European Communities, 2009g). 
27 Intercalibration Process 2008-2011 (revision of 16, European Communities, 2005d; 
including first results) (European Communities, 2011). 
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Appendix VII: Stakeholders in the Common  
Implementation Strategy (CIS) 
 
Interest  
cluster↓ 
Stakeholder groups and NGO’s ↓  
Agriculture 
(maximum of 
3 seats in the 
SGC) 
Strategic Coordination Group: 
o COPA-COGECA = Committee of Agricultural Organisations in the 
European Community – General Committee for Agricultural Co-
operation 
o ECPA = European Crop Protection Association 
o EIC – FENACORE = Euromediterranean Irrigators Community 
Energy 
(maximum of 
3 seats in the 
SCG) 
Strategic Coordination Group: 
o EREF = European Renewable Energies Federation 
o ESHA = European Small Hydropower Association 
o EURELECTRIC = Union of the Electricity Industry 
Industry 
(maximum of  
3 seats in the 
SCG) 
Strategic Coordination Group: 
o CEFIC = European Chemical Industry Council 
o UNICE = Union of Industrial and Employer’s Confederations in 
Europe 
Not represented in the Strategic Coordination Group: 
o EUROGYPSUM – Association of European Gypsum Industries 
(WG only) 
o EFMA – European Fertilizer Manufacturers Associations (WG only)  
o CONCAWE – Oil Companies European Association (WG only) 
o EUROMETAUX – European Association of Metals (WG only) 
o CEPI – Confederation of European Paper Industry (EAF only) 
o EUROCHLOR – European chlorine industry (EAF only) 
o EUROMINES – European Association of Mining Industries (EAF 
only) 
o CEPI – Confederation of European Paper Industry (EAF only) 
Navigation 
(maximum of 
3 seats in the 
SCG) 
Strategic Coordination Group: 
o CEDA – Central Dredging Association 
o ESPO – European Sea Ports Organisation 
o EURMIG = European Union Recreational Marine Industry Group 
Not represented in the Strategic Coordination Group: 
o PIANC – International Navigation Association (WG only) 
o CCNR – Central Commission for Navigation on the Rhine (WG 
only) 
Water supply 
and waste 
water (maxi-
mum of 3 
seats in the 
SCG) 
 
 
 
 
 
Strategic Coordination Group: 
o EUREAU – European Union of National Associations of Water 
Suppliers and Waste Water Services 
o EWA (European Water Association) 
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Interest  
cluster↓ 
Stakeholder groups and NGO’s ↓  
NGOs (maxi-
mum of 10 
seats in the 
SCG) 
Strategic Coordination Group: 
o EAA – European Anglers Alliance 
o EBU – European Barge Union 
o EEB – European Environmental Bureau 
o ELO – European Landowners Organisation 
o UNICE –Union of Industrial and Employer’s Confederations in 
Europe 
o WWF – World Wide fund for Nature 
Not represented in the Strategic Coordination Group: 
o EUPC – European Union of House Builders and Developers  (EAF 
only) 
o Grüne Liga (EAF only) 
o SAR – Seas at Risk (EAF only) 
International 
Governmental 
Organisations 
(maximum of 
10 seats in the 
SCG) 
Strategic Coordination Group: 
o CEMR – Council of European Municipalities and Regions 
o CEE NBO – Central and Eastern European Network of Basin 
Organisation 
o CEN – European Committee for Standardization 
o EPRO – Environmental Platform of Regional Offices in Brussels 
o ICPDR – International Commission for the Protection of the Danube 
River 
o INBO – International Network of Basin Organisations 
o WMO – World Meteorological Organisation 
Not represented in the Strategic Coordination Group : 
o CEA – Comité Européen des Assurances (EAF only) 
o EFG – European Federation of Geologist (EAF only) 
o EUCETSA – European Committee of Environmental Tenchnology 
Suppliers Associations (EAF only) 
o IMC – International Commission on Meuse (EAF only) 
o ISC – International Scheldt Commission (EAF only) 
SCG = Strategic Coordination Group; WG = Working Groups; EAF = Expert Advisory 
Forums 
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Appendix VIII: Stages in the Dutch water policy domain  
(national level) before and after adoption of the  
Water Framework Directive 
 
 
Stage 0: Dutch water policy life before the Water Framework Directive (from 1960 
to  2000) 
No↓ Observations↓ 
(a) A focal evolution from water quantity only (till the 1960s), via inclusion of water 
quality legislation (as of the 1970s) towards integrated water systems manage-
ment and transboundary river basin management (as of the 1980s).  
(b) An “ecological turn” in water policy discourse in the 1980s & 1990s which mixes 
with anthropocentric definitions of integrated water (resources) management.  
(c)  Tradition of informal agreements in addition to formal divisions of tasks among 
administrations. 
(d) In the 1990s, an organisational integration discourse is triggered by general calls 
for more participation a transparency and new public management. Due to resis-
tance to change by current administrative structures, main focus is on improved 
coordination efforts and experiments with interactive policies making. 
(e) Internal focus of the water policy domain/weak cross-sector integration efforts. 
(f) Dutch water policy experts and civil servants are very active and ambitious in the 
WFD drafting stage at the European level while domestic focus mainly is on 
flood safety issues. In general, these Dutch public actors consider themselves 
among the European forerunners of water quality investments.  
(g) Triggered by near flood disasters in 1993 and 1995 and the climate change dis-
course, in 2000, the Dutch Council of Ministers decides on a different approach 
to water, Water Management policy in the 21st Century (WM21) 
Stage I: Low political priority until two late wake-up calls (from 1998 to 2003) 
No↓ Observations↓ 
(h) WFD working groups are established and coordinated by a new WFD Imple-
mentation Project Team, which is chaired by the TPW Ministry. Regional and 
local water managers are not yet actively involved in the WFD process. 
(i)  Main focus is on timely and correct transposition of the WFD into Dutch legis-
lation (WFD’s Article 24) and drafting the WFD Implementation Handbook. 
The handbook plays a limited role in the subsequent regional and local proc-
esses. In general, socio-economic interests groups, NGOs and the UvW are 
positive about a strict implementation schedule without new organisational 
structures. Questions are posed on the nature of (intentions or obligations?) and 
national ambitions with regard to the WFD’s environmental objectives. 
(j) Appointment of national coordinators for initiation of regional river basin WFD 
coordination structures (Nov. 2002). National actors in European working 
groups of the CIS (named as ‘focal-points’) should act as liaisons with the do-
mestic process. June 2003, parliamentarian worries about the socio-economic 
impact of a strict implementation of the WFD’s environmental objectives. 
(k) The July 2003 National Water Agreement triggers integration of organisational 
structures for water quantity and quality issues.  The National Water Platform 
decides on water policy issues; an additional national-regional WFD coordina-
tion structure will discuss implementation bottlenecks.  
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(l) Publication of the Aquarein study report (November 2003) causes a late political 
WFD wake-up call and triggers pragmatic WFD implementation ambitions. 
Parliamentarians delay the legal transposition of the WFD. 
Stage 
II: 
Realistic ambitions, first river basins characterisations and iteration (2004, 
2005) 
No↓ Observations↓ 
(m) The EC starts a juridical procedure for non-timely Dutch compliance with 
WFD’s Article 24. 
(n) The new (integrated) Water Act will be based on three major arguments, i.e. less 
and more simple regulation, the European river basin management approach 
and ‘better legal anchorage and instrumentation of contemporary integrated 
water management’. 
(o) April 2004, the Dutch Council of Ministers approves the WFD Ambition 
Memorandum which emphasises a staged, pragmatic, feasible and affordable 
implementation until the end of 2027. The National Water Platform interprets 
the WFD’s environmental objectives as staged obligations. Historical land use 
rights and spatial planning policy are leading. Despite the national interpretation, 
the discussion on the juridical nature of the WFD requirements pops up at sev-
eral moments till December 2009. The EC suspects the Dutch competent au-
thorities of lowering the ambitions for WFD implementation, an image which 
proves to be very hard to dismantle.  
(p) November 2004, the National Political Water Platform discusses an informal 
interpetation document about the differences between intentional and obligatory 
requirements in the WFD (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2004c). 
(q) After cautious scrutiny by an independent audit committee, the Dutch Article 5 
reports are sent to the EC in time (March 2005). For the majority of Dutch 
water bodies full compliance with the environmental objectives in 2015 will be 
improbable. Parliamentarian worries about the WFD’s consequences remain. 
(r) The WFD process will have the nature of a “funnel model” (trechtermodel), i.e. the 
process will evolve from a general inventory of the range of (potential) objec-
tives and measures (between a maximum and a minimum ambition level) to-
wards final programmes of measures per individual water body  (based on feasi-
bility and affordability criteria). The Lower House of Parliament will be in-
formed annually by means of (December) memoranda. The approach includes 
regional and local WFD pilot projects to get a better grip on potential measures 
and their implications. 
(s) Periodically, the Water Policy Department plies for an integrated WM21/WFD 
approach at the regional and local levels. In turn, the chairs of the regional river 
basin platforms ask for transparent inter-ministerial coordination, especially for 
the WFD and Natura 2000. 
(t) November 2005, the National Political Water Platform approves the pragmatic, 
alternative approach for formulation of ecological objectives for heavily modi-
fied water bodies (as proposed by Dutch bureaucrats at a European workshop 
on the WFD and hydro-morphology in Prague). 
(u) December 2005, the Water Policy Department and the VNG agree to initiate a 
stimulation programme on active participation of local experts, politicians and 
bureaucrats (the so-called ‘Water-ambassadors Agreement’). Environmental 
NGOs and socio-economic interests groups are informed and consulted by 
means of one (existing) national and seven (new) regional sounding-boards. 
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(v) The 2005 December Memorandum sums the chosen organisational and substan-
tive process rules for the subsequent WFD implementation planning stages. It 
reconfirms the headlines of the 2004 WFD Implementation Memorandum. 
Objectives and measures for the WFD and the Birds- and Habitats Directives 
(Natura 2000 sites) will only be coupled whenever necessary given interdepend-
encies. Rules on a level playing field, water quality standards for (transboundary) 
problematic substances and the no-shift principle (Article 4(8) of the WFD) 
should be agreed on multilaterally (in the international river basin committees). 
The WFD monitoring programmes (both surface water and groundwater) 
should be designed in a cost-effective manner. Article 14 is interpreted as infor-
mation and consultation of NGOs and socio-economic interests groups by 
means of WFD Sounding-boards at the national, regional and local level.  
(w) Environmental NGOs and socio-economic interests groups subscribe the main 
starting-points, but consider the 2005 December Memorandum too generic. 
Parliamentarians ask for a further reduction of the estimated WFD implementa-
tion costs. 
Stage 
III: 
Harmonised objectives and measures, acceptable costs-benefits ratios 
(2006 to 2008) 
No↓ Observations↓ 
(x) A major steering dilemma continuously bothers the Dutch national public ac-
tors: How to sufficiently harmonise processes of autonomous (regional and 
local) authorities for comparable (national) river basin management 
plans/programmes of measures? How to translate the pragmatic implementa-
tion mantra by means of feasible and affordable measures in a comparable way 
across the country? 
(y) The (independent) February 2006 WFD quick scan from the Environmental 
Assessment Agency (Ligtvoet et al., 2006; with similar conclusions as the 2003 
Aquarein report) receives limited attention. According to the quick scan, the 
WFD requirements are far from fulfilled and continuation of running policies 
will lead to no further deterioration of (physical-) chemical and ecological qual-
ity only. Expensive additional measures will be necessary to comply with the 
environmental objectives of the WFD. Also, the September 2007 National 
Water Vision, an informal document of the then new Council of Ministers is 
not discussed by the WFD actors and does not play a significant role in the 
process on selection of cost-effective measures. 
(z) Compared with draft editions, the final 2006 December Memorandum shows a 
remarkable strategic move. Instead of stressing additional State investments for 
WFD measures, the national authorities “cash” a potential cost reduction of 
€1.9 billions by implementing WFD and WM21 measures in an integrated way 
(i.e. by means of combined measures that deliver synergy and innovation). The 
final memorandum is based on the national strategic societal costs benefits 
analysis and regional economic analyses as presented in so-called (regional river 
basin) Summer Memoranda. 
(aa) First priority is given to (almost) full implementation of WM21 measures before 
the end of 2015, while for the WFD assignment a staged approach till 2027 is 
mentioned. However, WM21 measures should be WFD proof and wherever 
possible contribute to WFD objectives. Considerable additional investments 
will have to be made in order to conduct 70-80% compliance with the WFD 
objectives in 2027. Despite the national integration desire, most regions hardly 
include WM21 measures for the river basin management programmes. 
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(ab) Due to time restrictions and delays in national formats and guidelines, processes 
of formulating objectives and selecting cost-effective measures run in parallel 
instead of one after the other (as a logical order to define “distances to tar-
gets”).  
(ac) The WFD/Natura 2000 coordination process is laborious. Distrust develops 
between the regional water management authorities (who feel excluded) and the 
ANF Ministry. The national authorities advocate a pragmatic approach: only 
coupling of both processes whenever water conditions may hinder compliance 
with objectives. 
(ad) National and regional costs-benefits analyses mainly run in parallel. The Meuse 
partners are irritated about the lack of data on generic measures from the ANF 
Ministry.  The Water Steering Group, a number of parliamentarians and repre-
sentatives from farmers and industrial interests groups expresses worries about 
both, the comparability of the regional figures and the unbalance between socie-
tal costs and benefits. Due to different starting-points, hypotheses, prepositions 
and methodological difficulties, the (national) strategic societal costs-benefits 
analysis does not yet answer questions about the most cost-effective measures 
and which measures may lead to disproportionate costs. 
(ae) After consultation of an independent committee of economic experts, the Na-
tional Political Water Platform decides to conduct an ex ante evaluation in the 
first half of 2008 instead of a societal costs-benefits analysis. Most actors (na-
tional, regional, local; governmental and non-governmental) agree that, due to 
methodological deficiencies, a sufficient reliable societal costs-benefits analysis 
is impossible.  
Stage 
IV: 
Drafting of river basin management plans and formal consultation (2008, 
2009) 
No↓ Observations↓ 
(af) For harmonisation reasons, the national Water Policy Department decides to 
initiate a national editing team (instead of regional ones) for the river basin 
management plans. In parallel, provinces and regional water management au-
thorities write their own water policies and management plans. 
(ag) Notwithstanding the national calls for integrated WM21 and WFD implementa-
tion at the regional and local scale, the TPW Ministry chooses a WFD limited 
reporting obligation (related to strict compliance with the WFD’s legally binding 
requirements). 
(ah) National, regional and local governmental actors generally are satisfied with the 
well coordinated formal consultation procedure for all related new water poli-
cies and management plans. Environmental NGOs and socio-economic inter-
ests groups suffer from the large amount of documents.  
(ai) In answer to all the received views only minor amendments have been made in 
the final river basin management programmes and related national, regional and 
local programmes. At the end of 2009, green NGOs express their disappointed 
about ‘a lack of ambition, too much business as usual’, while the industrial and 
agricultural representatives are more satisfied with the chosen pragmatic ap-
proach. 
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LLTO Limburg Agriculture and Horticulture Organisation (Limburgse Land- en 
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MSP Multi-Stakeholder Platform 
NGO Non Governmental Organisation 
PAA Policy Arrangement Approach 
RAOM Regional Meuse Administrative Platform (Regionaal Ambtelijk Overleg 
Maas) 
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Tuinbouworganisatie) 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Index of Authors 
 
 
- A - 
 
Aarts, N. 52 
Adger; W.N. 30; 409  
Adolfse, L. 301 
ACW 226; 228 
Allen, J.A. 28 
Allison, G. 47 
Andersen, M.S. 215 
Andeweg, R.B. 211; 264; 281 
Arcadis 218; 219; 304; 365; 371 
Arnstein, S. 43 
Arts, B. 48; 57; 58; 60-65; 69; 70; 73; 75; 
80; 84; 152; 276; 292; 335; 348; 386; 448; 
450 
 
- B - 
 
Bache, I. 19; 76; 77; 92; 409 
Bachrach, P. 73 
Backes, Ch. W. 217; 223; 223 
Backx, P. 357; 359; 395; 506; 569 
Baker, S. 409; 411; 412; 413; 440; 460 
Baldock, D. 111 
Baratz, M.S.73 
Barham, E. 27 
Barraqué, B. 2; 3; 10; 12; 36; 37 
Barten, I. 359; 509 
Bateman, I. 55 
Baumgartner, F.M. 69 
Bebbington, J. 6 
Beck, U. 20; 28; 50 
Bekke, H. 247; 256 
Berkes, F. 29; 30 
Bertens, P. 357; 358; 371 
Blatter, J. 30 
Bleich, E. 69 
Blewitt, J. 6; 91; 409 
Blomberg, E. 158 
Blomquist, W. 18; 27-30; 33; 34; 42; 48; 
49; 92 
Boettke, P. 92  
Bogaert, D. 59 
Boonstra, W. 249 
Börzel, T. 79; 161; 163 
Bos, H. 339; 353-355; 378; 388 
Boudewijn, R. 86; 117; 128; 156; 215; 216; 
404; 250; 263-265 
Bourne, C. 39 
Bressers, H. 12 
Brinton, M.C. 19 
Broekhans, B. 56; 250; 263-265 
Bromley, D.W. 8; 36; 37 
Brunazzo, M. 160 
Bulloch, J. 59 
Burchell, J. 108; 110; 112; 133; 155; 158; 
160 
Burns, C. 111  
Busch, s. 219; 270 
Buijze, S. 360; 507 
 
- C - 
 
Caflisch, L. 38 
Caponera, D.A. 27; 36; 46 
Casella, A. 78 
Cerutti, M. 171; 507 
Chapman, G.  163 
Checkland, P. 93 
CIW 365 
Clement, D. 262; 267 
Coalitie Baten Schoon Water 227 
Coglianese, C. 48 
Colomb, C. 112; 125; 130; 159; 160 
Commission of the European  
Communities 110; 114; 116; 120; 130; 133; 
140; 155; 158; 167; 405; 406; 408; 410; 
522-524; 533 
Common Implementation Strategy (CIS) 
112; 121; 135; 136; 143; 144; 147; 161; 162; 
526 
Corcelle, G. 110 
Cornet, T. 301 
Coser, L.A. 400 
Cosgrove, W. 2; 4; 31; 40; 44; 45 
Costanza, R. 6; 7; 40; 55; 132 
Cowan, N. 112 
Crabbé, A. 30; 62; 64; 67; 67; 70; 99; 212-
214; 282; 513; 514 
Crwys-Williams, J. 17 
CSN 234 
 
 
536 INDEX OF AUTHORS 
 
- D -  
 
Dahl, R.A. 50; 72 
Daandels, G. 291 
Deligne, C. 1 
De Vries, J. 248; 256 
De Weer, S. 95 
De Wit, M. 52; 94; 95 
Dewulf, A. 51; 52; 64; 399; 424; 443; 463 
DG Environment 116; 119; 146; 406; 522 
DGW 229; 254;  
Dieltjens, I. 95 
Dierikx, M. 230 
Disco, C. 214 
Dommering, A.E. 220 
Doorewaard, H. 100; 162 
Dourojeanni, A. 28 
Dragos, Aligica, P.  92 
Driessen, P.P. 50 
Drupsteen, Th. G.  259 
Dryzek, J. S. 6; 62-64; 409 
Dudley, G. 70 
Dühr, S. 112; 125; 130; 159; 160 
Dworak, T. 113; 114; 120; 144; 162 
 
- E - 
 
Earnshaw, D. 112 
Ecorys 227 
Edelenbos, J. 274; 275; 280; 281; 283; 400; 
419; 438; 455 
Eerste Kamer der Staten-Generaal 222 
Eliaeson, S. 25; 26 
Eppink, D.J. 85; 207 
Erlandson, D. 83 
European Communities 9-12; 84; 85; 87; 
107; 109-114; 116-120; 122-124; 126-129; 
130-135; 138-144; 146-153; 155; 157; 158; 
162; 166-168; 174; 179; 183; 196; 197; 202; 
203; 205; 213; 220; 223; 225; 241; 243; 246; 
248; 260; 268; 272; 274; 287; 322; 360; 373; 
401; 404-408; 410; 411; 429; 438; 447; 520; 
522-526 
European Union 109; 113; 118; 129; 190; 
241; 260 
European Water Directors 131 
Evans, P. 78 
Evers, C.H.M.   312 
 
 
- F - 
 
Fairbrass, J. 159; 161 
Falkenmark, M. 27; 40; 44; 90 
Feitelson, E. 28 
Fischer, F. 9; 50-52; 62; 83; 89; 101-103; 
419; 429; 434; 447; 453 
Fischhendler, I. 28 
Fitzsimmons, A. 32 
Flinders, M. 19; 76; 77 
Folke, C. 27; 40; 44; 92; 409  
Forester, J. 51; 62 
Foucault, M. 64 
Fouilleux, E. 132; 160 
Friedman, A.L. 92 
Friedman, M. 55 
Freeman, R.E. 92 
Frewer, L.J. 52 
Frouws, J. 73; 247; 249 
Fuller 1 
 
- G _ 
 
Gaebler, T. 213 
Garden, P. 30; 34 
Gardner, R. 18; 20; 89; 431; 449 
George, S. 9 
Geary, M. 5; 6 
Gibbons, M. 51 
Giddens, A. 50; 62; 63; 67 
Gilbert, C.K.C.C. 159 
Glasbergen, P. 43; 50; 52; 59; 293; 294; 
320 
Global Water Partnership 3; 5; 10; 27; 28; 
31; 32; 39-41; 45; 49; 90; 213 
Gold, R.L. 102 
Gonzales-Villareal, F. 28; 34; 42 
Goverde, H. 50; 61 
Gowdy, J. 56 
Grainger, A. 91 
Greenwood, J. 158 
Grijns, L.C. 213 
Grimble, R. 93 
Grimeaud, D. 113 
Guba, E.G. 102 
Gupta, J. 54  
 
 
 
 
INDEX OF AUTHORS 537 
 
 
 
- H - 
 
Haarman,  F. 271 
Haigh, N. 110-112 
Hajer, M.A. 51; 59; 60; 62-64; 69 
Hall, A.W. 28; 34; 39; 41; 42; 49; 76; 153; 
213 
Hall, P.A. 68 
Hanley, N. 55 
Halperin, M.H. 47 
Hardin, G. 7 
Hassoldt, A. 219; 270  
Havekes, H. 12; 47; 128; 130; 139; 140; 
217; 223; 235; 236; 239; 242; 245; 249; 253; 
262; 268; 327; 333; 351 
Haverkamp, S.C.M. 93; 363; 364 
Hay, C. 7; 9; 62; 67; 68; 99 
Heathcote, I.W. 32 
Heijnen, J.H. 251 
Heikkila, T. 45; 416; 417 
Heilman, J.G. 23 
Held, D. 76  
Hellinga, F. 42 
Hendriks, F. 65; 213; 292; 426; 445; 465 
Hendriksen, G. 96; 98; 349  
Hendriksen, J. 270 
Héritier, A. 117;161; 163 
Hermans, B. 272 
Hey, C. 136 
Hidding, M. 310; 311  
Hildebrand, P.M. 108; 110; 111 
Hoetjes, B.J.S.  256 
Hofstede, G. 85; 207 
Hofstede, G.J. 85; 207 
Hoijtink, R. 360 
Holmer, M. 51 
Hontelez, J. 56 
Hoogenboom, B. 70 
Hoogewoning, S.E. 310 
Hooghe, L. 34; 77-79 
Hooper, B.P. 32 
Hötte, M.H. 213; 281 
Howlett, M. 4; 21; 33; 47; 48; 54; 67’69; 73 
Howsam, P. 54 
Huitema, D. 12; 23; 36; 62; 63; 65; 70; 72; 
422; 442; 461 
Huizinga-Heringa, J.C. 230-233 
Hulshof, T.H. 248 
Huys Adviesgroep 251 
 
- I – 
 
ICPM 172; 173; 174; 183; 194 
ICWE 3; 10; 41; 54 
Imamura, M. 30; 34 
IMC 93; 95; 96; 178; 180; 183; 184; 189; 
190; 191; 193-195; 198; 200; 202; 206 
Immink, I. 247 
Ingram, H.M. 30; 42 
International Law Association 37-39; 185 
Interwies, E. 162; 516 
ISC 96 
Irwin, G.A. 211; 264 
Ison, R.L. 54 
 
- J - 
 
Jansen, E.J.  193; 363; 364 
Jansen, P. 271 
Janssens, J. 32; 33; 292 
Jasanoff, S. 50; 51 
Jaspers, F.G.W. 27; 32; 49 
Jeffrey, P.5; 6 
Jenkins-Smith, H.C. 63; 66; 69; 70 
Jenkins, W.I. 47 
Jessop, B. 77; 78; 413; 440; 460 
Jiggins, J. 52 
Johnson, S.P. 110 
Jones, A. 1; 2 
Jones, B.D. 69 
Jordan, A. 78; 108; 110; 111; 113; 117; 131; 
157; 160; 161; 282; 409; 413; 422; 440; 441; 
460; 461 
Judge, D. 112 
 
- K - 
 
Kaika, M. 10; 46; 107; 113; 116; 117; 123; 
132; 135; 148; 155-160;  217; 419; 437; 
454; 520 
Kallis, G.113 
Keohane, R. 78; 79 
Kickert, W.J.M. 69; 211; 264; 281 
Kindler, J. 32 
Kingdon, J.W. 70 
Kirmany, S. 54 
Kiser, L.L. 14; 17; 20; 80; 84; 89; 418; 431; 
449 
Klaver, J. 57; 59-61 
Klijn, E.H. 51; 69 
538 INDEX OF AUTHORS 
 
Klopstra, D. 257  
Klostermann, J.E.M. 6 
Knill, C. 10; 108; 110-112; 117; 159; 160 
Kooiman, J. 43; 76; 91 
Koppen, I.J. 111; 150; 159; 161 
Koppenjan, J.F.M. 51; 69 
Koppers, M. 324 
Kroon, T. 257 
Kruyt, R.L. 217; 222; 223 
Kuhn, T. 51 
 
 
- L - 
Laracker, V. 12; 352; 353; 355; 362; 367; 
369; 370; 371; 373-375; 386; 388; 392 
Lanigan, C. 112 
Latour, C. 95 
LBOW 222; 223; 229; 263 
Leal, S. 2; 37; 44-46 
Lebel, L. 30; 34 
Leenders, K.A.H.W 348 
Leeuwis, M. 356; 357 
Le Moigne, G. 54 
Lenschow, A. 110-112; 159 
Lepsisus, R. M. 25 
Leroy, P. 14; 17; 19; 20; 28; 48; 50; 57-65; 
69; 70; 73; 76; 80; 84; 152; 276; 292; 348; 
430; 448; 513; 515 
Liberatore, A. 412 
Liefferink, D. 10; 17-19; 22; 47; 57-59; 63-
65; 70; 74; 80; 108; 110-112; 117; 152; 159; 
160; 214; 215; 423; 430; 442; 448; 449; 462 
Lievens Communicatie 373 
Lightfoot, S. 108; 110; 112; 133; 155; 158; 
160 
Ligtvoet, W. 226; 230; 231; 247; 248; 271; 
274; 283; 531 
Lincoln, Y.S. 102 
Lincklaen-Arriëns 43 
Low, B. 34 
Lowe, P.D. 110 
Lower House of Parliament 220; 221 
Long, T. 156 
LTO 248; 272; 274 
LTO-UvW 280 
Lukes, S. 47; 72; 73 
 
 
 
 
- M - 
 
Majone, G. 55 
Mak, W. 150; 156; 224; 225; 229; 240; 253; 
254;507 
Mandela, N. 17 
March, J.G. 9; 19; 68; 120 
Marks, G. 19; 34; 76-79; 91; 414 
Marsh, D. 69; 74 
Marteijn, E.C.L. 52 
Mazey, S. 111; 160 
MB Advies 275 
McDonald, G.T. 32 
McGinnis, M.D. 19; 65; 66; 68; 69; 89; 92 
McGlade, J. 139 
McGrory, 108 
Meijerink, S.V. 22; 29; 36; 47; 56; 62; 67; 
70; 72; 85; 131; 156; 172; 201; 207; 215; 
407; 422; 442; 461; 513 
Melis, S. 86; 117; 128; 156; 215; 216; 244; 
404 
Metze, T. 62 
Miles, S. 92 
Milieu- en Natuur Planbureau 249 
Mingers, S. 117 
Ministerie van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer 
en Visserij 248 
Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat 212; 
214; 224; 227-230;240; 241; 245; 250; 253; 
256-259; 272; 275; 283; 304; 316; 318; 320; 
332; 352; 530 
Ministerie van Volkshuisversting, Ruimte-
lijke Ordening en Milieu 245; 246; 249; 
256; 260; 261; 292 
Ministy of Housing, Spatial Planning and 
Environment (HSE) 32; 40; 216; 404; 406; 
521 
Ministry of Transport, Public Works and 
Water Management (TPW) 115; 156; 214; 
216; 220; 236; 237; 270; 404; 406; 407; 521 
Minkov, M. 85; 207  
Mishler, E.G. 102 
Mitchell, B. 5; 9; 29; 32-34; 78 
MNP-RIVM 248 
Mol, A.P.J. 110 
Molle, F. 3; 5; 83; 399; 429; 447 
Moore, S.A. 30 
Moreyra, A. 28 
Mostert, E. 85; 150; 217; 223; 243; 279; 
287; 516 
INDEX OF AUTHORS 539 
 
 
 
 
- N -  
 
Nadin, V. 112; 125; 130; 159; 160 
Needham, B. 8; 35; 36; 247 
Neelen, G.H.J. 235 
Nee, V. 20 
Nicol, A. 29; 49 
Niesing, H. 85 
Nijkamp, P. 113 
North, D.C.9; 20; 68 
Nowotny, H. 50; 51 
Nye, J. 78 
 
- O - 
 
Olsen, J.P. 9; 19 
Oosthoek, J. 361 
Osborne, D, 213 
Ostrom, E. 8; 9; 14; 17-24; 26; 35; 40; 41; 
44; 47-49; 53; 57; 61; 65-67; 69; 72; 79; 80; 
84; 89; 90; 102; 149; 196; 244; 273; 333; 
384; 415-418; 431; 434; 449; 453 
Ostrom, V. 20; 78 
Ovaa, E. 255; 271; 280; 324 
 
 
- P - 
 
Padt, F.J.G. 9; 47; 62; 63; 67; 68; 293; 295-
297 
Page, B. 10; 107; 116; 117; 123; 132; 135; 
148; 155; 156; 158-160; 217; 419; 437; 454; 
520 
Pahl-Wostl, C 29 
Pal, L.A. 73 
Parsons, W. 68 
Pearce, D.W. 55 
Peters, B.G. 68 ; 78 
Peterson, J. 158 
Pezzey, J. 6 
Pierre, J. 43; 78 
Pierson, P. 9; 68 
Planbureau voor de Leefomgeving 251 
Ploegmakers, H. 293; 295-297; 331; 513 
Postel, S. 38; 56 
Postma, R. 98; 352; 353; 355; 361; 362; 
367; 369- 371; 373-375; 383; 386; 388; 389; 
392 
Prins, H. 85 
Priscoli, J.D.  53 
Projectteam Implementatie Kaderrichtlijn 
Water 237; 254; 263; 269; 270 
Provincie Noord-Brabant 291; 293-304; 
309-311; 315; 316; 320; 322; 326; 352; 353; 
358; 380 
Punch, K.F. 100; 102 
Putnam, L. 51 
 
- R - 
 
Raadgever, G.T. 271; 272; 274; 275; 280; 
400; 419; 438; 455 
Raats, T. 100 
Ramesh, M. 4; 21; 33; 47; 48; 54; 68; 69; 73 
Ratner, B.D. 61; 91 
RBOM 301; 305-309; 311; 314; 318; 324; 
328-330; 335; 342 
Rees, J.A. 42; 44; 49; 56 
Rehbinder, E. 108 
Rhodes, R.A.W. 455 
Richardson, J. 70 
Rijk, J. 360 
Rijsberman, F. 2; 4; 32; 40; 44; 45 
Risse, T. 79 
RIZA 143; 144; 247; 248 
Robinson, J. 91 
Rockloff, S.F. 30 
Rogers, P. 1; 3; 12; 28; 34; 37; 39; 41; 42; 
44-46; 49; 76; 153; 213 
Röling, N. 54 
Romijn, E. 212 
Rosamond, B. 68 
Rosenau, J.N. 76; 78; 92 
Roth, D. 251 
Roussel, P. 116; 522 
Rowe, G. 52 
Royo-Gelabert, E. 61 
Ruijgh-Van der Ploeg, T. 56 
Rutgers, M.R. 237 
 
- S - 
 
Saager, P. 122; 128; 172 
Sabatier, P.A. 23; 63; 66; 67; 69; 70 
Saeijs, H.L.F. 27; 40; 44; 55; 56; 96; 128; 
373; 406 
Sagoff, M. 56 
Salihovic, E. 262 ; 268 
Salman, S.A.M. 37 ; 38 ; 39 
540 INDEX OF AUTHORS 
 
Santbergen, L.L.P.A. 8 ; 32; 43; 50 ; 85; 96; 
98; 255; 271; 281; 331; 357-360; 366; 369; 
371; 374; 389; 391; 395; 426; 444; 445; 464; 
465; 512-514; 516 
Savas, E.S. 4 ; 54 
Savenije, H.H.G. 1-3; 27; 29; 31; 33; 37-42; 
44-46; 49; 53; 54; 56; 57 
Sbragia, A.M. 77; 110; 112 
Scharpf, F. 48; 49; 117 
Schattschneider, E.E. 75 
Schepers, R.  301 
Scheuer, S.136; 148; 150; 155; 163; 410 
Schlager, E. 18; 27-30; 32; 34; 42; 45; 48; 
49; 62; 92; 416; 417 
Schmitter, P.C. 73 
Schön, D. 52 
Schout,  A. 113; 131; 157; 159; 282; 413; 
422; 440; 441; 460; 461 
Schreuders, C.G. 193; 363; 364 
Schuijt, K. 55; 56 
Schultz van Haegen, M.H. 229 
Scott, J. 67 
Scott, P. 51 
Shihata, I. 38  
Shiklomanov, A. 4 
Sijmons, D.F. 245 
Sillitoe, P. 51 
Simon, H.A.  9; 68 
SIWI 40 
Soens, D. 366; 515 
Solanes, M. 28; 34; 42 
Solomon, H. 2 
Solomon, S. 1; 2; 27 
Spash, C.L. 55 
Staatscommissie voor de Waterstaatswet-
geving 220 
Stark, M. 357; 358; 371 
Sterk Consulting 267; 362 
Stevens, T.H. 55 
Stewart, R. 108 
Steyaert, P. 52 
Stirling, A. 409 
Stone, D. 28; 83; 89; 419; 429; 447 
Stroomgebiedcomité Mark 364 
Summerton, N.W. 115; 116; 404; 521; 522 
Swyngedouw, E. 5 
 
- T - 
 
Tanzi, A. 186 
Taylor, R.C.R. 68 
Team Waterberging Brabantse Delta 372 
Teisman, G. 50 
Ten Heuvelhof, E.F. 51; 120; 214-216; 
221; 229; 237; 250; 254; 255; 263-265; 271; 
280; 282; 400; 411; 414; 415; 419; 438; 455 
Terpstra, S. 310 
Tiebout, C.M. 78 
Tielrooij, F. 251; 257 
Tinker, J. 91 
Tobben, J. 272 
Tompkins, E.L. 30 
True, J.L. 69 
Tullock, G. 48 
Turner, R.K. 55 
Turner, S.P.25 
Turton, A. 2 
Tuurenhout, M. 236 
Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal 211; 
219-224; 226; 228; 230-232; 240; 249; 251; 
254; 256; 261; 263; 275 
 
- U - 
 
Uitenboogaart, Y.J. 279; 400; 410; 411 
UN-ECE 3; 12; 98; 115; 122; 134; 172; 
186; 187; 213; 404; 520 
Unie van Waterschappen 231-232 
United Nations 38; 134; 185 
 
- V - 
 
Van Berkel, M. 40; 44; 406 
Van Bree, G.W.G.349 
Van Breemen, A.J.H. 262; 267 
Van Bueren, E.M. 51; 69 
Van Buuren, M. 245 
Van den Berg, V.S. 98; 316; 356; 359; 361; 
374; 383; 384; 389; 392; 395; 516 
Van den Brink, M 62 
Van den Broek, J.H.G. 259 
Van de Nes. Th. 212 
Van de Sande, R. 359; 509; 515 
Van den Noort, J. 348-353; 367; 373 
Van de Velde, O. 237; 238 
Van de Ven, G.P. 47; 212; 236; 246; 253; 
349 
Van der Arend, S. 12; 56; 101; 118; 400 
Van der Bolt, F.J.E. 221; 226; 241; 244; 
248; 302 
INDEX OF AUTHORS 541  
 
Van der Heijden, J.J. 250; 263-265 
Van der Lei, E. 310 
Van der Molen, D. 150; 156;260’261 
Van der Schans, F. 248 
Van der Staaij,  211  
Van der Veeren. R. 56 
Van der Vlies, J. 213; 281 
Van der Vlist, M. 245 
Van der Wal, B. 217; 287; 312; 362 
Van der Zaag, P. 1-3; 27; 29; 31; 34; 37-40; 
42; 43; 45; 46’49; 53; 54; 56; 57 
Van der Zalm 1 
Van der Zande, A.N. 250 
Van Dijk, J. 245 
Van Eck, B.T.M. 95; 513 
Van Essen, H.R.M. 293; 294; 320 
Van Gijsen, M.E.A.256 
Van Griensven, E. 360 
Van Herpen, F.C.J. 312 
Van Kempen, J.J. 279 
Van Lamoen, F. 356; 392 
Van Leussen, W. 5; 212; 514; 515 
Van Rijswick, H.F.M.W. 5; 12; 117; 130; 
139; 140; 217; 221-223; 235; 236; 240-245; 
249; 250; 259; 262; 268; 280; 327; 333; 410; 
514 
Van Roode, G. 261; 508; 513 
Van Sprundel, L. 263 
Van Stokkom, H.T.C. 96; 98; 349 
Van Tatenhove, J.P.M. 3; 14; 17; 19; 20; 
22; 28; 32; 33; 48; 57; 58; 60; 62; 64; 65; 67; 
69; 70; 73; 76; 80; 84; 152; 247; 276; 292; 
348; 430; 448 
Van Tulder, R. 293 
Van Vliet, C.J.M. 256; 257 
Van Woerkum, C. 52 
Verboven, J. 297 
Verhallen, J.A.M. 43; 47; 50-52; 56; 93; 
426; 444; 445; 464; 465; 512; 513 
Verheijden, S. 360 
Verhulst, J. 150; 156; 505; 514 
Verschuren, P. 100; 102 
Versteeg, R. 257 
Visser, M. 360; 513 
VNG 224; 253 
VNO-NCW 225; 228; 272; 274 
Voorn, P. 359 
Vos, J.A.M. 347; 506; 513; 515 
Vroege, M. 220; 356; 357; 360; 388;389;  
513 
 
- W - 
 
Waajen, G. 217; 287; 508; 312; 362 
Wade, R. 20 
Wagenaar, H. 51 
Walker, J. 18; 20; 89; 431; 449 
Wallace, H. 112 
Warner, J. 28; 43; 47; 50-52; 93; 251; 426; 
444; 445; 464; 465; 513 
Warren, R. 78 
Waterforum 228; 272 
Waterschap Brabantse Delta 356; 360; 366; 
378-380; 385 
Watson, D. 54 
Watson, N. 5; 29; 32-34; 43; 56; 426; 444; 
464 
WCED 91; 187 
Weale, A. 110; 161; 163; 411 
Weber, M. 14; 18; 24-26; 80; 431; 449 
Webster, R. 160 
Weidner, H. 117 
Weingart, P. 51 
Weingast, B.78 
Wellard, K. 93 
WHM 183 
Wiering, M. 29; 58; 65; 75; 99; 118; 131; 
156; 212-215; 247; 276; 282; 335; 386; 410; 
515 
Wilkinson, D. 111 
Williams, A. 412 
Winnubst, M. 251 
Wisserhof, J.213; 247 
Wittenhorst, H.224; 225; 240; 253; 254 
Witter, V.J. 96; 98; 349; 506; 508; 513 
Wolf, A.T. 2 
Wondolleck, J. 43; 56 
World Bank 44; 45; 93 
Wouters, A.N. 250 
WWF 32 
 
- Y - 
 
Yaffee, S. 43; 56 
Yanow, D. 102; 103 
Young, A.R. 112 
Zito, A.R. 112 
 
 
 Index of terms & concepts 
 
- A and B - 
 
Aarhus Convention (1998) 115; 134 
Ability to pay 121; 155 
Accountability 13; 133; 404; 408 
Active involvement 13; 28; 128;134; 135; 
142; 143; 152; 156; 160; 167; 168; 189; 195; 
203; 220; 269; 286; 287; 311; 337; 345; 375; 
382; 389; 393; 408; 409; 425; 427; 446 
Actor (dimension of PAA) 67-72; 156-
159; 200-202; 279-281; 338-339; 390-391 
Actor coalitions 4; 20; 46; 58; 59; 61-66; 
69-72; 74; 87; 88; 108; 124; 148; 152; 156; 
157; 171; 172; 197; 201; 204; 211; 215; 276; 
284; 292; 335; 440; 442; 511; 514 
Actor oppositions 58; 59; 62; 66; 69-72; 
87; 88; 108; 123; 152; 171; 172; 180’197; 
201; 203; 211; 215; 237; 249; 251; 259; 276; 
280; 282; 284; 292; 296; 316; 335; 342; 344; 
386; 391; 399; 401; 430; 511 
Adaptive water management 29 
Advice Commission for Water (ACW) 
226; 228 
Advocacy Coalition Framework 63; 66; 
69; 70 
Agency (versus structure) 9; 19; 57; 67; 
69; 71; 76 
Agenda-setting 48; 69; 354 
Agri-environmental measures 163; 248 
Aggregation rules 22-24; 47-49; 66; 75; 
142-146; 158; 161; 167; 192-194; 200; 203; 
205; 206; 262-269; 279; 281; 282; 285-
287327-331; 338; 339; 343; 344; 380-383; 
389; 390; 393; 394; 396; 403; 406; 408; 424; 
425; 431; 433; 444; 445 
Air Quality Directive 244; 260; 261 
Ambiguity 12; 22; 52; 64; 83; 87; 89; 128; 
138; 139; 152; 154; 223; 420; 438 
Ammonia Bill (2002) 296 
Amsterdam  Treaty (1997) 107; 109; 111; 
112; 116; 130; 143; 159; 524; 525 
Anthropocentrism 91; 214 
Anyone rule 48 
Aquarein Report 218; 221; 226; 241; 244; 
302; 530; 531 
Article 4 (environmental objectives) 10; 
17; 84; 85; 87; 117; 119; 120; 123; 124; 126; 
131; 132; 138; 139; 148; 150; 152; 153; 174; 
176; 180; 206; 218; 222; 223; 225; 229; 233; 
242; 260; 272; 274; 320; 353; 378; 404; 410; 
412; 420; 427; 429; 438; 439; 446; 510; 511; 
531 
Article 5 (WFD; river basin characteri-
sation ) 118; 119; 132; 146-148; 173; 174; 
176-179; 186; 194; 195; 198-200; 207; 219; 
223; 224; 226; 234; 270-272; 279; 304; 318; 
331-332; 353; 530 
Article 5 Audit Committee 223; 530 
Association of Dutch Municipalities 
(VNG) 219; 224; 253; 530 
Association of Regional Water 
Management Authorities (UvW) 213; 
219; 220; 228; 231; 232; 253; 265; 280; 282; 
354; 529 
Berlin Rules 38; 39; 185 
Best available technology 117; 260; 534 
Bottom-up approach  49; 145; 179; 193; 
208; 211; 220; 265; 266; 269; 271; 275; 278; 
279; 281; 291; 328; 330; 344; 347; 355; 382; 
383; 387; 403; 411; 414; 421; 433; 438; 441; 
514 
Boundary rules 23; 24; 35; 41-43; 66; 133-
137; 144; 157-160; 188-190; 200; 204; 205; 
208; 252-255; 269; 280; 282; 323-325; 331; 
336; 340; 374-377; 392; 400; 403; 408; 409; 
412; 417; 426; 432; 435; 437; 439; 445 
Bounded rationality 10; 54; 68 
Brabant Environment Federation 
(BMF) 297 
 
- C and D - 
 
Capacity building 49; 162; 207; 208; 221; 
283; 333; 334; 376; 392 
Carrying capacity 8; 294; 299 
Case study 100; 103 
Charleville-Mézières Meuse Treaty 
(1994) 172; 173; 175; 182; 186; 203 
Choice rules (also: authority rules) 23; 
24; 43-47; 66; 71; 75; 137-142l 157; 161; 
164; 165; 167; 190; 192; 201; 204; 205; 208; 
244; 255-262; 280; 285; 286; 316; 325; 327; 
338; 340; 343; 344; 347; 376-380; 389; 391; 
393; 394; 396; 400; 402; 403; 405-407; 417; 
423; 426; 433; 435-437; 445 
INDEX OF TERMS AND CONCEPTS 543 
 
 
 
Co-decision procedure 10; 108; 110; 111; 
116; 117; 143; 144; 147; 158-161; 166; 167; 
408; 525 
Collaborative capital 57; 71; 151; 197; 
275; 276; 334; 345;385; 427; 433; 446 
Collaborative partnerships 29-30 
Collective-choice rules 19-53; 89-90 
Combined approach 11; 13; 114; 141; 
153; 155; 216; 217; 278; 287; 293; 407; 520; 
523 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
112; 119-121; 132; 133; 159; 160; 162; 166; 
185; 205; 252; 256; 410; 520 
Common environmental principles 12; 
176 
Common (or: internal) market 109-112; 
161; 411 
Common Implementation Strategy 
(CIS) 118-122; 135; 136; 143; 144; 147; 
160-162; 167; 217; 219; 409; 526 
Common Pool Resource(s) 3; 4; 7-10; 
13; 18; 20; 22; 32; 42; 44; 54; 56; 68; 79; 80; 
90; 132; 156; 416; 417; 425; 431; 443; 449  
Communication strategy (WFD) 254; 
301; 358 
Complexity 5-7; 29; 30; 32; 34; 85; 114; 
128; 132; 214; 280; 383; 417 
Compliance checking 75; 119; 121; 126; 
144; 150; 162; 168; 202; 265; 270; 427; 445; 
466 
Conciliation procedure 10; 116; 217; 
426; 438 
Constitutional-choice rules 20; 89; 418 
Conventional ecologics 6 
Conventional economics 6 
Convention on the Law of the Non-
navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses 37; 38; 185 
Cooperation procedure 109; 111 
Cork Agreement (2003) 297; 302; 391 
Corporatist policy arrangements 247 
Cost-benefit analysis 55; 56 
Credibility 102; 103; 435 
Cross-coalition learning 70  
Cross-sector integration (see also ex-
ternal integration) 12; 13; 75; 128-130; 
166; 171; 187; 204; 207; 213; 243; 244; 250; 
259; 280-281; 345; 388; 401; 407; 408; 412; 
413; 420-423; 438; 440; 441; 529 
Cultures 6; 7; 52; 53; 85; 204; 328; 425; 
444 
Customary rights 54 
Daughter Directive(s) 118; 128; 137 
Diagonal coordination 33 
Diagronic analysis 
December Memorandum (2005) 224-
226; 257; 258; 284; 306; 531 
December Memorandum (2006) 223; 
227-229; 232; 250; 258; 283; 284; 531 
December Memorandum (2007) 230; 
307 
Decentralised unitary state 211; 235; 
253; 285; 286; 291; 292; 328; 335; 337; 342; 
343; 381; 388; 394; 395; 403; 438 
Decentralisation 29; 48; 49; 76; 78; 235 
Declaration of Namur (1999) 173 
Deep core beliefs 66 
Deliberative dialogues 51 
Demand management 12; 23; 44-46; 56; 
138-140; 155; 157; 164; 167-168; 171; 187; 
190; 191; 201; 203; 205; 208; 255; 256; 258; 
280; 285; 286; 325; 326;  338; 343; 344; 
377; 379; 389; 391; 392; 394; 400; 402; 505; 
406; 425; 433; 435; 445 
Democratisation of expertise 51 
Derogation 119; 155; 226; 231; 248; 249; 
354 
Desired Groundwater and Surface 
Water Regimes (GGOR) 257; 302 
Discourse analysis 62 ; 63; 100; 152  
Discourse coalitions 62 ;66; 69; 71; 76 
Discourse institutionalisation 63 
Discourse structuration 63 
Discursive hegemony 63 
Discursive power 64; 66; 74; 75 
Disproportionate costs 121; 149; 153;-
155; 179; 221; 227; 229; 266; 308; 332;350; 
357; 390; 392; 532  
Distribution of resources and power 
(dimension of PAA)19; 75; 87; 88; 197; 
198; 276; 284; 335; 342; 381; 386; 392; 393; 
399; 401; 415 
Droughts 2; 11; 77; 98; 120; 126; 128; 
129; 139; 140; 158; 166; 167; 175; 179; 184; 
186; 190; 191; 198; 203; 206; 207; 214; 217; 
219; 235; 243; 257; 258; 278; 285; 286; 315; 
326; 336; 344; 349; 372; 378; 379; 387; 394; 
402; 405; 436; 510 
Duality of structure 63; 67 
544 INDEX OF TERMS AND CONCEPTS 
 
Dublin principles 10 
Dutch Council of Ministers 214; 222; 
230; 231; 233; 234; 240; 245; 246; 249; 529; 
530 
Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, Nature 
and Food Quality (ANF) 216; 219; 221; 
226; 244; 245; 247; 248; 249; 250; 251; 253; 
264; 265; 279; 282; 292; 296; 307; 308; 314; 
420; 532 
Dutch Ministry of Housing, Spatial 
Planning and Environment (HSE) 215; 
216; 226; 233; 244-246; 250; 253; 259-261; 
264; 265; 279; 282; 292; 296; 308; 316; 324 
Dutch Ministry of Transport, Public 
Works and Water Management (TPW) 
212; 213; 215; 216; 219; 220; 227; 233; 237; 
244; 248; 250; 253; 254; 257; 265; 268; 270; 
271; 277; 279; 282; 287; 292; 301; 316; 
3324; 505; 529; 532 
Dutch Rhine/Meuse Coordination 
Bureau (CRM) 301 
 
- E and F -  
 
Ecocentrism 91 
Economic acceptability 172 
Economic analysis 11; 138; 149; 194; 
198; 307; 312; 523 
Ecological connectivity zones 293; 299; 
316; 363 
Ecological economics 7; 13; 40; 131; 
132; 274 
Economical externalities 35; 37; 39  
Economic efficiency 41; 45; 50; 54; 146; 
149; 165; 196; 199; 205; 258; 273; 285; 325; 
333; 343; 377; 379; 384; 395; 402; 433; 436 
Economic incentives 56; 57; 149; 151; 
162; 165; 197; 205; 275; 276; 285; 333; 334; 
343; 345; 385; 395; 402; 404; 433; 436 
Economic instruments 54; 118; 165; 168 
Economic valuation 55; 56; 133; 166; 
167; 171; 332 
Environmental externalities 41; 56; 133; 
155; 157; 160; 163; 165; 167; 171; 183; 188; 
249; 252; 285; 322; 323; 343; 374; 394; 402; 
436 
Evironmental Management Act (1993) 
249; 259 
Environmental objectives (see also 
Article 4) 11; 14; 15; 17; 59; 84; 85; 96; 
103; 104; 108; 110; 114; 117; 119-121; 123; 
126; 127; 129; 131-133; 138; 139; 144; 152; 
157; 166; 174; 176; 180; 182; 184; 217-221; 
224; 226; 232-234; 239; 241-244; 249; 251; 
259-261; 286; 287; 301; 305; 317; 353; 356; 
357; 367; 393; 407; 408; 410; 422; 425; 429; 
437; 440; 441; 443; 511; 526; 529-531 
Environmental Policy Integration 
(EPI) 131; 157; 159; 163; 166; 282; 407; 
408 
Equitable and reasonable utilisation 
37-39; 185 
EURELECTRIC 156; 527 
European Commission (EC) 11-13; 39; 
107; 111-123; 126-128; 130; 132; 135-137; 
140; 143-148; 150; 152; 153; 155; 156; 158-
163; 167; 168; 176; 178; 190; 196; 197; 199; 
202; 207; 215; 217; 220; 221; 223; 224; 226; 
228; 230; 231; 242; 248; 249; 270; 273; 274; 
303; 306; 318; 330; 354; 355; 382; 404-406; 
413; 445; 520; 525; 526; 530 
European Council of Ministers 10; 107; 
109-111; 114-116; 138; 140; 144; 156; 158-
160; 167; 217; 517; 520-525 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) 109; 
111; 114; 150; 161; 196; 221; 274  
European Environmental Bureau 
(EEB) 121; 136; 148-150; 155-157; 159-
161; 163; 528 
European Parliament (EP) 10; 107; 109-
11; 113; 115-117; 120; 128; 132; 137; 138; 
140; 143; 144; 156-161; 166; 167; 216; 217; 
223; 404; 408; 520-525 
European Spatial Development Per-
spective (ESDP) 129; 130 
European Water Conference 120; 148; 
162; 163 
Eutrophication 113; 119; 176; 249; 256; 
526 
EU Water Directors 99; 115; 116; 118; 
119; 121; 122; 126-129; 131; 135; 136; 143-
147; 152; 153; 155-158; 160; 162; 166; 215; 
217; 220; 237; 287; 401; 406; 420; 438; 517; 
520-525 
Ex Ante Evaluation (2008) 229-231; 233; 
271; 283; 284; 314; 532 
Exemption options 14; 17; 84; 86; 87; 
103; 104; 108; 114; 117; 122;  152; 155; 
163; 182; 218; 221; 223; 233; 235; 261; 265; 
INDEX OF TERMS AND CONCEPTS 545 
 
 
 
271; 317; 354; 367; 410; 419; 420; 424; 429; 
438; 443 
Expropriation 247; 250; 258; 322; 338; 
340; 344; 373; 374; 390 
External integration (see also cross-
sector integration) 23; 24; 27; 33-35; 46; 
123; 129; 130; 163; 182; 184; 185; 205;235; 
243; 246; 281; 282; 285; 286; 317; 321; 343; 
367; 370; 372; 394; 400; 402; 422; 425; 432; 
436; 437; 441; 443 
Feasibility and affordability mantra 
211; 212; 218; 224; 226; 228; 277; 288; 291; 
318; 332; 337; 345; 359; 361; 385; 388; 389; 
530 
First Programme of Action on the En-
vironment 110 
Financial crisis 50; 108; 109; 113; 121; 
163; 347; 392 
Fish migration 96; 178; 181; 201; 363; 
364; 379 
Flexibility 40; 55; 143; 152; 260 
Floods 1; 5; 11; 57; 95; 98; 120; 126; 128; 
139; 166; 175; 179-181; 186; 191; 198; 203; 
206; 207; 214; 217; 219; 220; 235; 241; 243; 
245; 257; 278; 319; 368; 407; 510 
Formal consultation 195; 218; 232-234; 
254; 255; 265; 267; 272; 275; 278; 279; 281; 
282; 284; 299; 310; 314-317; 328; 331; 336; 
342; 352; 361; 362; 383; 384; 387; 389; 409; 
511; 532 
Formal rules (rules-in-law) 17; 68; 429; 
448 
Framing 51; 69; 425; 443 
Frankfurt Water Policy Seminar (1988) 
114; 406; 520 
Freedom of navigation principle 37 
Free-riding behaviour 6; 7; 54 
Functional redundancy 33; 34; 54; 143; 
237; 239; 247; 265; 282; 395; 396 
Functional water management struc-
tures 28; 31; 34; 77; 92; 123-125; 143; 164; 
175; 182; 183; 205; 213; 235; 236; 239; 281; 
285; 317; 319; 328; 342; 343; 355; 367; 368; 
371; 381; 394; 401; 402; 404; 425; 432; 436; 
444 
Funnel model (trechtermodel) 224-226; 
232; 283; 340; 530 
 
 
 
- G and H -  
 
General purpose jurisdiction 92 
Ghent Meuse Treaty (2002) 175; 185; 
187; 201; 203 
Global water crisis 1-3 
Good Agricultural and Environmental 
Codes 162-163; 249 
Good Ecological Potential (GEP) 120; 
150; 154 
Goods and services of ecosystems 27; 
40; 55; 56; 131; 212 
Governance principle 12; 13; 27; 58; 65; 
86; 87; 99; 103; 125; 143; 153; 193; 198; 
199; 235; 276-278; 317; 335; 336; 362; 367; 
386-388; 429 
Green Main Structure (Groene 
hoofdstructuur) 300 
Green water 4 
Groundwater Act (1981) 240; 259 
Groundwater Directive (2006) 129; 241; 
260 
Harmonisation (efforts) 112; 127; 147; 
173; 182; 188; 199; 200; 208; 216; 229;-
231; 266; 272; 287; 307; 313;315; 318; 328; 
332; 337; 339; 345; 359; 364; 365 
Heavily modified water body 118; 120; 
150; 156; 217; 223; 224; 229; 236; 260; 287; 
314; 316; 317; 356; 359; 362; 388; 393; 526; 
530 
Helsinki Convention 3; 12; 98; 122; 125; 
159; 172; 186; 187; 404; 520 
Helsinki Rules (on the Uses of the 
Waters of International Rivers) 37-39; 
185 
Hierarchical governance 31; 41; 48; 78; 
177; 286 
Historical institutionalism 68 
Homogeneous monitoring network 
172; 173; 176; 180; 181; 195; 271 
Hydraulic engineering 3; 45; 214 
Hydro-morphological alterations 96; 
98; 178; 183; 229; 278; 306; 336; 365; 387 
Hydropower 85; 86; 120; 146; 147; 156; 
161; 527 
Hydro-solidarity 40 
 
546 INDEX OF TERMS AND CONCEPTS 
 
- I and J - 
 
Ideal-type 24-26 
Informal consultation 234; 254; 255; 
266; 278; 281; 291; 307; 331; 336; 374; 387; 
409 
Informal rules (see also rules-in-use) 
58; 68; 224; 393 
Information rules 49-53; 66; 145; 146; 
148; 149; 154; 158; 161; 167; 194-196; 200; 
206; 269; 273; 274; 277; 279; 280; 283; 331; 
333; 339; 341; 342 
Infringement case 122; 150; 159 
Innovation 58; 61; 117; 155; 228; 231; 
252; 277; 278; 336; 352; 362; 390; 414; 417; 
531 
Institutional Analysis and Develop-
ment framework (IAD) 14; 17; 19-23; 61; 
65-68; 71; 72; 74; 80; 81; 86; 89; 92; 104; 
169; 280; 345; 399; 415-417; 431; 459; 533 
Institution(s) 9; 19; 68; 89 
Integrated areal approach 295; 297; 309; 
315; 354; 370; 371 
Integrated demand- and supply-
management 137; 190; 255; 325; 376; 378 
Integrated environmental objectives 
129 
Integrated Pollution Prevention and 
Control Directive 113; 141 
Integrated River Basin Management 
(IRBM) 3; 5; 6; 9; 10; 14; 17; 23-35; 47; 
40; 41; 43-57; 61; 71; 72; 75; 76; 79; 83-85; 
87; 90; 91; 99; 118; 120; 122; 125; 129-131; 
133; 137; 140; 142; 145; 149; 151; 163-165; 
168; 171; 172; 183-185; 188; 190-194; 196; 
197; 201; 204-208; 211; 212; 214; 234; 235; 
239; 242; 246; 251; 252; 255; 257; 262; 269; 
273; 276; 277; 279; 285; 292; 293; 319-322; 
324; 326; 327;  330-334; 342-345; 368; 370; 
372; 374; 376; 379; 380; 383-386; 394-396; 
399; 402-404; 409; 412; 421-423; 425; 429; 
432; 433; 436; 437; 440; 441; 443; 444; 533 
Integrated rural development 247 
Integrated sub-basin analysis (inte-
grale gebiedsanalyse) 371 
Integrated supply- and demand man-
agement 12; 46; 139; 140; 168; 187; 191; 
258; 280; 326; 344; 379; 402; 405; 406; 433; 
436 
Integrated Water Resources Manage-
ment (IWRM) 3; 6; 533 
Interaction rules 19; 71 
Interactive planning 124; 134; 135; 168; 
213; 389 
Intercalibration 118; 120; 144; 526 
Intergovernmental institutions 29 
Internal integration 227; 33-35; 120; 123; 
126; 128-130; 140; 159; 163; 164; 166; 168; 
182; 184; 198; 199; 204; 205; 207; 235; 
241-243; 259; 277; 285; 286; 317; 320; 342; 
343; 347; 351; 367; 369; 370; 393; 394; 
400-402; 405; 407; 413; 419-421; 423; 425; 
432; 435-438; 440; 443 
Internal (European) market (see also 
common market) 109; 111; 112; 161; 411 
Interpretation freedom trap 148; 152; 
155 
Interpretative (participative) analysis 
14; 101; 102; 400; 434 
Inter-Provincial Platform (IPO) 219; 
228; 253; 282 
Irreversible hydro-morphological (or 
ecosystem) changes 55; 98; 156; 180; 
229; 257; 266; 278; 286; 325; 336; 365; 378; 
379; 387; 404 
Joint decision trap 48 
Joint fact finding 53; 146; 147; 149; 151; 
168; 196; 270; 273; 277; 278; 325; 331; 333; 
334; 336; 345; 384; 387; 389; 391; 396; 427; 
433; 445; 451; 466; 511 
 
- L, M and N - 
 
Lake Volkerak-Zoom 351; 363 
Land Protection Act (1986) 240; 243; 
248; 249 
Leapfrog principle (haasje over) 244; 
246; 285; 295; 321; 343; 344; 371; 407; 408 
Legitimised information 53; 149; 165; 
167; 196; 205; 273; 285; 333; 343; 384; 395; 
402; 433; 436 
Level playing field 77; 153; 172; 175; 
176; 201; 222; 223; 225; 248; 274; 277-279; 
287; 336; 387; 390; 401; 511; 531 
Limburg Agriculture and Horticulture 
Organisation (LLTO) 334; 339 
Limburg Environment Federation 
(LMF) 334; 339 
Limited sovereignty 29; 39; 46 
INDEX OF TERMS AND CONCEPTS 547 
 
 
 
Lisbon Treaty (2007) 109; 113 
Logics of appropropriateness 9; 68; 69 
Maastricht Treaty (1992) 109; 111;128; 
130; 520 
Main Ecological Structure (Ecolo-
gische Hoofdstructuur) 293; 316 
Manure Substances Act (1986) 248; 249; 
326; 380 
Market-led governance 41 
Mark River Basin 93; 96; 98; 349; 350; 
352; 363-366; 378; 390; 391; 509; 517; 534 
Merkske River Basin 97; 316; 362; 364 
Meta-constitutional-choice rules 22; 52; 
65; 66; 89; 90 
Meuse Memorandum (2005) 305 
Meuse Memorandum (2006) 307 
Meuse River Actions Programme 173 
Mirror session 12; 101; 103; 400; 412; 
417; 423; 435; 442; 512; 517-519 
Mixed-mode model 50 
Multilateral acquis 201; 206; 207 
Multi-level governance 14; 19; 60; 70;76-
79; 84; 91; 92; 399; 409; 410; 418 
Multiple-functionality 175; 185; 198; 
199; 204 
Multiple Streams Framework 70 
Multi-purpose institution 31; 125; 183; 
239; 319; 368; 432 
Multi-purpose resource 42; 44 
Multi-stakeholder dialogue 88; 410; 420; 
423-425; 430; 439; 442; 443; 448; 458; 462; 
463; 465 
Multi-stakeholder partnership 291; 396; 
412; 427; 446; 466; 514  
Multi-stakeholder platform (MSP)29; 
99; 101; 103; 264; 323; 374; 381; 383; 517; 
533 
Multi-stakeholder process 51; 52; 76; 85; 
87; 88-90; 93; 100; 107; 322; 410; 412; 422-
424; 426; 442; 444; 462; 464; 514  
Municipal zoning plan (bestem-
mingsplan) 245; 311 
National river basin coordinators 264; 
270; 271; 291 
National Space Memorandum (Nota 
Ruimte; 2006) 
National Water Policy Memorandum 
212-214; 240; 245; 248; 256; 352; 368 
Navigation 37; 38; 95; 96; 120; 131; 136; 
183-185; 270; 293; 309; 349; 375; 378; 527 
Negotiated agreement 323; 328; 331; 
332 
Negotiated knowledge 51; 168 
New public management 213; 277; 285; 
286; 342-345; 394; 404; 529 
Nitrates Directive (1991) 113; 127; 226; 
231; 243; 244; 246; 248; 249; 252; 296; 298; 
314; 322; 372; 410; 420 
Non-compliance procedure 221; 303 
Non-participative observations 101; 
102; 423; 442 
No-shift principle 13; 124; 153; 154; 224; 
225; 229; 248; 268; 320; 339; 360; 369; 419; 
511; 514; 531 
No (significant) harm rule 37-39; 185 
 
- O and P - 
 
Observer 52; 102; 135; 147; 161; 172; 176; 
179; 180; 188; 189; 192; 195; 199; 202; 203 
One-dimensional view of power 72; 73 
One out, all out principle 224 
Open-access resources 36 
Operational-choice rules 22; 89 
Opportunity costs 56 
Overriding public interest 154; 199 
Paradigm 3; 5; 10; 12-14; 17; 50; 52; 58; 
60; 65; 79; 84; 87; 100; 122; 131; 153; 163-
166; 168; 172; 182; 198; 199; 201; 205-207; 
211; 240; 276; 285; 335; 337; 343; 386; 
394;399; 404; 422; 429; 441; 447; 448; 461 
Parallel analysis 99 
Participation principle 133; 134; 408 
Participative (interpretative) analysis 
14; 101; 102; 400; 434 
Participative observation 100-103; 400 
Path dependency 9; 20; 68 
Pay-off rules 53-57 
Peat (layers) exploitation 236; 348 
People, Planet and Profit (PPP) 131; 
198; 304; 320; 336 
Pilot WFD exploration project 219 
Pilot river basin project  118; 135; 145; 
162; 167 
Plenary Meeting (IMC) 174; 175; 177; 
180; 181; 188; 189; 192; 193; 195; 201 
Polycentric governance 27; 30; 31; 78; 
92 
548 INDEX OF TERMS AND CONCEPTS 
 
Policy arrangement 18; 19; 20; 22; 58; 
59; 63; 65; 66; 69-71; 74; 80; 87; 88; 99; 
104 
Policy Arrangement Approach (PAA) 
57-76 
Policy arrangement tetrahedron 17; 18; 
22; 59; 65; 70; 71; 74; 80; 88; 430; 448; 449 
Policy core beliefs 63; 66 
Policy discourse 3; 10; 17; 19; 57; 58; 61; 
62-67; 69; 72; 74-80; 84; 86-88; 104; 152-
156; 164; 165; 198-200; 205; 276-279; 285; 
335-337; 343; 386-390; 394; 305 
Policy entrepreneur 70; 72; 412; 422; 
441; 442; 461 
Policy life cycle 69; 396 
Policy network (analysis) 50; 52; 69; 74; 
77; 158 
Policy patchwork 161; 163 
Policy principle 12; 13; 14; 15; 17; 22; 34; 
35; 39; 65-67; 71; 84; 100; 108; 122; 131; 
132; 152; 153; 182; 185; 198; 199; 246; 277; 
278; 286; 322; 335; 336; 337; 372; 386; 387; 
399; 421; 429; 440 
Political modernisation 20; 58; 59; 65; 
70 
Polluter pays principle 10; 165; 172; 186; 
197; 205; 207; 259; 274; 277; 285; 286; 333; 
343; 384; 395 
Position paper 115; 146; 147; 162; 195; 
244; 272; 280; 281; 337; 339; 390; 404; 406; 
419; 514; 218-521 
Position rules 23; 24; 35-41; 71; 75; 131; 
133; 157; 160; 164; 166; 185-188; 201; 205; 
246-252; 278; 336; 338; 340; 246-252; 372-
374; 387; 388; 390; 392;402; 410; 421; 423; 
425; 427; 432; 440; 443; 446; 450 
Pragmatic approach 120; 155;225; 305; 
410; 411; 412; 532 
Precautionary principle 12; 15; 514 
Preventive action principle 12; 155 
Priority hazardous substances 11; 13; 
141; 155; 199 
Priority substances 11; 118; 137; 225; 
308 
Private property 36 
Privatisation 2; 42; 43; 48; 76; 287 
Programme of measures  141; 148; 232; 
251; 300; 360; 374; 390; 424 
Property rights 1; 35; 36; 39; 40; 41; 55; 
68; 71; 75; 133; 157; 160; 164; 166; 187; 
188; 205; 222; 251; 252; 285; 322; 340; 343; 
344; 374; 388; 394; 402; 410; 411; 436 
Proportionality 134; 155; 228; 231; 314; 
338 
Provincial Environmental Policy Plan 
294; 295; 321; 402; 436 
Provincial Spatial Development Plan 
289 
Provincial Spatial Integration Plan 
(ruimtelijk inpassingsplan) 311 
Provincial Structure Vision on Spatial 
Development (structuurvisie) 310 
Provincial Water (Policy) Plan 316; 362; 
507 
Provincial Water Regulation 294; 302; 
326; 380 
Public choice theory 21 
Public information and consultation 
11; 134; 142; 408 
Public-private partnerships 3; 28; 42; 43; 
426; 445 
 
- Q and R -  
 
Qualified majority voting 109; 161; 166; 
405; 520 
Qualitative analysis 101 
Quantitative research 100; 103 
Quartermasters Meeting (Kwartier-
makersoverleg) 301 
Rational-choice institutionalism 67; 68 
Reconstruction Bill (2002) 296 
Reconstruction committee (reconstruc-
tiecommissie) 297; 504 
Reconstruction (of rural areas) 296-298; 
303; 321; 323; 338 
Reconstruction Umbrella Plan (2001) 
296; 298 
Recources and power 72-75 
Recovery costs for water services 
(WFD’s Article 9) 10; 11; 13; 54; 77; 116; 
118; 138; 149; 157; 163; 166; 194; 207; 217; 
220; 274; 407; 523 
Redundancy 33; 34; 46; 54; 61; 142; 142; 
192; 237;; 239; 246; 262; 265; 277; 282; 
327; 335; 381; 386; 395; 396; 417; 422; 442 
Reference conditions 118; 120; 220; 526 
Reframing 51; 52 
Regional development and cohesion 112;  
120; 408 
INDEX OF TERMS AND CONCEPTS 549 
 
 
 
Regional economic analysis 307; 312 
Regionalisation 77 
Regional Meuse Administrative Plat-
form (RAOM) 301; 518 
Regional Meuse Political Platform 
(RBOM) 301; 305-309; 311; 314; 318; 
328-330; 335; 342; 518 
Regional Meuse WFD Consultation 
Platform 305; 316; 323; 324; 329-331; 337; 
340; 505; 508; 518 
Regional political river basin platform 
(Regiobnaal Bestuurlijk Overleg) 264; 
265; 282; 510 
Regional Spatial Plan (Streekplan) 294; 
295 
Regulatory power 19; 74; 75 
Relational power 71; 74 
Reliability (of information & knowl-
edge) 50; 53; 100; 102; 146; 149; 165; 194; 
196; 205; 273; 285; 333; 343; 361; 384; 395; 
402; 433; 436 
Reporting obligations (Article 15) 11; 
168; 263; 265; 274; 313; 337; 427; 445 
Reporting units 176; 306; 314 
Revitalisation (of rural areas) 295-299; 
301-303; 325; 328; 331; 339; 340; 354; 358; 
370-372; 375; 376; 388; 391; 395 
Rio Declaration 28; 134 
River basin as management unit 12; 13; 
24; 26-28; 84; 90; 123; 124; 153; 124; 153; 
182; 213; 235; 317; 367 
River basin characterisation report (→ 
Article 5) 118; 218; 224; 270; 286; 353 
River basin management plan (WFD’s 
Article 13) 11; 24; 48; 49; 71; 98; 99; 121; 
123; 124; 127; 134; 142-151; 155; 156; 158; 
164; 173; 174; 179-181; 189-191; 193-196; 
202; 203; 205; 207; 211; 218-222; 230; 232-
235; 241; 243; 244; 251; 252; 254; 255; 263; 
267-269; 271-273; 275; 278; 280; 283; 284; 
286; 291; 302; ; 303; 307; 308; 313; 314; 
316; 318; 319; 330-332; 336; 341; 344;361; 
366; 318; 319; 330-332; 336; 341; 344; 361; 
366; 374; 382; 383; 410; 411; 424; 427; 443; 
445; 507; 511; 531; 533 
Roof Article 5 report (IMC) 174; 195; 
207 
Roof monitoring report (IMC) 179 
Roof river basin management plan 
(IMC) 173; 174; 179; 189; 190; 194; 207 
Room for water approach 245 
Rules-in-law ( → formal rules) 17; 429; 
440 
Rules-in-use (→ informal rules) 234; 
254; 255; 266; 278; 281; 291; 307; 331; 336; 
374; 387; 409 
Rules of interaction 71 
Rural Development Programme 121; 
144 
Rural Development Regulation 162; 
163 
 
- S and T - 
 
SCALDIT project 204 
Scheldt River Basin District 12; 93; 95; 
96; 100; 202; 550 
Scientific-technical rationale 53; 155 
Scope rules 23; 24; 26-35; 46; 56; 66; 71; 
73; 75-77; 123-131; 156-159; 164; 165; 172; 
182-185; 193; 198-200; 202; 204-207; 235-
246; 277-281; 285; 286; 295; 317-322; 336; 
338; 340; 342; 343; 347; 367-372; 386-391; 
393-395; 400-402; 404; 407; 417; 423; 425; 
432; 435-437; 443-444 
Secondary beliefs 66 
Self-determination 135; 147; 167; 409 
Self-organisation 28; 40; 77; 151; 334 
Shared decision-making (→ co-
decision) 135; 167; 409 
Shared vision-building 29 
Significantly better environmental 
option 153; 154 
Significant water management issues 
134; 143; 146; 179; 234; 331 
Silo effect 33 
Single European Act (SEA) 109; 111; 
154; 155; 159; 161; 406; 408 
Social Acceptable Costs Analysis 
(Maatschappelijke Aanvaardbare 
Kosten Analyse) 305 
Social-constructivism 59 
Social equity 41; 45; 132; 258; 325; 344; 
377; 379 
Social-ecological systems 40;90; 417; 
514 
Social externalities 10; 35; 37; 39; 41; 56; 
133; 164; 185; 187; 188; 205; 249; 252; 385; 
322; 343; 374; 394; 402; 403; 436 
550 INDEX OF TERMS AND CONCEPTS 
 
Social learning 34; 51; 52; 64; 135; 147; 
151; 168; 277; 357 
Socially robust knowledge 51 
Sociological institutionalism 68 
Sovereignty principle 29; 75; 135; 147; 
187; 408 
Space for space principle 295 
Spatial Planning Act (2006) 245; 247; 
310; 371 
Speciality principle 5; 205; 246; 285; 343; 
408; 425; 443 
Stand still principle 13; 1899; 226; 300; 
306; 308; 354 
Start Agreement on Water Policy in the 
21st Century  219 
State property 36 
Strategic Coordination Group (SCG) 
99; 135; 136; 401; 527; 528 
Strategic societal costs-benefits analy-
sis 22; 227; 230; 305; 307; 532 
Structural determinism 59 
Structure (versus → agency) 9; 59; 62; 
63; 67-69; 71; 76; 89; 266; 418 
Structure follows strategy 68; 266 
Subsidiarity 5; 10; 11; 22; 36; 39; 71; 75; 
85; 114; 115; 123; 125; 128; 130; 1321; 134; 
135; 141; 144; 147; 153; 162; 164; 165; 171; 
193; 198; 199; 204-206; 208; 216; 291; 343; 
345; 394; 401; 403; 405; 408; 409; 412; 418; 
420; 421; 435; 437’; 440; 441; 514 
Supply management 45; 46’; 137; 139; 
140; 164; 191; 205; 255; 256; 258; 326; 377; 
379; 402; 433; 436 
Supranational authority 29; 30; 53; 139; 
164; 165; 182; 186; 196; 205; 401 
Surface Water Pollution Act (1970) 212; 
240; 248; 249; 326; 351; 380  
Sustainable water use 10; 11; 138; 139; 
178; 369 
Sustainable development 3; 5; 6; 9; 10; 
17; 28; 35; 36; 39; 41; 61; 71; 75; 76; 79; 80; 
84-86; 90; 91; 112; 133; 154; 159; 160; 166; 
172; 185; 245; 257; 293; 294; 310; 343; 399; 
409; 410; 417; 423; 429; 440 
Sustainable growth 109; 315; 520 
Sustainable human activities 79; 510 
Synchronisation of water management 
plans 213; 266-268; 277; 278; 295; 302; 
303; 336; 387 
Synergy 96; 103; 228; 231; 277; 278; 284; 
336; 340; 352; 359; 361; 362; 372; 389; 392; 
414; 435; 531 
Task-specific jurisdictions 78; 79; 92 
Technical feasibility 154; 306; 341 
Terrestrial ecosystems 4; 11; 123; 126; 
138; 260; 286; 342; 378; 425; 443 
Third Programme of Action on the 
Environment 110 
Thorbecke’s House 235; 263; 279; 301; 
337; 396 
Three-dimensional view of power 72-72 
Top-down approach 5; 49; 124; 145; 165; 
167; 179; 192; 193; 207; 211; 263; 265; 266; 
268; 269; 271; 272; 275; 278; 279; 281; 285; 
286; 291; 328; 330; 343; 344; 382; 383; 387; 
394; 403; 414; 421; 433; 437; 438; 510; 514 
Transaction costs 30; 32; 34; 36; 42; 43 
Transboundary coordination 13; 29; 39; 
53; 186; 187; 198; 199; 201; 202; 207; 215; 
268; 294; 299; 303; 304; 354; 358; 362-366; 
381; 390; 391; 393; 401; 403; 405; 406; 413; 
414; 418; 419; 421; 422; 426; 439-441;445; 
515; 520; 529; 531 
Transboundary Mark Basin Commit-
tee (TMBC) 363-365; 390 
Transboundary principle 29 
Transitional water 11; 126; 128 
Treaty of Rome (1957)  108; 109; 160 
Triangulation 14; 84; 100; 102; 103; 423; 
434; 435; 442 
Trust building 171; 196; 202 
Trustworthiness 102 
Two-dimensional view of power 72; 73 
 
- U, V and W - 
 
Unanimity rule 48; 183; 192 
Upstream-downstream asymmetries 2; 
27; 44; 45; 54; 85; 205; 206; 413; 418; 421; 
425; 435; 440; 444 
Urban Areas (Stedelijk Gebied) 300 
Urban Waste Water Treatment Direc-
tive 113; 120 
User rights 23; 24; 35; 36; 39; 40; 131; 
133; 185; 187; 201; 226; 247; 249; 250; 256; 
278; 280; 286; 287; 322; 323; 336; 344; 387; 
410 
Utilisation value 55 
INDEX OF TERMS AND CONCEPTS 551 
 
 
 
Validity 26; 50; 53; 102; 103; 146; 149; 
165; 196; 199; 205; 273; 285; 311; 333; 343; 
384; 395; 402; 433; 436 
Venue (shopping) 70 
Vertical integration 33; 310; 319 
Veto right (player) 112; 161 
Voluntary agreement 134; 247; 249; 251; 
278; 285; 336; 344; 347; 361; 373; 387; 388; 
393; 394; 410 
Waste water treatment infrastructure 
114; 226; 248; 307; 314; 351; 363; 520; 550 
Water Ambassadors Agreement 224 
Water Act (2009) 222; 234; 239; 240; 242-
245; 257; 260; 286; 303; 326; 380; 405; 530 
Water as a common pool resource 3; 4; 
10; 13; 84; 131; 132 
Water as an economic good 3; 10; 13; 
54; 85; 131; 132 
Water as a social right 156 
Water assessment procedure (water-
toets) 245; 258; 277; 371; 407 
Water body 8; 126-128; 150; 144; 179; 
217; 220; 225; 233; 260; 262; 270; 271; 287; 
312; 318; 359; 360-362; 365; 530 
Water body typology 220; 365 
Water Framework Directive (WFD) 10-
13; 114-169  
Water governance 12; 42; 153; 213 
Water Management Act (1989) 240-243; 
259; 263; 293 
Water Management in the 21st Century  
(WM21) 219; 237; 251; 299; 354; 510  
Water quality standards 113; 115; 153; 
215; 216; 248; 259; 261; 267; 267; 286; 293; 
364; 379; 531 
Water Quality Standards and Monitor-
ing Decision (BKMW) 261; 267; 286 
Water services 10; 11; 13; 42; 54; 77; 116; 
118; 121; 138; 149; 150; 157; 159; 163; 166; 
194; 207; 217; 220; 274; 407; 523 
Water systems approach 32; 212; 240; 
277; 292; 342; 347; 353; 368-370; 373; 386; 
388; 404 
Weaving faults (in the WFD text) 160 
Wetlands 4; 11; 119; 126; 127; 138; 146; 
147; 256; 526 
Wet nature pearls (natte natuurparels) 
298; 300; 363 
WFD Ambition Memorandum 530 
WFD ambition scenario 227; 307; 308; 
357 
WFD checklist of municipal measures 
359 
WFD coordinator 272; 305; 311; 313; 
315; 332; 337; 357; 358; 360; 361; 365; 371; 
383; 390; 507; 508 
WFD double pillar structure 264; 265 
WFD facts sheet  360; 361 
WFD Implementation Act (2005) 221; 
222; 254; 265; 274; 302 
WFD Implementation Handbook 219; 
324; 529 
WFD Implementation Memorandum 
(2004) 222; 224; 254; 275; 531 
WFD Implementation Project Team 
218; 219; 263; 270; 272; 367; 529 
WFD Meuse Project Bureau 312; 314; 
323; 328; 332; 340; 357; 359; 361; 366; 505; 
508; 509; 513; 515 
WFD Meuse project director 305; 358 
WFD monitoring programme 177; 181; 
359; 361; 531 
WFD municipal water ambassador 224; 
313; 340; 359; 374; 382; 390; 392; 426; 444; 
508; 509; 515 
WFD pilot project 224; 301; 305; 356; 
381; 388; 389; 392; 414; 530 
WFD programme leader 12; 101; 222; 
234 
WFD synergy projects  340; 352; 361; 
392 
Willingness-to-pay 55; 227 
Windows of opportunity 70; 422; 442; 
461 
World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) 
32; 121; 136; 146; 148-150; 155-159; 161; 
163; 175; 189; 528 
Written argumentation survey 12; 100; 
101; 103; 254; 272; 400; 407; 412; 518; 519 
 
- Z - 
 
Zenne River 1 
 
  
 
 
 
Impression of the “Ashgate Session” at Wageningen (August 17, 2006) for conducting 
a book on multi-stakeholder platforms for integrated water management From left to 
right: Annemiek Verhallen, Leo Santbergen and Jeroen Warner 
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